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The focus of this research is safety critical systems management set within the context 
of a series of Lean ‘brown field* manufacturing case studies. The thesis is founded 
upon a human factors perspective of quality/safety management and the perceptions 
of over 800 workers drawn from 4 corporately owned aero repair & overhaul UK 
sites.
Traditionally, human factors and aviation research has focused upon aircraft 
operations, where pilots and to a lesser extent air traffic controllers, have increased 
their ability to make safety critical decisions based on improved levels of team 
situational awareness.
However by contrast, no available literature exists to demonstrate the same potential 
from a front line operations perspective of aircraft maintenance engine overhaul, 
especially, within the context of Lean operations1. This absence of a rigorous study 
from an aviation repair process therefore presents a major gap in the main body of 
knowledge, especially in contemporary times when efficiency (‘leanness’) and 
effectiveness (quality & safety) are both targets of operations management 
improvement.
The research hypothesis is “problem driven” and theory building using a cross-case 
comparative method involving both qualitative and quantitative data collection. The 
data was analysed using a non-parametric design and seeks to extract differences in 
quality attitudes. The results of the study show the most significant barrier to quality 
and safety effectiveness, originates from management planning and workplace 
control.
This is a condition that was found to be perpetuated by a lack of understanding for 
how to transition from traditional craft based engineering, towards a more lean 
approach within the context of Total Quality Management (TQM) literatures.
The study shows “comer cutting” is a precondition of system failure, when a gap in 
understanding exists between the organisational leadership and its front line 
engineering resource namely; self-managed teams.
The results also demonstrate that people do not intentionally make mistakes, but 
generally do, because of operations system pace/instability of material flow. The 
researcher therefore concluded with a challenge to design new ways of neutralising 
latent error conditions before the safety critical events breach the quality systems 
defence mechanisms at each case study concerned.
In parallel, the researcher offers a new model of operational management that 
reconciles the principles of TQM, self-management and leaner methods of working, 
for improved and safer business performance.
1 Based on extensive literature reviews and expert interviews (2004 To 2010)
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.0 Chapter Introduction
Few industrial sectors, beyond nuclear and pharmaceutical production, face safety 
regulations to the extent of those that control aerospace manufacturing and repair. 
Since July 2004 the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), under regulation part- 
145, has worked extensively with psychologists and quality managers alike to develop 
what is more commonly referred to as human factors engineering as a means to 
prevent system failures and potential human fatalities. Practically, this approach often 
contradicts the commercial pressures faced by businesses to improve quality/safety 
against the need to reduce lead times, offer quicker turnarounds and operate leaner 
ways of working. Furthermore, within some industries there is a belief that poor 
quality and safety lapses are ‘person based’ and to control these potential failures it is 
necessary to engage traditional forms of direct supervision. This school of thinking 
represents what is referred to as the ‘classical approach ‘that traditionally relies upon 
increased levels of management control (Reason, 2003). This approach is therefore 
perceived by the researcher as being contradictory to the general trend of Total 
Quality Management (TQM), where Lean/Sigma businesses such as the one found in 
this study are promoting a more autonomous and team based approach (Womack and 
Jones, 1996). The model shown below in figure 1 represents this position and presents 
three different perspectives of literature themes, which will be used to frame the main 
research question within the wider context of ‘self-managed teams’ level of control. 
Also referred to as critical to quality characteristics (CTQC) the model draws 
attention to the importance of ‘systems thinking’ as a philosophy to improve business 
performance and mitigate the risk of non-quality under the autonomy of team control.
Figure 1 Critical To Quality Characteristics Model
Source: Researcher
Technical
System s
M an ag em en t
J System s
Social
System s
Within
Understanding Human Error 
 The Context of Self- 
Managed Teams
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1.1 Introduction To Human Factors
At the time of writing this thesis, parallel research carried out by Maurino (2006) 
identified a gap in the main body of knowledge concerning flight operations and 
demonstrated that the over-attention to individualistic forms of human error research 
was an incorrect focus. He argued that a better contribution to the body of operations 
management knowledge would be gained by an alternative focus, claiming that; 
“There is little to be gained by further pursuing individual-oriented avenues o f action. 
In the best o f scenarios, the profit will not be commensurate with the investment o f  
resources”. Scholtes (1998) an American human factors specialist reinforces this 
view arguing that safety systems research provides a more fruitful avenue of study 
based on the claim that 95% of all human error problems could be attributed to 
‘management system’ failures, with less than 5% blamed on people committing 
errors.
In spite of this widespread agreement, a divide still exists within the main body of 
human factors literature as to which methods are best suited to resolving specific 
types of quality / safety related problems. In this respect the researcher proposes that 
human factors research cannot be described as a unified disipline and like 
engineering, medicine and most other professions, there are many different and 
individual ‘schools of thought’. For example some studies of pilot behaviour have 
specialised in ‘cognitive’ approaches while others measure psychometric aspects of 
trait behaviour as a means of assessing the suitability of individuals to interact with 
safety critical systems. As such, there are different views of how best to assess 
individual actions and management system behaviour. Such a gap in the body of 
safety critical knowledge offers an opportunity for this study that few research 
initiatives have sought. The purpose of this research is to combine approaches, 
including TQM & Lean methods of working, from a socio-technical systems design 
perspective (the individual and the system). In other words the study will provide a 
level of understanding as to which barriers enable a system to fail or prevent the 
successful deployment improvement activities in businesses that have few supervisors 
and instead rely upon self-managed teams. The purpose of the research is therefore to 
know what is ‘going on’ inside an operations management design in terms of what 
system factors require action to improve business and quality of performance.
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The approach is compatible with the work of Adam (1993) who argues that the 
primary objective of meaningful human factors research is an approach to “knowing 
what is going on so you can figure out what to do”. Whilst researchers and 
practitioners approach safe working systems from a variety of backgrounds, they all 
share this common belief system, based on what the researcher describes as a comon 
goal to improve human performance through the concept of “shared situational 
awareness”.
It is now widely accepted amongst authors in the field of safety critical and 
organisational management that low levels of team situational awareness is a 
condition which can be described as a failure to understand the importance of 
‘awareness’ over a ‘situation’. In other words those individuals who function as part 
of a team need to understand and manage factors affecting human behaviour which 
may result in failure or breaches of safe practices Reason (2003). Endsley (2000) 
proposes “The perception o f the elements in the environment within a volume o f time 
and space, the comprehension o f their meaning, and the projection o f their status in 
the near future” His elaborate definition implies that organisations which have not 
engaged in the design of the workplace/workflow using human factor methods will be 
unaware of causation factors that, if left unchallenged, will disrupt the capacity for 
clear thinking and breach safety defenses. These aspects of the work system are 
shown in Figure 1.2. At best, any failure in these sub-systems of safety management 
will result in a poor quality product and, at worst, these failures in the context of the 
aerospace industry will result in the fatalities of hundreds of civilian aircraft 
passengers.
The researcher’s argument this far has been that systems design is more important 
than control and supervision of the individual, although according to Rasmussen 
(1998) some errors are accepted in terms of individuals acting alone and in isolation 
to the system. In other words Rasmussen is claiming that most quality-related 
problems are caused by individuals who fail to be functioning as part of a team. This 
argument is reinforced by Artman & Garbis (1988) who argued that properly 
supported team working enables the individual to build a common view of how best 
to improve the quality of their work, based on team work of shared understanding. In 
this context they propose that improved team situational awareness is based on “Two 
or more agents in active construction o f a situation which is partly shared and partly
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distributed from  one part to the next” As such, whilst the individual may make 
mistakes, it is generally believed that teamwork serves to catch issues and prevent 
their escalation into major catastrophes. The model shown below in figure 1.2 
highlights this position for the purpose of this study and questions the validity of the 
current and most favoured approach to team work from a Lean perspective, which is 
at odds with main stream human factors thinking as it fails according to Liker (2004) 
to consider sufficent attention to human factors redesign.
Figure 1.2 Model of Key Human Factors
Factors Influencing Situational Awareness
Commercial Pressure
Communication
Training
Procedures
Planning
Tooling
Quality Management
F atigue
Frgonomics Safet> Culture
I n n ru n iiR  nt D iK U M K iita l io n
Management
l \ t t i tu d e s lleadership
Source: Researcher Literature Review
It was decided to accept the work of Prof. James Reason (2003), who is one of the 
most influential British authors in the field of safety management, as a base line 
model upon which to ground this study. Reason’s work provides an expert review of 
human factors, within complex environments such as the aviation industry and his 
model underpins the current EASA position (especially the 145 regulation). Reason 
called for a design of systems such that safety and cost effectiveness are balanced as a 
means to ensure robust quality, safety systems can prevent or capture a catastrophe 
before it takes place. One of Reason’s major contributions to the design of effective 
socio-technical systems is his contention that methods should be designed to provide a
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successful defense mechanism to failures, although Reason stops well short of 
entering a debate upon the subject of leaner ways of working. The researcher 
therefore noted that Reason’s model implicitly accepts failures will happen based on 
the belief that all individuals are fallible and random events will happen -  hence his 
view is that defenses should be the focus of both compliance and control. Reason’s 
model (figure 1.3) illustrates how a successful defense mechanism is able to capture 
problems within the system before they escape to result in major catastrophe. 
Conversely an unsuccessful defense is therefore one where the error passes through 
the multiple ‘holes’ and lines of defense resulting in a full system failure (as 
illustrated in figure 1.4). Reason proposes individuals are quite capable of 
contributing to the safety of any given system, provided it is ‘well-guarded’, which 
refers to the way rules and standards are designed in terms of capturing mistakes in 
real time situations. It should be noted that such issues are not well addressed within 
operations management literatures. Instead operations management authors, such as 
Shingo (1986), tend to advocate mistake proofing to eliminate sources of error, but 
rarely do they address the environments where product variation is high and the 
technical ability to mistake proof is low.
Errors and failures are not always visible and in many cases remain hidden within the 
operations system design and are described as either ‘active or ‘latent’ forms of 
human failure. Latent failures can be described as a deficiency within the technical 
operations system, which according to Maurino (2006) can be analysed and used to 
evaluate the effectiveness of safety related concerns. In this manner, latent failures 
originate from poor system design where designers and system decision-makers are 
most remote from the actual conduct of the process, yet make assumptions in their 
designs, about how workers will perform tasks/control safety and quality based 
activities. According to Reason, latent errors present the greatest threat and are likely 
to be generated by those who are most remote, such as designers and high-level 
decision makers (2003).
Figure 1.3 Successful Defence Against Human Error
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Figure 1.4 Failed Defence Against Human Error
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Latent errors are those associated with poor systems design and control of the work 
environment. It is these errors, under conditions of TQM and leaner ways of working 
that will, in non-linear production flows (complex parts and processes), critically 
impact upon the safety of the socio-technical system designs. For the purposes of this 
study, a non-linear work process is considered to be one whereby there is high variety, 
low volume work environment whereby one engineer does not generally process 
engine product quickly from one place to another. These types of socio-technical 
systems are therefore according to Reason (2003) the most complex and the least
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characteristic of modem Lean ways of working (Liker, 2004). Further Reason argued 
it is also possible that systems, which are designed to make the process safer, can also 
be seen as its greatest point of weakness. His view is based on two aspects, which are 
usually defined by the transparency of a system itself, in terms of team knowing and 
team understanding. These are:
1. Not knowing what is happening.
2. Not understanding what the system can do.
The way in which active and latent failures contribute towards the cause of human 
error (figure 1.5) shows a clear pathway through which a mistake can penetrate a 
process and, take advantage of what Reason conceptualises as the ‘limited window of 
opportunity’, resulting in catastrophic system failure.
Figure 1.5 Reason’s (2003) Window of Opportunity
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Reason (2003) argues systematic errors are “Opposite sides o f the same coin, there are 
relatively limited numbers o f ways in which errors actually manifest themselves, which 
are inextricably bound up with the computational primitives by which stored 
knowledge structures are selected and retrieved in response to situational demands ”. 
His argument is that a rare combination of poor defences and a limited window of 
opportunity will escalate into a major catastrophic system failure. In complex 
environments such windows of opportunity increase substantially and it is unclear why
18
the Lean method of working in safety critical environments has not been well explored 
in the operations management literature and aero repair businesses in particular.
Rasmussen (1998) argued that inadequate situational awareness could be the cause of 
organisational inefficiencies that accounted for between 70-80% of all quality related 
problems. Ramsussen’s work adds a new dimension to the study of human factor 
failures and he exposes the importance of ‘collective knowledge’ of a team that is 
needed to maintain high levels of defense. Kosmowski & Kwiesielewicz (2000) 
reinforce this view and support the need for good team engagement with safety 
management and argue that an aggressive and competitive environment, 
inadvertently, creates poor team performance that more often than not; results in high 
levels of active errors. If left unchallenged, poor teamwork and poor integration of 
individual knowledge, induces high levels of system risk and potential sources of 
failure. In this regard, previous studies of team working within complex and 
commercially-pressured work environments, show poor team work is associated with 
greater risks of a mistake process abnormality that, when triggered and with a window 
of opportunity, will eventually result in the individual making a mistake of potentially 
catastrophic proportions.
Rasmussen (1998) was one of the first authors to explore this aspect of human error 
and he proposes three levels of analysis that need to be investigated to build a system 
of robust defences against catastrophic errors. The main levels of error creation, 
according to Rasmussen, include3:
1. Skill-Based mistakes (Educational Psychology)
2. Rule-Based mistakes (Occupational Psychology)
3. Knowledge-Based mistakes (Cognitive Psychology)
The three different forms of mistake challenge the individual and team concerned at 
different levels. A mistake that has been seen before and requires less diagnostic skill 
is likely to be the result of a well-rehearsed or learned knowledge form of automatic 
response by the person concerned (skill and rule based mistake identification).
The opposite to such a condition is where a complex problem is presented to the 
individual and they must use their long term memory/stored knowledge to 
conceptualise/diagnose what they see and how they can solve problems around them. 
Much of the Lean operations management literature concentrates on simplistic
3 These three levels o f analysis are instrumental to the focus and major theme of this thesis.
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operator routines in a repetitive operations management environment (vehicle 
assembly). The aero repair sector has neither of these conditions and by contrast 
requires a conscious effort by the individual to diagnose and repair aircraft systems. 
Such an environment has standardised work processes but there are much greater 
levels of variation in parts and systems than in the traditional operations systems of 
Lean production/assembly.
The aerospace repair process, the subject of this thesis, is altogether more complex 
and individuals are presented with problems that are not easily solved. These 
problems require deeper levels of cognitive skills and application of specialist 
knowledge to solve technical problems. The model put forward by Rasmussen is 
based on the opinion that individuals prefer to problem-solve at lower levels of 
cognitive function and will only move to the higher levels (knowledge based 
approaches) when encouraged to do so. The implication of Rasmussen’s view is that a 
production system design should be mistake-proofed as much as possible because 
individuals will always take short-cuts to resolve problems, rather than problem­
solving at a conscious and knowledge based level of awareness. His model was later 
adapted by Reason (2003) and developed into what is more commonly referred to as 
the ‘Generic Error Modelling System* (GEMS).
GEMS is based on an implicit assumption that individuals solve problems in terms of 
schematic representations of real world experience, the model accepts that individuals 
will always maintain a consistent cognitive representation of events, even when 
contradictory evidence exists to suggest the opposite logic should be applied. In this 
manner, individuals will continue to apply ineffective solutions and also forget to 
actually define the problem The GEMS model was used by the Air accident 
Investigation Board (AAIB) during 1981 when a Boeing 727 crashed at Tenerife 
because the flight crew devised a procedure based on incomplete and incorrect 
information. The flight crew ignored the information concerning their position and 
minimum descent heights and instead flew the aircraft into high ground, using an 
incorrect mental model. The implication for industrial managers is they must identify 
the gaps in current levels of thinking and socio-technical systems design to ensure that 
there is compliance between engineers and the design of the process to prevent and 
ultimately eliminate what Reason (2003) referred to as the limited ‘window of 
opportunity*. A further implication is that, even where a team approach is used, a
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common mental model that prevents re-questioning of the problem will lead to a 
catastrophic failure. For this study and in contemporary times, when businesses are 
engaging in Lean processes under commercial pressure, it is vitally important that 
attention is paid to the alignment of the social system and individual engagement 
within the process itself. Simply applying Total Quality Management (TQM) methods 
will not correct the situation of individual errors, team mistakes, and inappropriate 
models of safety management, especially under conditions of high complexity 
(Bicheno, 2000). As such, new models of worker engagement must be designed and 
simply migrating an automotive socio-technical system and its practices vastly 
underestimates the complexity of aero repair businesses and can accelerate 
catastrophic events.
So far, this chapter has argued there is very little evidence of Lean and human factors 
research in safety-critical processes like aero repair and has concluded that the 
dominant models of TQM and Lean are relatively unknown in this sector thus creating 
a gap in the body of operations management knowledge. The next section will 
therefore focus on the types of conditions that give rise to human error and how 
insufficient attention to the socio-technical operating systems, causes problems. These 
problems are exacerbated when increased loading is put upon an operation as Dhillon
(2002) argues, “There is a significant link between work place mistakes and the 
economic conditions”. As such, pressures for delivery schedule adherence, aircraft on 
ground, and other commercial pressures can increase the stress in a system causing a 
rise in the number of ‘windows of opportunity’ for error.
1.2 Examples Human Error
In the majority of instances human error is captured and remains within a system, but 
in very rare cases, failures result in catastrophe. Whilst this thesis focuses on the 
aerospace repair sector, the application and principles of error management are not 
confined to this field alone and they can be applied to any situation where the cause of 
poor quality is complex and unknown. Informing better safety management has often 
resulted from high profile catastrophes and the countermeasures enacted to prevent 
reoccurrence but this form of learning is reactive and unsatisfactory when dealing 
with operations systems that fail and can result in many hundreds of deaths.
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A landmark case that has shaped recent thinking concerning the importance of human 
factors was cited in 1987 when the ‘Herald of Free Enterprise’ a roll-on-roll-off ferry 
sank with the loss to 192 lives. When the initial investigation into the cause of the 
accident was carried out, blame was apportioned to the person who failed to close the 
bow door. But after further deliberation the prosecutor of the case in question, stated 
that because the management team of ‘Townsend Torresen’ had ignored previous 
safety recommendations for warning lights to be fitted to the bow doors, the main 
contributing factor was in fact attributed on the organisation and not the person who 
committed the error. What appeared to be an accident caused by basic human error 
was in fact the inevitable consequence of, what human factors specialists now refer to 
as, a classic case of system-induced error. In this manner the management 
responsibility of a system design has now become a major element of modem human 
factors research and much has been learned by the aero sector from these disasters. Of 
critical importance to this study is the role of management and their liability. 
According to Sheen (1987) the acting chief prosecutor summarised the Townsend 
Torresson disaster in terms of “Inadequate procedures that were found to be endemic 
throughout the organisation, infected with a disease o f sloppiness*'. As a direct result 
of this case, the law commission introduced an amendment to the legal framework by 
which all corporations within the UK, aviation or otherwise, can now be held 
accountable and criminal charges can be brought if negligence is proved. Changes to 
the law, including tighter corporate manslaughter penalties, have also forced a greater 
need and investment amongst safety critical industries to accept the underlying cause 
of poor quality, in terms of compulsory human factors training and a new attention to 
system design. Following on from what is described as the ‘failed system of defence’ 
(Reason, 2003) the examples that follow below (listed in Appendix 1), typify what 
can happen when people fail to follow basic procedures even when under well- 
established methods of quality control. The first of which is taken from the official 
French accident report that described the crash of Concorde in Paris during July 
20024. During take-off the tyre on wheel number 2 was cut by a metallic strip of metal
4 Concorde was a supersonic passenger aircraft and was a product of British & French manufacture.
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left on the runway. The metallic strip came from the thrust reverser cowl door of 
engine 3 on a DC 10 that had taken off just five minutes before Concorde. The 
metallic strip had been replaced in Tel Aviv in June 2000 during aircraft maintenance 
and then again in Houston on the 9th of July. The strip installed in Houston had neither 
been manufactured nor installed in accordance with the procedure as defined by the 
original equipment manufacturer.
Figure 1.6 The Failure of the French Concorde.
Source: Taken From Google Imaging
As a direct result of human error and non-compliance to procedure, the actual crash, 
taking approximately 2 minutes, killed 9 crew members, a 100 passengers and 4 
people on the ground. The researcher has also identified with the findings of a well- 
documented case study that linked the cause of human error to the negative effects of 
commercial pressure to meet deadlines. The case in question was blamed on Aloha 
Airlines (1988) for not providing adequate maintenance procedures involving the 
accident of a Boeing 737 aircraft, which experienced a massive explosive
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decompression on route to Honolulu. The accident resulted in structural failings at
24,000 feet causing the front end of the fuselage to break away. The aircraft was 
carrying 89 passengers and 6 crew members at the time. The decompression injured 7 
passengers and killed 1 flight attendant, after which the pilot performed an emergency 
descent and landed the aircraft on the island of Maui. The National Transportation 
Safety Board NTSB (1984) reported the cause of the Aloha Airlines accident as 
inadequate maintainenance checks. An inspection process that was considered as non­
value adding was removed from the maintenance schedule in order to reduce the time 
the aircraft was out of serviced. The operation in question would have otherwise 
detected the presence of a significant outer skin cracking, which subsequently led to 
the separation of the fuselage in the upper lobe. Apart from very poor maintenance 
standards the underlying and most significant factor that led to the accident was 
financial pressure. The investigation concluded that had Aloha management permitted 
the necessary fuselage inspections as per Boeing recommendations, the accident, with 
its devastating consequences, as shown below5 in figure 1.7 could have been avoided.
Figure 1.7 Aloha Airlines Structural Fuselage Failing
Source: Taken From Aloha Airlines Disaster Report (1988) Appendix 1
5 Aloha A irlines Boeing 737-297, registration N 7 3 7 1 1 at Kahului A irport on April 28, 1988 after part 
o f  its fuselage was torn away in flight.
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With this catastrophe in mind, Ostrom (1990) argued “Airlines have a great interest 
in shifting some o f the inspection activities from inspectors to the mechanics 
performing the work. The reasons fo r doing this are increased productivity and 
decreased cost” and whilst these actions seem commercially logical they ultimately 
change the dynamics of human factors within an operations management system a 
fundamental change to the socio-technical system design.
Whilst air accident statistics underline how exceptionally low by comparison to all 
other forms of travel the aviation industry really is, the fact remains that public 
perceptions through media representation may be construed very differently by the 
year 2010. The significance of which is now considered by the authority Flight Safety
(2003) as a global problem based on a statistical trend that measured civilian aircraft 
accidents during 2006 at an all time high of 35 crashes, of which 50% is attributed to 
human error (resulting in 702 fatalities worldwide). According to Sears (1986) 
research showed that of 93 aircraft accidents the major contributory factor was 
engineering maintenance mistakes that amounted to 12% of all aircraft accidents to 
date. This contradicts the popular view that pilot error is the critical failure source. 
Later research carried out by Hobbs (2000) supported the claim that engineering 
repair processes are critical and found such errors accounted for 12% of all accidents, 
with a further 50% of this statistic blamed on engine/flight related delays. The Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA)6 also predicts that unless the current trend is reversed, the 
accident figure will increase and the number of aircraft crashes will rise to 52 by the 
year 2010. The CAA claim the industry will have 600 million more passengers and 7 
million more tonnes of cargo than today therefore making aero repair a critical subject 
for improvement. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) support this 
need and argue that the chances of being killed in an aircraft accident in 2005 was less 
than one in every 10 million take off and landings, against a figure of just three in 10 
million in 20037.
6 Civil Aviation is regulated by the United Nations through the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation and subsidiary National Aviation Authorities such as the European Air Safety Agency, 
United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority and the United States Federal Aviation Administration.
7 For the purpose of clarification, Ranter (2006) categorises all of these problems in terms of: “A  
commercial multi-engine airplane, which, in certificated maximum passenger configuration, is capable 
o f carrying 14 or more passengers. ”
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The contemporary study of human factors within the sector of aero repair represents a 
timely insight especially as businesses are facing greater commercial pressure to 
improve the flow of work whilst maintaining the safety and integrity of the socio- 
technical elements of the operations management system.
13 Motivation and Background to the Research Problem
Comparing previous statistics against the main gap of operations management and 
TQM knowledge that underpin this study, the researcher conducted a preliminary 
literature review and found a trend whereby four out of every five major quality/safety 
failure investigations (an initial pilot case study) were attributed to human error with 
commercial pressure as a constant feature of the investigations. This finding, together 
with the lack of detailed investigations/models of best practice, reinforced the 
researcher’s interest in studying the practices of the sector. It should also be noted that 
the researcher himself is an error management investigator and has significant 
‘knowledge’, which has stimulated his desire to study the repair & overhaul sector as 
a means of contributing to the professional practice of human factors for improved 
business performance management. Thompson (2001) reinforces this need for 
research and proposes that maintenance errors are now the single biggest cause of in­
flight engine shutdowns at £350,000 per failure of which a mere £35,000 is the cost of 
a cancelled flight. Other evidence, from the European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA) claims the need to study repair processes and research evidence presented by 
the agency showed that for every single serious event there were 40 additional costly 
events and over 600 other more minor hazards that were all present at the time of the 
breached defence. Figure 1.8 provides a visual representation of these problems based 
on the ratio of minor events (‘beneath the water line’) and major accidents. The 
‘hidden’ system failures and minor events were considered by the researcher to be the 
key issues that require understanding in order to influence the professional practice of 
process excellence thinking.
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Figure 1.8 The Safety Error Iceberg Model
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Source: Taken From Flight Safety Airworthiness Notice (2003)
The Error Iceberg model summarises the major elements of this study, which 
originally was developed by Heinrich (1980) but was later adapted by Reason (2003). 
The bottom end of the iceberg model provides a summary of the key factors that are 
most likely to influence the ‘windows of opportunity’ or aspects of operations 
management design that need to be identified and countermeasures introduced to 
prevent a major air catastrophe from taking place.
A major factor that motivated the researcher was the inadequacy of the existing 
operations and quality management literatures. These bodies of knowledge have 
focused on the problems of new manufacture, but ignored repair engineering 
processes, which have often addressed the issues of all other forms of manufacturing, 
but not that of repair environments (the characteristics of the aircraft engine repair & 
overhaul sector). The researcher therefore believes a study of repair engineering 
processes, based on understanding common cause variation would be a vital area of 
the team 's behaviour in accounting for the severity of risk factors that may or may not 
exist ‘beneath the water line'. The statistical process control chart (SPC) shown below 
in figure 1.9 typifies this position in terms of highlighting the existence of wide 
variations of work content, based on the UCLr value, i.e. the moving range of 98 
hours. The chart is also considered as important as it represents an area of operations 
management thinking where a preliminary study showed that problems with repair 
processes are often resolved in the form of trade-offs between safety, quality, speed, 
and cost effectiveness across the entire aero repair & overhaul sector. It should be
noted that these are untypical ‘trade-offs’ and are not identified by Slack et al (2004) 
due to his focus on unregulated and high volume operations systems.
Figure 1.9 Statistical Process Control Chart (SPC)
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These contradictions and trade-offs warranted further investigation and theory 
building for which this study is founded upon. Further, the commercial repair sector -  
both military and civilian, are under pressure to improve performance and increase 
process flow, whilst at the same time maintaining safety systems that prevent what 
Reason earlier described as the windows of opportunity and vulnerability.
It was therefore determined that the best approach to this study would involve a 
realist8 approach supported by a multiple and longitudinal case studies drawn from a 
single organisation. The chosen corporate organisation was selected because it was 
engaged in the repair of aero engines and had an extensive improvement system 
(based upon Total Quality and Lean ways of working) with an operational context of 
‘process excellence’ based upon autonomous team working. These factors were 
considered to offer the best possible insight into the performance of safety systems 
and the ‘beneath the water line' issues that had been identified in the literatures.
8 The realist approach is a point o f reconciliation that sits between the extrem es o f positivism and 
naturalism. Realists such as Giddens (1985) & W ass and W ells (1994) argue that a synthesis of 
extrem es is possible and occurs naturally during most field research.
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The case study business was also considered appropriate because it was a commercial 
operation, which is subject to global levels of competition. As such the focal business 
also provided an opportunity to extend the work of Reason (2003) and assess the 
contradictions of contemporary organisational models with high levels of safety 
defences as well as to test the limits of TQM when translated from less safety critical 
environments (Hayes & Wheelwright, 1984). The literature concerning TQM is 
heavily reliant upon repetitive and simple processes that are dominated by rule based 
decisions whereas the aero repair sector is complex and team members have much 
more skill variety, job enlargement, and a reliance upon knowledge-based skills. An 
aero engine is therefore regarded as a complex product and, based on a series of 
diagnostics will need a customised repair path and an approach to TQM that differs 
considerably from other sectors where one engine type can be very different from the 
next. The aero repair environment is therefore characterised as high variety and low 
volume production, which is furthermore complicated by infrequent orders of 
uncommon repair processes. Figure 1.109 illustrates the complexities of this position, 
based on a typical repair & overhaul engine type, which, for each of the 4 case studies 
under investigation, are performed under the responsibility of self-managed teams.
Figure 1.10 The Com plexity O f Jet Engine Repair & Overhai
50 D ays T o  S tr ip  
B uild & T est
600 S u p p lie rs  
W o rld w id e
32,000 P a r ts
P a r ts  R an g in g  F ro m  lp  
T o  £600,000
Jo in t V en tu res
Source: Taken From Case Study Production System
9 The cut away o f  the gas turbine engine shown above is a Trent 900, which achieves around 13000 
flying hours between major overhauls, thus dem onstrating the reliability o f  a typical big civilian 
aircraft engine.
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The engine type (figure 1.10) is known as a turbo fan and represents the most 
common type of gas turbine technology used in the most popular airframes such as 
the Boeing 747 and Super Jumbo Airbus A380. Military and civil engine variants are 
of a similar type and are typically refurbished using a unique timing concept described 
as ‘power-by-the-hour’. This concept uses a customer engine ‘lease’ agreement as 
opposed to the traditional option to buy (repairs are part of this lease agreement). Such 
an approach creates many commercial pressures to return engines back to the aircraft 
as soon as possible. ‘Power by the hour’ has redefined the business model at the case 
company, within the context of TQM and Lean principles have been engaged to 
ensure quicker turnarounds of engine repairs that has fundamentally challenged the 
cultural/traditional way of thinking and working. From a theoretical perspective Berry
(1991), proposes a TQM culture transformation requires a “Philosophy fo r total 
corporate focus that exceeds customers expectations and significantly reduces costs 
resulting from poor quality by adopting a new management system and corporate 
culture”. From a TQM perspective the most effective and efficient approach to 
operations management advocates decentralised decision making, self-management of 
quality/safety routines based around the investment of empowered team working, 
which is the model adopted by each case company across multiple Aero Repair & 
Overhaul (AR&O) sites.
However, the practical application of TQM or Process Excellence from a case study 
perspective differs from the traditional definitions drawn from the practices of 
companies like Toyota on the basis that the automotive approach uses a highly 
structured team model with a distinct team leader/supervisor whereas each of the case 
studies in this study, is fundamentally different in its uses of a self-managed team 
approach.
For the purpose of this study, the achievement of TQM at the case company is 
described as a journey and self-management provides the main building block of the 
approach with a new style of management directed towards improvement and large- 
scale organisational change transformation. The deployment of the new socio- 
technical strategy and system has resulted in significant change from the traditional 
craft based engineering ‘job shop’ approach and towards a more customer driven 
approach of Lean production systems. The combination of both TQM and Lean 
production systems at the case company share the same principles of consensus
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management where low levels of demarcation and investment in human resources 
thinking has resulted in a learning environment that performs well and retains a safety 
consciousness approach. Such a socio-technical approach has been termed by Peters
(1993) as a “Simultaneous loose-tight properties o f organizational change, where the 
awareness o f organisational values can provide the glue fo r holding companies 
tightly together” In other words TQM in conjunction with self-management is seen by 
the case organisation as an all-encompassing approach that is capable of engendering 
organisational quality through a collective responsibility, based on 10 principles of 
TQM as declared Saylor (1992)
1. Leadership
2. Commitment
3. Total customer satisfaction
4. Continuous improvement
5. Planning
6. Training and education
7. Ownership
8. Reward and recognition
9. Error prevention
10. Co-operation and teamwork 
Given the recent events within the aero repair industry, access to a business in a 
process of large-scale transformation and the team/system approach to human factors 
created a unique opportunity to study how a complex operations management system 
adapts to new conditions using Lean and TQM approaches to adaptation. The 
potential contribution to the body of knowledge by researching such an organisation 
were considered a valuable means of adding to the body of knowledge in the fields of 
operations management and human factors engineering.
1.4 Research Aims & Objectives
The focus of this study is aimed at identifying these barriers and constraints that limit 
the extent to which self-managed teams are able to meet the real world challenges of 
achieving high quality engineering within the context of TQM. In order to test the 
compatibility of self-management within an existing framework of TQM, the 
researcher has identified a number of potential areas of quality risk, where the cost of 
non-quality is described as complex and unknown. The types of benefit sought from 
this study include the identification of the factors that have prevented teams from
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engaging in safety management and the development of a model of use for managers 
and academics alike. The chosen context of aerospace repair and overhaul was a 
deliberate decision, as this sector exposes one of the most extreme conditions, within 
Lean production/TQM. The case study is set within a harsh and legally regulated 
sector, where auditors have the right to withdraw operating licenses, based upon non- 
compliance to strict aviation safety law. Another set of factors that presented the 
aerospace repair sector as ideal for study, concerns the fact that a single error related 
event, which is the cause of an engine flight shutdown, or worse still a catastrophic 
failure can result in regulatory penalties and in the most extreme case corporate 
manslaughter charges. The context was therefore considered suitable for study 
because a conflict exists between the need for respect for individual/individual 
discretion and skills versus the traditional TQM structures of supervision and indeed 
the regulatory presented to the industry (EASA part 145). The principles of self­
management & Lean are also at odds with the extensive research gained from more 
mainstream sectors of new production, which tend to follow traditional models of 
Lean that favour front line leadership, within the context of the Toyota Production 
System (TPS) itself. Figure 1.11 was created by the researcher as an initial framing of 
the research and to aid understanding and expose which gaps if any, might lie, within 
factors of efficiency and effectiveness of TQM based on the unique operating 
environment of repair & overhaul engineering.
Figure 1.11
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The model identifies the input, psychological and output error factors that could exist, 
as active, or latent modes of failure, should the socio-technical system become 
unbalanced or exhibit weaknesses that open ‘windows of opportunity’.
1.5 Research Question
The exact research question that guides this study is declared as problem-driven 
approach based on the need to understand;
“To what extent can self-managed team working, facilitate the principles o f safe 
Total Quality Management within the operational context o f process excellence ”
For this project, the researcher will seek to provide a level of understanding as to 
‘why’ self-managed teams are at risk of making mistakes, within the context of 
established methods and procedures that could result in ‘active error’ within a 
working environment which calls for high use of problem-solving skills. Another 
objective of the study was to provide a level of understanding of ‘how’ some 
procedures might fail to provide adequate safeguard against long-term problems for 
both active and latent (system design) errors. The researcher acknowledged the 
historical concerns of previous studies and specifically decided to assess the volatile 
situations/systems issues that involve errors based on poor ‘rule’ based application of 
the latent issues of the operating system and the potential failures caused by poor 
operations management designs (socio-technical system). It was critically important 
that this study was not to investigate actual accounts of failure but instead to look at 
the perceptions of employees as a means to measure and analyse error related risks 
that are most likely to exist beneath the water line of the operational management 
system design. A study of narrative explanations of error management was considered 
as part of this investigation but discounted because, whilst contextually rich, were too 
individualistic to gain better insight into system design and management (Catchpole, 
2010).
The selection of a corporate case study with multiple sites thereby provided an 
opportunity to statistically test differences of understanding and attitudes towards 
quality to help explain why such errors were able to penetrate the safety systems 
mechanisms of defense. Such an approach was considered to offer a beneficial 
extension of the seminal work presented by Reason (2003).
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The final objective of the study is to provide a level of understanding of ‘what’ 
barriers exist to prevent high-level maintenance managers from creating a positive 
resolve towards the management of institutional and latent error risk within the socio- 
technical system. The purpose of this question was to look at system designers and 
how these ‘remote’ individuals could benefit from this study, in the form of a model 
to guide their decision-making, so as to optimize the socio-technical system of self­
managed teams with TQM
1.6 Chapter Summary.
This chapter has set the scene and background to the study of contemporary safety 
management systems thereby outlining the main features of human error. It has also 
identified a number of potentional gaps for exploration between self-managed team 
working and TQM/Lean production especially in a low volume, high variety and high 
discretion workplaces where knowledge-based error prevention is undertaken. This 
form of workplace is considered to have the same compatibility as the quality 
philosophy of new manufacturers or first build, where human factors problems are 
resolved through the elimination of variation, reduction of waste, process 
standardisation and employee engagement. Features, of which remain questionable in 
the context of a repair environments, where operations management conditions are 
diametrically opposed to first build. As such, design for and sustainability of 
improved quality of performance for safer working environments in high variety 
environments is a major area of weakness in current academic thought. To date, the 
researcher would argue that no study or research programme has addressed the role of 
safety management, under Lean working conditions in high variety environments, 
such as those found in this study, namely; 3rd line deep strip aero repair & overhaul 
engineering. A study of high variability and low volume operations management 
systems and self-managed team working therefore suggest there is much to be gained 
and learned from a study in this type of environment. These operations management 
designs are by definition, poorly understood workplaces and their broader socio- 
technical systems designs also suggest they require an altogether different range of 
considerations that need to be optimised in order to result in high standards of safety 
and productivity.
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Chapter 2 will set the thesis within the context of the extant literature and show the 
many gaps that prompted this study. Operation management design issues, within the 
context of socio-technical systems theory (STST) will be examined. In so doing, 
STST will be used to expose the number of gaps in TQM literature and will also form 
the bedrock for discussion of the research strategy that will be defended in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3 will also provide a justification for why the researcher decided to employ 
the pluralist methodology, the entire decision trail related to the case study selection, 
research, problems, and later data management, display and review processes. It will 
also show how ‘quantitative’ as well as ‘qualitative’ cycles of research were engaged 
to ensure a robust ‘cross case comparative design’.
Chapter 4 will then explore, in more detail, the case studies and describe the recent 
changes/improvements of the case studies (within the legal framework of the 
European Aviation Safety Agency regulation part-145).
Chapter 5 will present an overview of the case study results and provide a detailed 
analysis of the research findings against the prescriptions of the literature review and 
original research question. In so doing the results will provide a broad framework of 
quality related issues that can be used for experiential and focus group research.
The analysis presented in chapter 6 will include a resultant model, which is intended 
to capture the findings of each case study, for future testing by researchers and 
managers from an aero repair and overhaul point of view. Finally, the conclusions 
and implications of the study will be summarised in chapter 7 together with the next 
set of most rewarding research activities in this field of human factors and operations 
management. The remainder of the thesis contains the supporting information, copy of 
the questionnaire and an audit trail for future cross-referencing purposes. To assist the 
reader, the researcher has created a schematic to show the flow of the thesis 
(figure 1.12). The figure depicts how each stage of the thesis builds from its preceding 
stage and how multiple points of reflection were built into the process of research to 
add to the robustness of the study. The next chapter will set the thesis within the 
context of the extant literature and show the many gaps that create the need for this 
study.
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Figure 1.12 Schematic Overview of Case Study
Chapter 1 
General Introduction R esearch Q uestionB ackground  To P roblem
Research Problem 
Identified
Chapter 2 
Literature Review
Social Perspectives_ T echnical Perspectives
Theoretical
Framework
Chapter 3 
Research Methodoloev V alidity & R eliabilityC ase S tudy  O ptions
Research Strategy
Chapter 4 
Case Studies
E rro r  M anagem ent CasesSelf-M anaged T eam  System
Contextual
Understanding
Chapter 5 
Research Results Q uestionnaire  R esultsFocus G ro u p  R esults
Significance Of 
Results
Chapter 6 
Research Analvsis C ross C ase AnalysisR esultan t M odel
Identify Research 
Opportunities
Chapter 7 
Research Conclusion M anagem ent Im plicationsR esearch Im plications
Source: Researcher
36
Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.0 Chapter Introduction
The previous chapter has presented a general overview of this thesis and has identified 
that the aero repair & overhaul of gas turbine technology is a critical context of 
operations management that is under researched especially within the context of 
human factor engineering and safety. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
operational management practices from a safety-critical systems perspective as a 
means to identify those practices that induce human error. In order to achieve this aim 
this chapter will ground this study within the organisational and operations 
management literature bases using ‘systems theory’, socio-technical systems theory 
(STST) and operations management (OM10) to provide the context of this review. In 
so doing numerous gaps in the main academic body of knowledge will be exposed 
thus justifying this study and showing why new theory is needed.
Set within the context of high product variability, low customer demand and low 
repetition of skills (including ‘non-linear’ product flows), the chosen literature will 
also explore the unusual operations management structure of self-managed teams and 
the relation of this form of structuration with seminal work of Reason’s (2003) 
‘system induced’ forms of human error conditions. The problem presented by the 
operations management literatures (which focus on high levels of materials flow) and 
human factors specialists such a Reason (which focus on system and individual causes 
of safety failure) is that much of the operations management work is located within 
high volume and low variety settings (such as car assembly). When the context is 
changed to high variety and low volume and also where there is a high level of 
individual discretion and self-management, risk factors grow and when commercial 
pressure is added, then failures in a safety-critical aerospace system may result in 
fatalities. This seemingly contradiction of structure, safety management and high 
materials flow/quality improvements is the subject of this study.
The research will therefore examine a new dimension to the field of human factors 
research that extends beyond Reason’s work to embrace a broader church of human 
factor perspectives. The researcher will therefore consider a more eclectic approach to
10 The concept of operations management is, in the literature, called by a number of interchangeable 
titles. These include manufacturing management and production management. The title ‘operations 
management’ OM will be used throughout this thesis.
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theory building that challenges the school of individualistic research with a more 
social psychological perspective which is considered to be better suited to 
understanding the limitations and performance of self-managed teams (Harshit, 2005).
Reason’s human factors models have been applied exclusively in areas of front line 
supervision and therefore lacks due consideration of complex 3rd line aero engine 
overhaul & repair. As such, this approach calls for a broader range of considerations 
that will be discussed within the context of high performance management systems. In 
so doing the researcher will discuss a range of technical operations management 
approaches (such as Six Sigma11 & Lean) and place into context the relevance of 
these ‘hard system’ tools/techniques against a range of social considerations that 
frame the main research question (Slack et al., 2008). The main research question is 
stated as:
“To what extent can self- managed team working, facilitate the principles o f safe 
Total Quality Management?”
The research question and scope of this study concerns the investigation of a complex 
socio-technical system (an environment where safety is at its most effective through 
the careful design of technical and socio systems). To aid understanding a literature 
model was created by the researcher (Figure 2.0) and is offered as a means of 
contextualising the socio-technical systems perspective12.
11 The opportunity for quality improvement should be maximised through the application of six sigma 
& lean, which according to Chowdhury (2001) “Zj both a philosophy and methodology in which an 
organisation continuously improves its processes, with the aim o f  defect free manufacturing
Six Sigma is also credited as a statistically derived measure of a process that consistently produces no 
more than 3.4 defects or failures for every one million outputs.
12 Socio-technical systems are those, which rely not only on technology but also on humans and social 
organisations for their adequate functioning.
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2.1 Systems Thinking In Operations Management
To place the relevance of the research question into context, the literature will begin 
with a historical overview of contemporary manufacturing management, which 
originated from the historical perspective of ‘General Systems Theory’ (GST) and the 
biological sciences. The purpose of selecting a systems view of human factors and 
operations management is that most forms of failure are actually the result of the 
system and its design rather than individual malpractice. As such, and in line with the 
protocols of theory-building research, a systems approach will be taken to the 
organisation and the major subsystem of operations management.
Bertalanffy (1951) was the first to formalise the systems approach and the need to 
take a systems approach to the design of effective systems that can adapt, survive, and 
grow. This early work, which argued that the system was greater than the sum of the 
parts, was later developed and adapted to use the systems metaphor with business 
organisations (Dunlop 1958). Ackoff (1971) Beer (1972), Garvin (1993), Goldratt & 
Cox (1998) and Seddon (2000) have since used it, to explain the performance of
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operational management thinking and have promoted the utility of system theory for 
application to management problems/new business designs.
Authors from the operations management field of study have also found utility in 
using a systems approach within which the most important subsystem is that of the 
conversion process -  the main responsibility of the operations management of a 
business. According to Wild (1984) the concept of operations management is defined 
as the specialist body of knowledge which is; “concerned with the design and 
operation o f systems fo r  manufacture, transport, supply or service ” or as Drucker 
(1990) claims “the physical process that adds economic value to materials”.
The modem operations management literature implicitly accepts the concept that a 
business must be regarded as a single system and managed as a holistic entity in order 
to optimise its performance (Acquilano & Chase, 1992; Stevenson, 1993; Swamidass, 
1991; Womack & Jones 1996; and Liker 2004). Kast & Rosenzweig (1985) reinforce 
the importance of theory generation from a systems approach and contend an 
organisational system is “an entity in its own right, with unique properties 
understandable only in terms o f the whole, especially in the face o f a more traditional 
reductionist or mechanistic focus on the separate parts and a more simplistic notion 
o f how these parts f i t ” and they go on to argue, “The term system covers a broad
I ^
spectrum o f our physical, biological and social world” . In other words an 
engineering business is a system of numerous inter-related subsystems that include the 
socio-technical aspects of operations that reinforce effective human factors and high 
performance production. Central to the design of an effective and efficient operations 
management system is the conversion cycle of purchasing (input cycle), and 
distribution (output cycle), each sub system’s performance can affect the overall 
business performance and the structural features that support the flow of materials. 
Support for such an approach is provided by Scott (1987) who argued that “Previous 
definitions tend to view organisations as a closed loop system, separate from its 
environment and comprising a set o f stable and easily identified participants. 
However, organisations are not closed systems, sealed o ff from their environments 
but are open to and dependant on flows o f personnel and resources from outside”.
13 For other definitions see Ackoff (1971). The broad range of applications and academic disciplines, to 
which the ‘systems approach’ has been applied has prevented the true unification of the theory. This 
lack of unification reflects the diversity o f the approach rather than any internal conflict of logic or 
flaw.
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Contemporary operations management theory stresses the importance of business 
designs that are considered to be ‘open’ systems (Dale et al., 1997). Such systems are 
capable of interacting with the supply and consumer environment and controlling the 
conversion process to meet its operational goals. Emery (1969), an eminent socio- 
technical systems author, formally defined this position as “From the physical point 
o f view, the characteristic state o f the living organism is that o f an open system. A 
system is closed if  no material enters or leaves it; it is open if there is import and 
export and, therefore, change in the components. Living systems are open systems, 
maintaining themselves in exchange o f materials with the environment, and in 
continuous building up and breaking down o f their components’’. He further claims 
“Human organisations are living systems and should be analysed accordingly 
management is concerned with the control o f social systems, technologies, and 
markets therefore living systems are essentially ‘open systems’, not *closed systems” 
This was a definition that Pasmore (1988) later extended and codified as a model of 
high performance socio-technical system theory.
Pasmore argues the use of the biological systems metaphor is appropriate and states 
that researchers “...fin d  intimations o f an exhilarating ‘ unity’ o f science, because the 
system models used by biological and physical scientists seem to be exactly similar. 
Thus, the system model is regarded as universally applicable to physical and social 
events, and to human relationships in small or large units”14. The researcher 
therefore accepted that the systems approach to biology and organisational research 
were compatible. Furthermore, from within the Total Quality Management (TQM) 
literature base there was more support for a systems approach to management 
involving both social and technical elements of high performance businesses. This 
view was explicitly supported by the quality guru Deming (1993) in his system of 
‘profound knowledge’, reinforced by Goldratt & Cox (1998), and explicitly 
recognised by the key authors of the Lean business system (Womack & Jones, 1996). 
As dominant models of operations management these authors reinforce the need for a 
systems view and Womack and Jones contend that high performance can only be 
achieved through an effective systems design. They propose, “manufacturing 
organisations, which have learnt to exploit the potential of the system through high
14 ‘Systems theory’ has been applied by many academic disciplines involving modifications of the 
approach to better match the system under investigation.
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quality and leaner ways of working, are more efficient and more likely to be 
successful than those businesses who do not”. Womack & Jones (1996) go on to claim 
that “when the competition also engages in the same models o f open systems 
management, those organisations, which improve at the fastest rate will be more 
efficient and effective than those, which are time lagged”. Such an approach to 
organisational ecology and the importance of good operational management processes 
implies that management choice and employee integration are fundamental building 
blocks of a successful business strategy and model.
The basic features of an organisational system are; an input-process-output cycle, 
management, a planning activity, and a means of system regulation through measures 
and monitoring (Pasmore, 1988). Katz & Kahn (1978) argue that of all these features, 
it is the planning and leadership processes that are most important because these 
processes are concerned with forming and ‘internal fit’ of the social and technological 
processes of the business.
Another aspect of systems theory is the achievement of a ‘steady state * of material 
flow within which outputs and inputs are balanced. The improvement of the flow 
processes requires engagement of employees to find ways of reducing waste and 
making the entire socio-technical system more adaptive. According to Deming 
(1986), this feature of systems theory is directly linked with the ability of individuals 
to exploit improvement processes and align all activities to achieving an optimised or 
‘waste-free’ operations management system and do so by use of sophisticated 
monitoring of processes and customer requirements. The key assumption of Deming 
and other systems authors is that managers must design and maintain an efficient 
‘steady state’ system to provide a measure of basic stability for the materials flow 
process and engagement of improvement activities to take place. Brown (1996) 
supports and extends this view by arguing that any high performance 
organisational/socio-technical systems design relies on effective management to 
create direction and focus, as an enabling factor for self-regulation to take place. The 
researcher duly accepted the utility of a systems theory foundation to this study and a 
means of framing human factors design and management of high performing 
businesses. In accepting this foundation theory the literature implies that effective 
human factors management results from an appropriate management design, 
engagement of employees and the ‘right behaviours’ of management to plan and
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direct efficiency programmes. Figure 2.1 provides an overview of the basic features of 
an open system and its impact on this study. Having provided a brief account of 
systems theory, the researcher investigated the different schools of thought that have 
emerged since the 1960s and found that contingency theory and socio-technical 
systems theory to offer many insights in to effective organisational design. Other 
management and organisational theories that were reviewed but later discarded 
included process theory (rejected because of the reliance upon following activities and 
decisions which was considered beyond the scope and ability of this research to 
conduct) and information, communication and control theory which each emphasize 
regulation, but not in a meaningful manner, to house a theory of human factors 
management. The next section will provide a brief review of contingency theory. 
Figure 2.1: Summarising the Basic Features of an Open System.
C o n c e p t D e fin itio n
System s
H ierarchy
A system, according to Porter (1985), is located within a higher order and 
is known as the supply chain. The actions of which involve the execution 
of tasks needed to meet system goals.
Steady  S tate To maintain a balanced fit within the environment the system must be 
regulated such that environmental change can prompt adjustments in the 
performance of the system.
V iability To survive, a system must be contained within a larger system, which, 
according to Beer (1972), must be capable of organisational dependency 
to both customers and suppliers.
Inpu t-P rocess
&
O u tp u t Cycles
According to Huczynski & Buchanan (1991) all systems exist to satisfy 
the goals determined by their designers and as such organisations 
represent “social arrangements fo r  the controlled performance o f  
collective goals ” Open systems therefore engage in a conversion process 
that generates a level of throughput exchanges within the system.
In fo rm ation
Processing
An open system requires, according to Hayes & Wheelwright (1984), the 
concept of ‘feed forward’ management planning where routines are 
needed to guide the system under conditions of environmental 
uncertainty.
R egulation An open system requires feedback of information concerning the flow of 
transactions with the environment. Negative feedback, according to Kast 
& Rosenzweig (1985), concerns information that deviates from the steady 
state and “should be readjusted to a new steady state ”
M e a s u re s The measures adopted and information processing within an organisation 
must be sufficiently sensitive to detect changes. These sensors must also 
be designed with standards to ‘filter out’ information in the form of 
decoding15
Source: Rich (1999) adapted for purpose.
15 The ‘Control Theory’ (CT) literature was reviewed by the author, but the main tenets o f ends 
(outputs) and means (inputs and the transformational process) analysis were deem ed to be a subset o f 
GST. Kast and Rosenzweig (1985), propose “Control theory, like many other broad theories, is more a 
state of mind than any specific amalgam of mathematical, scientific or technological methods. ... The 
broad objective of a control theory is to make a system -  any kind of system -  operate in a more 
desirable way: to make it more reliable, more convenient or more economical” (p.509).
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2.2Contingency Theory: Organisational Structures & Performance Management 
Systems.
Having discussed the main features of general systems theory and identified its main 
components, this section will now explore the contribution of ‘Contingency Theory’ 
(CT). Contingency theory was selected as a potential literature base due to its 
concentration upon the management, planning, structure and improvement of 
organisational systems and also because of its fundamental tenet that organisations 
must be best suited to their environment and that organisational structure has a pivotal 
role in achieving this ‘fit’. This ‘fit’ was considered to be an important aspect of 
operations systems design especially when the command and control structure of a 
typical business is replaced by self-management in faster moving environments, these 
design features also impact upon the safe working practices and resilience of 
operations management systems.
The basic premise of contingency theory is a rejection of the classical ‘one best way’ 
of managing (Taylor, 1947) and the proposal that an organisation must ‘fit’ its 
environment and that different environmental factors will shape the design features 
that make certain businesses successful whereas others fail. In this manner, 
contingency theorists attempt to explain why different business structures are more or 
less appropriate to certain product environments and therefore offer a superior 
advantage (Donaldson, 1995).
Theorists, such as Thompson (1967) and Pugh (1968), placed high importance in 
understanding contingencies that lead to different structures. They emphasised the 
role of management in properly designing operational and planning systems to 
maintain an organisation-environment ‘fit’. Many of the contingency theory studies 
were based on empirical research that sought to explain the complexity of 
organisational systems by discerning patterns of relationships among subsystems, 
which resulted in improved business performance. Bums & Stalker (1961) summarise 
the approach by arguing there needed to be a switch in managerial philosophy from 
the scientific perspective of ‘the one best way fo r all organisations' to the ‘one best 
way for each organisation ’. The main focus of contingency theory therefore concerns 
the alignment and fit of the business structure, which ultimately determines goals and 
organisational performance, which according to Child (1984) is important, because it
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focuses on; “the allocation o f roles and responsibilities, the grouping o f functions, 
decision making, co-ordination, control and reward -  all these are fundamental 
requirements fo r  the continued operation o f the organisation. The quality o f an 
organisation's structure will affect how well these requirements are met”
According to Pugh & Hickson (1976) there are severe penalties in terms of failing to 
maintain a critical ‘fit’ with the environment and each of these penalties has a 
negative impact on material flow and commercial performance of the organisation. 
The consequences of this mismatch is acknowledged by Hannan & Freeman (1989) 
and propose it will lead to a reduction in information processing efficiency that would 
inhibit the success of organisational learning and slow down change processes. Pedler
(1992) adds to the argument that insufficient attention to the structures of the firm will 
lead to poor levels of organisational learning and higher states of functional 
demarcation, where an over reliance on specialisation within an organisation can 
create difficulties and lags when change is necessary and when managers seek to 
create a culture of consensus and co-operation. In this respect, the structure and 
adaptive processes of the firm are critical aspects of high performance and within this 
discussion, two ‘ideal types’ are presented, firstly the ‘open’ systems perspective, 
which is characterised as consensual or organic and secondly the ‘closed’ system 
which is more formalised that leads to what Child (1984) describes as bureaucratic, 
demarcated, and mechanistic approach to management. Under the ‘closed’ approach 
to management, control routines and supervision are used and where all workplace 
activities are based on rules and bureaucratic procedures. Within the management of 
the operations and organisational systems centralised decision-making is undertaken 
and challenge to the management prerogative is not permitted. Mintzberg (1983) 
proposes this is an appropriate management perspective suitable to relatively slow- 
moving environments.
The ‘open’ systems ‘ideal type’ approach is characterised by decentralised decision­
making, based on styles of management, which create facilitation and ownership of 
the system itself. Both concepts which, according to the researcher, is of relevance to 
this study, where self-management, in the form of organic structures, assume the slow 
moving position of technology, which by its very definition, is characterised as a 
‘closed loop’ system, within the context of gas turbine technology. To place this 
discussion into context Bums & Stalker (1961) were the first to propose that
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organisations fall into the mechanistic or organic models of structure and decision­
making. They classified the ‘mechanistic’ organisation as a ‘closed’ system set within 
a stable mass production environment drawing from their study of a Rayon Mill. 
Whereas the second case study was set within a more ‘organic’ open systems 
environment of a high innovations electronics company, which was characterised as a 
turbulent manufacturing organisation. The main features of these two organisational 
designs are set out in figure 2.2.
Bums and Stalker (1961) concluded, from their study, that a stable environment 
created a more ‘superior fit’ within the mechanistic mass-production design. Whereas 
the other study carried out under conditions of environmental uncertainty and 
‘organic’ design, was considered to be more appropriate. Both structures however, 
were described as rational designs that Bums & Stalker (1961) stated were; “explicitly 
and deliberately created and maintained to exploit the human resources o f a concern 
in the most efficient manner ”
Figure 2.2 Organisational Forms
Feature ‘Mechanistic’ ‘Organic’
Market Environment Stable Uncertain
Goals Defined, enduring & static. Diverse and changing.
Production Mode Mass production & Maximum 
output.
High Variety & Customer 
Service.
Technology Established & uniform. Complex & dynamic.
Functional
Specialisation
High, static roles and bureaucratic 
methods. High number of job 
grades.
Fluid, low, informal and low 
number of job grades. Self- 
determination of methods.
Competence Senior Management With skills holder.
Decision-making Routine & programmable. Heuristic & co-ordinated.
Orientation Means Goals
Communication Narrow & Vertical (Orders) Lateral & vertical (Advice).
Control Hierarchical (Superior) Interaction (Networks)
Source: Burns & Stalker (1961) adapted for purpose.
However, later research carried out by Child (1984) exposed gaps in what is described 
as organic superiority, thus highlighting problems that concerned a lack of 
differentiation between the basic structure and operating mechanisms. In other words 
Child argues that Bums and Stalker failed to describe and reconcile the complexity of 
decentralised decision-making, in terms of a lack of understanding of how basic
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management planning and control processes could enable organisational change to 
take place. In view of this criticism Child (1984) proposes, regardless of the type of 
organisational design; “a formal structure does not resolve these differences in a way 
that integrates peoples* actions in an effective manner**. The rebuke offered by Child 
was duly considered by the researcher to be an important challenge to the superiority 
of the organic approach -  an approach that underpins the TQM and Lean models of 
operations management. What is unclear is the extent to which an organic structure 
and ‘hands o ff management can control a workplace that must ensure the highest 
level of defence (Reason, 2003) and where mistakes can result in fatalities. The aero 
repair sectors are diverse they have come to rely on highly skilled methods of self- 
determination, which is of particular interest in use of organic and autonomous team 
structures. The association in the literature that high performance results from an 
organic structure was considered a very important issue with regards to this research 
and whether organic structures do lead to better performance.
The organisational structure school of thought is just one contingency associated with 
high performance. Technology is the common denominator that unites many other 
authors. ‘Technological determinism’ and the impact of ‘technology’ was first 
proposed by Woodward (1965) who argued “It was possible to trace a cause and 
effect relationship between a system o f production and its associated organisational 
pattern and, as a result, to predict what the organisational requirements were likely 
to be, given its production system’*. Such an approach has a natural fit with many 
operations management authors (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984). However, Child 
(1984) again exposes a number of weaknesses with this approach. He argues that 
‘technological determinism’ has a number of methodological flaws in defining 
technology itself and also in its testing. Based on testing by the ‘Aston studies’ of 
(1969), Woodward’s theories were effectively discredited. This study was founded 
upon multiple definitions of technology16 and a large-scale survey that proved no such 
deterministic pattern existed. As such, the concept of ‘technological causality’ 
remains questionable, yet for the purpose of this study such determinism could not be 
discounted and implies the technology employed by cases involved with the study 
should match as closely as possible.
16 46 companies were researched using ‘technology’ types of ‘operations technology’ (workflow 
activities); ‘materials technology’ was based on the study o f inputs used in conversion and ‘knowledge 
technology’ which according to Hickson et al (1969) embodied the human organisation of production.
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The concept of technological determinism has not received such criticism in the 
operations management literature. Authors such as Hayes & Wheelwright (1984) 
defend the view that technological design factors were more important than issues 
concerning the structure of human resources. Technological contingency theory 
offered a new insight into modem high performance organisations and demonstrated 
that technology would impact on the skills and numbers of employees needed, 
however contingency theory did not satisfy a basic need of the researcher to look at 
performance rather than structural design. The research into technology also did not 
exactly provide evidence for autonomous team working and the design of operations 
systems for high quality, high safety and high efficiency. This view is in contrast to 
operations management authors who directly relate team structures to higher 
performance (see Womack et al., 1990; Plossl, 1991; Grant et al., 1994, Levey and 
Monk, 2002).
Another contingency school and a common feature of all schools is the criticality of 
management in designing systems, also planning and dictating the learning approach 
of the firm. Contingency theorists therefore acknowledge the importance of 
management choice and the management prerogative. Donaldson (1995) first argued 
that “strategy determined structure” claiming that structural adaptations occur only 
when the success of business strategy becomes impeded17. Similarly, he 
acknowledged the existence of competitive penalties associated with a poorly aligned 
or a self-sustaining structure, ineffective management control and time-lagged 
decision-making that would ultimately threaten business performance, improvement 
and adaptation. Child (1984) acknowledges this position in terms of five such 
penalties and argues that planning systems, which fail to support formal participation, 
posed the greatest threat to organisational learning as illustrated in figure 2.3.
The design dilemma faced by contingency theorists is that of participation in self­
management by employees. In other words a trade off exists in terms of slower 
decision-making between scientific formalisation of the operation management 
process and the inhibiting impact this has on continuous improvement. Later 
operations management theorists such as Schonberger (2002) Gregory (1990) Neeley
(1994) and Womack & Jones (1996) accepted this position within the context of
17 For a modern review of the strategy-structure debate see Donaldson (1995).
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world-class manufacturing as part of the total quality management movement, which 
remains the most dominant approach in today’s operational management structures.
Figure 23  Penalties of Poor Organisational Design.
Effect Cause
Poor
morale
The result of inconsistent decisions, no standardised rules, and lack of 
delegation, lack of clarity, poor prioritisation and stress caused by 
ineffective support systems.
Decision 
time lags
A function of interrupted information exchange highly specialised 
decision-making, insufficient delegation of decision-making power, 
lack of procedures to evaluate the results of historic decisions.
Poor
Co­
ordination
Resulting from poor and conflicting structure of goals, lack of 
synchronisation and regular information exchange and exclusion of 
key employees from the decision making process.
Low
Innovation
Created by a lack of specialised jobs concerning forecasting, planning 
and environmental scanning, lack of senior management support for 
planned change, dislocation of departments with market intelligence 
and those tasked with change or technological responses.
Escalating
Costs
The result of a long hierarchy and high amount of indirect to direct 
employees, bureaucracy requiring additional staff and the existence of 
some or all of the earlier problems.
Counter­
measures
The operation of a formalised, regular, and participative process of 
decision-making. The use of a logical portfolio of performance 
measures for each goal established. A flexible business structure 
through which goals can be executed. Nurturing of consensus 
management, high levels of employee participation and widespread 
promotion of the ‘need’ to change, thereby establishing a culture of 
‘continuous improvement’ as the norm for all employees in which to 
engage.
Source: Taken from Child (1984)18
Upon reflection, the researcher accepted that few studies since Child (1984) have 
delved deeply into the design and hindrances that face management even when the 
management prerogative for the design of the business is unchallenged. It was 
considered important that this study represents an insight into contemporary 
operations management organisations as an opportunity to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness in high variety/low volume/high worker discretion aero repair & 
overhaul engineering. Contingency theory was therefore regarded by the researcher as 
offering a valuable insight into successful organisational designs because it offered 
according to Kast & Rosenzweig (1985) “important guidelines for organisational 
diagnosis and managerial actions in specific situations ... contingency views
18 The work of Simon (1959) and later Williamson (1975) reinforces the negative impact of decision­
making delays on the performance of the organisation.
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recognise that the environment and internal subsystems o f each organisation are 
somewhat unique and provide a basis fo r designing and managing specific 
organisations”. The role of contingency theory was therefore highly relevant to this 
study as it promoted the importance of management decision-making in planning 
processes that provided structural guidelines in the understanding and extent to which 
self-managed team working can facilitate the principles of TQM. In this manner, the 
structure of the organisation and its management processes were considered important 
to the management of company safety and the reduction of human/system errors.
In summary, while contingency theory provided a general understanding of operations 
management structures, it was not an appropriate means of housing this study. This 
was because the dynamics of human factors are considered more important than 
focusing on business process and structure alone, this is an element, which 
contingency theorists failed to address. In the opinion of the researcher, this weakness 
resulted in partial rejection of contingency theory, which is also associated with 
systems theory, later known as control theory as well. In light of this and other such 
considerations of contingency theory, each school failed to account for how the 
principles of self-management could be integrated into the TQM system seen as 
necessary for improved business performance encompassing technology under human 
factors control. Based on the need to satisfy the dynamic requirements of an error 
management system, it was next considered that the concept of socio-technical 
systems theory (STST) was the most appropriate framework to house this study, 
because it is able to account for the importance of flexibility in complex maintenance 
environments.
2 3  Socio-Technical Systems Theory: W ork Organisation & Management System
Socio-technical systems theory (STST) emerged during the 1960s19, at the same time 
as contingency theory. STST developed out of the need to understand and manage the 
complexity of organisations reliant on social systems. It was Trist (1963) who 
described STST as an approach, which is suitable for managing the balance between 
the needs of the technical system that would inevitably be affected by the social 
system and vice-versa. This view was also supported by Emery (1959) who 
emphasised this position by stating “It is important to understand that when both the
19 The Tavistock Institute, an ethnocentric and philanthropic organisation, was at the forefront of STS 
research into human resource management and issues concerning the ‘quality of working life’.
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social and technical systems are jointly optimised, peak performance can be 
achieved”. In other words, one approach cannot be achieved without proper regard for 
the other. Ellegard (1992) describes this as an ‘organic entity’, “...claiming that when 
both the technical and human elements o f a system are used effectively, economic 
benefits will result, in terms o f high productivity and improved product quality ”. In 
addition, both Emery & Trist (1963) argued that STST could be used to explain cause 
and effect relationships between the internal design of an organisation and human 
factors efficiency, which ultimately defines organisational effectiveness in terms of a 
whole type task driven environment.
The socio-technical systems approach therefore advocates both a systems and 
contingent approach to a ‘designed internal fit’ of the workforce and material flow 
processes, in terms of its interaction with technology. Later theorists such as Pasmore 
(1988) argued that STST emerged as a dominant factor because of its contribution to 
the relationship between organisational effectiveness and the quality of working life. 
Pasmore (1988) defined the socio-technical system itself as the “ Individual attitudes 
and beliefs, based on the implicit psychological contracts between employees and 
employers; reactions to work arrangements, company policies, and design features; 
relationships between groups, among group members and between supervisors and 
subordinates; cultures, traditions, past experiences and values; human capacities for  
learning and growth as well as fo r sabotage and collusion; power and politics; 
individual personalities and group norms; the potential fo r  motivation or alienation; 
fo r  loyalty or dissension; for cooperation or conflict; and remarkable, uniquely 
human emotions such as love, hate, charity, anger, joy, fear, pride, devotion, jealousy, 
compassion, and excitement”.
At the core of the STST design is the concept of continuous improvement, a process 
that underpins both the Lean and the TQM approaches to operations management. 
Further the STST approach promotes the use of teams to create dependencies between 
‘whole tasks’ of operational activities. STST also focuses on ‘team-based’ tasks, as 
opposed to the traditional mass production design of hierarchical tasks that Perrow 
(1974) argued would result in the process of de-skilling. As such STST promotes 
multi-skilling, job enlargement, and job enrichment under the banner of greater 
autonomy. Pasmore (1988) argues that organisations are natural socio-technical 
systems in that they are “made up o f people (the social system) using, tools,
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techniques and knowledge (the technical system) to produce goods or services valued 
by customers (who are part o f the external environment). How well the social and 
technical systems are designed with respect to one another and with respect to the 
demands o f the external market determines to a large extent how effective the 
organisation will be... The structuring and integrating o f human activities around 
various technologies... affects the types o f inputs into the organisation, the nature o f 
the transformation processes, and the outputs o f the system that determines the 
effectiveness and efficiency o f the utilisation o f the technology”. His argument is that 
optimisation can occur if management engage the correct design of hard and soft 
systems to manage production.
Pasmore (1988) goes on to argue that the quality of internal ‘fit’ with an organisation 
itself determines out-put results in terms of high output performance which can only 
be achieved by the use of a consensus management approach to the workforce and 
deliberate engagement of management and teams in a form of co-destiny relationship. 
STST also promotes cross-fimctional management where all employees and not just 
the decision-makers must engage in a process of optimisation by reallocating roles 
and work across different employee groups. He also argued that STST designs should 
place high importance on productive efficiency and satisfied employees, a point also 
reinforced by the work of Blake & Mouton (1964) and their managerial grid. As such, 
STST is a technology first approach, but supported by advanced human resource 
management practices to include support for the development and training of a multi­
skilled team-working20, activity. These features reinforce and extend the work of 
Bums & Stalker (1961) under the ‘organic’ business design.
Whilst Pasmore (1988) does not explore the management planning process in depth, 
he supports the work of Emery (1969) and characterises management as ‘engaged’, 
for the majority of their time, in the collective planning of the organisation, whilst 
operational management routines, are deployed to subsystem whole tasks of 
specialists within the team. Whole task designs therefore represent what the TQM 
guru Garvin (1993) refers to as interdependent, but self-managing teams who own 
specific tasks that form part of the conversion process and act within ‘internal 
customer-supplier’ relationships. From a structural position, the concept of ‘whole
20 The introduction of autonomous teams is considered the means of aligning and balancing the 
economic, technological and individual requirements of work.
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team tasking*, according to Trist & Bamforth (1951), creates a series of ‘boundaried 
subsystems’ that form a range of control mechanisms based on input-process and 
output cycles at the part level of analysis.
The heavy emphasis on management design and engaged team work, in the major 
STST research literatures, offered many potential avenues of exploration for this 
research and the researcher considered that there were many design implications for 
this study including the role of the team, professional skills dependencies and 
commercial improvement processes. The context of ‘whole-tasking’ directly reflected 
the autonomous teams approach and held predictive utility as to what elements of aero 
engine repair would be enhanced under TQM, leaner working methods and high 
levels of material flow/safety. The concept of ‘whole tasks’ as the basic building 
block of the firm was also seen as a departure from typical definitions of teams and 
cellular type production methods as found in the operations management literatures 
concerning new manufacture and the role of the team leader.
According to Pasmore (1988) the STST approach is a structural type of logic that 
allows closer control of the production process and shorter ‘conception to correction’ 
routines through the development of team skills (defences to errors). In light of this 
position the researcher found a synergy existed between the positions put forward by 
the STST leading figure of Pasmore (1988) and that of the human factors expertise of 
Reason (2003). Both these authors advocate the principles of containment, in terms of 
effective human factors to prevent the escape of safety critical conditions. A position 
that was illustrated by Heinrich (1980), in his ‘error iceberg’ model, as factors hidden 
‘beneath the water line’ where abnormalities and quality defects unless identified at 
the subsystem level of analysis are at risk of breeching the ‘whole’ organisational 
defence mechanisms.
Another dimension of STST of high importance to this study was provided by the 
work of Hackman & Oldham (1980). These authors argued that an operating system 
which focuses on whole tasks has both psychological and motivational benefits in 
terms of providing a sense of belonging and job enrichment, where teams are better 
placed to learn skills such as problem-solving, which are major features of 
contemporary operations management associated with high performance. These 
features also fitted well with the overall intention of the study to examine “To what
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extent can self-managed team working, facilitate the principles o f safe Total Quality 
Management?”. The question also has a major linkage and dependency with organic 
operational management as described by Senge (1993) and Storey (1994) and more 
recently Liker (2004)21. These authors directly correlate high performance with whole 
task management.
Another aspect of STST which held a bearing on the design of this study was the need 
to integrate whole tasks with an integrated range of performance management that 
provide formal recognition for organisational learning and self-improvement. The 
researcher duly accepted these as an important factor in the process of continuous 
improvement, as illustrated by Hackman & Oldham (1980) in figure 2.4, for modem 
facilities especially those in low volume and high variety sectors.
Figure 2.4 Socio-technical Systems Job Designs
Dimension Definition
Skill Variety
Concerns the variety of different activities that are encompassed in 
the work conducted which involve a variety of skills to be employed 
by the individual.
Task
Identity
The degree to which the work of the individual, or as part of a team, 
encompasses a ‘whole task’ to produce, from an input, a 
recognisable completed output.
Task
Significance
The impact on the performance of others in the organisation or 
environment as a result of the work being conducted.
Autonomy
The degree to which the work permits freedom, independence, to the 
individual regarding the timing and methods employed to complete 
the job.
Feedback
The degree to which conducting the work provides the individual 
with clear information concerning the effectiveness of the individual 
(or team’s) performance.
Source: Taken From Hackman and Oldham (1980)
Such a structure of management practices was reinforced by Pasmore (1988) who 
claimed that when teams engage in more formalised management planning routines, 
the deployment of ‘stretch objectives’ both vertically and horizontally, will enable 
what Likert (1961) refers to as the ‘linking pin’ approach to take place22. Such 
‘boundary spanning’ activities involve the championing of change, at the management
21 STS designs were used by Volvo in Sweden at the Uddevalla and Kelmar plants, but failed to 
generate the productivity levels, needed to compete, with mass production assemblers.
Team leaders and administrative personnel are those individuals who Likert (1961) refers to as 
'linking pins’ who act as company-wide representatives in problem-solving groups to improve the 
quality of organisational resource.
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level through the use of a steering committee with a reliance upon the team leader to 
identify and engage in the overall improvement process. As such, the manager and 
team leader become engaged in organisational levels of learning whilst human 
resource policies and procedures ensure that all employees learn how best to improve 
their ‘whole task’ areas of responsibility. The approach therefore unites management- 
led planning and operational improvements within a single ‘systems approach’ 
without disturbing the autonomous nature of business ‘whole tasks’ and ‘local’ 
improvements. These STST design features correlate strongly with the concept of 
Total Quality Management TQM including the management of critical control points 
within the manufacturing process as advocated by Deming (1982) Juran (1944) and 
Pasmore (1988) as illustrated in figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5 STS Design Principles
Design Principle_________________________________________________________
1 The effectiveness of the whole is more important that the efficiency of the parts, the flow 
of materials and relationships between elements of the total production process govern 
‘saleable output’ not throughput efficiency at cell. The latter shows how efficient the cell 
has been at converting inputs that may not be required for sale.
2 Variances must be controlled at their source and abnormality should be detected quickly -  
through standard operating practices -  operators should be able to detect problems and to 
take proper corrective action.
3 Boundaries between teams should be set such that the creation of a variance and its 
detection occur in the same geographical department to encourage employees to work 
together to solve the problem.
4 Feedback systems should be as complex as the variances that need to be controlled such 
that signs of variance may be detected and corrected before failure occurs.
5 Inputs should be monitored as closely as outputs and the impact of variances should be 
isolated in order to prevent total system failure. Technical resources should be directed to 
those variances with the greatest potential for systems disruption._______________________
Source: Taken From Pasmore (1988) pp 80 -94
According to Pasmore (1988) this process will determine the efficiency and 
effectiveness of each ‘whole task’ and should therefore focus upon the management 
of a product and its process quality. He argues that through prioritisation, defects and 
losses will be eliminated thereby allowing the continuous improvement process to 
take place, based upon detected and deviation between ‘whole tasks’ without the need 
for management intervention. Further to this Pasmore (1988) identifies the role of 
whole task in terms of ‘stretch goals’ where performance targets should focus on ‘loss
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free’ production23 and perpetual adaptation of performance. In order to create what 
Pasmore referred to as ‘internal fit’, while other STST theorists advocated widespread 
investment in training for problem solving so as to increase the diagnostic skills of the 
team. This approach can be compared to that of Contingency Theory where the 
deliberate reduction of the command principle is associated with ‘functional 
specialists’ i.e. maintenance technicians.
STST goes one step further in the deployment of the specialist buffers of the 
organisation and proposes the integration and co-location of specialists within the 
whole tasks as a means of increasing the rate and extent of improvement activity. The 
purpose of continuous employee skill development serves to enhance the level of self- 
sufficiency, which also enables the decentralisation of management control. This 
involves the need for technical training requirements that parallels with the work of 
Perrow (1974) who suggested that training is a necessary process that will help to 
reduce levels of demarcation between technical specialists and team-based working. 
The combination of these planning, structural and training features are all factors 
associated with high performance team working, which typifies what Perrow (1974) 
describes as a ‘learning organisation’. STST theorists, like contingency researchers, 
therefore regard training as a necessary function that will enhance the quality of the 
decision-making process. In light of this position the researcher considers this 
argument to be of vital importance to this study where consensus management is a 
major feature amongst self-managed teams as the main stay of the aerospace sector, 
whose investment is based on the strategy to solve complex problems in highly 
technical environments. STST theory was therefore accepted as a key body of 
knowledge upon which to found this study, based on the argument put forward by 
Child (1984) who claimed that TQM processes could be coupled with learning 
processes to ensure organisational performance is optimised. Again a contrast exists 
with the centralised, rule-dominated and time-lagged bureaucracies of the mechanistic 
production designs, which according to Liker (2004) provided a direct link between 
STST and the engagement of contemporary TQM. This approach is based on the 
assumption that TQM has emphasised the importance of the ‘team leader’ which 
according to Storey (1994) is associated with the high performance of TQM design. In 
light of these and other such similarities the researcher has accepted the main
23 Pasmore’s deign principles highlight local rationality at the team level and reinforce the principles 
identified in the general systems theory review.
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framework of STST literature as it provides a major opportunity to review the 
components of TQM from a socio-technical point of view. It also acknowledged that 
there is a major gap between STST theory and the organisational design features of 
this study, where autonomous team working is functioning without the vital linking 
pin stage of the team leader. Such a consideration is therefore seen as very important 
to this study in view of the current problems facing self-management in relation to 
both safety and quality of all aerospace repair-engineering processes. The principles 
of self-management in relationship to this type of organisational framework therefore 
assumes a compatible relationship with TQM in terms of ‘efficient’ (Lean) and 
‘effective’ (quality) socio-technical system.
However, whilst self-management is acknowledged by Ellgard (1992) as the highest 
form of STST system design, there is much confusion over this aspect of STST 
design. As far back as 1963 Trist proposed there is a high level of ambiguity 
concerning self management, the impact of commercialism and how best to research 
it. In other words Trist argued that more research is needed to explain how self­
management can co-exist with the commercial pressures required to control business 
performance. Trist’s work never embraced the regulated industrial sector and, to this 
day, few studies have attempted to theory build in this sector of the economy. One 
study that has addressed this area of management is Raferty & Tapsell (2001), but no 
one study has focused its attention within context of 3rd line aero engine overhaul & 
repair. The findings of the Raferty & Tapsell study does shed light on the pressures 
and contingencies of the regulate sector but does not explicitly address the 
contingencies of the aero repair sector.
The researcher accepts the fundamental principles of socio-technical research designs, 
the need for new theory to be built within the regulations of repair and overhaul and 
especially within the structural choice of self managed teams.
Whilst studies of self-management have not happened in the aero repair sector, similar 
empirical studies in other sectors have shown this structural choice to be associated 
with high performance, team working has been a constant feature of highly reliable 
and high performance businesses for over a twenty-year period, Delbridge (2000). In 
this respect, teams are potentially both the result of TQM and also the enabler for it to 
be successful and sustainable. However, it should be noted that in this study the role 
of high performance teams have in every occasion included the central and pivotal
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role of the team leader as a front line manager and local decision-maker Under the 
definition of self management within this study such a pivotal position is absent. 
However, the main expansion in the research of team-based working does coincide 
with the growing awareness and emulation of Japanese management practices and a 
renaissance for STST designs.
Researchers such as Buchanan (1994) focused on studies of Japanese practices in the 
context of TQM/Lean production and claimed that his results were able to provide an 
insight into higher levels of team performance in areas of quality and commercial 
indicators whilst also allowing for sustainable continuous improvement. This is 
regarded as a new form of team structure and is reinforced by a number of studies 
such as that of Storey (1994). The 1990s marked a new point in the definition of team 
working which was an evolution from the embryonic attempts to use such structures 
in the late 1960s and 1970s. The two time periods and the definition of the team 
leader are illustrated figure 2.6 shown below.
Figure 2.6 Contrasting Socio-technical Systems in the 1970’s with High 
Performance Team Designs in the 1990s
Teams In The 1970V Teams In The 1990s
Aimed to reduce costs of Aimed to improve organisational
absenteeism and labour turnover flexibility and product quality or
and increase productivity. competitive advantage.
Based on the argument that Based on the argument that increased
increased autonomy improves autonomy improved skills, decision-
quality of work experience and making, adaptability and use of new
employee job satisfaction. technology.
Had little impact on management Involves change in organisation’s
function beyond first-line culture and redefinition of management
management. function at all levels.
“Quick fix” applied to isolated Could take two or three years to change
and problematic work groups attitudes and behaviour throughout the
organisation
Personnel administration Human resource management strategy
technique.
Source: Adapted From Buchanan (1994)
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Theoretically, according to Wellins (1992), the benefits of socio-technical systems 
were manifested in terms of autonomous team working and this he associated with the 
practices of many world-class organisations. He highlights the bias of Scandinavian 
businesses for this approach to management and presents a powerful, yet flawed, 
description of autonomous working practices found at Volvo during the 1990’s. The 
central feature of the Volvo system was an improvement system based on human 
resource system to enhance quality standards by reducing the amount of defects. This, 
Wellins argued, resulted in performance uplift up to 90% good quality at first final 
inspection. Other success factors were identified, According to Gandz (1990) who 
also studied Volvo; these successes could be attributed to the process of co­
responsibility, which included both the regulation and organisation of human resource 
strategy. This was delivered in such as way that quality and efficiency became an 
empowering process amongst self-management where business decision-making was 
encouraged as the main feature of autonomous team working itself. Gandz therefore 
argued that when self-managed teams were organised in this way business 
performance outputs would be improved to include ownership of quality in safety 
critical situations.
However, further research carried out by Gandz (1990) showed that managers can 
equally disrupt the most effective elements of STST design, by placing undue bias on 
productivity as opposed to the investment of conditions seen as necessary to support 
the empowerment of employees to take place. To counter-act this type of situation 
Gandz (1990), argued in favour of the maintenance of six general conditions, as listed 
below, these he saw as critical success factors in key areas of socio-technical designs.
1. Adequate training
2. A shared vision
3. Development of a set of a set of shared values
4. Development of a common set of shared benefits
5. Installation of managerial faith within teams
6. Development of an organisational culture, which supports risk taking.
Probably the most damning finding impacting on the 1990s passion for team working 
and autonomy was that, in productivity terms, self management and the Volvo system
59
was found to lag far behind that of other mass production and Lean ‘team leader’ 
based models (Womack & Jones 1990).
In this manner, while many of the positive elements of STST features were considered 
as highly relevant to the practice of self-management, as opposed to team working 
with a team leader position, the application of such a structure in a high variety, low 
volume and high risk environment as found in the aero repair & overhaul business 
leaves many unanswered questions? The basic principles of STST researchers is that 
happy workers are productive and that autonomy is a higher level of Maslovian 
motivator and should enhance the quality and enjoyment of working life. However, 
deviations are easy to detect on a moving car assembly line yet they are masked on a 
complex repair schedule, work is repetitive on the car line and relies upon 
routines/standards but it highly variable within aero repair and productivity 
management is easier in standardised production environments with rework bays and 
not such an easy approach for repair businesses where work, work content and the 
hours needed to perform a task vary (even when conducted by the same person using 
the same tools/technology).
While the researcher accepts the broad arguments put forward by Gandz, he is also 
cautious of the dangers this promoted in terms of what Gandz saw as important within 
the teams role and function of risk taking. For safety reasons this position is 
highlighted as a contradiction to the legal requirements of EASA part-145 and the 
requirement for all work to be traceable and there to be a separation of work from 
quality assurance activities. As such whilst decision taking is seen as a necessary part 
of self-management the process of risk taking could not be accepted, within the 
context of aerospace engineering, without due consideration for a supporting risk 
management process. This was a concept that Wellins (1992) researched during the 
same time period as Gandz but Wellins highlighted the need to invest in depth and 
breadth of training to resolve the potential issues of quality risk. He claimed that an 
effectively educated social system would broaden the range of activities of self­
management to properly take place. This approach highlights the importance of, what 
is referred to by human factors researchers as, effective situational awareness, which 
Peterson (1983) acknowledged in his model of interactive levels of analysis as shown 
in figure 2.7. These levels of awareness mark fundamental differences between the 
simpler awareness of repetitive vehicle assembly and the complexities of aero repair.
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It is a great shame that Wellins did not develop his models of autonomy and team 
working and align his work with the human factor management issues as outlined by 
Peterson (1983) and later Reason (2003). The shame is that, at the same time 
mainstream management literatures were promoting team working and autonomy the 
human factors literatures, exemplified by Reason, had switched attention from 
‘blaming the individual’ upon detection of a failure, to accepting it was an 
inappropriately designed system that created the potential for failure. An incorrectly 
designed system would therefore include all the problems associated with commercial 
pressures but equally the dysfunctions of an incorrect structure and unclear hierarchy 
of control/decision making. As such the two literatures of management and 
organisational behaviour never benefited from the human factors analyses of 
operations management and more general human psychology. In this manner it was 
the operations management field of study that lost the most and did not return to this 
debate until well into the new millennium as research shifted from high volume 
environments (such as car production) to low volume activities and repair work.
Figure 2.7 Interactive Levels of Analysis
Level of analysis 
1. Individual
Direct and indirect effects’
Work design 
Productivity 
Self-perceptions 
Psychological contracts
2. Department
3. Organisation
Role structure 
Physical layout 
Interaction patterns 
Management behaviours
Relationships among departments 
Organisational structures 
Reward systems 
Organisational flexibility
Source: Peterson (1983)
Peterson may justifiably be claimed to be an STST researcher albeit with a 
psychological bias. His model shows what he considered to be the most important 
hierarchy of operations management systems design. These principles were echoed by
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the main human factors researchers of the time and were duly accepted by the 
researcher as critical areas of management that would influence the design of this 
study. In effect Peterson provided a framework of analysis that could be applied in 
order to understand the vagaries and contingencies of human factors within aero 
repair. Peterson’s model therefore provided a general framework by which the 
researcher could test the position of other human factor specialists, such as Maurino 
(2006) who claimed that traditional approaches to human error had ignored a major 
gap in the operational management thinking -  that of poor design and operational 
designs increasing the likelihood of failure.
Peterson’s research draws attention to the relationships between technology and team 
working, which Applebaum & Batt (1994) claimed was a critical relationship shown 
by their researches with the world-class manufacturing case study of the Xerox 
Corporation. Their findings found a positive connection between its quality 
management system and self-managed teams, which resulted in high output 
performance. They attributed the improved performance to direct investment in team 
empowerment in areas such as safety management, work planning and control of 
products and processes. The benefits resulted in Xerox achieving reduced levels of 
management hierarchy; the elimination of supervision also resulted in closer and 
better working relationships and improved system performance measures (such as 
cost, quality and delivery).
Applebaum and Batt (1994) concluded that two key forms of STST systems existed; 
namely the American version of Japanese ‘team led’ lean systems and a Swedish 
version which “Combines the principles o f Swedish sociotechnical systems and self- 
managed with those o f quality engineering”. The researchers describe the second 
model as a high performing system that favours an eclectic approach, involving a mix 
of Lean production and statistical process control. By contrast the former model 
represents a pure Lean approach that includes individual involvement through team 
participation in problem-solving events.
Thus far, this chapter has presented the power and seductive rationality of how a well 
designed STS can result in higher performance and how STST authors generally 
believe that the most evolved (European) form of STST organisational model is one 
of self managed teams albeit that empirical research stops short of providing design
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advice as to how to implement such a system or what features of the system will 
change and be contingent upon the extent of regulation experienced by the 
product/process of a regulated and non-linear type of repair business. The next section 
of this chapter will explore some of the weaknesses that were discovered during the 
literature review.
2.4 Limitations of Socio-Technical Systems
So far this chapter has promoted a movement away from scientific ‘one best way’ 
management towards socio technical systems perspective of high performance 
management. The review has highlighted the importance of an open systems approach 
to the study of manufacturing organisations and the need to assess both technical as 
well as social elements of work design to be studied. Whilst generally accepting the 
STST approach to integrating human resources with technical working practices, the 
literature also falls short in terms of enabling the researcher to extract the best design 
for this study.
The literature has suggested that the best form of study should include a business 
whose structures are organic in nature and involve whole task autonomous working. 
However, STST offers no direct design instructions and limited predictive utility for 
the optimisation of safety-critical organisations such as those found in the aero engine 
repair sector. The low volume, high variety and high employee discretion 
environments are not covered by any STST study since the initial work conducted in 
the 1960s. In parallel, those studies of human factors in regulated industries have 
promoted the need for supervision and multiple layers of supervision without really 
addressing the real structural issues of a business or indeed high commercial 
performance (Reason, 2003).
The STST approach recognises the importance of organisational learning24 and the 
positive impact of such an approach on the adaptive capability of the business and 
continuous improvement activities. However, even Pasmore (1988) fails to advocate 
the methods of learning and effective organisational change interventions that support 
high performance. Indeed, even operations management authors have tended not to 
assess such structures or ignore these issues and present this aspect of change 
management as largely unproblematic (Hayes & Wheelwright, 1984; Brown, 1996).
24 This approach is known as ‘single loop’ learning
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However, for brownfield businesses, such as the one found in this study, the 
emulation of high performing models requires a lot of learning and adaptation of 
existing systems and cultures to achieve the autonomous team-based structure. Further 
STST researchers have not truly questioned the work of contingency theorists and 
instead they have tended towards an organic structure even though contingency 
theorists might argue that the aero industry is slow, regulated, more bureaucratic and 
therefore more likely to need a mechanistic management model and a traditional 
structure. Even Emery (1969) offers no insight into how safety conscious 
management in his long-wall mining organisations structured their affairs and what 
level of decision-making was passed to the operations teams. As such, the little 
evidence shows how a business may change to become more autonomous but studies 
do not show the limits of autonomy.
Where such team-based practices are described or explored, operations management 
authors tend to regard innovations (that originate from Japanese Lean and TQM 
systems) as easy to transfer from one country to another. Indeed, many authors argue 
that the techniques are simple enough to understand and therefore need only good 
leadership to implement (Schonberger, 2002). The implication is that there will be 
little resistance from the established leadership patterns and learning will ease existing 
leaders into a new ‘enlightened’ STST role. The models of self-management under 
conditions of TQM and Lean production will, according to Caffyn & Bessant (1996), 
experience the greatest learning challenges and generate much resistance even when 
businesses use the same methods and improvement techniques. In view of this 
situation Pugh (1968) notes that Japanese practices have “...become part o f the world­
wide organisational convergence across cultures, and many organisations in different 
cultures are looking for further ways o f benefiting from the Japanese approach as 
William Ouchi demonstrates ... while this convergence might apply to the formal 
management structures o f the organisations, it does not apply to the actual behaviour 
o f the organisational members in different cultures -  even when the structure is the 
same ...there are, therefore, considerable cross-cultural differences existing between 
organisations. The issue is: are they moving towards convergence and, if  so, how 
fast?”
The STST school of thought therefore offers some insight into the processes of 
isomorphic change and the way in which Lean and TQM systems are translated from
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their essentially automotive origins to the aero repair sector. The approach also allows 
an investigation of how best to optimise or understand levels of sub optimisation as a 
result of management design.
The literature review has also exposed a gap in the body of knowledge concerning the 
treatment of high discretion work environments and how modem models of high 
performance have been and are being translated. The most significant gap concerns 
how human error factors are taken into account when seeking not to trade off between 
speed and safety. The model shown below in figure 2.8 illustrates this position in 
terms of those approaches. The features of this model will be explored in the 
subsequent sections that follow within the focal literature of high performance 
operations management designs practices of autonomous work teams.
Figure 2.8
Background Literature Audit Trail (Accepted and Rejected Theories).
S v s t p m s  T h p n r v i ^  KeV Them es for Contemporary
Socio-Technical Systems Designs
Rejected
Theories
Contingency
Theory
Control
Theory
Socio-Technical
Systems
Theory
Organic Structures and Team 
Working
Teams designed around w hole Tasks
Team Focus on Quality Improvement 
and greater efficiency
The role o f m anagem ent is to  Plan 
the future and performance 
improvements needed to  m eet 
commercial realities
Cultural and Professional differences 
are largely unproblematic
Extensive investm ents are needed  
to ensure em ployees work in a 
standard m anner/solve problems
Source: Researcher
After reflection, Contingency theory, and other theories such as control theory, were 
rejected because they described the support structural considerations of the firm rather 
than self-managed team structures, which is the subject of this study. Further most 
contingency studies showed that firms with structures that are similar to the norm will 
perform better than others yet this study is concerned with an innovative structural
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arrangement of shop floor teams. Whilst control theory was investigated it was also 
dismissed because it is essentially a model of monitored performance and team 
dynamics rather than a full human factor approach to TQM/high performance. It was 
difficult to disentangle much of the human relations theories from the human factors 
and socio-technical theories and the study, whilst cognisant of individual motivation, 
is more concerned with system factors of which individual motivation would be one 
variable/element. The most appropriate theory in which to house this study was 
considered to be Organisational Systems Theory and Socio Technical Systems Theory 
in particular. The latter presents a coherent body of knowledge that links structures, 
processes and technology in a manner that is associated with high performance. The 
researcher duly accepted socio-technical systems theory as the foundation for this 
study and concentrated on operations management as the focal literature set.
The next section of this literature will present a review of the operations management 
field of study to show how STST designs underpin modem models of high 
performance organisations and quality management practices, albeit in contexts of 
low variety, low personal discretion and the level of quality applied.
2.5 Contemporary Operations Management
Organisational and operations management literatures have remained largely detached 
since the study of industrial organisations and even today the most fruitful form of 
management study is to look at issues that position operations management within the 
business. Such a divorce is ironic given the impact of industrial engineering on the 
early models of organisational design under classical scientific management and how 
industrial engineering has been the critical success factor in Lean and TQM systems 
(Womack & Jones, 1996; Hellsten and KlesQo, 2000; Escrig-Tena, 2004; Catchpole 
et al, 2007).
Neither the organisational or operations management bodies of knowledge deal 
effectively with high variety and low volume sectors or studies of safety/error 
management. Most academic studies of quality management have rarely ventured into 
this classification of production organisation. In the few occasions that studies have 
done so they have tended to concentrate on the tools/techniques used or the use of 
quality management practices from an employee and perceptual approach Clifford &
66
Sohal (1998). As such, a study of this sector presents a major addition to the body of 
knowledge in this difficult industrial sector.
In spite of well published literature by Hill (1987) & Slack (1991) the concept of 
‘manufacturing sub-systems’ has not been fully integrated into the organisational 
literatures and safety literatures have not explored the application of lean ways of 
working. Within the operations management field of study, working practices often 
run ahead of academic models and this is particularly true of high performance 
operations management which has continued to study working practices and their 
emulation rather than looking deeper into the design of the system -  the biggest 
culprit of this lack of study concerns the emulation of Japanese TQM systems by 
Western businesses. However, the researcher found that, unlike bureaucratic 
monopoly manufacturers, the evidence of studies of regulated industries that face 
commercial pressures to change is limited. As such, the combination of STST and 
modem operations management is timely and adds significant understanding as to 
how leaner and safe working practices can coexist. This study also sheds light on the 
design of safe systems and how an autonomous team structure is counter to the 
organisational literature of bureaucracy, there is a slowness of decision making 
resulting in a negative impact on performance, thus limiting the possible 
achievements of a system design.
In order to understand this operations management (OM) design dilemma further the 
researcher will now discuss the main features of ‘manufacturing sub-systems’ starting 
with the origins of contemporary management thinking based on the work of Skinner 
(1974). Skinner was the first researcher to argue that operations management could be 
a means of competitive advantage -  if the operations subsystem was correctly 
designed and integrated within the organisation rather than treating operations 
management as a purely isolated activity conducted by insular industrial engineers 
(the consequence and legacy of the scientific management era). His model of 
manufacturing advocated a strategic elevation of operations management (away from 
a functional specialism and towards a strategically integrated executive decision­
maker). His proposal was that, if well designed, OM should provide a pivotal role 
within an organisational structure and this mantra has guided operations management 
thinking for the last 40 years. Leading figures, exemplar practitioners and theorists 
have all, to a greater or lesser extent of explicit acknowledgement, held this view over
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the past 30 years (Hayes & Wheelwright, 1984;Womack & Jones, 1996; Schonberger, 
2002; and Peters, 1993).
Skinner’s work (1974) has also influenced the rise of ‘quality thinking* within 
operations management because he challenged the myopic attention to cost under the 
traditional model and he argued in favour of additional performance objectives for 
operations management -  notably quality. It is also important to note that at the time 
of Skinner’s work the codification of Total Quality Management practices by Deming
(1986) was also happening albeit America remained impervious to these ideas until 
the late 1980s. It should be noted that at this time the works of the socio-technical 
systems theorists such as Emery & Trist (1963) were also gaining popularity amongst 
organisational managers in the UK and Europe, based on the introduction and 
business benefits of autonomous team working but in the absence of TQM. The 
combination of these authors and the general themes in the literature was a strong 
rejection of demarcated business functions (classical ‘scientific management’) and an 
organisation and operations subsystem that is based on greater participation, 
devolution of decision-making, and an awareness of process management.
Although Skinner never gave up his belief that ‘cost’ would always be the key 
performance objective for operations systems but that it should be joined by others, 
his thoughts have migrated through various other generations of operations 
management authors to resulting in a new ‘no trade-off approach to operations 
performance objectives (Slack et al, 2008). The new position suggests that when cost 
is seen as an outcome of an operations management system, the primary objective 
then becomes the focus of the product itself, in terms of achieving quality, and then 
delivery capabilities. In other words, traditional trade-offs would have included the 
cost of the product versus the quality of the product, such that managers would expect 
to charge a premium for higher quality products. Whereas when a higher emphasis is 
placed on quality as the key performance objective, the organisational performance 
results in lower waste and theoretically lower costs (figure 2.9).
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Figure 2.9 Dimensions of M anufacturing Strategy
Hypothesis
1 The operations or manufacturing function can be a strong competitive resource if 
properly designed and operated.
2 Cost, efficiency and productivity, while commonly accepted as the most important 
performance objectives, are generally too narrow and limited and, paradoxically, self- 
defeating to create competitive advantage. The following performance objectives 
need to be considered:
Cost, efficiency, and productivity Delivery lead-times, Quality, Service & 
Flexibility for product change reliability.
The investment required in the Flexibility for volume change 
production system
3 A focused strategic objective or ‘manufacturing task* based on one or two of the 
above objectives is derived from the firm’s competitive strategy, economics and 
technological opportunities.
4 To meet the strategic objective, operations system must be designed and tailored to 
focus on that task, with limited ranges of products, markets, technologies, degrees of 
process demands and order quantities.
5 The key job of high-level managers is the design of the supporting structure of OM. 
A strategically designed structure is the key to the operations function becoming a 
powerful competitive weapon.
6 The structure of an operating system is derived from decisions concerning ‘make 
versus buy’, capacity, equipment and processes, number size and location of 
facilities, what products are made in which plants, and the management systems for 
production planning, scheduling and control, information systems, quality control, 
organisational structure, and work-force management.
Source: Taken From Skinner (1974)
Schonberger (2002) was one of the first authors to contend the ‘no trade-off 
argument, claiming that when quality is considered as the first objective of an 
operational management system, almost all other key performance indicators (KPI) 
are affected positively. In other words, if quality improves then efficiency, in terms of 
flow, is increased thereby manifesting in less cost, and improved, lead-time 
performance that can be passed onto the customer in terms of increased customer 
satisfaction. The critical issue presented by Schonberger was the prioritisation of 
quality methods and its causal link to higher performance. This theme has continued 
to the present day and few authors have contradicted this new logic of operations 
system design. Although Schonberger clearly shows quality as a strategic and 
measured part of operations management, he proposes no further design advice 
concerning how best to structure quality management and sustained improvement.
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The model as shown below in figure 2.10 typifies the ‘no trade-off position where 
quality and delivery are characteristics of a high performing operational management 
system.
Figure 2.10 Trade-off Selections for Manufacturing Strategies
Trade-off Proposition
Mass
Production
Logic
New
Wisdom
Lead time vs. delivery reliability Yes No
Quality capability vs. quality consistency Yes No
Quality consistency vs. price Yes No
Quality capability vs. price Yes Yes
Design flexibility vs. price Yes Yes
Design flexibility vs. lead-time Yes Yes
Lead-time vs. flexibility Yes Reduced level of 
impact
Source: adapted from New (1992)
The main principle of the ‘no trade o ff school of operations management thought is 
the need to align operations structures with organic and flexible teams (Slack, 1991; 
New, 1992). Such an approach is reinforced by Roth (1995) in his empirical study of 
782 British manufacturers. He discovered that high performing business which 
operated with multiple objectives were found to be more successful than scientific 
forms of manufacturing and that these businesses worked in a ‘quality first’ mode. 
Baker & Mapes (1996) also supported the quality approach and argued that, as a 
primary performance objective, it supported high performance and that when a quality 
first approach is taken “Most measures o f operating performance show a significant 
positive correlation’s with each other” There is widespread support for the concept 
that performance indicators can be mastered through a process of competency, which 
commences with quality management. However, less evidence was offered about the 
best structure with which to enact this process of mastery or how contingency factors 
impact upon the most likely design of the business. However modem approaches to 
improvement such as Lean and TQM have implicitly and explicitly accepted that all 
improvement commences with a mastery of quality methods/performance reliability. 
See figure 2.11.
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Figure 2.11 Five Forms of Manufacturing Advantage
Market
Advantage
Role of
Operations
Management
Key Performance 
Indicators
Supporting
Authors
Quality To make things 
right.
Internal & Customer 
defect levels.
Deming (1982) 
Oakland (1989) 
Garvin (1992).
Speed To make things 
fast.
Value-adding ratio & 
throughput times.
Mather (1988), 
Plossl (1991).
Delivery To make things on 
time.
On-time delivery, 
frequency of delivery 
& buffer levels.
Hall (1987), 
Plossl (1991)
Flexibility Changing and 
updating what is 
made.
Changeover times & 
ability to late- 
configure products 
(customisation).
Shingo (1986), 
DeMeyer et al 
(1989), Hamel & 
Prahalad (1994).
Cost To make things 
cheaply.
Cost of manufacturing, 
supplies & overheads.
Skinner (1974), 
Fine & Hax 
(1985).
Source: Adapted from Slack (1991) pp 7-8
2.6 Critique of Operations Management Performance Objective Logic
Having reviewed the operations management literature, the term ‘safety management’ 
is wholly absent from these models and is, at best, implicit in the term quality 
management and quality focus. This omission may well reflect the focus of the 
operation management researchers, within new and volume orientated production 
processes, which are characterised as linear in their design.
Interestingly, there is no mention of safety management as a key performance 
measure in the operations management literature (Slack, 1991). Further there is a 
dominance of studies from batch processes (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984) and Hill
(1987), which fail to show any clear indication of the optimal structure with which to 
enact or build the high performance organisation (regardless of whether that high 
variety/low volume business is within a regulated sector or not).
Under batch processes where volume is high, repetition is high and safety factors are 
comparatively lower than those of high variety and low volume production of safety 
critical devices -  such as the context of non-linier environments for example, aero 
engine overhaul & repair. In highlighting this position the researcher contends that the 
human element of quality control falls short in its explanation of how to manage
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engineering activities within the context of TQM generally and that this lack of safety 
management has allowed a theme of ‘delivery’ to emerge in the literature or at best 
the implicit belief that safety is an element of the quality approach itself. Whichever 
view is taken, the current operations management literature is weak and potentially 
flawed.
2.7 Operations Management and High Performance Structures
Reflecting upon the operations management and socio-technical systems thinking 
literatures there is a common focus on organic and team based structures that enact 
the practices needed to achieve high quality performance. From the operations 
management it is not clear how such a team approach can work in a system of self­
management, without a single person who is responsible for team quality 
performance. Within the STST literature there is a position known as the ‘linking pin’ 
(a supervisor), most operations management authors have named this position -  the 
team leader (Womack and Jones, 1996; Levey and Munck, 2002; McCulloch et al, 
2010). The position of team leader derives from the preferred structure of Japanese 
high performance businesses such as Toyota (Hampson, 1999; Haynes, 1999, Radnor 
and Boaden, 2004).
A team leader is therefore the front line of management who takes responsibility for 
the management of the team and operational controls such as safe working and human 
factors (Parker, 2003; Harshit, 2005). This role is much broader than that of the 
supervisor as defined by authors such as Mullins (1993). Within the context of self­
managed teams -  the team leader is absent by initial design or has been removed 
during an adaptation to the current state operations management structure. As such, 
there is no focal accountability even though systems will inevitably have latent failure 
causes and self-management relies upon an extremely high level of self-discipline by 
the individual.
Without this central role it is posited by the researcher that the team will lack focus, 
coordination and have no means of translating or directing efforts to improve quality 
performance. In this manner the team becomes exposed to commercial pressures as a 
group and manage their own human factors compliance of a process that most 
operations authors believe is critical to high performance.
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The implications of the quality-first underpinning to performance objectives and the 
modem approach to highly performing systems are that accepting quality as a primary 
driver for business performance does not limit nor imply which structures are best in 
terms of a mechanistic or an organic approach (the strategy: structure debate to which 
this chapter will return). Furthermore, if self management is considered the most 
evolved stage of deployed decision making and the closest way to control the 
production process then the operations management literature confirms the need to 
research the high variety, low volume and high discretion/regulated operations 
systems. Again this cursory review of operations systems performance objectives 
confirms the importance of the main research question of this study and
“7b what extent can self-managed team working, facilitate the principles o f safe Total 
Quality Management?”
Within the context of the aviation industry and the management of life-threatening 
safety errors, this gap in the body of knowledge deserves to be closed as part of the 
contribution of this study.
The strategy (codified into operations management performance objectives) and the 
structure of the organisation to ensure high quality is a subject to which the technical 
safety literature has also paid insufficient attention. Reason (2003), the human factor 
safety guru, stops far short of acknowledging the role of improvement and quality 
processes in favour of a more technical view of safety and safe systems using 
bureaucratic supervision. Reason himself makes mention of team working or its 
impact, positive or negative, on safety compliance and high performance or high 
reliability. This thesis concerns effective team working for safety and high 
performance management. The term high performance is elusive and there are no 
measures of ‘world class’ standards. For the purpose of this thesis, the term high 
performance means a compliance with EASA regulation part 145 (the global 
standard) as well as local measures of quality, on time in full delivery and safety 
compliance indicators including reported accidents, near miss reporting, poor 
behavioural safety practices and the number of changes requested by operating teams 
to enhance the resilience of the operating system.
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However, Reason does draw a causal linkage between the working environment, 
stress levels that result from commercial pressures to deliver product, and 
management weaknesses as key sources of system failure. He argues that these are 
contributory factors to individual breaches of safety. In this respect Reason implies 
that structure is more important than strategy and, to a high degree, commercial 
pressures and total quality management practices/learning how to improve processes 
by teams is secondary to enforced policing of the operations system by the 
supervisor/specialist. Self-management should be avoided on the grounds of the need 
to separate production from inspection. Reason’s systems model therefore deals 
ineffectively with issues such as team working, responsibility and accountability for 
quality, and the role of the specialist as a system designer who will never work within 
it. Before building a model of safety management, the researcher will continue to 
explore the role of Total Quality and its impact on operations management designs.
To put in context the importance of structures for safety management and the 
importance of quality management practices (as a means of learning how to improve) 
it is first necessary to explore the evolution of industrial quality thinking. The Total 
Quality Management leading thinkers also present alternative models of 
organisational structures and stress certain working practices as associated with high 
performance. The next section of this chapter will review the evolution and 
contribution of Total Quality Management on contemporary management.
Modem models of high performance operations management rest heavily upon a 
foundation of technical TQM and also the soft ‘human’ aspects of TQM that 
determine the adaptive capability of the firm (improvement) and the ultimate 
determinate of performance (employees determine how optimally the technology is 
used). Various studies have confirmed this relationship with high performance and a 
process based view of operations management (rather than a functional view). As 
such business systems are treated as dependent and integrated processes, which are 
not reliant on individual activities; this is another significant parallel with STST 
theories as previously discussed.
2.8 A Brief History of Industrial Quality Evolution
Industrial quality management grew as a mainstream aspect of engineering knowledge 
when it began to be codified after the Second World War (and during the latter part of
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mass production and the scientific management era). From this point in history, 
quality management grew from the sole prerogative of quality inspectors to quality 
management practices vested in every employee. Total Quality Management is 
therefore ‘total’, all embracing and covers the activities of the entire organisation 
including the design of operations systems and their daily management (Hines et al, 
2004). In this manner, it can be seen that TQM has a very critical impact on the skills 
of personnel, the robustness of processes and how learning results in improvement at 
the workplace
Early theories of operations management were based upon industrial engineering and 
the scientific management approach of Taylor (1947). This approach denied 
employees the engagement with process management where no skills were transferred 
to employees and all quality management authority was vested in engineers. As such, 
standardised work and close supervision, with the treatment of workers as 
automatons, typified this approach/ business model that saw employees as money 
motivated and untrustworthy (Mullins, 1993).
Safety failures were therefore considered not to result from the system but from the 
individual (carelessness, deliberate sabotage etc.) of an uneducated workforce. Indeed 
historical records show that safety management was a low priority with deaths being 
common in many workplaces. Similarly quality standards were designed by 
engineers, and quality specialists served as arbiters of good and bad using final 
inspection of the work produced -  the employee was divorced from this 
responsibility. The job description of the operator reflected instead the quantity of 
work conducted often regardless of its quality (Fisher & Nair, 2009). Functional 
specialisation was commonplace with demarcated silo’s and ‘command and control’ 
management practices. Another central belief was that if left unmanaged workers 
would stop all production through the concept of ‘systematic soldiering’ (Taylor, 
1947), the countermeasure to which was greater levels of supervision. Taylor 
proposed, “ What workman want from their employers beyond anything else is high 
wages. What employers want beyond anything else is low labour costs” and this 
statement shows the friction and alienation of the worker (a mechanistic design as 
outlined by the contingency theorists Bums & Stalker 1961).
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Such a mechanistic approach to the design and structure of the industrial organisation 
worked well in many US and European aviation organisations and these businesses 
prospered from this approach. The UK by contrast, struggled to deliver the same 
standards of success, which Kogut & Parkinson (1993) explain in terms of a lack of 
investment in capital intensity and training to support a growing and formalised socio- 
technical system. However, the mass production approach and its logic underpinned 
the manner in which British businesses were managed, structured and controlled 
(Weber, 1948).
Bums (2000) claimed that scientific management still remains a dominant factor in 
most UK aerospace businesses today, owing to its heavily regulated systems of 
production, where written rules and procedures have proven successful in ensuring the 
safety requirements of complex aircraft system law. As such, the industry tends 
towards a system of rules and compliance and regulatory bodies that favour 
mechanistic approaches to operations management rather than creativity, learning and 
improvement. Further to this claim, Bums argues that the scientific approach also 
provides a wholly legitimate quality framework where managers can remain legally 
accountable for the safety implications of quality, based on what he termed as the 
rational system of industrial control. In this respect the study has encountered another 
phenomenon that is worthy of additional study -  a further conflict between the 
traditionally dominant model of scientific management and that of self-managing 
work teams. The formalisation of the scientific method regime at least ensured quality 
standards through formalisation and direct supervision whereas self-managing teams 
lack these levels of defence and error management.
The scientific approach relies upon formalised rules and bureaucracy as first proposed 
by Weber (1948), who proclaimed that bureaucracy should remain a central feature of 
scientific management, because it eliminated what he referred to as ‘human 
fallibility’, based on following the principles of ‘There is one best way for all 
organisations\  Such an approach legitimised managerial authority and the 
management prerogative to design systems within a scientific approach to rationality 
whilst managing a business for profit.
The managerial prerogative was offset by a perception that the workforce was 
motivated only by money, and the fallibility of employees was an individual problem,
76
which, if it were to persist, should result in the termination of the individual’s 
employment. In this manner safe working was considered an individual issue and not, 
as is currently the view, the result of a poorly designed or an adaptive system of latent 
errors. These financial motivations are increasingly questioned by recent 
organisational theorists who propose instead that the team is the fundamental building 
block of the modem ‘consensus based* organisation (Kanter, 1989, Womack and 
Jones, 1996). These traditional values are contra to the principles of STST; a more 
modem approach to quality management has much greater empathy with the STST 
approach whilst still providing a rigorous method of quality control (Pasmore, 1988). 
During the scientific management phase of management thinking, the dominant 
classical management model regarded quality management as a business function and 
not a process. A subsequent lack of investment in employee skills and a focus on 
quality in terms of specialist departments created problems for new business when the 
power of demand and supply switched away from the producer and on to the 
consumer. This switch exposed problems with the insular and functional specialist 
view of quality and placed a greater need to ensure process control and the 
engagement of more workers to support the specialists. In other words, quality 
became more of an individually owned concept rather than the problem of the quality 
department.
2.9 Moving From Quality Inspection to Quality Management
The switch away from functional quality inspection and control also suited engineers 
(those employees with the greatest technical skills) who were also dislocated by the 
system design in so much as they were ultimately held accountable for quality even 
though the performance of the operator was actually the causal activity that generated 
the quality output measure. The new move to process quality assurance therefore 
opened many new avenues for the engineers themselves and enabled a more proactive 
and cross-functional ‘team’ approach to be undertaken. Further, the move to the new 
era of quality assurance re-skilled the workforce and the pressure of powerful 
consumers meant that the cost of poor quality rose dramatically at the same time that 
the lead-times for products were reduced (Deming, 1982). The need for process 
quality assurance to satisfy consumer pressures therefore required a more organic and 
less ‘functional silo’ structure to the business and from the 1960s onwards markets 
became more competitive and required a much quicker response to market demands. 
By the 1980s businesses had evolved and emerged with organisational processes that
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were more adaptive, where the quality approach was one of total quality management 
involving all business processes. These innovations were stimulated and greatly 
accelerated by the exposure and publication of Japanese high performance working 
practices. Figure 2.12 shows the major differences between the traditional 
management methods of scientific quality management and that of TQM, which has 
emerged since the 1980’s (Seddon, 2000).
Figure 2.12 Scientific Management vs. Total Quality Management
Perspective Scientific Quality Management Total Quality Management
Design of work Silo Management Flow Driven
Attitude to customers Contractual Value Driven
Decision-making Separated from work Team Work
Measurement Related to budget Customer Related
Attitude to suppliers Contractual Co-operative
Management ethos Budgets & people Learning Culture
Source: Taken from Seddon (2000)
It should be noted that even today where aerospace organisations have become more 
aligned with the concept of organic structures there are still working practices that 
resemble this earlier period of industrial history. Mullins (1993) contends that 
aerospace organisations have provided resistance to such a general trend of 
manufacturing and have favoured the practice of ‘closed book’ management, which is 
of particular significance to this study. Again Mullins’ (1993) arguments provide a 
contradiction and gap in the body of operations management knowledge. Such a gap 
suggests either unwillingness or an inability to reconcile the contingencies of 
aerospace with the practices of TQM.
2.10 The Requirements of TQM
The newly emerging model of TQM for general industry required development of 
new internal relationships and a capability for improvement rather than management 
by ‘rulebook’ and command/control in isolation to a team approach (Bootzin, 1983). 
Bootzin claimed that as organisations grow they would also experience the need for 
improvement and for businesses to become more flexible/adaptive to meet 
commercial needs (an open systems approach to business). The impact of
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consumerism means businesses that cannot react quickly and provide customers what 
they want will, he argued, decline. From the literature review of TQM, the researcher 
compiled an evolutionary model of management thinking with five distinct stages of 
development (figure 2.13). The first stage of the summary model is most closely 
featured within the classical school of ‘scientific’ management, which as discussed 
previously is the oldest and most traditional form of a quality management system. As 
industrial systems grew this approach during the 1970s developed into a more 
mathematical and graphical approach that sought to measure and control processes 
using statistical forms of analyses. The responsibility for managing this approach 
rested with the quality department as opposed to the individual. Although, by the 
1980s, the focus had once again changed towards a more compliance-based 
methodology that used organisational systems, which were formally documented and 
controlled through audited quality management systems such as BS5750 and ISO 
9001 (the accreditation award was based on a third party audit of practices). The 
watershed point in contemporary TQM thinking occurred during the 1990’s and 
reflected an approach to company-wide integration including the embedding of total 
quality language and mental models within the values and goals of the business 
(Storey 1994). By the early 2000s the view of total quality management had for all 
businesses, and the aero industry in particular, met with major problems in terms of a 
system that was failing to deliver the quality assurance performance levels that were 
expected by consumers and set by competitors (primarily Japanese businesses).
The last evolution presented in the model is the 5th stage, which has not been proposed 
by any other operations management or human factors author, is the concept of TQM 
management practice that is extended to cover the quality of the entire process from 
repair to returning the aircraft to service (an integrated supply chain approach). The 
fifth stage therefore integrates human factors engineering with decentralized 
management and autonomous teams as a natural extension of the management ‘best 
practices’ in the structure, execution and improvement of work.
As can be seen in figure 2.13, the precision and seductive rationality of the classical 
approach and all of its management benefits conflict with the modem approach to 
team based improvements. These frictions have not ‘gone away’ and modem models 
of high performance operations management continue to wrestle with the human 
resource issue. Many studies show how businesses have engaged team structures and 
yet still failed to generate the level of improvements necessary to compete Wellins
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(1992) and even more show a clear correlation of success with a ‘top down’ 
management approach (Womack and Jones, 1996).
Figure 2.13 Historical Overview of Quality System from 1950 To 2009
Identifying
Characteristics
Stage 1
Inspection
1950s
Stage 2
Statistical
Quality
Control
1970s
Stage 3
Quality 
Assurance 
ISO 9000 
1980s
Stage 4
Total Quality 
Management
1990s
Stage 5
Human 
Factors 
In Quality 
Management 
2000+
Theoretical
Perspectives Scientific Scientific
Scientific & 
Humanistic Humanistic
Scientific & 
Humanistic
Quality
Perspectives
Problems To 
Resolve
Problems To 
Resolve
A Problem To 
Be Resolved 
Proactively
A Com petitive 
Opportunity
Problems To 
Resolve
Concerns Detection Control Coordination Strategic Impact Safety
Theoretical
Authors
W eber (1948) 
Taylor (1947) 
Drucker (1990)
Shainin (1957) 
Deming (1960) 
Shingo (1985)
Ishikawa
(1984)
Herzberg
(1987)
Akao (1990)
Juran (1944) 
Maslow (1987) 
Goldratt (1994)
Rasmussen
(1998)
Reason (2003) 
W est (2004)
Emphasis
Product
Uniformity
Product 
Uniformity 
W ith Inspection
Engaging The 
Entire 
Production 
System
The M arket Based 
On Customer 
Needs Removing 
W aste & 
Variation
Quality Based 
On Socio- 
Technical 
Equilibriums
Methods
Gauging & 
Measurement
Statistical Tools 
& Techniques
Programs & 
System s Six Sigma & Lean
Maintenance 
Error Decision 
Aid
Role of Quality 
Professionals
Inspection
Sorting
Counting & 
Grading
Troubleshooting
Quality 
M easurem ent 
& Quality 
Planning
Facilitation 
Educators 
Goal Setting
Analyzing 
Input vs. 
Output 
Human 
Factors
Roles & 
Responsibilities
Inspection 
Departments 
Rift between 
creating
problem and 
detecting it
M anufacturing 
& Engineering
All
Departments
Self-M anaged 
Teamwork Based 
On Quality Being 
Everyone’s 
Responsibility
Psychologists 
Engineers & 
Managers
Orientation & 
Approach
Inspects In 
Quality
Controls In 
Quality
Builds In 
Quality M anagers In 
Quality
Human
Factors In 
Quality
Human factors
system
Deskilled 
operators 
controlled by 
specialist 
(Reactive)
Closer
monitoring o f 
operators using 
charting 
(Reactive)
Com pliance to
formalized
and
established
processes
(Reactive)
Shared knowledge 
Process controls 
and designed-out 
failings 
Personal
responsibility for 
quality
TQM features 
but with 
addition o f 
Defence 
mechanisms 
and
reintroduced
inspectors
Source : Researcher Literature Review.
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2.11 Inspiring the New TQM Model
The position of the 'founding father’ of modem TQM is accredited to the American, 
W Edwards Deming (Bicheno & Catherwood, 2006) who, after the Second World 
War, was sent to Japan to help recover the country’s shattered industrial economy his 
work continued the general theme of human factors and system performance by 
management design. Despite the age of his work and theories they remain pertinent to 
modem businesses and few businesses have actually implemented all of his 
recommendations in order to achieve a highly effective socio-technical system. 
Deming rose to fame because his views were quickly adopted, in the 1960s, by the 
Japanese Union of Scientists & Engineers (JUSE)25 who were keen to use both his 
knowledge and experience in order to raise the quality levels of their industrial 
products and also to make the most of the scarce natural resources available within the 
country. However, Deming’s philosophy did not become popular in the UK until the 
early 1980s, when British businesses began to emulate Japanese working practices to 
‘Lean’ their business/organisational models (Rich, 1999; Bicheno and Catherwood, 
2006).
According to Womack & Jones (1990) early attempts of TQM gained global 
popularity amongst academic management literatures based on the success of 
industries such as Toyota, Honda and Panasonic. As a direct result of this success, 
Japanese ways of working were being adopted in many other western consumer 
markets, there was a rise in Japanese exports to countries like the United States, which 
in turn lost up to 50% of its automotive manufacturing as a direct result of the 
philosophy of total quality management movement.
Although, TQM may appear a relatively translatable concept, it should also be noted 
that a number of variations exist within the main body of TQM literature. The 
definition extracted from the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) that 
claims TQM as, “As a management approach for an organization, centered on 
quality, based on the participation o f all its members aimed at long-term success 
through customer satisfaction, benefiting all members o f the organization and 
society ” (ISO BSEN 9001, 2008).
25 JUSE is widely known as the Centre of Quality Control in Japan, who is responsible for managing 
the Deming Awards process.
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Oakland (1989) takes a socio-technical view and defined TQM as “A/z approach to 
improving the competitiveness, effectiveness and flexibility o f a whole organisation in 
such a way that brings everyone into the processes o f improvement9' He also proposed 
“TQM programmes promote quality as a strategic business imperative that requires 
re-evaluation for how organisational members can address the quality o f their work 
and production /service processes These views show a high level of consistency and 
this is true of operations management and TQM authors as well as between TQM 
gurus themselves who tend to emphasize its different facets rather than mark a 
fundamental departure in thinking.
When a comparison was made of the various definitions of TQM, by the researcher, it 
was found that a common denominator was the use of TQM as a strategic direction- 
setting device that also stimulated daily improvement processes. These two concepts 
are embodied in the Japanese phase of TQM, which followed Deming’s application of 
TQM at companies like Toyota. Ishikawa (1984), one of the Japanese academics to be 
influenced by Deming, argued that managers must learn to both lead and facilitate an 
effective change control process, based on quality education for all as part of 
Deming’s widely proclaimed 14 points of management. Ishikawa’s approach 
promoted a process based on organisational structure, which has little similarity with 
the classical and mechanistic management designs associated with Taylor (1947). It 
favoured a process-based structure, although Deming did accept the scientific 
methodology and controlled approach to managing businesses. The main techniques 
offered are based on controlling processes and creating greater transparency in human 
behaviour.
Another quality management guru to influence modem models of thought was Joseph 
Juran (1944). Juran was a work colleague of Deming’s who was also was promoted 
by JUSE and is credited with the ‘Juran trilogy’. The trilogy is again an attempt to 
increase the dependencies between teams within a business by promoting the concept 
of the internal customer and shows how high performance results from an attention to 
quality between internal business teams. His work also promoted the importance of 
management in planning ‘system transforming’ improvements and ‘breakthrough 
projects’ to enhance the flow of production by STST redesign. Juran is also credited 
for adding a human dimension to the field of TQM theory, based on a philanthropic
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approach that reinforced the STST principle that quality and human resource 
management are synonymous and only effective designs result in higher performance.
The researcher therefore accepts Juran’s contribution based on the philosophy that 
quality must acknowledge the responsibility for satisfying the complexity of human 
factors, based on maintaining a balance of resource for social and technological needs. 
In other words both Deming, and more significantly, Juran believed that quality 
problems should not be confined to the limitations of hardware system redesign, but 
extended to the management system of knowledge and skills. A concept, which is 
duly accepted as a critical factor in the consideration of the main research question 
where barriers to efficiency and effectiveness amongst self-managed teams could be 
seen as a direct result of inadequate socio-technical systems design. Juran was not 
alone in his line of thinking and as such the importance of effective socio-technical 
systems was closley associated with the work of Ishikawa (1984) within the context of 
‘quality circles’. Ishikawa’s contribution was therefore accepted as relevent to the 
design of this study, based on Lean methods tool and techniques that sought to 
enhance problem-solving skills between the manager and his or her self-managed 
team. Despite the apparent difference in approaches between TQM theorists, Storey 
(1994) argued that there is a commonality between what they recommend in terms of 
enablers for successful implementation.
Whilst much can be learned from the application of TQM and its impact on 
performance and internal relationships there is another set of studies that suggest the 
ideals of TQM are very hard to apply and even harder to sustain. The failings of TQM 
will now be reviewed.
2.12 The Difficulties of Implementing TQM
Total quality has grown to become the dominant logic of businesses in all sectors of 
the economy and quality improvement is now, in the modem operations literature, a 
precursor to high performance and leaner ways of working (Womack and Jones, 
1996). However, the reality of TQM implementation and successful exploitation in 
terms of performance objectives shows the application of TQM may well be much 
harder than portrayed by the quality gums. Research carried out by Usilaner (1993) 
focused on the failings of organisations to change from the previous regime of 
scientific management to the TQM model (figure 2.14). His research showed a
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number of major differences that exist between organisations who had succeeded with 
TQM compared with those who had failed.
Kearney (2002) confirms Usilaner’s view and provides research that showed in 
approximately 80% of all TQM programmes, none had been able to demonstrate any 
form of statistical success. For example 30% of the companies who took part in their 
study failed to report any significant improvements and furthermore 50% had no 
available information to demonstrate the quality of their business performance, 
although there was good evidence of the use of quality systems such as ISO 9000. But 
most, if not all, companies who took part in Kearney’s study experienced difficulties 
in adapting to the implementation of TQM especially when moving to the higher 
stages of business evolution (those features shown in the researcher’s model presented 
previously).
Figure 2.14 Characteristics of Failing TQM Programmes
Characteristics of Successful TQM Characteristics of TQM Programs 
Programs That Fail
Active top management leadership and 
commitment
TQM is considered to be in a state of 
permanent change based on culture, structure 
and processes
Well defined and widely communicated 
organizational strategies
TQM concepts integrated into the fabric of the 
organization with well-established reward and 
recognition programs.
Persistent, long term objectives and results
Minimal top management support
Failure to recognize the need for fundamental 
change with accompanying emphasis on TQM 
training, tools, and techniques.
Lack of overall organisational strategy.
Minimal integration of TQM with existing 
processes, and strategies
Expectations of quick results not achieved or 
sustained over time.
Source: Taken From Usilaner, 1993
Contributing to this discussion, Seddon (2000) argues for the existence of structural 
rift when some organisations attempt to practice scientific management in conjunction 
with the philosophy of TQM. The resultant factor being that these two systems were 
diametrically opposed and could never co-exist. Although Seddon says nothing of the 
‘soft’ system literature concerning TQM failures that has been highlighted by other
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TQM theorists, who claim that a general lack of investment is more likely to represent 
the root cause of TQM failure itself.
Arumugam (2005), using case research, revealed the significance of the 
implementation and sustainability of the soft aspects in TQM organisations. He 
considered that the correct design of these issues and the engagement of staff was 
essential for sustainability and long-term success. His study, based on a large 
Malaysian semi-conductor organisation, investigated the effects of soft issues when 
sustaining TQM from the perspective of employee’s attitudes to quality. The results, 
taken from 230 employees, revealed a significant relationship between individual 
attitudes towards quality that correlated with the organisational commitment of safety 
related factors.
Eskildson (2004) provides further support for the need of a bias for softer elements of 
the STS design and concluded that those management teams that used greater 
engagement techniques and available attitudinal measures when implementing TQM 
had fewer difficulties with lasting change.
In summary, the literature review has identified many aspects of quality management 
literature which suggests that, in the majority of cases, problems with quality, 
scientific or TQM are centred on the existence of gaps in social dimensions. It was 
Emery (1969) and later Pasmore (1988) who contended this position from an STST 
perspective and acknowledged it as a vital consideration in the successful application 
of operational management thinking. Ineffective socio-technical designs are likely to 
have created an environment, which is not conducive to the role and function of teams 
(self-managed or not). The OM literature has therefore shown that to become a world- 
class business or perform at the highest level possible, the mastery of quality must be 
applied. The first stage of which is duly accepted by the researcher from the approach 
put forward by Schonberger (2002) who argued that change management must be an 
integral feature of quality practice as a means of engendering a more efficient and 
effective range of methods to improve operational performance of material flows.
85
2.13 TQM and the Aerospace Sector
With reference to the aerospace sector, the direct results of the changes over time to 
management thought have not always resulted in emulation of ‘world class’ models, 
even though the industry may want to engage in such practices, and have often been 
the subject of regulator scrutiny. The changes to the management of quality prompted 
legal intervention in the sector, which has been constrained by prediction of future 
accidents and the need for more defence mechanisms to be introduced (separate 
inspection departments) to maintain a divorce between quality responsibility and 
operations/commercial responsibility). In other words value is not just a customer 
concept but should be considered as trade-off between the customer and the industry 
regulator. As such, any safety critical organisation such as the one found in this study 
must comply with regulator constraints that may limit what can be achieved from a 
quality and delivery point of view. The role of EASA therefore acted as a mediator to 
this position on behalf of CAA member states, major changes were enforced during 
the early part of 2004, and quality and productivity management were deliberately 
separated thus forging a new safety driven approach within TQM. Under these 
regulations the organisational structures through which operations and quality staff 
reported were deliberately disconnected to avoid any chance of conflicts of interest 
and the sacrificing of safety/quality for production performance. This intervention 
therefore added a new dimension to the organisational puzzle as to how best to 
structure the software and human aspects of the aerospace socio technical system. 
This single move therefore served to question the extent to which TQM could really 
be engaged by aerospace companies and, more germane to this study, whether self- 
managing operations teams could actually survive under these regulations.
Since July 2004, it is now a legal requirement for aero repair businesses to engage 
with new safety regulations that emphasise greater levels of control of quality 
operating management systems. Previously the management of product and process 
safety was seen as a key and integral facet of quality management, which in spite of 
the best interests of TQM researchers, had, to a large extent been completely ignored 
the lack of human factors thinking in the operations management literatures has added 
to this lack of management guidelines for effective TQM in repair businesses.
However, as previously noted this model does not rest well with the regulated 
aerospace sector and is a deductive model based upon trends in the organizational
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management literatures. These conflicts have not been explored in the academic 
literatures that focus on the organisation unlike the abundance of psychological 
literature regarding the pilot; even here the literature focuses on errors rather than 
quality management aspects of operations. The previous section has addressed the 
role of quality (TQM) as the first stage on the development of an operations system 
that performs well and enagages all staff in the improvement process. The next 
section will address the technical and hard aspects of high performance STST designs.
2.14 High Performance Management: Exploring the Focal Literature of Modern 
Total Quality Management & Lean Operations
The linking literature between the background systems theory, especially STST, and 
the focal operations management literature is that of the body of knowledge 
concerning organisational Total Quality Management (TQM) and the harder process 
flow enabling innovations known as Lean Manufacturing (LM). The technical 
attributes of high performing systems Nave (2002) describes as Lean/Sigma 
methodologies that provide the current evolution of quality thinking and the interface 
between quality and delivery performance objectives. In simple terms, these 
improvement processes blend:
on1. Efficiency -  The Lean Approach and Sigma Approach
2. Effectiveness -  Customer service and cost effective operations
Bicheno & Catherwood (2006) provide a comparative background of the two 
approaches (shown in figure 2.15) and these features are now accepted as the key 
features of world-class organisations. According to Bicheno (2004) these 
improvement systems are both reliant upon consensus and process based 
management, for a modem technical systems design and a migration from mass 
production to the exploitation of TQM.
26 Lean according to Ohno (1985)“Improves performance and leads to leaner operations, which in turn 
highlights poor quality and the need fo r  change” Based on the concept of PDCA.
27 Six Sigma is a methodology that relies heavily on statistical techniques to reduce defects using a 
methodology known as DMAIC (Define, Measure, Analyse, Improve and Control).
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Figure 2.15 Lean and Six Sigma Methods
Area Lean Six Sigma
Objectives Reduce Waste & Improve Customer Reduce Variation & improve Customer
Fram ew ork Value Value
Focus 5 Principles (Not Always Followed) DMAIC (Always Followed)
Im provem ent Value Streams Project Focus
Goals Many Small Improvements Small Number of Large Projects
Time Horizon Cost -  Quality -  Delivery -  Lead Time Improve sigma Levels 3.4 DPMO
People & Im provem ent Long-Term -  Continuous Short Term Project By Project
Tools Team led at different levels Black Belts Supported by Green Belts
Typical Early steps Often Simple But Complex To Use Complex & Statistical
Im pact Map the Value Stream Collect Data On Process Variation
Problem  Root Causes Large & System Wide Cost saving Project Approach
5 Whys (Weak) Design O f Experiments (Strong)
Source: Bicheno & Catherwood (2006)
2.15 Lean & Six Sigma
Over the past 20 years, these two improvement schools of thought have emerged 
concerning high performance operations management. One approach favours the 
understanding of process variation and its strict control by management and worker 
and is known as the ‘Six Sigma’ approach. The second approach, drawing from 
empirical studies of the demonstrated high performance of Japanese businesses (such 
as Toyota, Nissan, etc) focuses on eliminating waste and solving issues by exposing 
them as inhibitors to material flow. The latter approach is known as the ‘Lean 
approach’.
Whilst these approaches have a common foundation involving better performance 
they do have differences that are worthy of exploration in this study. Both these 
approaches have a distinct logic and approach to management, structures and 
improvement processes. Indeed, to many authors, these approaches can be integrated 
and Drickhamer (2002) proposes the merger of these two approaches to form the 
Lean-Sigma hybrid offers “...the solution to many complex and long-standing 
[quality] problems”. This view and approach is reinforced by other authors including 
Bicheno (2004) who draws a direct correlation between Lean Six-Sigma and world- 
class performance. The main features of this approach are shown in figure 2.16.
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In effect, the Six-Sigma approach is based on the mastery of Slack’s (1991) quality 
performance objective and then the delivery of products using the material flow focus 
of the Lean approach. These approaches were first combined by Japanese companies 
such as Toyota who used quality management as a means of engaging just in time 
innovations in material flow systems (Ohno, 1985; Monden, 1993, Liker, 2004). 
Figure 2.16
The Technical System Model of contemporary TQM
Total Quality Management
Process
Capability
Process
Flow
Six Sigma 
Management
Lean
Management
Lean/Sigma
Quality
Performance
Delivery
Performance
Im nroved B usiness P erform ance
Source: Researcher
2.16 Improving Process Capability - The Six Sigma Approach
Chowdhury (2001) claims, “Six Sigma is both a philosophy and methodology in 
which an organisation continuously improves its processes, with the aim o f defect free  
manufacturing ”. The term Six Sigma itself is a measure of near-perfect performance 
(3.4 defects produced in one million units produced). However, many authors 
propose that it is merely a modern reinvention of the earlier quality tools associated
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with gurus such as Juran, Deming, Ishikawa and others (Rich, 1999) and a means of 
catching up with the levels of performance already achieved by the Japanese high 
performance businesses.
Figure 2.17 Capability Conversion Chart
Sigma (6a), Defects per 
Million
6 3.4
5 230
4 6,200
3 68,000
2 308,500
1 691,500
The Six Sigma approach was first popularised by the US company Motorola. Its 
chairman, at the time, Smith (1998), first introduced the concept of Six Sigma and this 
was later refined by the General Electric Corporation. Chowdhury (2001) argues that 
the Six-Sigma approach is an approach to statistical problem solving using a range of 
tools and techniques to understand and improve process variation. He proposes that 
the approach will enable much less variation to happen through a better understanding 
of the relationship between inputs and outputs. He further states that the approach 
uses a rigorous methodology to systematically address defects and the potential for 
defective production. This approach is known as DMAIC (Define, Measure, Analyse, 
Improve and Control) and represents the five stages of project execution, it is an 
approach to reduce the complexity of problems and lead to their resolution.
According to Bicheno (2000) Six Sigma is a “hard nosed approach based on facts, 
which are easy to communicate and works well in process driven structures’\  
However, Bicheno stops far short of explaining what a ‘driven structure’ is but he 
implies that the structure is a pyramid of Six Sigma experts located throughout the 
business with the intention of lowering process variability.
This approach uses a staged qualification with levels known as ‘belts’ commencing 
with ‘Green Belts’ and ending with ‘Black belts’ ‘Master Black Belts’. Six Sigma 
therefore promotes a ‘management by fact’ culture based on the belief that all 
improvement projects should be kept simple, measurable, agreed to, realistic and 
time-based. (SMART) In light of this it is known to place a very strong emphasis on 
the measurement phase of process problems, based on data, which is quantitative
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rather than qualitative in its approach. It can, therefore, provide a methodology, which 
systematically addresses the root cause of many chronic or long-term quality related 
problems. In order to demonstrate this position a level of process stability is 
established based on numbers of ‘Defect Parts per Million Opportunities’ (DPMO)28 
For example, measuring process variation through statistical processes control 
(SPC)29 is a process by which end users, or more importantly engineering teams, are 
able to measure the performance of a process in terms of defected parts per million 
opportunities. The term Six Sigma, derives from a statistical measure where a process 
spread or its standard deviation consistently produces no more than 3.4 defects or 
failures for every one million outputs. For example the higher the Sigma level the 
lower the defect rate becomes.
Standard & Davis (1999) argue that Six Sigma is one of the most powerful 
approaches to improving quality; this view is based on the belief that improving 
process capability is centred on measuring and reducing variation. Such an approach 
therefore aligns well with the strategic intentions of competitive performance 
objectives (Slack, 1991) and tools for all grades of personnel based on a ‘master Black 
Belt’ expert technical specialist to operator/practitioners known as Green Belts. The 
difference between grades concerns the advanced statistical and hypothesis testing 
skills of the master black belt and the less quantitative skills (simpler statistics) of the 
Green belt. The main strength of this method, with respect to human error and 
mistakes, is therefore centred on statistical probabilities, where specially trained 
experts can systematically reduce process variation as a means of creating a culture of 
continual improvement activity. Other authors have suggested that it relies less on 
TQM and more on expert mathematical interventions (it avoids the pitfalls of a total 
engagement of all workers in a consensus TQM approach). Albeit Six Sigma may also 
be used by businesses that are themselves experienced in TQM methods, structures 
and softer personnel skills (Cowdrey 2002)
28 The process was pioneered by Bill Smith at Motorola in 1986 and was originally defined as below 
3.4 Defects Per (one) Million Opportunities (DPMO)
29 Statistical Process Control (S P C )  is a method used in quality management that measures a process 
during its operation in order to control the quality of the product or process behaviour itself.
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2.17 The Problems of Six Sigma
The problems with Six Sigma again concerns issues of applicability to high 
variety/low volume production/repair and sustainability of improvements. Further 
issues include the amount of money and time needed as an investment in training 
personnel. Such training may also not translate into cultural change but result in 
employees who religiously follow methods rather than the implicit ‘thinking’ and 
problem understanding associated with less mechanistic approaches to TQM. The 
entire support structure of this approach is inherently complicated and can alienate 
those who are not ‘black belts’.
Another complication concerns the over reliance on statistics Hinckley (2001) warns 
of the dangers for those organisations that rely on statistics alone, as this approach 
will not guarantee the highest quality levels. In other words given the extremely rare 
events which often impact on quality where data is not evenly distributed about the 
mean the vital few are often ignored. It is therefore important that while controlling 
what Hinckley refers to as the ‘trivial many’ the variation paradigm is acknowledged 
as a means of preventing the dangers of over focus. In other words while Six Sigma is 
very effective at controlling small variations, it has a reputation for classically 
ignoring the chronic consequences of ‘skewed’ data, which often result in the most 
serious causes of major quality failing. As such it may be impossible to achieve the 
virtually defect free process performance of the statistical level of 6, Eckes (2001) 
also notes these dilemmas and states the well-publicised successes of Six Sigma Black 
Belt practitioners often miss the obvious and therefore such organisations suffer from 
lack of confidence in what is assumed to be a data driven quality strategy. In addition 
he notes, some projects can take up a year to complete, which often become very 
costly. This point is reinforced by Pande & Holpp (2002) in their study of General 
Electric where project costs in 1997, exceeded 600 million dollars with just 400 
million dollars of return. The situation worsened in 1998 with 1 billion dollars of 
investments, based on 400 million dollars of return. In light of this evidence Velocci 
(2002), who also studied GE, claims that the underlying failings of Six Sigma for GE 
were caused by the following list of factors.
1. Lack of focus on the customer
2. Projects are skewed internally
3. Implementation objectives are not linked to the business objectives
4. GE used Six Sigma as a tool for quality and not as a management methodology
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5. Lack of involvement of suppliers and customers
6. Lack of benchmarking to promote understanding of competitor performance.
Also, in parallel with the criticisms of TQM, Nicholas (1998) goes on to claim that 
Six Sigma fails to deal adequately with the issue of sustainability. In other words 
Nicholas believes it places an over emphasis on technical issues to the detriment of 
human factors and the problems people have in understanding and managing 
organisational change.
2.18 A Review of Six Sigma
With so many criticisms of Six Sigma (Seddon, 2000), the researcher is cautious of 
accepting its full value, based on the argument that statistical analysis in the form of 
DMAIC (Define, Measure, Analyse, Improve and Control sequential method) is best 
suited to those environments where processes are already stable, in control and high 
enough in volume to warrant statistical analysis. It would appear that the short term 
results, following the investment in training, are usually successful, but in the long 
term, improving processes will usually involve organisational change and unless fully 
understood by everyone improvements lose momentum. The latter is a major issue -  
such changes and confusion in roles, changes to practice etc. are all cited as major 
causes of human failure and error.
During this study, the researcher has discovered that to be an effective improvement 
process, Six Sigma organisations must perform at a standard, 3 Sigma or repetitive 
performance. Such a level of performance is beyond the ability of aerospace repair 
processes that often operate with a lack of measurable performance data owing to low 
product volumes that are rich in high process variability, which this approach is not 
intended to control. In light of this concern, Standard & Davies (1999) also argue that 
Six Sigma itself has a very limited role within the area of addressing human factors 
problems. In other words, measuring mistakes through the use of statistical tools can 
often lead to reductionism, based on what these researchers claim: “There is no 
reason to expect the familiar statistical techniques used for controlling variance to 
have any effect on mistakes. The occurrence o f mistakes is not even well modelled by 
statistics. For example, the probability distribution o f screw torque cannot predict 
whether or not the screw has been installed. ” Standard & Davies go to describe this 
problem in terms of two classes of mistakes (which mirror Reason’s latent safety and 
human factor errors):
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1. Mistakes waiting to happen.
2. Mistakes that actually happened
A further concern identified in the literature was the clash of improvement methods 
that competed for the same resources (money and people) and how programmes like 
‘Lean’ manufacturing are based on teamwork whilst Six Sigma, on the other hand, has 
promoted an elitist hierarchy of experts who work alone on projects with the aim of 
improving quality in relation to cost Zairi, (1991) Overall, the researcher reflected that 
the above approach is an extension of the TQM method which has many elements of 
TQM but it lacks a suitably ‘total’ approach to intervention with all employees. A 
second improvement approach that has gained popularity in many manufacturing 
sector is Lean manufacturing and leaner ways of working. This will now be reviewed 
before returning to a discussion of aligning Six Sigma and Lean ways of working.
2.19 Removing Waste & Making Value Flow - The Lean Approach
The second dominant model of industrial improvement has become known as Lean 
production it emanated from Japanese automotive production and the successful 
exportation of these working practices to the West. Womack & Jones (1996) claim 
that this approach is not Japanese but instead based upon the innovations of the car 
assembler Toyota. The approach to manufacturing is premised on the elimination of 
waste from any and all manufacturing processes via a process of continuous 
improvement and business system redesign. These wastes are activities and practices 
that add no value to the production process or represent any form of added value that 
the consumer is willing to pay for. Waste is therefore seen as a barrier to both 
efficiency and effectiveness. Ohno (1985), the innovator of the approach to Lean 
waste reduction, argues that improved material flow results from fewer delays, less 
duplication and needs fewer resources to operate the system. Shingo (1986) argues 
that quality defects are in fact waste he recommended an engineering approach to 
Lean where “the only way to achieve Zero Defects is to discover the conditions that 
give rise to defects or process change and eliminate them
2.20 Measures of High Performance
The primary measures of high performance for Lean businesses tend to focus on cash 
and material flow (and length of time inventory is held) -  the leanness of operations 
Kaplan (1990). In order to keep material flow rates high it is important to maintain
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very high levels of quality and to ensure no defects are passed onwards for further 
processing Ohno (1985)
There are seven key areas of waste which again are used as Lean indicators:
1. Overproduction disrupts flow and results in excessive lead-time, which 
conversely affects quality by hiding defects through mass storage. Sometimes 
compounded by bonus systems which inadvertently ‘push’ unnecessary 
products down-stream in order to satisfy short-term gain.
2. Waiting is waste that highlights the misuse of time and within production 
environments can result in either people or products that, for a variety of 
reasons are not working, or being worked.
3. Transport and the movement of products should be reduced to the bare 
minimum as over handling leads to wear and potential damage.
4. Inappropriate Processing is linked to mass production and discourages 
responsibility of ownership. The ideal situation is that small machines are 
substituted within cells that are situated next to their respective down-stream 
operations.
5. Unnecessary Inventory hides problems, reduces floor space and most 
importantly incurs unnecessary costs.
6. Unnecessary Motion is waste that relates to the ergonomics of production. 
For example the unnecessary use of labour intensive activities, such as manual 
lifting or any physical tasks that could be made easer or more cost effective 
through automation. Waste therefore is likely to manifest itself in low 
productivity which in-tum leads to poor quality.
7. Defects in productivity are cost incurred off the bottom-line profit. These 
occur for a variety of reasons, which according to the Toyota production 
system should be treated as an opportunity to improve quality through urgent 
Kaizen reviews.
During the time the product is within a facility the typical level of value added activity 
is between 1% & 5 %. (Source: Researcher pilot studies at Cases). The aerospace 
industry, unlike automotive and high volume/low variety products, does not have 
fixed and standard performance measures that are published. In many respects these 
sector indicators would be meaningless because the sector does not have standard lead 
times, customers will place orders ahead of time and change delivery schedules, and 
products have long R&D processes (with added adjustments to the product once it has 
been sold and is in its repair cycle). For the aerospace industry, the core 1
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Lean principle of ‘Value’ is not a static concept as it is in sectors with high volume 
and low variety (where the customer engagement with the product is also low). The 
latter is not true of the high engagement and high complexity of aerospace products.
2.21 Features of Lean and High Material Flow Performance
There are many features of a Lean system, many of which are drawn from Japanese 
innovations at the Toyota Motor Corporation. Figure 2.18 shows these innovations, 
their purpose and how they contribute to high levels of material flow (The definition 
of a lean system is adapted from Slack et al., 2004 -  see appendix 3).
Figure 2.18 Features of Lean and High Material Flow Performance.
Feature Impact Indicator Authors
Value Stream
Mapping
(VSM)
Visualises waste and delay 
in the operations 
management system
Value added% Rother and Shook 
(1999)
Mackle (2002) 
Womack and Jones 
(1996)
5S Workplace organisation 
enabling standards and 
‘process basics’
Accidents
Availability of 
materials
Hirano (1995)
Visual
Management
Enabling easy identification 
of items in the workplace or 
team performance
Quality
Delivery
Cost
Safety
Schonberger (1996)
SMED Quick changeover of assets Flexibility
Variety of production
Shingo (1987)
Standard
Work
Instructions
Standards for conducting 
operations and timings of 
tasks
Standards and 
compliance
Ohno (1985) 
Monden (1993)
Andon Line stoppage by personnel 
on detection of an 
abnormality or defect
Defect avoidance Monden (1993)
Takt Time Pacing of an operation to 
conduct at the rate of 
consumption
Enables flow and 
synchronisation 
Dram beat for 
customer
Ohno (1985)
Pull Systems 
and Kanban
Use inventory to allow 
perfect availability of 
products as an enabler for 
just in time production and 
pull materials rather than to 
forecast work
Material flow Monden (1993)
Single Piece 
Flow
Producing only one piece at 
a time rather than large 
batches of inventory (large 
queues)
Reduces lead time 
Enhances quality 
failure detection 
Eliminates systems 
variety, inventory 
and waste
Schonberger (2002) 
Suri (1998)
Spear (2008)
Source: Researcher
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Lean techniques provide a self-reinforcing system whereby any waste or interruption 
to material flow can be identified and eliminated/controlled. The purpose of Lean 
ways of working is to align activities and ‘make what is required when it is required’ 
(Ohno, 1985). The achievement of high levels of material flow is not just a question 
of good quality but entails a very coherent and process based approach to 
management. Quality problem-solving tools are used widely by Lean businesses to 
ensure learning and continual improvement of material flow rates and as such the 
design of the material flow system is critical to high performance. In this manner 
these designs are attractive to aerospace businesses because of the long lead times, 
long process times and the repair of single units (an aircraft or an engine at a time). 
Customer demands to get repair work conducted quickly and return aircraft back to 
earning money are high, these commercial pressures are changing the industry and 
growing the sector’s interest in leaner ways of working. Indeed Boeing, Rolls Royce 
and Airbus all have Lean and Six Sigma programmes which have been portrayed to 
the workforce, shareholders and customers as successes), Rolls- Royce News letter 
2005)
However, practically, the Lean approach has been used in new manufacturing of 
products, and the regulated repair sector has only just begun to conceptualise and 
emulate these techniques (Reference: RAF Marham and repair of Tornado aircraft 
with RBI99 engines). The repair sector has many more levels of engineering and 
supervision than would be seen in automotive Lean cases even for first build 
aerospace products (such as bodies or wings). These issues will be returned to later in 
this thesis. The next section will provide a brief review of the combined and hybrid 
approach known as Lean Six Sigma, which is now beginning to be the dominant 
model of world-class operations management in the aerospace repair sector.
2.22 Lean / Six Sigma
It could be argued that when Lean and Six Sigma are applied together, faster results 
are achieved; this was supported in the study of Kaandebo (1999), which was carried 
out within Lockheed Martin. For example the organisation initially used the principles 
of Lean to identify and implement process flow, which enabled the foundations of 
quality to move into a second phase of Six Sigma. Similarly BAE systems in Fort 
Wayne North America according to Sheridan (2000) also used a blending of both Six 
Sigma with Lean as a means to reduce the total number of in flight shutdowns to 0.7
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incidents per million hours flown. According to Basu (2001) the successes found 
amongst those organisations that have adopted this approach have taken place on the 
basis of what he described as a road map based on three waves of development, which 
led to what he referred to as “fit Sigma ”
1. The first wave moves to TQM base on a companywide program of quality 
improvement.
2. The second wave takes TQM to Lean Sigma emphasising the importance of 
structured training.
3. The third wave develops into the ‘fit Sigma’ approach that includes 4 additional 
features compared to Lean Sigma:
1. A formal senior management review similar to the S+OP process
2. Periodic self-assessment with a structured checklist -  as per EFQM model
3. A continuous learning and knowledge management program
4. The extension of the program across the whole business
In light of what can be described as a revolutionary approach to TQM, Drickhamer 
(2002) claims that combining both approaches can deliver faster results when Lean 
techniques are used to initially to “lower the water to expose the rocks ”
In other words Lean is seen as an enabler for Six Sigma to solve these more complex 
or long-term process issues. In light of this criticism, both approaches, according to 
Bicheno (2000), share a common belief system, in that each perspective within the 
broader framework of TQM accepts that waste reduction is seen as the first step to 
address organisational waste, which Kaufman Consulting (2000) argues is not unique 
but derives from industrial engineering practice of ‘scientific management’.
In respect of this position they argue in favour of a synergy of common problem 
solving tools such as, process mapping, 5 why’s and cause and effect or Ishakawa 
tools, all of which have been illustrated in terms of a complete ‘overlap’as illustrated 
in figure 2.19 shown below.
Figure 2.19 Overlay of Lean & Six Sigma
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However the merger and overlap of Six Sigma with Lean, Imai (1997) claims 
“improvement should be gradual and continuous, building on the gains”. He goes on 
to argue in favour of that Kaizen Blitz activities that should be used as a means of 
‘continuous improvement’, which is key to TQM and long-term business success. In 
respect to this position, Imai (1997) explains that Kaizen is central to the Lean 
philosophy, based on the PDCA Cycle, 5s housekeeping, 5 Why’s and most 
importantly of all the systematic identification and removal of waste.
Armed with the knowledge of the material flow and quality dimensions of the 
technical operations system design, the key question facing managers who wish to 
design effective and efficient organisations remains how best to engage the people 
who will determine the actual performance of the system. The next section will 
present a review of the social designs of high performance businesses including the 
role of leaderless teams. The review is important because in the aerospace sector 
much importance is placed on individual certified skills. The production systems 
produce high dependency between employees, managers to plan production
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(environmental and operations management support) and the application of 
knowledge based decision making (the highest level of human factor decisions).
2.23 Change Management and High Performance Social Systems
The social and technical elements of high performance have been explored in 
previous sections of this literature review. Central to this debate has been the 
influence of the interventionist approach taken to engage the workforce. Early 
management studies showed mixed results in terms of management designing 
operations systems for high performance (see Mayo 1930 and the bank wiring room 
or ‘Hawthorne experiments’). Whilst Mayo may not have successfully proven, with 
his experiments, that it was possible to directly control performance levels by 
manipulating the work environment, he did set a general trend of 
understanding/improving the psychology of workplace design. Such facets of 
workplace design are vitally important to a study where safety engineering and human 
factors need to be controlled.
Mayo’s work rejected the de-humanising workplaces associated with the earlier 
approach to scientific management and promoted the ‘sense of belonging and job 
satisfaction’ achieved through treating workers well (as much as motivating them with 
productivity pay incentives). His contribution to high performance studies was that 
the human resource management approach to the workforce was an enabler for 
effective team working and a new quality of working life. His major arguments for 
managers included:
1. Managers should be friendly to employees
2. Individuals should be asked how they feel about their work
3. Humanistic management design improves morale and productivity
These principles of high performance management are contrary to Weber’s 
bureaucracy and suited to the concepts of motivation (Maslow, 1987) and conditions 
for successful improvement (Deming, 1993). Mayo’s ideals are integral to Deming’s 
14 points for ‘profound knowledge’ management (the policies of TQM businesses). 
These points are summarised in the figure 2.20 below.
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Figure 2.20
Deming’s 14 Points of ‘Profound Knowledge’
The 14 Points
1 Create constancy of purpose and continual improvement. Long term planning 
must replace short-term reaction
2 Adoption of Japanese philosophy by management and workers alike.
3 Do not depend on quality inspection, but rather build quality into the product 
and process
4 Choose quality suppliers over low cost suppliers in order to minimise variation 
in raw materials and supply.
5 Improve constantly to reduce variation in all aspects of planning, production, 
and service.
6 Training should be provided for workers and management, to reduce variation 
in how the job is done.
7 Leadership not supervision gets people to do a better job.
8 Eliminate fear and encourage a two-way communication to improve 
organisational interest.
9 Break down internal barriers
10 Eliminate slogans and recognise that processes make mistakes not people.
11 Eliminate numerical targets through management targets that encourage low 
quality.
12 Remove barriers to worker satisfaction including annual appraisals
13 Encourage self-improvement and education for all
14 Everyone is responsible for continual improvement in quality and productivity 
particularly top management
Source: Deming (1993)
2.24 Leadership & Self-Managed Teams
Thus far the literature review has identified the importance of a team-based structure 
when enacting the changes/interventions that lead to high performance. The study of 
Rafferty et al (2001), drawing on the work of Banker et al (1996) model, identified a 
number of different types of teams, as highlighted in figure 2.21 shown below.
Figure 2.21
Team-working Model of Continuum
Traditional Quality Lean High Performance Semi-autonomous Self-Managing
Work Circles Production Teams Teams Work Groups Teams
Groups
Source: Banker, Field, Scroeder & Sinha (1996)
The team-working continuum begins with an approach referred to as traditional work 
groups, where individuals are expected to perform core production activities, while
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other work groups are responsible for support activities, such as quality control and 
maintenance. In this context traditional work groups have no management 
responsibility or control. But on the other hand Lean production teams are 
characterised as those members who work collectively to achieve a standardised set of 
processes and at the same time expose opportunities through the involvement in 
problem solving situations. Under this model, as teams become more involved in 
organisational activities they can be considered in terms of ‘high performing’ thereby 
taking an active part in the management decision-making process and the ‘just in 
time’ philosophy, thereby enabling the facilitation of TQM principles to take place. 
Further development of the mature teams, along the continuum, shows greater 
responsibility for management and the execution of major production activities 
including quality control and equipment maintenance. In effect, this is self­
management through an empowered approach to self-regulation of the team’s own 
work. In respect of this position Scholtes (1998) argued that through the application of 
goal setting, the move towards self-management must be management led and must 
also require changes in working practice that are primarily aimed at improving the 
quality of performance in complex situations. In order to illustrate this position 
Scholotes (1998) presented a ‘continuum model of leadership’ where the development 
of teamwork requires a rigorous process of high-level management support based on 
recognition and feedback as illustrated in figure 2.22 shown below.
Figure 2.22 Continuum of Leadership Model
Subordinate-centered Leadership------------------------
Boss-centered Leadership --------------------------
Use of Authority by 
the Manager Area of freedom 
for subordinates
t t t t t t t
Manager Manager Manager Manager Manager Manager Manager
makes “Sells” presents presents presents defines permits
decision decision ideas and tentative Problem, limits; subordinates
and invites decision gets asks to function
announces questions subject suggestions, group to within limits
it. to makes make defined by
change decision decision superior
Source: Taken From Scholtes (1998) p 385
102
The effective design of self-management has also been addressed by Dawson (1994) 
who carried out a study within a cellular manufacturing unit at General Motors, 
claiming that when redesigning an organisational system a number of change 
initiatives should always be required, especially when linked with the introduction of 
new technologies and changing working practices.
These views were important in shaping this research and all authors agree that 
traditional leadership styles are a challenge to successful ‘self-management’ and that, 
in full support of an STST approach, the management systems and policies must be 
aligned, operated under a policy of trust within the context of continuous 
experimentation/improvement of working practices. Further, Thompson (2000) 
argued for a ‘well designed team’ with the right people in the correct positions 
accompanied by intelligent leadership that is capable of facilitating human resource 
through a number of transitional phases, which Holpp (1993) has illustrated in figure 
2.23 shown below. Holpp’s model is based on six stages of development that teams 
must progress through in order to become fully developed as a self-managed unit.
Figure 2.23 Moving towards self-managed teams
The self-managed teams
I
The leader is 
Responsible for 
Daily operations 
and makes most 
decisions that 
impact the team.
11 1 1
The leader is ™ ete™ ls,  
accountable for RefP°™ blefor  
team activities Panning and
but the team 
handles day-to- 
day duties on 
its own
organising and 
reports to the 
leader on a 
regular basis.
IV
The team 
organises its own 
work and takes 
full responsibility 
for quality and 
productivity.
The team 
handles all work 
inputs and 
outputs 
on its own 
authority.
VI
The team 
administers 
functions like 
selection, hiring, 
rewards and 
discipline.
Source: Taken From Holpp (1993) Six steps to self-management
Beginning with formalised leaders through to empowered teams the model put 
forward by Holpp illustrates that as teams mature they also accept more 
responsibilities and should be encouraged to develop both planning and quality 
responsibilities. For example if a team decides to choose its own structure it can 
provide advantages for both, the members of the team and the organisation as a 
whole, which according to Bodwell (1999) creates the following business 
opportunities.
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1. Increased morale
2. Authority to do what is necessary
3. Provides information and knowledge
4. High involvement in decision-making
5. Ownership of product quality
It should be noted that no model of team structures actually shows how a business can 
redesign itself or use business process re-engineering to jump over points in the 
leadership or team evolutionary stages, this presents a potential for failure as 
management leadership or team structures evolve at a faster or slower rate than each 
other.
2.25 The Limitations of Self-Management: Implications for High Performance
The researcher accepts that the claimed advantages of self-managed teams are not 
necessarily the most appropriate design for all types of organisations. For example, 
Lucas (1998) argued that if the type of work carried out does not require small groups 
of individuals with similar skills, self-managed teams are often seen as counter­
productive. Lucas goes on to claim that in the event of a team member who fails to be 
adequately empowered to receive enough decision-making authority, conflicts can 
develop in terms of how the team can function as a whole. Other factors within this 
level of weakness include problems associated with attitudes towards self-managed 
teams by senior management. For example Lucas found that managers in many 
instances were reluctant and sometimes unwilling to engage in the change process 
from controlling to supporting.
Other disadvantages of self-managed teams are focused at the individual level of 
analysis, whereby sometimes team members are unwilling to make personal 
adjustments seen as necessary to comply with the structure of other team members. 
As a result some individuals often become fearful of change and experience difficulty 
with certain expectations. Establishing the foundations for self-management is 
therefore about managing a process that should be introduced in a series of 
incremental steps, so that everyone will understand the vision and philosophy of the 
organisational aim. Failure of organisations to introduce the principles of self­
management in this way could result in hostility or worst resentment, thereby eroding
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the fabric and structure of the team dynamic, this situation will ultimately lead to 
chronic team failure.
According to Moravec (1997) a lack of empowerment for the complexities of 
autonomous team working is reflected by a lack of management, where the 
importance of leadership is often underestimated and very often assumed or taken for 
granted within the team itself. In light of this situation West (2004) argued that a 
common mistake, made by over 95% of all companies engaging in the process of self­
management, is the definition of team empowerment in relation to daily control. In 
light of this claim Darling (1996) argued ‘There is a significant gap between the 
perception o f empowerment as viewed by management and the reality as viewed by 
employees'. In other words as argued by De Ment (1996), team members in general 
have a better understanding of and are more sensitive to business requirements when 
the principles of cross-functional working are adequately supported and applied.
De Ment (1996) went further to argue that empowering self-managed teams to 
function as part of a cross-functioning unit will, in many cases, reflect a diverse range 
of sub-cultural norms that challenge belief systems at many different levels and unless 
managed with strong leadership could result in the potential for conflict and strategic 
misdirection.
In light of this position, Thompson (2000) criticised the principles of self­
management because it lacks due consideration for the cultural and political issues it 
failed to explain. The latter is of particular importance to this study when operational 
management models such as TQM and Lean production have originated from models 
in other sectors and often other countries.
2.26 Cultural Barriers to Self-Managed Teams
The style, structure and activities of-self-managed teams are affected by a number of 
factors and self-management represents a complex management design issue. At the 
heart of the debates concerning self-management is the issue of culture (national but 
more importantly organisational culture). These discussions are critically important to 
businesses that are adapting and implementing new working methods within an 
existing business with existing practices. For many of the authors reviewed thus far, 
the concept of culture is almost ignored or seen as unproblematic with an implicit
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belief that when the technical dimension of the operations management design is 
complete, the human resources will evolve to a new culture that is sympathetic to the 
operations design (Delbridge et al, 2000)..
According to research conducted by Jeffries (1996) the key to managing change is an 
understanding of a variety of social values of the factory and team -  these values 
being “All the interactions, which take place between people, their relationships and 
the feeling engendered by their behaviour”. The importance of understanding this 
complexity concerns understanding individual differences within the context of 
organisational culture, a phenomenon that is oversimplified by the management 
literature and many change models. Such insufficient attention is understandable 
when academics have failed to test models in a variety of settings. Also, for 
commercial reasons, where buy-in is used amongst culturally complex organisations 
there is often failure to consider resources required to manage change within the 
philosophy of TQM
In many cases the alignment of different sub-cultures is an intervention approach that 
is not best suited to non-linear processes, where teams have highly individualistic and 
specialist knowledge and where change can disrupt the business model and its safety 
management processes. In other words a quality culture is formed by acknowledging 
many different attitudes and perceptions within teams and using these differences to 
create opportunities to learn and evolve to higher levels of performance (Padman and 
Zhou; 2006). Again, if this logic is followed then it may be possible to have different 
teams operating at different evolutionary stages within a single factory setting. 
Economics, customer requirements and general management trends in organisational 
design may well lead to one way of thinking but the needs of the local teams will 
determine what is needed and how quickly it can evolve. The latter is not discussed in 
the management literature despite the pivotal role of team working and the enhanced 
reactive capability of businesses that deploy the greatest amount of self-management 
to teams in the workplace.
The complexity of these design considerations is exposed by Handy (1981) who 
claimed, “Organisational culture is greatly affected by its history, size, involvement 
with and level o f technology, goals, and its environment and people. When the 
expectations and assumptions within that culture are met and reinforced, the
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psychological contract is fulfilled, leading to satisfaction at work”. Further Schein 
(2002) claimed industries that ignore the power of organisational culture are also 
unaware of how it can in turn, be shaped to change attitudes and behaviour for 
improved quality of performance. This reinforces the need to design all practices and 
operations systems to contingently suit the organisation and not to accept a modem 
day ‘one best way’ of team working using Japanese Lean and quality methods. The 
latter is a situation that Bumes (2000) believes “The search for excellence does not 
reflect a unified discipline and in particular different styles o f management in one 
country may not be easily translated to the next”. Such a view is reinforced by 
Hofstede (2001) who demonstrates the existence of a variety of cultures at the 
national and organisational levels.
Figure 2.23
Hofstede’s Model of National Cultural Differences 
Focus Country
The Market 
Power 
Order 
Efficiency 
Consensus 
Equality 
Systems 
The Family 
Japan
Source: Taken From Hofstede (2001)
USA (driven by the individual)
France 
Germany 
Poland, Russia 
Netherlands 
Nordic Countries
UK (driven by hierarchy and complex systems)
China
Japan
Hofstede’s model was purposely selected for discussion because it outlines the 
importance of differences at a social psychological level of analysis. There exists the 
concept of national identities for example British and Japanese; it is questionable as to 
whether innovations in one part of the globe can be embedded in another. The 
assumption being that British people are inherently dependent on a systems approach 
to work and require a procedure and process that is typically linear and based on 
logical reasons. British society has shaped workplace designs around structured 
hierarchies and deference to specialists, which are classically aligned with scientific 
management. By comparison, the Japanese, according to Hofstede, are less dependent 
on hierarchy and have a greater empathy with the needs of the total organisation
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thereby exhibiting traits such as flexibility and good will. Such an approach is much 
more sympathetic to the human relations and TQM approaches to 
management/improvement. In other words the national paradigm model put forward 
by Hofstede, suggests that in Japan, there is only Japan, thereby harnessing a 
collective consciousness that is aligned to the requirements of TQM. This approach is 
therefore based on achieving open systems thinking, which is characteristically non- 
linier and more easily aligned to the principles of Lean standardisation and not 
conducive to the practice of aero repair & overhaul engineering. In this manner it is 
possible to indentify a major gap in the body of existing knowledge and question as to 
whether it is possible to import innovations designed to generate high performance 
from another culture and to embed them successfully in another. The literature 
review so far also has not yet fully concluded that there is one best way, TQM and 
problem-solving, teams may begin to look more similar and global regulations may 
force businesses to adopt the same structures in order to comply.
In order to fully evaluate the impact of theoretical transportation consideration should 
be given to Hofstede’s approach, which places, into context theories about 
management with proper regard for the values context in which these ideas were 
developed. Kono (1992) supports this view and argued that Japanese styles of 
management differ for a number of reasons. Japanese people are conditioned from a 
very early age and exposed to international events through an education system as 
early as pre-school. At work high expectation is placed on employees to integrate 
within company culture and coupled with decentralised trade unions, enhanced 
communication has resulted in better standards of industrial relations. The Japanese, 
unlike their British counterparts, have also benefited from government support, which 
shows a greater involvement in company business, by working with industry to create 
common goals through support agencies, such as the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry. Hofstede created a further model with four dimensions that shaped the 
quality of human performance in terms of:
1. Power v Distance
2. Individualism v Collectivism
3. Uncertainty v Avoidance
4. Masculinity v Femininity
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According to Reason (2003) an expert in the field of applied human factors research, 
the new model is more useful to a study of general human factors. Hofstede’s work 
has parallels with the current focus of study in the aerospace sector. The new model 
has great significance, which is particularly relevant to the field of aircraft operations 
where behaviour in different cultures changes considerably. For example Asian 
cultures are based on encouragement of interpretation of published procedures, 
especially in situations where those procedures include the use of Flight Reference 
Cards. For example in Far Eastern and Asian cultures a rigid application of 
procedures is followed and applied in all cases irrespective of its relevance and 
ineffectiveness to aircraft safety. As such this has resulted in a larger number of in­
flight emergencies that are treated quite differently between Eastern and Western 
cultures. On the one hand western pilots work around flight deck problems by 
analysing and improvising while Asian crews immediately engage the autopilot 
sequence and refer to procedural checklists.
According to Helmreich & Merritt (1995) the impact of individualism in Asian 
cultures can be perceived as detrimental, since self-reliance is seen as an indication of 
strength and seeking help implies weakness. Within Western cultures Harrison (1972) 
described organisations in terms of four ‘ideologies’, this becomes of practical interest 
when explaining the culture of maintenance organisations that relate to task-oriented 
activities as illustrated in figure 2.24 shown below:
Figure 2.24
Harrison Typology Model
Power Culture The organisation depends on trust and empathy
Few rules, little bureaucracy 
Political organisation
Dangerous structure for large organisations
Role Culture Logical and rational
Procedural communications 
Personal and expert power held back 
Slow to react to threats
Task Culture Team culture
Difficult to control
Revert to a power or role culture when resources are limited 
Gets the job done
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Person Culture Socio-technical Systems
Control by mutual consent 
Shared influence.
Social groups
Source: Taken From Harrison (1972)
The preceding models add insight into how cultures, at the national and organisational 
levels, influence performance and the willingness of individuals to interact and 
achieve/sustain high performance. The UK has been portrayed as resting at an 
uncomfortable point between harnessing creativity of teams and tendency towards 
centralised and scientific management regimes. The latter is counter to all models of 
high performance operations, the use of organic structures and the deployment of 
responsibility to teams. Furthermore, the practices in the aerospace sector are shaped 
by the historic approach to management and the use of highly regulated processes 
which may limit the degree to which TQM and self managed teams are able to co­
exist within a safety-critical work environment/operations system design.
2.27 Cultures and Safety Management
It is widely accepted that accidents are caused by inadequate performance of people 
who had the capacity to perform effectively and yet failed to do so. Reports from the 
Confidential Human Factors Reporting Programme (CHIRP) and the Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS)30 support this view and argue that attitudes play a 
significant role in aviation safety and by modifying attitudes through training is one 
way to effectively improve a safety driven culture. Helmreich & Merritt (1995) 
carried out research into attitudes and values amongst pilots, who like many other 
professions within the aerospace industry place high value on the nature of their work. 
The findings from their study are based on the interaction of three levels of analysis:
1. Professional Cultures
2. Organisational Cultures
3. National Cultures
The survey concluded that job satisfaction levels were largely determined by the 
organisational culture and the subsequent conditions that individuals experience in
30Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a national program, which is part of the Confidential 
Human Factors Incident Reporting Program (CHIRP)
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their particular area of work. For purpose of understanding Helmreich & Merritt 
(1995) define the culture as: ‘The values, beliefs and behaviours that we share with 
others that help us define a group, especially in relation to other groups’. Helmreich 
and Merritt reported a strong correlation between the strength of organisational 
culture and its performance, with coherence and stability of attitudes as the defining 
features that determines what is understood by a strong unified culture.
For example a comparative case based study between two successful airlines, namely 
British Airways and Virgin Atlantic, revealed that whilst each organisation’s culture 
was significantly different and its good safety record was dependant on consensus of 
opinion that included everyone within the same organisation (Helmreich and Merritt, 
1995). The authors compared two American airlines and measured respectively the 
relationship between safety and its organisational culture. In the first case 87% of 
Pilots interviewed were found to have high levels of morale, when compared with the 
second case study, which represented just 3%. The reason according to Helmreich and 
Merritt is explained as follows. Pilot’s cynicism about the motives of their managers, 
were based on a response rate of 12% that agreed with the statement “Management 
never compromises safety for profit”?
However, the most concerning finding came from the statement “Crews I fly with 
adhere to standard operating procedures. ” In case study one 93% agreed with the 
statement compared with 73% in case study number two. The findings therefore 
indicate an important link between attitude and behaviour, thus underlying the point 
that high levels of professionalism displayed by pilots are easily undermined by the 
influence of negative organisational culture, which in turn leads to poor compliance of 
standards operating procedures (SOP) According to Helmreich & Wilhelm (1997) the 
safety critical nature of the aviation industry in general must include due 
consideration at the individual level of analysis. Increased productivity without proper 
regard for safety is perceived as the principle measure by which the majority of 
employees gauge their employer’s commitment to safety.
Regardless of which team approach is undertaken, the evolutionary models reviewed 
show how teams become more effective as management decision making is deployed 
to them. Notwithstanding the importance of national and organisational cultures, the 
relationship of teams with high performance and effective safety management still
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exists. The next section will continue the analysis of how individuals, within 
established operations management socio-technical systems, regard and react to safety 
processes and abnormality.
2.28 Team Situational Awareness & Human Error Training
A critical element of the above discussion and team design is the concept of ‘team 
situational awareness’. Team situational awareness refers to the collective ability of a 
team to understand what is going on at any point in time and to determine where an 
abnormality is happening that requires the team to react and restore the process to 
control. Situational awareness is therefore a skill held by the team which acts as one 
of Reason’s (2003) barriers to system failure.
Human factors authors propose that it is vitally important to improve the quality of 
decision making between one employee and the next by redesigning the workplace 
and interactions of employees to enhance situational awareness and safe working 
(Spear 2008). The decision making process is therefore considered as an important 
part of self-management, based on the fact that individuals can only process 
information effectively if they have a safety and quality ‘team situational awareness’. 
According to Salas (1995) the concept of team situational awareness is seen as a 
necessary framework that can be used to facilitate effective cognition. Stout (1994) 
goes further to describe it as a contributing factor, which defines the performance of a 
safety critical organisation. Stout argues that team situational awareness is composed 
of each team member’s situational awareness and based on a pre-existing knowledge 
base of shared mental models.
Stout proposes that skill based activities represent about 25% of all errors, which are 
learnt and in some situations do not require a conscious level of awareness. Based on 
learned cognitive thinking, skilled activities require a level of awareness that relies on 
thinking programmes at the conscious level of control, for example the most common 
failing which is associated with the incorrect selection of a thinking program, could be 
undoing a nut, rather than doing it up. This is often referred to as a ‘slip, completely 
missing out a programme is called a ‘lapse’. Skill based slips are linked to the 
problem solving activity, while rule based and knowledge based mistakes arise during 
subsequent attempts to find the end result in terms of a solution to the problem. A pre­
condition for the occurrence of a slip of action is the presence of attentional ‘capture’
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from either distraction or preoccupation. Whenever attention is misdirected it will not 
be focused on the routine task in hand.
Stout argues that normally individuals like to operate at the skill-based level because 
it requires little conscious mental effort (referred to by Reason as a ‘ready to run’ 
programme where individuals will normally revert to a rule-based activity). For 
example when individuals have no prior experience of a particular task he or she may 
opt to pursue a written procedure without necessarily understanding it. The researcher 
refers to those influences, which may lead to a person, making errors or mistakes, 
which are also described in terms of violations, where barriers to effective teamwork 
are known to frequently take place. Referred to in terms of ‘internal’ factors, these 
considerations would typically include influencing conditions such as fatigue and 
noise distraction. Research has shown that the effects of this have not only resulted in 
decreased human performance, but it is also seen as the underlying cause of many 
workplace mistakes that often result in catastrophic accidents.
The effects of interruptions are especially significant in complex and dynamic 
situations of which 50% are due to poor levels of situational awareness where human 
error is cited as the main contributing factor. Research into the effects of this problem 
was carried out within the context of noise distraction by Banbury (1998) who 
suggested that the most significant cause of human error in the workplace was due to 
poor communication. The context relies on good speech both formal and informal 
without interruption and distraction from background noise. His research showed that 
the most frequent complaint was linked to difficulties with concentration when 
background conversation was taking place. In addition research carried out by Boyce 
(1974) measured the impact of noise distraction amongst 200 open plan office 
workers of which 67% were most affected by telephone ringing. Secondly 55% were 
concerned with background noise of talking and approximately half of the sample 
reported problems with concentration because of air conditioning and office 
machinery. Banbury (1998) also found that office noise either with or without speech 
significantly impaired memory performance in complex decision-making situations.
Despite the large number of empirical findings most studies concerning the effects of 
interruptions are centered at the individual level of analysis in terms of information 
processing. The cause and consequence is often attributed to ineffective
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communication where access to information is sometimes unavailable or denied. In 
some cases information can be immediate or prolonged depending on its availability 
or urgency of the task in question. While the costs of delays and interruptions are 
often calculated to the nearest minute, research from the perspective of the repair and 
overhaul sector is largely overlooked in terms of unexpected delays. The results create 
a series of stop/start situations where process delays occur because of unidentified 
sources of variation (conditions that are contrary to Lean and Six Sigma ways of 
working). Described as a planning problem, the consequences of system variation 
often results in a discontinuation of a current task or activity and is linked to the 
negative effects of impaired thinking processes (researcher pilot study and historical 
incident investigations (see Banbury, 1998).
Research carried out by Broadbent (1989) argued that the consequence of 
interruptions during the early stages of task involvement is seen to be more disruptive 
than those occurring toward the end of the task. The parallel with aerospace repair 
activities is pivotal and stop/start operations add to the confusion and potential for 
system error. In light of this consideration the researcher argues that an important role 
and function is played by management in creating a transparent environment 
conducive to information availability and human factors awareness. The point being 
made by the researcher is that if individuals can be conditioned to the practices and 
implicit values of TQM they will be less likely to be ‘at risk’ to, what human factors 
specialists call the ‘error zone’ (Reason, 2003).
Within the error zone, if the position of Rasmussen (1998) is accepted, then rule based 
mistakes represent about 60% of errors. In the aerospace repair sector, such events 
could occur when an engineer selects a package of procedures, which are 
inappropriate to the task in question. Such an event could influence behaviour to 
apply what is normally regarded as good rules, or conversely, bad rules which can 
take the form of shortcuts that lead to mistakes. It should be noted, many other authors 
cite commercial pressures as aggravating this situation thus leading to more 
fundamental risks as individuals cut comers as a matter of ‘norm’ (rule based errors). 
When rule-based activities fail to provide the expected answer to a problem, 
individuals are more likely to refer to knowledge-based procedures. A concept that 
represents 15% of human error, based on experience of analysing a problem as a 
means to finding a solution, or rejecting a problem until the required task is complete
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(Rasmussen, 1998). According to Cannon-Bowers (1993) the quality of team 
situational awareness will therefore impact on a commonality of factors, not just ‘rule 
breaking’, this can be more akin to the quality of individual decision-making based on 
the system’s ability to:
1. Set Team Goals
2. Assign Individual Tasks
3. Identify Team Member Roles
These activities are often the responsibility of management, especially under the 
regime of scientific management, and lapses in the effectiveness (quality and 
timeliness) can result in errors. Furthermore for autonomous teams, it is not clear how 
these activities are conducted and the previous ‘team evolutionary’ models presented 
earlier offer no insight into what is the appropriate structure, behaviour, situational 
awareness and human factors that must be taken into consideration when working 
with such teams and deploying goals. The latter area is a major gap in the 
organisational literature and a subject of immense insight for regulated industries such 
as the one found in this study. As such, a lean team based organisation without the 
features of evolved team working, as described above, could generate safety errors 
rather than absorb or eliminate them.
Converse & Kahler (1992) extended this line of research and proposed an approach 
that considered shared mental models based on three different types of knowledge 
structures. Firstly considering what is referred to as declarative knowledge, where 
individuals process information in terms of ‘knowing that’ about the system, which 
according to Stout (1994) is described as,” Containing knowledge o f facts, rules, and 
relationships, and include knowledge: o f the overall system, task goals, the relation 
among the system components, equipment/hardware, positions/roles, and the team 
members themselves*’. Secondly ‘procedural knowledge’ contains information 
regarded in terms of ‘knowing how’, which Stout (1994) describes as: “Stored 
information about the steps that must be taken to accomplish various activities, and 
the order in which these steps must be taken” According to Converse & Kahler
(1992) each approach contains similarities, in that both models contain elements of 
knowledge-based and rule-based concepts. Accepting that self-managed teams must 
share knowledge about the situation and system in general the model put forward by 
Converse & Kahler (1992) is important as it provides a holistic explanation in terms 
of support of a developing socio-technical system. During the development of shared
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mental models Converse & Kahler (1992) argued in favour of understanding the 
importance of ‘strategic knowledge’ since this approach underlines the importance of 
team situational awareness in terms of ‘knowing why’ that Converse & Kahler (1992) 
describe as: “Are comprised o f information that provides the basis o f problem 
solving, such as action plans to meet specific goal knowledge o f the context in which 
procedures should be implemented, actions to be taken if  a proposed solution fails, 
and how to respond if  necessary information is absent”. In this context ‘strategic 
knowledge’ is seen as an important consideration of self-managed teamwork in the 
application of selecting an appropriate task strategy. In other words declarative and 
procedural knowledge can be considered as ‘static’ whilst strategic knowledge is a 
‘dynamic’ feature in achieving the educational requirements of problem solving for 
TQM.
The introduction of training strategies and relevant methods applicable to changing 
knowledge and situational awareness can therefore be enhanced to include training for 
shared knowledge structures that promote improved human factors performance 
within teams for enhanced ‘shared cognition’ According to Jonassen & Tessmer 
(1997) this is important because teams “Contain knowledge about the overall system 
or task domain where shared cognition can help facilitate the active participation 
between team members themselves” The rationale behind this approach is based on 
the concept of the group dynamic in terms of, that which is learned can be reflected by 
means of how and when a particular strategy can be most appropriately deployed. 
Collins (1991) supports this approach and claims that the advantages of this type of 
training encourage team members to learn how to react to future problems in relation 
to a social context. Collins also acknowledged that cross training of the strategic type 
could provide a unique mental representation in relation to learning about 
responsibilities of other team members in situations that require job rotation.
Training of this particular type is highly relevant to this study, because it permits the 
different roles within self-management to experiment with their shared roles and 
responsibilities that require test actions in an environment that is both safe and 
encouraging, thereby underlining the position that team situational awareness must be 
seen as an enabler to empowerment. Rogers (1994) argued in favour of developing a 
natural drive for self-actualisation, based on a humanistic perspective of motivation 
for learning. He makes the important distinction in terms of cognitive processing 
between meaningless information and experiential or significant information. The
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former relates to semantic processing such as learning vocabulary and the latter refers 
to applied knowledge such as technical information by means of evaluating the 
reasons ‘why’. Rogers claimed that experiential learning is necessary for personal 
change, growth and development, which should include the following conditions:
1. Setting a positive climate for learning
2. Clarifying the purposes of the learning
3. Organising
4. Making available learning resources
5. Balancing intellectual and emotional components of learning
6. Sharing feelings and thoughts with other learners
According to Rogers, learning can be facilitated only when individuals feel part of the 
learning process and have control over its nature and direction. In light of this claim, 
Holland (1986), like Rogers, suggested that mental modelling provides the basis for 
all reasoning and learning processes, which he described in terms of:
1. They are incomplete and constantly evolving
2. They are usually not accurate representations of a phenomenon; they
typically contain errors and contradictions
3. They are parsimonious and provide simplified explanations of complex
phenomena
4. They often contain measures of uncertainty about their validity that allow
them to used even if incorrect
5. They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules.
Evidence supporting this approach can be cited from Orasanu (1990) who investigated 
decision-making performances amongst aircrews. The case study looked at the 
decision-making strategies in relation to problem situations during flight simulations. 
The results demonstrated that high performance learning reflected twice the levels of 
situational awareness when compared to poor performing teams with 50% more 
accuracy in task requirements. Cannon-Bowers et al (1993) refer to this point and 
argued that high performing teamwork depends on the interaction between 
individuals. The process by which TQM can facilitate the systems thinking 
philosophy is intended to meet a wider range of environmental conditions, in complex 
surroundings. According to Johnson (1993) this approach provides strategic 
management within a context of shared understanding which is primarily a cultural 
and cognitive phenomenon. In other words Johnson is claiming that individuals have a 
unique representation that is linked to social conditioning. The point being that if
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organisational change contradicts an individual’s cultural belief system, the process 
will be slow and difficult to manage.
2.29 Team Working & Change
In understanding the complexity of a situation it is important to consider the 
implications of change in terms of Bumes’s (2000) 3 different approaches as shown 
below;
1. Incremental model of change, which is carried out incrementally taking one 
goal or problem at a time. This process is also carried out by a number of other 
sub systems that act independently based on achieving long periods of stability 
for incremental change to occur.
2. Punctuated equilibrium of organisational transformation, which is based on 
long periods of stability with short bursts of fundamental change.
3. Continuous transformation model of change is usually deployed where 
business environments are considered as unstable
Bumes goes on to argue that when selecting the correct model for managing change 
both the individual, group and system as whole would be affected in terms of the 
correct choice model to be applied as illustrated in figure 2.25 shown below.
Figure 2.25 Change Management Model
Incremental Punctuated Continuous
Individuals Learning Promotion Career development
Groups Kaizen Team building
Changes in 
composition and task
Systems
Fine Tuning BPR Culture
Source: Taken From Burnes (2000) pp-304
According to Bumes the management of change is broadly assumed to fall within one 
of two categories. The oldest, of which is the ‘planned’ approach that Lewin (1958) 
believed should be managed through 3 sequential steps. This approach is based on 
Gestalt psychology concerning the understanding of how managers should react to 
environmental change. Lewin argued for the importance of resolving social conflict 
stating that the best way to achieve this was to facilitate learning so that individuals
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could understand and restructure their perceptions. Lewin was heavily influenced by 
the Gestalt psychologists within the context of team dynamics and argued that a group 
to which an individual belongs is the foundation of understanding resolution of 
conflict and managed change, within a 3-step process as shown below.
1. Unfreezing by encouraging the reduction of causal relationships that maintain 
attitudes and traditional belief systems.
2. Movement through the development of new attitudes or behaviour that will re­
define the problem.
3. Refreezing through effective communication based on understanding the need 
for change that should be identified and made clear as soon as possible.
However, critics of Lewin such as Dawson (1994) argued that the group dynamic 
approach is over simplistic where organisational change is a continuous and open- 
ended process. Thereby claiming that freezing and refreezing states were not possible 
since organisations are dominated by power and politics, which inevitably restrict the 
group’s potential as an effective method of change. The ‘emergent’ approach 
therefore challenged the ‘planned’ approach and claimed that change should be part of 
a continuous process that is both open-ended and unpredictable. In favour of the 
emergent approach Kanter (1989) claimed that the role of change agents is 
unnecessary and instead considered the process of change as an integral element of 
the business strategy. The assumption being that when individuals are managed 
effectively a clear understanding of roles and behaviours will naturally align with the 
organisational systems aims and objectives. Accepting this position the emergent 
approach, as illustrated in figure 2.26 shown below, claims that most people fall into 
two categories: Firstly the unconscious incompetence grouping in which knowledge is 
described in terms of ‘not knowing what the individual doesn’t know’. Secondly, as 
the human relations approach unfolds, a new way of thinking is communicated 
whereby individuals start to recognise and to engage in a process of ‘knowing what 
they don’t know’ For example as managers start to empower teams to accept 
ownership of process they realise how they are expected to perform. As new roles and 
confidence grows a level of conscious competence is developed whereby individuals 
become aware of knowing what they know. As new roles are learnt and become 
continuously practiced a process of learned competence is established and teams 
accept the ‘one best way’ thereby developing a range of skills or activities that can 
enable them to attain a level of ‘unconscious competence’ as illustrated in figure 2.26 
shown below.
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Figure 2.26 
Competency Matrix
Unconscious Conscious
Incompetence
Competence
Source: Taken From Scholtes (1998)
However, in addition to the change management theories successful implementation 
of TQM should also consider a cultural level of analysis that West (2004) highlighted 
in terms understanding the importance of intergroup differences. For example West 
refers to subcultures that should always be exposed in order for open systems 
management to take place. West is critical of organisations that introduce team 
working without addressing this issue and argued that unless differences between 
teams are fully understood, inter team conflict will erode the stability and potential for 
businesses to perform properly. West claims that goals should always be made clear, 
with feedback on the effectiveness of performance or systems issues will not be 
solved. The modem equivalent solution to West’s predicament has been termed policy 
deployment and it is a lean method used to align improvement activities (See Akao, 
1990).
2.30 Chapter Summary & Literature Model
The preceding sections have built a picture of the inconsistencies between academic 
thought and the high variety environment of aerospace operations management. The 
literature has shown how a complex operating environment is subject to many latent 
risks, well beyond the simplistic models of TQM for high volume businesses, towards 
a blend of human factors that are contained within a safety critical and team based 
approach to high materials flow. The sections have also shown that inconsistencies in 
the socio-technical system design, especially the role of management and planning, 
can generate many interruptions to material flow, create team confusion (in identity
1 2
4 3
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and also in the priority of work) and allow/condone ‘rule breaking’ by individuals and 
teams thus compensating for poor planning and control (ineffective management 
practice). This chapter has provided an overview of socio-technical systems literature, 
which places into context the main research question. It began with an historical 
overview of ‘general systems theory’ before entering the focal literature concerning 
operations management within modem ‘open’ systems thinking. The review 
continued to explore modem approaches to team based improvement (Lean and Six 
Sigma) before presenting the challenges of managing teams themselves and how such 
structures can operate in an autonomous state under conditions of TQM 
The researcher’s choice of literature therefore extended beyond contemporary 
approaches of total quality thinking towards a more in-depth contribution from the 
human factors theories. These theories, pertinent to low volume and safety critical 
management practice, were also found to have significant gaps but were more closely 
aligned with the subject of study i.e. professional engineering teams engaged in aero 
engine repair. It is contended that contemporary human factors research can play an 
important part in explaining the possible risks associated with self-management, based 
on need for enhanced levels of ‘team situational awareness’. These issues were duly 
built into the research methodology, which will be explored in the next chapter.
To conclude this chapter, the researcher compiled, and then tested, with an expert 
review (Dr Simon Banbury Human Factors Expert), the model for credibility. The 
literature-based model, which is shown in figure 2.27 below, is presented as a means 
of illustrating the key variables at play in a safety critical, constantly improving and 
team based workplace within which there is potential for human error. This model is a 
contribution to the subject of study because, to date, no such model exists it extends 
the seminal work of Reason (2003) bringing his work closer to the realities of 
working in a modem factory. Modem socio-technical systems have much evolved 
since Reason’s time of writing and new improvement paradigms, such as Lean and 
Six Sigma, now dominate modem workplaces including those of a repair nature. 
However, academics with an interest in improvement have rarely ventured into the 
world of human factors thinking. As such, a gap exists between Reason’s (2003) 
latent error risk models and ‘windows of opportunity’, Rasmussen’s (1998) model of 
three different social types of error risk and modem leaner/TQM team-based working 
practices.
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Figure 2.27
Linking Socio-Technical Risk Factors To Error Provoking Zones
Theoretical Issues Practical Issues Teams & Quality Risk
Lean
Finance
System
Team
Working
Management & 
Leadership
Traming&
Education
Policy
Deployment
Inadequate Problem 
Solving Skills
Fails To Remove 
Waste & Variation
Rushed Tasks Due 
To Time Pressures
Role Confusion & 
Mistakes
Non-Compliance To 
Procedures
Technical
Equipment
Low Motivation For 
Self Improvement
Lacks Daily 
Control
Loss o f Strategic 
Direction
Human Relations 
Theory
Quality o f Training Is 
Determined B y Economic
Push = Overproduction 
Pull = Efficiency & Flow
Managers Fail To Change From 
Controlling To Supporting
Inappropriate Use 
O f Equipment
Theoretical T ransportation 
Ignores Cultural Differences
Inappropriate Choice In Team 
Design
Highly Individualistic & Fails 
To Explain Cause & Effect
Regulatory Factors Discourage 
Cross-Functional Manage ment
Contradictory Improvements 
Top Down vs. Bottom Up
Cost Based Accounting As 
Opposed To Flow Based
Source: Researcher
In consideration of this position the researcher concludes this chapter by stating that 
factors such as those extracted from the literature review would be relevant to the
Rule Based 
Errors 
Skill Based 
Errors 
K
now
ledge Based 
E
rrors
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process of theory building and more importantly will be used to frame chapter 3 of the 
research methodology, especially the measurement system used to collect and analyse 
data from factory teams and their management.
In summary the researcher has provided an overview of socio-technical systems 
literature and has explored the many different ways in which systems are designed 
and the influencing factors this has upon them. The chapter has also provided a review 
of high performance organisational designs and has identified the modem structural 
choice as that of team-based working. The gap in the body of knowledge is therefore 
expressed as:
“To what extent can self-managed team working, facilitate the principles o f safety 
and Total Quality Management?”
It is expected that the outcome of the study will inform academic knowledge in these 
key fields of research and also influence the practice of management and the design of 
socio-technical systems. The importance of which cannot be understated in terms of 
the value this type of research can bring, based on prevention of mistakes or worse 
still, errors that result in the potential for catastrophic failure, which more often than 
not is the end result.
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Chapter 3 Research Methodology
3.0 Chapter Introduction
The previous chapter has positioned and framed the research question within the body 
of knowledge and existing literature. It has presented a systems approach to the study 
of organizations and the management prerogative to design effective socio-technical 
systems in order to generate higher performance yet it has also exposed many gaps in 
the current theory that, in the main, neglects any form of human factor management. 
The neglect of organizational, total quality or high performance operations literatures 
is a major weakness in the current management models of high performance. Indeed, 
it would appear strange that these issues have not been researched in the areas of 
regulated industries, the health service or in the automotive sector that has contributed 
so much to organizational theory. Whilst TQM and Lean authors would prefer the 
repetitive and low safety risks of repetitive manufacturing environments there is 
almost nothing written about Lean, TQM and high performance businesses in contexts 
that are safety critical, less repetitive and need high levels of individual skill.
This chapter will present and defend the research strategy, methods and overall design 
of this ‘theory building’ study of safety critical socio-technical systems. The chapter 
will outline, discuss, validate and defend the chosen research strategy and its 
associated methodology as an appropriate means of answering the main research 
question; “To what extent can self-managed team working, facilitate the principles of 
safety and Total Quality Management?”
In light of this statement the researcher will argue, from a realist perspective, the need 
for both inductive and deductive cycles of theory building in order to offer a greater 
probability that new theory can be generated. It will also show that the elements of the 
research strategy were crafted in a manner where qualitative observation was used to 
reinforce quantitative methods; it will also show those that were rejected and not 
included in the final pluralist methodology. As a synopsis, the final research strategy 
comprises of a multiple case replication strategy involving a pluralist methodology of 
questionnaires, focus group interviews, secondary data and observational analysis. 
These methods draw from the precedent of research STST methods and studies that 
have theory-built within operations management, the pluralist combination was
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considered ‘fit-for-purpose’ to evaluate complex human factors in a low volume 
brown field manufacturing setting31.
3.1 Epistemological and Methodological Overview
Any piece of research should commence with a review of philosophical debate 
concerning exactly what is ‘valid knowledge creation’ is in order to craft and defend 
its chosen research strategy including the acknowledgement of the limitations of 
decisions to adopt or preclude certain approaches. This investigation is characterised 
as a realist perspective to the study of organisational management, based on a multiple 
case replication research strategy involving pluralist and triangulated methods.
Before exploring the methodology, the researcher will provide a review of the two 
main philosophical approaches to research, namely positivism and phenomenology. 
Positivism is a long-standing and traditional perspective that has a long precedent in 
the sciences and operations management and is reliant upon quantifying scientific 
observations and is a process that favours numerical and statistical manipulations of 
data and an observed reality. The phenomenology/naturalist approach, by contrast, is 
based on observational methods and ethnographic studies which have a much greater 
affinity to the social rather than natural sciences. The naturalist approach is subjective 
and rejects the ability to ‘make sense’ of collective behaviour preferring instead to 
support the view that reality is individualistic and within the person. Between these 
two diametrically opposed perspectives, is a middle ground or ‘realism’ school of 
thought. Realists blend both quantitative as well as qualitative methods, which, 
advocates argue, will enable a deeper insight into the subject of study and the messy 
issues of operations management (Rich, 1999).
The distinction between these philosophical perspectives reflects the degree to which 
the person/subject of study controls or is controlled by their environment. The 
researcher will therefore commence with a philosophical debate concerning ‘valid 
knowledge creation’ in terms of understanding the available choices of methods, 
within a framework of the two broad schools of research design. Easterby-Smith et al
3 1 A  brownfield site is an area used for industrial, manufacturing or commercial use that has been long- 
established. As such it has existing culture/customary practices and work processes that must adapt to 
change rather adopt change as is the case of a new ‘green field’ site which has less resistance during 
such change.
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(1993) argue that designing management research is often: “A study o f being that 
involves an ideal type o f comparisons whereby “... in the red comer is 
phenomenology; in the blue comer is positivism. Each o f these positions has to some 
extent been elevated into a stereotype, often by the opposing side”. Such a positioning 
is, according to Layder (1994) a prerequisite for developing and justifying a research 
design, whereas epistemological research is an approach based on; “how we know 
what we claim to know” The relevance which according to the researcher, is whether 
‘reality’ is external to the individual (positivism) or ‘reality’ is a function of an 
individual’s consciousness (naturalism)32.
3.2 Positivism in Operations Management
Layder (1994), argues that epistemological considerations define ‘what’ is an 
acceptable and valid source of knowledge based on whether the individual can be 
treated as a ‘subject’ or an ‘object’ of inquiry. In considering the positivist approach 
one can argue that ‘reality’ is external to the individual and should be the focus of 
researching patterns of behaviour. The assumption being that a structure of 
determinate relationships can be established, this, more commonly, is referred to as 
‘concrete structures’ based on observed and measured objectively, without bias or 
‘value judgement’.
However, it is claimed that, even when all relevant variables of the study are 
identified and measured, the positivist approach lacked the necessary ‘depth’ needed 
to build theory from what Denzin & Lincoln (1994) describe as the ‘messy’ 
complexities of the Lean/TQM phenomena. Operations management authors tend not 
to fully reject positivism but there has been a greater trend towards qualitative rather 
than quantitative research designs as the field of study moves from merely testing 
theories to generating them. Meredith (1993) also argues “The use o f conceptual 
research methods based on descriptive, empirical investigation can significantly 
increase the external validity o f OM research conclusions and thus their 
corresponding relevance to managers”. Given the intention of this study to contribute 
to good management practice, Meredith’s view was duly accepted and a purely
32 There are many terms used in the literature as substitutes for the term ‘positivism’ (Easterby-Smith et 
al 1993). These include ‘objectivism’ (Morgan and Smircich 1980) and ‘empiricism’ (Burrell and 
Morgan 1979). The alternative terms used in the literature to describe naturalism (Wass and Wells 
1994) including phenomenology (Easterby-Smith & Thrope 1993). For the purpose of this thesis the 
terms positivism and naturalism will be used to describe the extreme positions outlined.
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positivist approach was therefore rejected as inappropriate to the development of 
theory needed to understand self managed teams. A positivist approach would 
therefore provide only a partial account of the phenomenon/reality of aerospace repair 
processes and would lack a depth of analysis needed to identify context and 
perceptions of error sources.
By contrast, the naturalist perspective regards ‘reality’ as a function of individual 
consciousness, subjective interpretation and grounded in personal experience. The 
approach is based on the attributes of individual creation where observed and 
measured reality is impossible and an undesirable activity. Naturalists are 
diametrically opposed to the positivist research approach but there is a ‘middle 
ground’ that seeks to reconcile the extremes such that observable events may be 
interpreted using both behavioural and observed forms of research. The latter 
approach was duly accepted (the school of realism) as a means of framing the main 
research study design. For the purpose of clarity, the realist approach is outlined in 
figure 3.0. The underlying ontological assumption is that reality is external to the 
individual and capable of objective forms of ‘scientific’ measurement.
Figure 3.0 The Deductive Positivist Research Model.
R esearcher Tests a Theory 
Leading To
R esearcher Tests Hypotheses o r R esearch Questions Derived from  the Theory 
Leading To
R esearcher Operationalises C oncepts or V ariables Derived from  the Theory 
Leading To
R esearcher Uses an Instrum ent to  M easure Variables in the Theory
Source: Taken From Cresswell (1994)
However in accepting this position the researcher will not ignore the importance of 
individual interpretations, which Ajzen & Madden (1986), see figure 3.6, present in 
their model of human cognition, where levels of individual subjectivity cannot be 
removed from the social reality of the organisation itself. In light of this consideration 
it is also important to accept the argument put forward by Swamidass, (1991) also 
Scudder & Hill (1998) who advocate the position of the positivist school of research,
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which has a long precedent in the field of operations management. The latter suggests 
it is important to have a quantitative element to any study in order to generate valid 
knowledge within the operations management field of study.
The researcher therefore accepts that ‘valid knowledge’ is derived from quantitative 
research, which forms the basis upon which this study will take place. In other words 
a number of assumptions will be made based on hypotheses driven predictions, which 
will be used to test the principles of TQM within the context of cross-functional 
management. Also accepted is the position of cultural indifference within the case 
study itself, whereby attitude differences between the two main study groups are 
expected to exist as suggested by Hofestead (2001) earlier in chapter 2 of the 
literature review. The adoption of positivist research is therefore proposed as 
essentially unproblematic, as long as the researcher adopts objective procedures that 
Blaikie (1993) states are ‘value-free’ and supported by rigorous statistical testing. 
Proof of reality can be demonstrated using deductive forms of scientific logic. In other 
words a range of scientific procedures capable of providing a suitable range of tests 
procedures will need to be considered. The criteria which can then determine levels of 
statistical significance will include social data tests used for their reliability and 
validity, within a framework of positivist research design. This is a requirement that 
Ragin (1994), claims is a necessary consideration for any form of hypotheses driven 
research to take place. The researcher duly accepted this approach as a scientific 
means of discerning the existence of broad patterns of cause and effect relationships. 
In summary the positivist approach will provide a clear structure for the collection and 
testing of data, such that the differences between case study sites can be discerned and 
therefore prompt deeper investigations using more qualitative methods as a secondary 
form of research design.
However, the researcher makes clear that, for the purpose of this study, a purely 
positivist approach will be rejected, as it is more suitable for testing theory than 
developing new models of human understanding in areas, which are poorly 
understood and not yet fully established. This approach was also considered 
inappropriate to this study because of the complex socio-technical system of self­
managed teams where cause and effect relationships can not be easily be identified, 
measured and extracted from the workplace setting. In other words the issue of data 
manipulation as used by the experimentalist would forcibly ‘smooth out’ outliers
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differences and promote ‘similarity’. A concept that Parkhe (1993) considers 
important when identifying interesting deviations, the researcher will use this concept 
as the basis for prompting deeper and more qualitative levels of investigation. It is 
therefore considered that smoothing of data would be incompatible with the 
development of new theory building; this is seen as an important consideration when 
aiming to close the gap in the existing body of operations management. In light of this 
consideration the intention is to maintain the importance of positivism, within a non- 
parametric design, but to draw short of accepting what is referred to as parametric 
data, where any generalizations according to Norusis (2006) will always be 
statistically similar when comparing attitudinal differences, between and across case 
study groups. Therefore the extremes of positivist research and its ‘smoothing’ of data 
are not considered as a viable approach to the real world problems of human factors in 
safety critical operational management structures.
In rejecting the experimentalist approach the researcher is considering that the 
practical contribution this study can offer in terms of the limited number of time 
constraints that this type of research can bring to the field of operations management, 
thereby accepting the criticism and limitations that a purely positivist approach 
(experimentalists) would bring, in terms of solving the real-world problems from a 
safety critical and human factors point of view. In support of this position Swamidass 
(1991) states “the scope o f operations management (OM) cannot be captured and 
explained in its entirety by purely deductive tools...unlike mathematics or logic, OM 
is embedded in the empirical universe...the lack o f an empirical dimension in past 
OM research is a reflection on the unbalanced research emphasis in the area, which 
is correctable and deserves correction by increasing the pace and quality of 
descriptive, empirical investigations” In light of this argument the design 
considerations of Swamidass (1991) are accepted, he argues “field based research 
can narrow the gap between practice and research because it takes the researcher to 
the field for dialogue and observation ...some OM topics that are too fuzzy and messy 
[and] ...are under researched because they are unsuitable for deductive methods of 
research ”
At the present time, human factors within the aerospace industry and TQM are not 
well understood and therefore, as Parkhe (1993) advises it must be studied using a 
subjective rather than positivist methodology. Parkhe argues, “at a stage of
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development where phenomena are not well understood and relationships between the 
phenomena are not known, precise experiments that precede rather than succeed 
studies amount to being precise about vagueness ” Before the final cycle of the case 
research was conducted, and in response to Parkhe’s opinion, a pilot study was used 
to precede phase 1, the main questionnaire. As such the balance of the study was 
blended and the design was structured to offer new insights into the phenomena of 
repair & overhaul of safety related risk factors in areas of effective and ineffective 
management practice. Such a viewpoint is reinforced by Meredith (1993) who argues 
“The use o f conceptual research methods based on descriptive, empirical 
investigation can significantly increase the external validity o f OM research 
conclusions and thus their corresponding relevance to managers ”
3.3 Naturalism in Operations Management
Having reviewed the main features and propositions of the positivist school, a 
growing trend exists against experimental forms of research and calls for a greater 
depth of study (from a real world/problem driven point of view) of research designs 
that focus on quality/safety related problems. In light of this situation the naturalist 
approach is therefore seen as having a bias towards meaning and offers an opportunity 
to provide a wider insight in to how best to design this study. The importance of 
which is centered on qualitative levels of understanding which Morgan & Smircich 
(1980) claims that “Once one relaxes the ontological assumption that the world is a 
concrete structure, and admits that human beings, far from merely responding to the 
social world may actively contribute to its creation, the dominant models become 
increasingly unsatisfactory, and indeed inappropriate. The requirement for effective 
research in these situations is clear; scientists can no longer remain as external 
observers measuring what they see; they must move to investigate from within the 
subject o f study and employ research techniques appropriate to that task”
The ‘ideal type’ naturalist approach is diametrically opposed to that of positivism, and 
represents a comparatively newer branch of knowledge that accepts subjectivity in 
human decision-making and behaviour. For naturalists, ‘value freedom’ cannot be 
assured and the ability to manipulate human systems, such as industrial organizations, 
in the same manner as the natural sciences is not possible according to Layder (1994). 
This approach therefore highlights the role of the individual within management 
research as providing collective interpretation, based on ‘meaning’, which according
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to Delbridge (1998) is bound up with the experiences of the social world. In other 
words the view offered by naturalists rejects anything that lies outside of this 
experience and therefore has no real relevance to the understanding of social groups.
As such, using data collected during specific ‘snapshot’ interventions, naturalism 
seeks to capture the dynamism of events rather than ‘freezing’ the social world. These 
techniques favour observation and interaction with individuals, following abstention 
from ‘a priori’ axiomatic structures built from previous knowledge and extensive 
literature reviews. As such, the approach is characterised by ‘inductive’ methods as 
opposed to the positive tradition (deductive approach), which implies that the 
researcher enters the social setting to develop explanations as a result of a research 
process based upon observation and reflection. In view of the purely naturalist 
approach to research, figure 3.1 shows a very different methodology based on a 
‘bottom up’ research approach.
Figure 3.1 The Naturalist Research Process.
R esearcher Gathers Information 
L ea d in g  T o
R esearcher Asks Questions 
L ead in g  T o
R esearcher Form s Categories 
L ead in g  T o
R esearcher Looks for Patterns (Theories)
L ead in g  T o
R esearcher Develops a Theory o r Com pares Pattern with O ther Theories
Source: Taken From Cresswell, (1994)
However, the main criticisms of the naturalist approach concern the number of 
potential and almost infinite causal relationships that exist with, even simple, social 
phenomena. Such a variety of choices, according to Miles & Huberman (1994) is 
undesirable33 and leads to difficulties during the interpretation of results, which Miles 
& Huberman (1994) go on to argue, “Even advocates o f the naturalist approach 
conflict in terms o f reconciling epistemological issues and also practical 
considerations during research itself ’ In other words the naturalist approach in its 
entirety was considered to be inappropriate methodology as a whole, since
33 During the design of this research strategy the recommendations of Miles and Huberman (1994) were 
observed and a pre-structured literature survey was conducted.
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organizations, such as the one found in this study function as part of a system. The 
researcher therefore rejected this approach as the single source of design, because of 
its inability to provide direction and structure, this is summarized in terms of two 
extremes as listed in figure 3.2 shown below.
Figure 3.2.
Theoretical Comparisons
Naturalist Approach Positivist Approach
Assumptions Assumptions
Reality is socially constructed Fact and data with objective reality
Variables are complex and interwoven Variables can be measured & identified
Event taken from informants perspective Events taken from researcher perspective
Dynamic quality to life Static reality to life
Purpose Purpose
Interpretation Prediction
Contextualisation Generalisation
Understanding the perspectives of others Causal explanation
Method Method
Unstructured interviews Testing and measuring
Concludes with hypothesis & theory Commences with hypothesis & theory
Inductive and naturalistic Deductive and experimental
Data reported in language of informant Statistical reporting
Role of researcher Role of research
Researcher as instrument Researcher applies formal instruments
Empathic understanding Detachment objective
Source: Taken Barnes (2000)
3.4 Realism in Operations Management.
In the light of these two extremes the realist position is accepted as a suitable means 
of framing and housing this study. The realist approach is a point of reconciliation that 
sits between the extremes of positivism and naturalism. Realists such as Giddens 
(1984)34 & Wass and Wells (1994) argue that a synthesis of extremes is possible and 
occurs naturally during most field research. They contend that positivism, whilst 
legitimate only provides a partial account of reality and that no form of science can 
rely exclusively on empirical evidence alone. Instead, much of reality is implicit or 
hidden from empirical observation and therefore realists propose that valid knowledge
34 Giddens (1984) was one of the first academics to propose that structure and action constitute social 
life.
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should encompass both observable and non-observable forms of study. Central to this 
debate Bechofer (1974) proposes a “...research process is not a clear-cut sequence o f 
procedures following a neat pattern but a messy interaction between the conceptual 
and empirical world, deduction and induction occur at the same time ” As such he 
argues for cycles of investigation that move from observable studies to more 
qualitative approaches. Gummesson (1991) reinforced this line of thought by 
proposing “...there is nothing to stop a researcher from adopting a positivistic 
paradigm in a certain research setting and a hermeneutic in another, even in the 
same project”. Such ‘cycling’ between quantitative and qualitative observation is, for 
Miles & Huberman (1994) a powerful means of exploiting the realist approach that 
allows for a greater insight into ‘messy’ and complex social phenomena. Other 
researchers within the field of operations management such as Gilbert (1993) 
Swamidass (1991), Meredith (1993) Fillipini (1997) and Liker (2004) agree with this 
whilst at the same time rejecting the purely positivist approach in favour of using 
realism that generates a depth of understanding best suited to more complex operation 
management environments. These researchers also caution against what is referred to 
as positivist ‘snapshots’ claiming that the purely positivist approach leads to artificial 
‘smoothing’, of data that has, in many cases has been shown to result in an 
oversimplification of reality.
As a direct result of this criticism the researcher, for the purpose of this study, has 
cited the work of Bhaskar (1978) who promotes a realist approach and proposes that 
there are three overlapping domains of reality. The first is centred on the empirical 
domain and includes experiences and observations of reality. The second, concerns 
the actual reality and events either observed or not and the third the real structures and 
mechanisms that produce these events. As such the concept of ‘realism’ is considered 
both objective and subjective this legitimises the researcher’s choice and position in 
accepting what is described as middle ground. Bechofer (1974) reinforces this 
position claiming that “research processes are not a clear-cut sequence o f procedures 
following a neat pattern, but a messy interaction between the conceptual and 
empirical world, deduction and induction occur at the same time ”
The realist perspective according to Maylor (1998) therefore permits a deeper 
exploration of issues and deviant outlier cases, which the researcher accepted as a
35 The term hermeneutic is used interchangeably with the term naturalism in the philosophical 
literature.
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valuable research perspective for consideration. Consequently, the realist perspective 
was considered to be the most appropriate means of research design, Silverman 
(2000), Yin (2003) Miles & Huberman (1994) claim that it is the ‘dominant’ form of 
organisational and operational management research design.
The realist perspective also permitted the ‘cycling’ between quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of the investigation such that Crompton and Jones (1988) argue 
that “quantitative data always rest upon qualitative distinctions” In other words the 
researcher is prepared to combine both elements of interpretation and will not assume 
a position of mutual exclusivity and for this reason decided that a wide choice of 
methods could be used to analyse both qualitative and quantitative research findings 
(Oakland, 2003). In this manner, the realist approach was selected as the most 
appropriate grounding for this study as a means of identifying the main features and 
barriers of TQM as well as offering a deeper insight into the safer management 
practice of self-managed team working itself. In light of this consideration Easterby- 
Smith (1993) argued that a “Failure to think through philosophical issues while not 
necessarily fatal, can seriously affect the quality o f management research ” Wass and 
Wells (1994) argue that a research design is “a technical decision whereby the 
strengths and weaknesses o f various techniques, in relation to the research problem, 
are optimally combined”
3.5 Main Research Design Model
Having established the realist epistemology as the grounding approach for this study, 
this section will concern the selection and presentation of the research strategy itself. 
In achieving this aim a philosophical evaluation of investigative techniques that could 
be employed as a means of acquiring knowledge and manipulate data36 has been 
included. Such considerations were integral to the selection of an appropriate strategy, 
whereby the methods used can be considered as more or less effective against the 
given objectives of the chosen research design. In consideration of the research 
question that guides this study, the researcher found that the chosen research design 
could not be explained by either a purely positivist approach, owing to vagueness of 
understanding, or a purely naturalist approach, which falls outside the perceptual 
boundaries of subjective interpretation.
36 Source: Dictionary of Sociology 2nd Edition Unwin Hyman 1995
The chosen approach is therefore set within a realist, longitudinal framework, with 
cyclical phases of quantitative and qualitative research, involving a pluralist range and 
use of methods. The model shown below in figure 3.3 provides a schematic overview 
of this position, based on the researcher’s design strategy that demonstrates to the 
reader a logical flow of research events.
Figure 3.3
Main Research Design Model
Secondary
Qualitative
Perspective
Primary
Quantitative
Perspective
Cross
Case
Model
Of
Analysis
Questionnaire Research
Cross Comparative 
Case Study 
Design Strategy
Focus Group Research
Normality Testing 
Hypothesis Pedictions 
Reliability Testing 
Validity Testing 
Statistical Testing 
Data Coding
Source: Researcher
From a methodological viewpoint, this model allows for the widest variety of methods 
to be employed, combined with quantitative techniques, which will result in data 
expressed in a numerical format for the purpose of statistical manipulation37 
In other words a ‘qualitative observation’ identifies the presence or absence of 
something, in contrast to ‘quantitative observation’, which involves measuring the 
degree to which a feature is present the latter of which according to:
Kirk & Miller (1986) “Relies upon the emphatic skills o f the researcher as an 
interviewer/observer ”.
As previously noted Huff & Reger (1985) advocate the ‘realist’ approach and favour 
cyclical processes in which the researcher’s role can be described in terms of
37 The use o f statistical m anipulation is contingent upon a number o f factors including the size o f the 
sample and therefore it is not always conducted as in the conditions o f multiple case studies using a 
com mon approach.
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methodological pluralism. In addition, this position is accepted in terms of 
triangulation, with reference to the type of data to be collected, which according to 
Denzin (1978), Eilon (1974), Morgan (1983), Brewer and Hunter (1989), and 
Meredith (1993) will strengthen the validation process where the subject matter is ill 
defined and difficult to control. The recommendations of the above researchers were 
accepted, in terms of the methodological benefits that pluralism and cyclical 
approaches can bring to data collection and validation to this study as a whole. These 
advantages will ensure confidence in the results, are based on the ability of the 
researcher to detect anomalies during the quantitative process and according to Jick 
(1979) provides a critical test for different theories to take place. In light of these and 
other such considerations the choice of this design strategy was accepted based on an 
operations management researchers such as Massey (2000) and Rich (1999), as an 
appropriate choice when investigating manufacturing organizations; They argue that 
case studies offer: “A more rounded, holistic study than any other design” . In 
addition, Yin (2003) proposes that case study research allows; “an investigation to 
return the holistic and meaningful characteristics o f real-life events -  such as 
individual life cycles, organisational & managerial processes... ”.
A case strategy is therefore considered highly suitable to this study as it is able to 
measure areas of human error risk, in environments that are poorly understood and as 
such are more likely to produce new theory, which is a key objective stated by 
Eisenhardt (1989), Leonard-Barton (1992) and Pettigrew (1992) within this area of 
operations management. Another argument, raised by Yin (2003) again supports the 
case study design based on its suitability for conditions where “little is known about a 
phenomenon, current perspectives seem inadequate because they have little empirical 
substantiation .. .In  these cases theory-building from case studies does not rely on
-i o
previous literature or prior empirical evidence ” . He adds, the case approach is best
suited to answering ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why?’ types of questions where the researcher 
cannot influence control over the subject as illustrated below in figure 3.4. As such, 
the case study process and strategy align well with the chosen research objectives that 
guide this study (as declared in chapter 1).
38 Meredith (1993) reinforces the utility of the approach for poorly defined phenomena.
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Figure 3.4
The Appropriateness of Different Research Strategies
Strategy Form of Suitable Research 
Question
Requires Control 
Over Behavioural 
Events?
Focuses On
Contemporary
Events?
Experiment How and Why? Yes Yes
Survey Who, What, Where, How Many, 
and How Much?
No Yes
Archival
Research
Who, What, Where, How Many, 
and How Much?
No Yes and No
History How and Why? No No
Case Study What, How and Why? No Yes
Source: Taken From Yin (2003)
3.6 Case Study Strategy Selection & Design
The term ‘case study’ covers many different approaches within the realist perspective 
and, as Yin (2003) claims, it offers three basic classifications namely; exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory39, their use is based on the intent of the researcher. 
Exploratory studies involve the identification of questions/hypotheses for later study, 
whereas, descriptive cases involve a comprehensive account of the phenomenon 
within its context, and finally, the explanatory case is used to test ‘cause and effect’ 
relationships as events unfold. Stake (1994) also provides three types of case study 
commencing with ‘intrinsic’ cases used to generate understanding of a phenomenon, 
‘instrumentation’ cases used to test methods and the ‘collective’ form of cases, used 
to examine common types of research phenomena. Although, more recent studies 
have identified six classifications of case study which Shavelson (2000) identifies as.
1. Multi-case studies
2. Historical case studies
3. Observational case studies
4. Oral case studies
5. Situational case studies
6. Clinical case studies
39 Explanatory cases involve the questions of ‘how and why’. Descriptive cases examine ‘how’ 
subsystems interact and exploratory cases focus on ‘what’ questions before engaging further fieldwork 
to test the hypotheses developed.
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Of the many different types of case study, a multiple-case replication approach was 
considered to be the most appropriate for this research, because it can align the main 
research question with contemporary events set within a framework of high mix low 
volume types of OM systems. Herriott (1983) provides strong support for this 
selection and argues that research of the type found in this study, will be able to 
predict patterns of results and theoretical replication to ensure a common approach 
across a multiple case study design. He argues that this is the strongest way of 
building theory and a multiple case approach allows consideration of the business 
problems as a holistic system. Such a view was accepted by the researcher and 
considered to be necessary when evaluating the major areas of error risk that require 
objectivity, thus avoiding focusing on one problem in isolation. In light of this and 
other such considerations the concept of multiple embedded case studies were 
considered because they are able to reduce the risk of misjudgment whilst at the same 
time exposing different levels of generalization, in terms of the practical benefits to a 
small populations of businesses sectors.
The multiple case approach permits, according to Eisenhardt (1989), greater levels of 
confidence and validity of emergent relationships especially when the results need to 
be compared between cases and/or when deviant or contradictory cases are likely to 
be found. For this reason the multiple case study approach offers the potential to 
refine and extend theory, suiting the purpose of this investigation, which Leonard- 
Barton (1990) argued in favour of, in terms of the benefits of developing the 
opportunity for theoretical replication to take place. In accepting this position the 
concept of a cross-comparative case study was considered to be a suitable choice, it 
will be used to measure the extent to which a quality problem may exist in terms of 
creating an objective reality, which according to Schramm (1971) “Tries to illuminate 
a decision or set o f decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and 
what was the resulf9 To achieve the goal of academic rigour the researcher has 
therefore identified with the three guiding principles set out by Gligun (1994) & 
Ghauri (2002), based on the following prerequisites shown below.
1. A matching of method and strategy with the implications of the research 
question.
2. To allow deeper research and lower the ability of the researcher to control 
behavioural events.
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3. The ability of case research to focus on contemporary events as opposed to 
reflections upon historical events at each case study site.
In accepting a case based approach it will also be necessary to define the ‘boundary’ 
of the unit of analysis for this research a case study is defined in terms of a single 
manufacturing site (a systems approach to safety management). The number of cases 
selected to determine this position was set at four and each case was a subsidiary 
repair facility of a multi-national corporate enterprise (Leonard-Barton, 1992). The 
selection of 4 cases is considered to be an effective number in order to offer an insight 
into human error risk, based on purposive selection criteria. A viewpoint, which is 
supported by other researchers such as Eisenrhardt (1989) who advocated using more 
than 3 cases and less than 12 based on the caveat of practical administration. This 
consideration was duly accepted, based on the doctoral factors such as time, access 
and finical pressure, set within the same parent organisation. The repair & overhaul 
business was deliberately selected because, it was operating a Lean and TQM 
approach to operations management, as such it was most likely to offer insights into 
safety management practice under conditions of human factors control. Each case 
shared a corporate culture and common ways of working under a single human 
resource strategy within the context of TQM and self-managed teams.
The informants were selected from common grades of employee divided by ‘staff 
and ‘shop floor’ groups at each case study location using a cross-functional 
management model. The selected informants were considered to be critical elements 
of the gas turbine repair & overhaul business process, which complies with the 
recommendations suggested by Yin (2003) as representative of all businesses in the 
aero-engine repair sector. The purposive selection criteria is shown in figure 3.5 
below, which demonstrates a level of compliance, based on the recommendations put 
forward by Silverman (2000) concerning the ability and need for the researcher to 
generalize from a purposive or theoretical sampling point of view.
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Figure 3.5
Purposive Selection Criteria
Selection criterion Main Purpose
One corporate owner of the 
sites
To reduce the affects of cultural bias. All sites were part of 
an identical improvement, HR and quality strategy. Each 
site also reported to the same directorial structure.
Same engine type (Civilian 
Engine)
To ensure the technical system and repair processes were 
similar. Civilian engines were those where most air traffic 
accident data existed. All engines were of a similar and 
regulated complexity.
Established factory All sites had an established culture and working practices 
based upon over 40 years of repairing engines. Each case is 
third line aero-engine repair (the level of engine supply that 
is at the base of the safety iceberg model proposed by 
Reason (2003).
Mature Improvement 
Programmes
All sites were experienced in the application of quality and 
lean working methods.
Source: Taken from Silverman (2000)
A pluralist approach to data collection instruments was selected during the design and 
execution of this research. These instruments included a pilot study to sensitize the 
researcher to each case site and to identify key issues within the field of error 
management itself. In view of this requirement a variety of background literature was 
drawn upon which was partially accepted for its contribution to theory building and 
was subsequently used as a suitable framework for testing the original research 
question. The assumption being that human error problems, for the most part, 
correlate significantly with defeats in systems thinking, this therefore provided a 
“read-across” with operations management thinking. While most human factors 
studies reflect the need to capture different kinds of data, the researcher states that no 
single method or way of combining employees’ attitudes will be used alone as a 
means for measuring factors affecting human error risk40.
In light of this consideration the study therefore integrated cognitive research 
methods, whereby the cohesion of knowledge structures can be assessed in terms of a
40 Human error analysis and subsequent risk reduction are of significant concern for all type of human 
process tasks found in various industries.
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measured response to what the individual thinks or believes to be representative about 
his, or her particular environment and their role and function within it. In so doing, 
part 1 of the study includes the deployment of a large-scale questionnaire as a method 
of effective data collection; it is based on how individuals relate to operational 
constraints it also measures the relationship between cause and effect thinking. 
Although, when nearly all conditions within the field of human factors research are 
defined by language, perception and meaning it is acknowledged that overt forms of 
measurement, without due consideration for naturalist forms of research would be 
reductionist in its approach (Saunders et al, 2000). Therefore a complementary 
secondary approach was added to the research design, whereby qualitative methods 
can provide deeper and more complex answers than quantitative studies alone.
Whilst understanding the significance of attitude research, the study could not ignore 
that individual problems are jointly defined by feelings that relate to objects, events 
and behavior as stated earlier in the literature review. To substantiate this claim 
further, the work of by Ajzen & Fishbien (1980), was considered, they developed a 
theory that was able to legitimize the relationship between attitudes and behavior, 
which was specifically designed to overcome this type of problem. The model is 
referred to as the ‘theory of reasoned action’ because it assumes that actions are best 
predicted by intentions and that these intentions will be determined by the attitudes of 
individuals who are able to express their concerns through experience of 
environmental perception. Ajzen and Madden’s (1986) contribution is based on the 
premise that attitudes are heavily influenced by environmental control and for this 
reason a realist research framework was used and a researcher day book was 
maintained to capture reflections and informal aspects of the investigation (as per the 
recommendations of Yin, 2003). Considerations at this level of analysis underline the 
importance of the individual’s belief as to whether he/she can or cannot perform a 
certain task against a given situation as outlined in their model shown in figure 3.6 
below.
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Figure 3.6
Model of Planned Behaviour
Behaviour
Attitude
Intention
Subjective
norm
Perceived
behavioural
control
Expected outcomes of behaviour and 
value of those outcomes to the person
Relative importance of 
person of attitude and 
subjective norm
Beliefs about how favourably or 
unfavourably other people would react if 
one performed the behaviour, and 
motivated to comply with their views
Source: Taken From Ajzen & Madden (1986)
3.7 Questionnaire Design
Following the literature review and expert interviews, the researcher has selected 9 
common factors to include in the questionnaire, which form the general framework of 
quantitative human factor barriers. These barriers could affect the goal of achieving 
self-management with TQM as shown in the list below.
Factor 1 = Planning
Factor 2 = Equipment
Factor 3 = Procedures
Factor 4 = Quality Management
Factor 5 = Fatigue
Factor 6 = Training
Factor 7 = Communication
Factor 8 = Safety Culture
Factor 9 = Management Attitudes
In order to gain appreciation of each site, the researcher visited each factory and met 
with the management team to introduce the general context of the study based on the
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objectives of human factors itself. The visits included a tour of each facility, which 
also provided the opportunity for assessment of the uniqueness and the history of the 
culture of each site. Such an approach is widely favored by case researchers as a 
means of contextual sensitization and also as a practical means of designing and 
phrasing the questionnaire. A common questionnaire was therefore administered to all 
cases based on a sample size of approximately 200 employees per site location, 
including 20% of those respondents taking part in the secondary stage of follow up 
qualitative research. The structure formed a series of focus groups and semi-structured 
interviews as part of the secondary data/observational research cycle. Based on the 
logistical task of programme managing and processing large amount of data, the 
researcher committed approximately 12 months of full-time work across each of the 
four UK based sites. The data collection methods, which are taken from a standard 
Likert scale were used to collate interval data types, represent affective attitudes of 
error provoking factors through a single questionnaire design. The likert system is 
often used in operational management research, because each item on the 
measurement scale is not influenced by the researcher’s intuition or common sense 
opinions.
Likert scales are usually designed around a single number that represents the sum and 
average scores respectively, thereby providing the researcher with a set of raw data 
scores as a broad indicator of human error concerns, as illustrated by the choice of 
design shown below.
Questionnaire Numbering System
1 = Strongly Disagree (No Problems)
2 = Disagree (No Problems)
3 = Unsure
4 = Agree (Problems)
5 = Strongly Agree (Problems)
The questionnaire was deployed to a central co-ordinator at the human resource 
department of each site’s Learning and Development adviser and these personnel 
were used as the point-of-contact to receive completed questionnaires. It should also 
be noted that access to the sites was negotiated via the trade union and the trade union 
was content to support the human factors programme.
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However, before the survey could take place the issues of variable selection and 
control were addressed in terms of understanding the validity of the questionnaire 
process itself. For example, the original research question, about the relationship 
between self-managed team working and the principles of TQM theory, was based on 
the experience and informed opinion of the researcher in his professional capacity as 
an error management investigator and the experts that had been interviewed. In order 
to test this relationship, a number of variables had to be clearly identified using 
established methods of social science that ensured statements based on assumption 
could be tested for their relevance and truth.
3.8 Questionnaire Validity
The scientific term ‘validity’41 refers to the process by which the researcher can 
confidently measure a range of human factor risks, against the original research 
design. In order to provide evidence of scientific generalisation a level of consistency 
should be demonstrated; the study should be robust and able to stand the test of time 
whereby this particular study could be repeated in other places and by other people. 
This study satisfied the first principle of external validity in the area of the process of 
expert sampling. This process included a cross representation of people from the 
department of error management research at Cardiff University School of Psychology 
along with industrial professionals from the field of aviation maintenance such as of 
quality, human resource and error management consultants. Their advice was duly 
accepted. In addition, the supporting literature was used as a checklist as highlighted 
by Thompson (2001) this is perceived as instrumental in shaping the design of the 
questionnaire, as agreed by the panel of experts. For example each survey was 
administered to a sample of staff and works groups; reference Appendix 1, which was 
estimated to take approximately 20 minutes to complete. The final evidence for 
content validity is indicative of how closely the results shown in chapter 5 are 
expected to correlate between and across all case study sites. Consideration in this 
context was therefore given to a range of factors within the design of the 
questionnaire, which aimed to understand the strengths and weaknesses at three levels 
of analysis. This was carried out by means of controlling and reducing employee’s 
unreliability through standardisation of questions, within the context of its;
41Testing the scientific validity requires development of a qualitative methodology for the measurement 
of behaviour
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1. Wording
2. Content
3. Format
The testing involved examination of each section within the questionnaire, which was 
widely discussed with a number of end users (n=12) before the administration of the 
survey proper. After considerable debate it was agreed that every question in each 
section was equally relevant with no single question being more noticeably relevant 
than any other. Finally the advantages of carrying out the process of external validity 
is supported by the fact that the researcher is not acting alone and thereby able to 
defend decisions that justified the investment of resource during the second phase of 
the study. This was considered important in order to justify the investment of further 
time and resource when planning formative evaluations, as follow up research to stage 
1 of the study based on the validation process as shown below.
1 Review the questionnaire by the panel of experts.
2 Carry out a think-aloud process with the cross sample of experts.
3 Engage 10 employees to write detailed responses of the draft questionnaire.
4 Invite employees to carry out a pilot questionnaire.
5 Compare the responses of high and low scores against background research.
Establishing external validity is therefore ultimately dependant on how the 
researcher is able to prove that the correct generalisation has been made. For 
example how can the researcher be confident that the results of the study, which 
will be carried out in the UK, will be consistent with the findings of other global 
studies, when according to Hofsteade (2001) different cultures often exhibit certain 
types of behaviour that may be culturally biased between one country and the next.
For example Craig & Douglas (2000) found in their study of social acquiescence 
bias a strong correlation amongst some Japanese subjects who required a sense of 
‘togetherness’ in their organisation and therefore did not want to elicit negative 
responses for fear of offending or causing problems. In other words Craig & 
Douglas argued that this type of situation could be explained in terms of a cultural 
bias, which is characteristic of many Asian countries where workers would be 
expected to respond positively to questionnaires as it would be considered rude to 
do otherwise. In some situations they also found evidence of research bias in
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redundancy environments where employees of one organisation felt that any 
negative comments found in their surveys might be used against them.
However, at the micro level of analysis the researcher is also aware of what social 
scientists refer to as response order bias, whereby the aim of a well designed 
questionnaire must be able to reduce the effects of error within the survey itself, 
starting from the rationale that human error can be attributed to many different types 
of stimuli, with some errors relating to carelessness, negligence or poor judgment. 
Secondly the researcher considered the concept of internal validity, which refers to the 
rigorous methods under which the questionnaire was carried out. For example it was 
noted that approximately 20% of subjects during the pilot phase of establishing 
validity were observed as not completing the questionnaire accurately. The researcher 
therefore concluded that (approximately 3/4 of the way through the pilot 
questionnaire) a satisfactory resolution would be to redesign the questionnaire and to 
simplify it. A number of inconsistent trends had developed and the original design of 
the questionnaire had induced a condition known as ‘response order bias’ whereby 
some subjects lost track of the a number of options and selected answers that came 
easily to mind rather than the options the researcher had intended for choice. To 
resolve this problem the researcher removed 33% of the questionnaire thus reducing 
the effect of response order bias.
3.9 Reliability Methods
The concept of reliability42 is based on the assumption that objective research must be 
able to demonstrate scientific rigour through a standardised range of methods that will 
reduce the chance of variation thorough what is described as research bias. A 
consideration that Yin (2003) formalised in terms of: UA process by which another 
researcher should be able to carry out the same study, following the same procedures, 
making the same findings and drawing similar conclusions ” In compliance with this 
position the researcher will process the first stage of the study, namley each 
questionnaire response separately, to create a database of raw scores for the purpose 
of what researchers refer to as testing for ‘normality’ To facilitate this the ‘Anderson 
Darling’ best line of fit test will be used to establish the reliability of the data, in terms 
of its spread or standard deviation about the population mean. A probability value will
42 Research Reliability relates to whether research results can be applied to a wider group than those 
who took part in a study.
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then be established in terms of defining the type of data collected as either a 
parametric or of a non-parametric research design. The aim of the normality test will 
allow the researcher to compare response frequencies in terms of measuring the 
intervals of scores within a histogram against expected frequencies, if the distribution 
curve is assumed to be normal. In other words the researcher is concerned with how 
well the data fits a normally distributed curve, against an overlay of data as illustrated 
in figure 3.7 shown in the example diagram shown below.
Source: Taken from Min Tab (2007)
The test statistic taken in this example represents a probability value of 0.75, which is 
higher than the significance level of 0.05. In general terms any data, which fits a 
normal distribution profile, will be represented as a large probability value, thereby 
resulting in the acceptance of what is referred to as the null hypothesis. If the test 
statistic is equal to or above 005 i.e. the critical value, a level of significance will be 
established to guide the researcher in accepting the null hypothesis. For example if the 
test probability value is less than 0.05 then the researcher can accept the questionnaire 
as being of a non-normal outcome. Whereas if the data is greater than 0.05 the 
researcher can be certain that the data is of a normal distribution, this would 
hypothetically prove that each person who took part in the survey was in agreement 
with the same human factors concerns. In order to test the consistency of the 
measurement system itself the researcher must also be able to demonstrate the criteria
Figure 3.7
Actual Vs Expected Normal Observations
Actual Vs. Expected Normal Observations
actual
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
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of accuracy and repeatability. For example Miles & Huberman (1994) advocate the 
importance of taking actions to increase the reliability of a case study, such as 
clarifying the research questions and designing the study in congruence with them. 
The researcher therefore considers the measurement system as reliable if a person’s 
score from one question is statistically similar to the next. By means of testing this 
element of reliability, the researcher adopted the principles of internal consistency that 
statistically measured the levels of variance between questions using a standard 
Cronbach Alpha test. This test will be applied using a computer-aided programme 
namely SPSS43, which is capable of measuring correlation values based on a series of 
what is referred to as split tests. The rationale being that the closer the score is to one; 
the higher the reliability estimate is proven to be. The accepted social science cut-off 
point for any Cronbach Alpha test should be <0.70 or higher for a set of items to be 
considered a scale.
However some researchers insist on using 0.75 or 0.80 while others are prepared to 
accept as little as 0.60. For the purpose of this study the chosen statistical cut-off point 
is set at <0.70 based on an error of measurement declared at half the standard 
deviation.
3.10 Hypothesis Prediction
Once the researcher was confident that standards of reliability have been attained the 
next phase will be to utilise the principles of hypothesis testing. This approach is 
based on designing a model (as proposed by Rasch, 1980)44 where the concept of 
interval levels will enable the researcher to make estimates that can be used to 
understand patterns of data for the objective of theory building. For example if there is 
a statistically significant relationship of attitudes towards human error risk between 
staff and works grouping the existence of team situational awareness will be assumed. 
Whereas if the alternative was found to be true the null hypothesis would be rejected, 
thereby claiming the existence of a disconnection between these two sample groups. 
In other words evidence would exist to demonstrate the principles of a silo mentality 
whereby each group is working in isolation to the next underlining what human 
factors literature describes as a lack of team situational control. In order to establish 
this position for the purpose of theory building a common one-directional test will be
43 SPSS, is a comprehensive statistical analysis package used for non-parametric testing
44 The Rasch scale is based on the assumption that the probability of a particular response to a test item 
depends on two parameters that can be estimated independently.
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used, as opposed to a two-directional approach where no prediction can be assumed to 
be made.
In general terms the significance levels of hypothesis testing relates to a fixed 
probability of either accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis if the prediction is 
found to be true. In other words the researcher expected the probability value to be as 
small as possible in order to reject the null hypothesis, based on accepting wide 
variations in attitudes to quality related problems of the two sample groups, namely: 
staff and works employees. The probability or p-value will be used to compare the 
significance levels and if the value is smaller than 0.05 the null hypothesis will be 
rejected and reported as p = > 0.05 thereby suggesting that the null hypothesis is 
unlikely to be true. For example the smaller the p value becomes, the more convincing 
the null hypothesis will be. In other words if the expected outcome is proven to be 
true, attitudes towards quality will vary significantly, underlining that both works and 
staff grouping are not the same.
For the purpose of this study the researcher has chosen to follow the convention of 
always stating the null hypothesis by means of demonstrating strict equality in the 
context of accepting or rejecting the alternative. The research question that guides this 
study is therefore accepted from what Henslin (2000) claims is a formalised approach 
to theory building, based on the deployment of either single or multiple numbers of 
hypotheses that will provide: “A testable prediction about the relationship between 
two or more events with no logical interpretation ”. The goal of the hypothesis test is 
therefore aimed at providing strong enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis in 
favour of the stated alternative hypothesis. The exact hypothesis that guides this study 
is declared as one tailed, based on the problem statement shown below:
1. The null hypothesis predicts that no significant relationship concerning 
quality problems will exist between staff and works groups across all sites.
3.11 Statistical Methods Used
In order to understand more of this relationship the researcher will need to evaluate 
the significance of these findings that goes beyond the simple order of magnitude, 
towards a more in depth analysis in terms of understanding its shape or standard 
deviation. Typically the type of test used to measure this relationship is referred to as 
the 2 sample‘t test’, whereby the differences between mean scores at each case study
149
site can be analysed within the concept of what statisticians refer to as ‘normal 
theories’ The suitability and application relies on data known to be of a non normal 
shape and within close proximity to the standard deviation of its population size.
For the purpose of this study the exact probability value will be considered in terms of 
real-world research, which is expected to be slightly skewed. The rationale being, that 
field research of the type found in this study is far removed from the rigours of 
laboratory research.
Accepting this position, the researcher chose to carry out a mixture of both 
approaches, whereby the 2 sample t test will be used as a check measure to provide a 
general comparison of data sets which is closely distributed about the mean.
However, the main body of analysis is accepted in terms of utilising non parametric 
methods such as the Mann-Whitney test, whereby the researcher will measure the 
differences between average scores of one group against the next by counting 
categories, based on the median and not the mean.
The method used to assess this position is formally referred to as non-parametric 
statistics (Wass and Wells, 1994), whereby the range of data being analysed reflects 
very little about the parameters of the population mean. In other words when carrying 
out a non-parametric analysis the Mann-Whitney test is considered as being more 
robust because the researcher does not have to rely on the estimation of parameters, 
such as the mean or the standard deviation. The test statistic used for Mann-Whitney, 
is referred to as U and represents a value, which can be compared to a table of critical 
values for U based on the sample size of each population group. For example if the U 
value is larger than the critical value for U, a significance level or probability of p= >
0.05 will be established, thereby enabling the researcher to accept or reject the null 
hypothesis in favour of the alternative point of view. In summary the benefits of using 
this type of test instead of other parametric methods, will enable the researcher to 
predict generalisations, which are seen as more applicable to the real-world situation 
of problem solving from a human factors point of view.
However, when considering a more in-depth comparison of analysis involving 
multiple groups or more, the researcher will also be interested in measuring the effects 
of team performance against a particular condition, namely a ‘factor’ and in so doing
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will measure the interaction of this effect or influence. The Chi Squared test will be 
used for the purpose of this interaction because it has been designed to convert the 
differences between questionnaire scores by analysing the probability of chance when 
comparing the data being measured, against the number of variables referred to as 
degrees of freedom. For example the effectiveness of self-management in its ability to 
facilitate the principles of TQM maybe more or less effective when input factors such 
as bad planning or inadequate training result in high levels of system variation. In 
order to test this relationship the researcher will cross evaluate the actual results 
against a theoretical range of expected results. The Chi-Square test was selected 
because it is able to compare what is referred to as the ‘goodness of fit’ for 
‘independence’. In other words, the test will highlight paired observations, based on 
two or more variables, which have been defined through a contingency table in terms 
of each case levels of independence. For example if the p-value is high there will be 
considerable overlap between case study groups where the distributions of results are 
assumed to be the same. In some cases the chi-squared test can also be used for 
quantitative purposes as well, but in such situations the researcher will not be able to 
use t or f  test because the data would be described as ‘categorical’ and thereby not of 
quantifiable origin.
In anticipation of such an opportunity arising, the researcher has accepted the 
argument put forward by Schaubroeck & Kuehn (1992) who claimed that:
“The majority o f published studies are conducted in the field, although laboratory 
work comprises o f nearly one-third o f field research. Half o f occupational research 
problems are experimental and compared to most other studies are based on common 
method factors by using diverse data sources. On the down side, a majority o f field 
studies were cross-sectional in nature, as there is little cross-validation o f evidence, 
such as psychological measures and archival records. Researches appear to invest in 
particular design strengths and compromise others”
3.12 Linking Qualitative & Quantitative Research
In general terms the use of quantitative research, whilst initially providing an 
understanding of where the problems areas might lie, fails at the same time to 
facilitate a meaningful account of what individuals are able to express in their own 
words. In order to address this position Bryman (1989) argued that qualitative
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research in the form of phenomenological studies45 should take place, which for the 
purpose of this study the researcher will complete, within a time frame of 1 year, once 
the questionnaire process is complete. The concept of semi-structured interviewing 
will therefore be used in order to satisfy this aim based on establishing the principles 
of congruence46 that Miles & Huberman (1994) claim are important, when 
establishing a triangular approach to a cross-case research design. In developing this 
position the researcher has adopted the methodology of focus group research, which 
was selected for its narrative value to include direct quotations from those persons 
involved. A concept that Greenbaum (1998) argued would also provide an 
opportunity for understanding and measuring the importance of attitudes that are not 
entirely available based on questionnaire results alone. In light of this consideration 
Tesch (1990) also proposed a number of different qualitative methodologies, based on 
four traditions and groups of classification a shown in figure 3.8 below.
Figure 3.8
Types of Qualitative Research
Characteristics of 
Language
Discovery of 
Regularities
Comprehension of 
text or Action
Reflection of 
Research
Content Analysis 
Discourse Analysis 
Symbolic Interaction
Grounded Theory 
Qualitative Evaluation 
Action Research
Phenomenological
Research
Case History
Life History
Reflective
Phenomenology
Existential Psychology
Heuristic Research
Source: Taken From Tesch (1990)
Tesch divides the main areas of her model into subgroups, arguing that it is not 
possible to define clear-cut borders between different groups. Instead she is 
suggesting that different qualitative methods should consist of many different shades 
and mixes. Tesch stresses that qualitative research may mean very different things to 
different people because analysts come from a variety of backgrounds, such as 
sociology and psychology, therefore each will bring his own bias to the understanding 
of the research.
45 The results of phenomenological studies arise from interpreting analysis of texts.
46 Referred to data analysis that includes within-case, within-group, across-case and across-group 
pattern matching
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The researcher’s decision to use the methods of a phenomenological structure was 
based on the need to create an environment that will encourage discussion of attitudes, 
feelings, beliefs and experiences in such a way that would not be available using 
single method studies alone. While the researcher accepts that focus groups in general 
are independent of their natural setting, an important factor remains that a valuable 
range of information can be gained in such a way that would increase the likelihood of 
an open and interactive debate. The rationale supporting this argument is taken from 
Morgan & Kreuger (1993) who claim that focus group research encourages the use of 
everyday language, which is of particular importance when exploring the degree of 
consensus in any given situation. In other words the researcher will consider the 
importance of individual viewpoints in order to confirm a level of validity against the 
information collated at the first stage of questionnaire design. For example attitudes 
and employee belief systems will be analysed independently of the workplace setting, 
this will necessitate the need for a carefully designed produce, based on the following 
checklist of criteria shown below:
1. Recruit participants using site human resources champions through human 
resource database
2. Make necessary arrangements to include training room and refreshment 
services
3. Introduce everyone with name badges if locally appropriate
4. Explain the purpose of the focus group, how long it will take and what 
feedback they will get.
5. Explain that what employees say will be treated as confidential
6. Each session to commence with an easy range of topics that ensure all 
employees have a basic understanding of the session aims and objectives.
7. A record to be kept, which summarises the consensus of group opinions and to 
be subsequently prepared in report format for research purposes.
8. Develop a framework of human factors criteria based on questionnaire 
design.
All of these factors were built into this study and in light of this consideration Miles 
and Huberman (1994) go on to argue that adequately sampled and carefully analysed 
information will illuminate a unique level of understanding, which is not limited to 
specific case concerns, but instead will enable the author to: “Calculate where a given 
order o f events is most likely to occur or not occur”
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However, the down side of this approach according to Morgan (1988) means that the 
researcher is sometimes faced with the difficulty of interpreting subjective data in the 
form of opinions, which highlight the issue of reliability in terms of social control.
Unlike traditional analysts the researcher for the purpose of this study has rejected the 
notion that focus groups will form the conceptual framework of study. Instead he 
identifies, with the model put forward by Tesch (1990) and uses the qualitative data 
methodology as a collection tool for clarification of primary research, within the 
context of her model of ‘Types of qualitative research’ In general, qualitative data is 
usually presented in words as opposed to numbers and whilst becoming the preferred 
method of human factors research, Miles & Huberman (1994) argue that the issue of 
numerical control is still problematic, they describe it as: “Pervasive and not gone 
away ” In other words, presenting and arranging of information must be organised so 
that comparisons and contrasts can be identified. In light of this requirement Miles 
and Huberman (1994) argue in favour of linking both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches into one cross-case design, based on the premise that: “We need a theory 
that explains what is happening- but a theory that does not forcibly smooth the 
diversity in front o f us, but rather uses it fully to develop and test well-grounded set of 
explanations” With this approach it is important that the researcher is able to 
categorise all information in such a way that a single cross-case design represents a 
pareto of relationships in terms of the most serious threat to the quality and safety 
concerns. In adopting this approach Dawson (1979) highlights this process as a highly 
labour-intensive activity that must be conducted in such a way that its methods do not 
‘cheapen’ the quality of cross-case design. Miles & Huberman (1994) support this 
position and claim that: “The most serious and central difficulty in the use o f 
qualitative data is that the methods o f analysis are not well formulated”.
For qualitative data, there are clear conventions the researcher can use. But the analyst 
faced with a bank of qualitative data has very few guidelines for protection against 
self-delusion, let alone the presentation of unreliable or invalid conclusions to 
scientific or policy-making audiences. How can we be sure that an “earthy” 
“undeniable,” “serendipitous” finding is not, in fact wrong? In view of this 
consideration, the actual methods used and the results obtained for the purpose of 
analytical evaluation are based on the framework suggested by Rossman & Wilson
(1991) who claim that linking primary with secondary forms of research will:
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1 Enable conformation or corroboration of each other via triangulation
2 Elaborate or develop analysis providing richer detail
3 Initiate new lines of thinking through surprises or paradoxes.
The researcher therefore compiled and documented information from the workshops 
held, the aim was to convert large amounts of basic raw data to a form of typed 
content summary. Next the principles of first-level coding were used for the purpose 
of structuring what is referred to as a contact summary of events. In so doing the 
researcher extracted what is considered to be key phrases and sentences reported from 
the findings of the focus group workshops, which are considered as error provoking 
factors cited from the main questionnaire concerns. This element of the analysis was 
carried out on completion of each workshop held, based on the advise put forward by 
Loftland & Loftland (1984) who recommended carrying out write-ups no later than 
one day after field contact is complete. By simplifying the content of events from each 
case study location the researcher is able to condense a large array of error provoking 
factors into 9 generic measures, whereby a methodology will then be established in 
terms of linking both data sets into one cross-case design. In acknowledgement of the 
complexity surrounding this requirement, a method was designed whereby a set of 
codes are used to assign units of meaning, which relate to key words, sentences or 
paragraphs as a whole. The assumption being that the researcher will be able to 
examine, identify and highlight similarities of findings, within the context of different 
error trends, by linking the results of the questionnaire and focus group concerns. This 
approach in principle was taken from Ragin (1987) who argued in favour of a method 
that will enable the development of: “Dialogue between ideas and evidence” The 
researcher has therefore structured the following model, for the purpose of this study, 
that will reflect a range of error provoking factors, which will be highlighted by 
patterns of reoccurring themes as listed in figure 3.9.
Figure 3.9 List of Error Provoking Factors
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Focus Group Factors Codes Tally
Commercial Pressure............ CP 111111111111111111111111
Leadership............................. L 11111111
Communication...................... C 111111111111
Individual Accountability.... IA 1111
Attitude Differences............. AD 111111111111
Role Ambiguity..................... RA 11111
Peer Pressure............ ........... .PP 1111111
Responsiveness To Change... RC 11111
Team Responsibility............. TR 111111111111
Problem Solving..................... PS 111111111
Source: Researcher
In the first instance a numeric tally was used to provide an overall percentage 
frequency against each set of focus group results, which will be arranged in 
chronological order against a pareto of questionnaire scores.
The model in question has been designed to analyse a range of generic input 
factors, based on configurations and associations of historically grounded patterns 
of information, extracted from the focus group results. The researcher therefore 
assumes the position of data reduction, whereby the methodology itself cannot be 
separated from its analysis and will serve to validate and interpret quantitative 
findings in such a way that final conclusions can be made, based on the principle 
of ‘data condensation’ In other words the proposed model will enable the 
researcher to analyse interrelationships and thereby highlight gaps between the 
social & technical system that other researchers, within the field of human factors 
research, have not yet explored. A matrix analysis was therefore created, based on 
literature taken from Miles and Huberman (1994) who point out the benefits of 
linking quantitative as well as qualitative results into one cross case design. This 
position was accepted and a model was created, which is able to analyse 
interrelationships based on extrapolating multiple explanations, as highlighted in 
what has been described as a model of cross-case analysis47 as illustrated in figure 
3.10 shown below
47 Cross-case analysis is central to the process of constructing generalisations
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Figure 3.10 Model Linking Qualitative & Quantitative Results
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The model is intended to provide a deeper understanding within the context of cause 
and effect relationships, as opposed to the qualitative and statistical approaches that 
are either too factual or highly subjective when analysed on their own. For the 
purpose of clarity, only the highest three factors will be presented for analysis during 
chapter 5 and compared to the background literature of chapter two and, more 
importantly, to highlight gaps against the organisational strategy as declared in 
chapter three.
3.13 Limitations of the Case Study Design
In any type of research design a trade-off exists between theory and those practical 
considerations, which has been accepted in terms of a number of limiting conditions. 
Given a greater amount of time and access to the organisation the researcher would 
have increased the numbers of focus group sessions as a means of testing the 
questionnaire model derived from the quantitative phase of the research design.
In selecting the exact type of case study strategy to be deployed, many alternative 
courses of action were both considered and rejected, these included, amongst others, 
grounded theory. This approach was deemed as inappropriate because of ethical
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issues when aligning ethnographic research with certain questions and outcomes that 
relate to the uniqueness of this study in particular. For example it was considered that 
such issues were impractical to manage owing to the economic and political nature of 
human factors surrounding the role of the trade union and local management which 
typifies the nature of this study in terms of a repair-engineering environment, although 
these issues were deemed not to affect the ability to generalise from the findings of 
the study as a whole.
However, it should be noted that the number of Bristol cases is comparatively small 
compared to the other three sites and for this reason the results could be slightly 
skewed in comparison to the sample sizes used across the other sites, albeit that the 
actual number of cases was still within the advised number stated by Leonard-Barton
(1992) Other limiting factors concern the comparability of the different UK sites 
themselves that, whilst chosen for their overall compatibility, differed slightly in 
terms of the type of product and processes themselves. Whilst similar in the nature of 
product repair type, each engine project differed slightly in content and volume.
Finally, no account is made of the differences in design processes, which could have 
impacted on error management because of considerations that failed to account for the 
impact of mistake proofing devices. Although it was believed that older engine 
designs would have benefited from greater problem solving even though errors may 
have been ‘designed out’. The researcher therefore proposed that there are few 
differences between old and new designs, and that the study would focus on TQM 
practice and not design effectiveness. Furthermore the supplier network, though 
considered to be an influencing factor, was not taken into account because it was 
outside the scope of case study control and therefore did not form part of the socio- 
technical system design. Data is controlled and subject to official secrets act. 
Limitations are: the timing and the allowance of the unions to do this work, also the 
focus is on civilian and not military aircraft, however these were seen to be 
comparable processes by the researcher.
3.14 Issues & Ethical Considerations
The researcher could not ignore the rules of scientific convention and therefore ethical 
considerations were integrated within this study at a very early stage in its design by 
means of establishing a number of guidelines that were be communicated as a matter
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of policy to protect the anonymity of those persons concerned. While the highest 
ethical standards will be followed at all times, the issue of complete confidentially 
was difficult to maintain as this particular case study involved sharing of information 
across and between each of the case study sites. As such, individuals were given the 
option to refuse to participate in this study. Some of the problems have already been 
resolved through direct contact with those individuals where the problems were most 
apparent from a safety critical point of view. In spite of this position the research 
promotes the standard rules of convention that that protect any individual from the 
sensitivity of data contributions. In addition, the researcher must also be aware of the 
effect of his bias and with this viewpoint in mind the Research Ethics Framework48 
established in 2006 was duly followed,. For example, the interests and rights of all 
employees involved or affected by the study have been assured of their anonymity, 
through a number of agreed criteria shown below:
1. Consider the social and psychological impact of people affected by the research
2. Offer anonymity and confidentiality to all employees.
3. Verify data collected through interviews with employees and provide feedback on findings
4. Select research methods that are fit for purpose.
5. Report research findings with integrity
6. Establish rules on intellectual property rights and reporting restrictions
7. Consider the consequences of research findings for air passenger safety
8. Acknowledge that some of the research may be open to interpretation.
9. Consider the consequences of research misuse by other interested parties.
10. Ensure approvals are granted before publication and presentation of findings
To further demonstrate a level of confidentially all persons associated with the study 
are protected through what is described as a non-disclosure agreement (NDA)
The NDA process was created by the organisations corporate legal team that was duly 
granted by Cardiff University Business School, which is aimed at protecting the 
intellectual property rights and commercial sensitivity of the organisation as a whole.
The agreement is also applicable to the requirements of the Ministry of Defence 
(MOD) thereby conforming to the requirements of the Official Secrets Act (1971)
48 The Research Ethics Framework (REF) is intended for social science research and was formally 
introduced by ESRC in January 2006 to protect the dignity, rights and welfare of the individual.
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3.15 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter has outlined and defended the chosen research strategy by declaring a 
range of tools and techniques, within a framework, which is able to facilitate the 
original research question declared during chapter 1 as; “To what extent can self­
managed team working, facilitate the principles o f safe Total Quality Management?”
The design of this strategy included a range of scientific methods from both 
qualitative and quantitative perspectives of social science, which formed the overall 
flow of methodological design. Based around the concept of ‘realism*, the methods 
deployed were selected for their flexibility, in being able to facilitate the real world 
gap between theory and the growing consequences of human failing as outlined 
during chapter’s 1 & 2. By adopting a cross-comparative case study design, the 
researcher was able to provide a strategy that will highlight quality problems, which 
are in-put driven and not easily resolved at the individualistic level of team control.
In order to substantiate this claim a statistical process will be used to formalise the 
content of the research question in terms of several hypothesis driven predictions. To 
legitimise this approach, it was also seen as necessary for the researcher to follow 
strict rules of scientific convention, whereby the principles of both validity and 
reliability could be demonstrated. The design and methodology, which was 
subsequently accepted, was based on the assumption that other human factors 
specialists would be able to follow, in terms of a capable and repeatable process.
In spite of the statistical methods used, the researcher was also heavily influenced by 
the literature made available by Miles & Huberman (1994), who underlined the 
importance of linking qualitative as well as quantitative data sets into one cross-case 
design. Therefore no one single approach could be accepted in its entirety, based on 
the premise that research into the problems surrounding socio-technical systems, 
require an eclectic strategy that should centre on the design and use of a flexible range 
of research methods. This study therefore shows a design common to those STS 
studies of Emery and Trist based on a modem approach to systems investigation.
In summary, the model put forward at the beginning of this chapter, provided the 
reader with an overview of the strategy and methods used, which are seen as capable 
of measuring what is currently referred to as ‘unknown areas of human error risk’.
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The rationale being that attitudes when measured through a carefully constructed 
process, will be perceived as a credible account that business leaders can assess for 
the purpose of improving current levels of out-put, based on improved quality and 
safety of control.
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Chapter 4 Case Study Details
4.0 Chapter Introduction
The previous chapter has explained and defended the research strategy and has also 
detailed the appropriate methods required to measure the extent to which human error 
risk may, or may not, exist within an industrial system. This chapter will provide a 
background of business understanding set within the context of real-world problems 
across four corporately owned UK sites. The chapter will begin with an overview of 
the business strategy, providing the reader with an appreciation for the organisational 
factors that have challenged the entire PLC business (from which four cases of similar 
process types have been selected) in relation to risk factors affecting the performance 
of TQM. Each of the case study sites is owned by a single corporate parent and can be 
described as entering a transition period where its customers are demanding change, 
which in turn has pressurised each of the repair & overhaul sites to adopt the 
philosophy of TQM by corporate dictate. The goal of adopting a company-wide TQM 
approach included improving process quality as well as output, within a highly 
complex and technical environment that is committed to the repair & overhaul of 
civilian & military aircraft engines. The business groups in question are part of a 
public limited company that was first registered in England by the registrar of 
companies in 1971. In 1991, the aerospace repair business was formed to combine all 
civil and military engine maintenance activities under one director and by December 
of 1993, Aero Engine Services Limited gained the approval as a JAR-145 
maintenance49 organisation and in 1998 it was re-organised into customer-facing 
operational units. The aero customer-facing businesses now consist of, Aero Repair 
and Overhaul, Airline business and Defence Aerospace, including a global profile as 
shown below:
1. Interim order book of £ 16.7 billion
2. Sales of £8.3 billion
3. 38,000 employees world-wide in 15,000 different job types
4. Services include more than 4,500 customers across 500 different Airlines.
5. Over 53,000 gas turbines in service in over 150 countries
In order to meet demand for an additional 23,000 new aircraft types ranging from 
light to short haul also wide body jets, the organisation forecast that 48,000 engines, 
valued at £61 billion, will be needed.
49 This is an approval, which allows the company to maintain aircraft engines in line with civil aviation 
law.
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However, now that the market share has grown, a maturing portfolio has demanded a 
new emphasis from offering every application, to concentrating on investing in the 
applications where there is the strongest business case. In order to facilitate this 
approach the business has therefore concentrated on the principles of Lean 
engineering, which ensures that all new product introductions are considered in terms 
of life cycle profitability. This approach is both specific and functional aimed at 
adding customer value to meet predefined standards in terms of improved business 
performance under the global template of TQM. This has helped consolidate the 
organisation as a leading manufacturer in gas turbine technology across 5 market 
sectors, namely: Defence Aero Space, Aero Repair & Overhaul, Civil Airlines, 
Marine and Energy. In 1991 the aero repair & overhaul business was formed to 
combine all civil and military engine maintenance activities under one director.
This business now has the capability of meeting customers’ needs for engine 
overhaul and component refurbishment across 17 global facilities. The organisation 
has its headquarters in Derby, which is the original centre for large civil engine 
overhaul. Other facilities include Ansty, Bristol and East Kilbride, with completed 
portfolio of wholly owned subsidiaries in Brasil, Canada, Deutschland and Oakland. 
The aero repair & overhaul group is also complimented by joint ventures in Hong 
Kong, Dallas, Singapore and Germany as illustrated in figure 4.0 show below 
Figure 4.0
Geographical Map of Case Study Location
RR D e u t s c h l a n d
AR&O UK
RR O a k l a n d HAESL
RR B ras i l
Fig 4.0 Source: From Case Study Customer Business 2008
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Set within a volatile market place aero repair & overhaul business is becoming 
increasingly important to fleet operators now that traditional risk and responsibility of 
the fleet operator itself has reverted back to industry where on-wing-care50 agreements 
are managed with the help and wider support service of pic. In addition to these types 
of contracts, aero repair & overhaul also carry out repairs with customers directly who 
require traditional ‘time and material’ contracts, thus providing all types of 
maintenance for what can be described as a ‘legacy’ type repair.
Many commercial pressures affect the case study business. The majority of customers 
prefer fixed price contracts, which not only assist in helping them with their budgets, 
but also because they believe it provides aero repair & overhaul with an incentive to 
become more efficient in terms of an opportunity to develop more of a market share. 
In order to demonstrate the principles of operational efficiency; the organisation has 
therefore developed a standard range of business methods that measure operational 
performance of advanced repairs, within the manufacturing philosophy of TQM. In 
line with the corporate Rolls-Royce business improvement strategy (2003) the 
company has therefore focused its attention on: “Promoting locally managed facilities 
that specialise in performing advanced
repairs in support o f multiple engine types, within a management philosophy of TQM
4.1 Repair and Overhaul Processes
In order to sensitise the reader to the process of aero engine repair, the researcher has 
prepared the following SIPOC (Supplier-Input-Process-Output-Customer systems 
analysis) figure 4.1 which demonstrates an end-to-end view of the process stages from 
supplier (induction) to despatch (Customer).
50 On-wing care provides 24/7 aircraft on ground service
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Figure 4.1
Aero Repair & Overhaul Supplier-Input-Process-Output-Customer (SIPOC)
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4.2 Introducing Self-Managed Teams
Prior to the implementation of self-managed team working the AR&O organisations 
followed a typical hierarchical structure with each site being managed by a head of 
site that reported to the regional Director. A typical pyramid structure was made up of 
production shop managers, supervisors, foremen and team leaders. The management
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team made all decisions and very little decision-making activity was devolved to the 
shop floor.
However in trying to achieve the goal of TQM the new focus of attention was taken 
from the school of human relations management and in 1998 recognition of the values 
of autonomous team working was accepted as the new way forward in terms self­
managed teams being able to make a greater contribution to the needs of customer 
demand. During this time, sufficient examples both within the UK and Japan, 
confirmed the belief that effectively organised work teams would be capable of 
contributing to the overall business performance. The assumption being that 
empowered teams if invested in sufficiently, would be able to solve problems at 
source and thereby reduce the overall cost of business performance, the model below 
shows the direction of change the organisation is trying to achieve.
Figure 4.2
Researcher’s Model of Direction & Change
Scientific Management Human Relations Management
Product Driven
Old Fashioned Contemporary with strong traditions 
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Expensive
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European
Quality Engineering
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Service Ethos
Source: Researcher Secondary Data.
In 1998 a joint working committee introduced the principles of self-management 
under a collective bargaining agreement between the management and the works 
unions. This agreement was part of a wider re-organisation of the business structure,
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which centred on the business functions and key process that were needed to deliver 
increased customer satisfaction. The model, which was agreed to, required the 
dismantling of the existing management structure, this was characterised by 
supervisory forms of front line control management within a working environment of 
cells under the overall control of production managers.
The new organisational model was substantially different; it saw the replacement of 
supervisors with team coaches on a ratio of 20 to 1 to facilitate self managed teams 
through two key stages of development. The team coach was required to lead by 
example rather than direct, he or she had no disciplinary powers or authority in a 
traditional management sense. The purpose of the role was to support the team as far 
as possible until each could become autonomous thus ultimately removing the 
necessity of the future existence of the team coach. The typical benefits and 
expectations of which include the following list of criteria shown below.
1. Improved performance through increased employee involvement
2. Customer focussed objectives owned by the team
3. Team alignment to business performance measures
4. Teams planning and carrying out their assigned work task
5. Increased flexibility through multi-tasking of team members
6. Greater involvement in problem solving and decision-making
7. Team members developing their personal skills portfolio
8. Leadership and coaching style of management
The culture of leadership prior to this point was one of command and control which 
given the processes of repairing and overhauling gas turbines, is characterised by huge 
amounts of problem solving decision points. New manufacture is therefore seen as 
significantly different from repair and overhaul where non-standard processes make 
the process of flow very difficult to achieve; therefore it is not easily translated to the 
philosophy of TQM.
A huge opportunity to reduce cost dramatically and improve satisfaction and quality 
to the customer was the driver behind the reason to adopt the business model of self­
managed teams. The model that was used to develop this strategy was first introduced 
in 1998 by a consultancy organisation named AT Kearney, whose primary vision was 
accepted on the basis of their model shown below. The model put forward by A T 
Kearney (2002) is considered to be consistent with the theoretical approach of socio
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technical system theory, as discussed earlier in the literature review. The philosophy 
of self-management was therefore introduced based on the premise that teams would 
make a natural transition towards theory Y from theory X. Figure 4.3, shown below, 
illustrates this position. Based on a shared value system it was phased in and allowed 
to develop naturally, aligning itself with the principles of self-management with 
TQM. The assumption being that experienced teams at stage 3 would foster awareness 
for extra curricular activities, such as engaging with the tools and techniques for 
improved business performance.
Figure 4.3
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Source: Case Study Production System
Whilst not rejecting the value of these claims the researcher is also interested in 
understanding how successful the model has been since its introduction in 1998. In 
respect of this requirement many different sources of information have been drawn on 
including a recent postgraduate study carried out by Simkiss (2004). The study was 
carried out within a cross case framework to include both Ansty and Bristol sites, it 
measured the affectivity of managers in supporting the development of self-managed 
teams. It was found that 40% of the staff population believed that line managers often 
failed to listen or consider ideas for change compared to the results of shop floor
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engineers, who believed that 70% their managers did. The inference being that white- 
collar managers were less prepared to listen to new ideas and improve the business. 
The survey also revealed that only 20% of staff members believed that their managers 
were good communicators, compared to the belief of 55% of shop floor workers. 
Again, the suggestion being that investment in resource is primarily aimed at the shop 
floor and not the white-collar community as a whole. This raised concerns about the 
implications of attitude in terms of the way morale has influenced behaviour in 
promoting the organisational goal of cross-functional team. When asking employees 
across both groups their thoughts on how they viewed the communication policy in 
general, the survey showed that the majority of white-collar staff valued the quality 
communication as less effective than the same groups who took part in the survey 
from the shop floor.
The conclusions drawn from the survey suggested that the frequency and quality of 
communication correlated with the lack of cohesion and buy-in between teams, which 
is one of the reasons why the researcher has factored the issue of cross-functional 
management within the main research objectives. However, in spite of these findings 
the benefits that self-managed teams have brought to the business, far out weighs the 
drawbacks and, in line with other large industrial companies, the relationship between 
the management and the trade unions has significantly improved because of this. 
Because of self-management, team working has reduced the cultural barriers that 
historically existed between the management and shop floor, which in turn has also 
helped in the transition to a more customer driven approach. The unions, who provide 
representation, are considered as business partners. The main unions are:-
1. Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU),
2. Manufacturing Science and Finance (MSF)
3. Association Professional Executive Staff (APEX).
The TGWU represents the shop flbor engineers and the MSF represent the white- 
collar engineers, whereas APEX is aligned to the clerical population leaving the 
management grades unrepresented.
Now that the chapter has set in context the recent changes for the business, the next 
section will present a review of each case study site. Every site has the same process 
stages although engine types will vary between sites.
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4.3 The Derby Case Study
The case example is located centrally within the UK, the Derby AR&O site is the 
largest of all the repair businesses. It includes whole engine strip, build and test 
facilities for modem large fan engines, based on a typical operating life cycle of 
between 25 to 30 years. It is anticipated that the majority of these engines will visit 
the Derby overhaul facility at least 5 or 6 times during their lifetime, to receive 
regular scheduled maintenance, product upgrades and performance improvements.
The Derby overhaul facility saw investments of £80 million during 2007, these were 
based on the adoption of modem working practices following initial experiments with 
self-managed team working (1998), which resulted in a 25% improvement in 
productivity. The result was increased satisfaction for some 40 different customers 
and air service providers. The site at Derby utilises 18,400m of workshop 
incorporating an integrated quality control and inspection system to support multiple 
engine projects, within a Lean concept of one-piece flow. This process includes the 
stripping and rebuilding of engines to module level, where, engine teams function as 
value streams for the overhaul of engines such as the RB211-524, 535, Trent 500, 700 
and 800.
However, the term ‘maintenance’ has much expanded with the introduction of new 
technologies; the context of ‘total care’ is beginning to challenge the existing 
production system through what is described as an engine health monitoring service. 
For example a typical aircraft can send real time data to the control room in Derby 
where the engines’ performance is constantly being monitored for problems in areas 
such as vibration, temperature and engine speed changes. This means that any issues, 
which arise in-flight, can be analysed and understood before the aircraft lands. The 
consequence of this approach has set new challenges to business whereby scheduled 
load & capacity planning for flow is often disrupted by the need for emergency 
overhaul repairs.
Recently, the magazine business ‘Aviation Maintenance’ representative visited the 
new Aero Repair and Overhaul facility at its Derby and spoke with the company’s
director of service delivery, Kontich (2006) who was quoted as saying: “The facility
!
has embarked on a very different kind of world in what we call Total Care. This new 
environment puts tremendous pressure on the highest levels o f reliability,
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airworthiness and safety at the least total cost. Doing a better job o f managing the 
cost structures o f delivery is a key challenge in the face o f huge growth”
However, at the beginning of this study, the case site was experiencing great problems 
with the accommodation of improvement methodologies and self managed team 
working. These problems were manifest in the ability of self-managed teams to 
facilitate the principles of TQM. The teams were experiencing challenges to their 
autonomous decision making as Lean initiatives and commercial pressures had 
combined to challenge the speed of work, responsibility for work and how teams 
interact with their support functions. The new pressures created a suboptimal 
allocation of decision-making responsibility, Lean initiatives had eroded the ability to 
work overtime, it had leveled scheduled the production programme and increased the 
need for team flexibility including the redeployment of labour. The removal of the 
night shift also occurred and production pressures grew to complete all work during a 
two shift operation. The removal was justified because of human factors issues 
associated with such late working where the body clock of the employee was affected 
thus there was at risk of making many mistakes. In this respect Derby can be 
positioned as a level of stage V of the Holpp (1993) model and current pressures, 
imposed by the business, were reducing team profile towards a level II stage. The case 
is therefore was at a ‘stressed’ stage whereby pressures influencing the team provided 
a good insight into human factors, team working and TQM. The site was duly 
accepted as a research partner as it would provide a good insight into the research 
question.
4.4 The Bristol Case Study
In support of the whole engine strip and build process at Derby, the Bristol facility is a 
specialist component refurbishment centre which supplies repaired combustion 
chamber units. The role of Bristol is to work as a service provider to other AR&O 
businesses as well as Derby. The facility is situated in the south west of England and 
produces an annual turnover of 20 million pounds and specialises in fabrication 
overhauls to the hot end of gas turbine technology for both military and civil engines, 
such as the Pegasus, which powers the Harrier Jump Jet. The facility also produces 
the EJ200 engine, which is a fast jet used in the Eurofighter Typhoon, and it also 
services the Trent engine portfolio that provides power for long haul and wide bodied 
civilian aircraft.
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The type of customer contracts entered into by the business is considered to be diverse 
and includes some of the latest concepts such as ‘power by the hour’. These latest 
generation contracts service customers with lease engines as opposed to the purchase 
of an engine -  in this manner the service package for total support care generates an 
income for every hour an engine is worked on an aircraft. As such the site has many 
pressures to return repaired engines to the service of the customer as quickly as 
possible (so they can earn an income again).
The complexity of the case is illustrated by the many different types of engines and 
customer demands, which are further compounded by variable operating conditions 
defined by different customers through their choice of aircraft and application for 
which the engine is used (short haul -  many take off and landings versus long haul 
with fewer takeoffs and more flying hours). The differences between applications can 
vary from between 25,000 flying hours seen in a typical civilian long-haul aircraft, to 
a fast military jet, whose engines can be removed from service every 250 hours. It is 
this level of product variance, which characterises the current production system in 
terms of the classic ‘jobbing shop’. The low volume, high engine type conditions and 
variable repair/process mix (routings through facility) calls for skills which emphasise 
predominately hand craft experience, knowledge based diagnosis of engine needs and 
experienced decision making.
In light of these and other such complex conditions, the core business metric is still 
committed to the concept of turn-round-time performance that should not exceed 
more than 21 calendar days. This is the manifestation of the lean approach to working 
and the service level agreement to supply units to customers.
The case is described as a non-linear production type because all components are 
repaired through the deployment of self-managed teams, which currently consist of 86 
permanently-contracted individuals. The breakdown of these teams shows 67 ‘works’ 
engineers consisting of a skilled fitters, machinists, welders & inspectors. The white- 
collar population, referred to as ‘staff, consist of 19 people of whom 7 are technical 
engineers and 7 are administrators. The controlling element of the system is made up 
of 4 managers, whose role is to provide leadership and support for all aspects of civil
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& military aircraft front combustion chambers51. An illustrated example of the 
product application is shown in figure 4 below.
Figure 4.4
Euro Fighter Typhoon
Source: Case Study Library
The pressures facing the Bristol facility have included ‘quality escapes’ or errors that 
have passed through the organization’s lines of quality and safety defence and been 
detected by customers’ goods receiving inspection processes. An investigation was 
conducted and found that ‘comers had been cut’ because of poorly defined procedures 
where teams were ineffectively working between one department and the next. The 
procedures for handovers were found to be informal and the teams, through poor 
industrial relations, made a series of errors, which could have been prevented if 
reference was made to technical specialists. The Bristol teams were assessed at the 
stage V level of team engagement and self-management according to the Holpp model 
(1993)
4.5 The East Kilbride Case Study
East Kilbride is geographically situated in Scotland, within the city of Glasgow and 
currently employs approximately 1000 skilled engineers (similar in size to the Derby 
facility). East Kilbride provides whole engine refurbishment programmes as 
illustrated from the engine and airframe portfolio below.
51 A com bustion cham ber is the part o f an engine in which fuel is burned to produce thrust when 
directed out o f a nozzle in je t engine.
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Engine Application Aircraft Type 
Saab 2000 
Embraer 145
Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil
Tay 651-54
V2500-A1
V2500-A5
AE2100A 
AE3007 
Dart Rda7
Spey 511,512
Fokker F27 
B AC 1-11
Airbus A320 
Airbus A319, A320
Boeing 727 re-engines
The level of product complexity is high and the portfolio is wide with many engines 
that are very old and some that are very new (learning curve implications). Further, 
some of the engines are joint venture products but, due to the location of the design 
authorities, access to data and knowledge sharing is difficult. The site is further 
complicated because of export control regulations (United States of America) 
whereby communication has to be managed strictly (so that no communication can be 
intercepted), Such an activity slows the decision-making process also improvement 
projects are difficult because, under export control, engine test run data cannot be 
collected (and will not be released without authorisation and special permission). 
Older engines that are not regularly maintained are a problem because consistent 
quality data is not available. Further some customers will not allow ‘inter- 
changeability’ of products -  the same product that came from an aircraft must go back 
to it (this is known as repair by repair working). For customers who ‘pool’ products 
this acts as an inventory buffer and means some products operate with shorter lead- 
times (these engines go back to different aircraft but to the same original standard -  
known as repair by replacement working).
Traditionally this area of the business, like many other AR&O sites has adopted a top 
down approach that was historically compromised by a distinct lack of customer 
satisfaction and confidence which tarnished the reputation of the facility and its teams. 
To illustrate this point, the turnaround times prior to 1996 were in excess of 130 days 
for component refurbishment, which is excessively long (very low value adding from 
a lean perspective). The long time involved suggested failings in the material flow 
systems at the facility and highlighted a potential lack of management control and 
unacceptably high levels of operating costs. In turn, this had led to discussions about 
the future viability of the site and discussions about subcontracting the work to other 
businesses. During this ‘burning platform’ for change, the business introduced self­
managed teams even though the initial stance of the trade unions on site was to reject 
this form of working.
Appendix 3
Definition of the Lean System
There are many different definitions of the lean operations management system. After 
extensive literature review, the diagram below proposed by Slack et al., (2004) was 
accepted as a means of housing and framing this study and to answer the question 
‘what is lean?’
Figure: The Lean System
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Adapted from Slack e t alv (2004)
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The business therefore found itself under major threat of closure, owing to the 
growing dissatisfaction of its customers and in particular the inability to meet engine 
delivery dates. To counteract this problem East Kilbride launched a programme 
similar to all other case studies called ‘Better Performance Faster’ whose primary aim 
was to review all processes including the way management led its people, in all 
aspects of the repair & overhaul activity.
One of the most significant outcomes of this process was the introduction of self­
managed team working, which resulted in a radical management-restructuring 
programme that saw the introduction of business leaders as facilitators as opposed to 
the traditional approach of managers & supervisors. The new ‘bottom up’ approach to 
management was based around the introduction of team coaches, whose role was to 
facilitate new codes of behaviours where the following of strict rules was substituted 
by a value driven system for wanting to ‘get the job done’. The latter was a principle 
used by Volvo during their experiments of the 1980s.
The philosophy behind this approach is based on the investment of empowering teams 
to improve product quality through ownership of TQM principles. The new challenge 
for East Kilbride was aimed at delivering an improvement strategy, which is Lean 
enough to meet the demands of reduced customer turn-round-time (TRT), whilst not 
undermining the importance of EASA safety compliance in pursuit of the 
organisational goal of self-management & TQM.
Using the Holpp (1993) model see figure 2.2, the East Kilbride teams were assessed at 
a level of self management which does not rate on the scale and at best were 
positioned at Stage 1. It should be noted that during this research the teams have 
progressed at different rates but were assessed at the level V -  equivalent to that of the 
other AR&O sites.
4.6 The Antsy Case Study
The Ansty facility is located in The Midlands of the UK close to Coventry. The site is 
described as a military repair & overhaul facility with a core business process 
specialising in overhauling military engine types (fixed aircraft wing, rotating
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helicopter wing and naval engine types). The products are very complex and 
equivalent in structure to those of the other sites.
The business has major contracts with the UK Ministry of Defence to repair & 
overhaul engines for the Tornado and Euro fighter programs. Approximately 70% of 
this work is taken from the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) whose yearly budget is 
has been cut in half through government spending reductions. These reductions have 
placed significant commercial pressures on the Ansty facility to reduce its costs and 
embrace leaner ways of working. According to an MoD official “The MOD will 
either cut their cost o f ownership or reduce its fleet size, but either way we will 
achieve the objective o f cost reduction ”.
One could argue therefore that self-managed teams have by default provided the 
Ansty business and MOD alike with an easy opportunity to reduce costs by virtue of 
its head count reduction. Within the last 10 years the management structure has 
become leaner or more flattened, this was achieved by the removal of 2 full layers of 
managers. Such restructuring has implications for the layers of business defences 
(Reason, 2003) and also reduces the co-ordination of material flow processes 
provided by these managers/reallocating roles and responsibilities to other workers. 
These actions are, as noted in the literature review, positively correlated with 
increased errors and potential system failures.
From secondary data, the pilot study and interviews, the researcher established that 
problems with human factors have in fact not changed since 1998. The introduction of 
self-management has created new .pressures for the business in terms of a lack of 
management where the majority of teams have a reporting structure, based on a ratio 
of approximately 50 to 1 (in some cases 100:1). This means that structures are very 
flat but that many people report to very few employees in management positions (the 
equivalent ratio at the customer sites was 6:1 at the time of writing this thesis). Based 
on a series of informal interviews, the researcher established that pressures on key 
people, such as engineering inspectors, was very high and incurred great stress. These 
inspectors were found to carry out their responsibilities, based on inadequate levels of 
team situational awareness (ability to work across departments) and faced many 
interruptions to their working day. Again this scenario is equated with a higher 
potential for failure of safety systems using the Reason (2003) approach.
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The researcher found that some areas of team working are lacking in investment, 
leading to conditions where tooling is either broken, poorly designed or not available, 
this problem is within financial levels of management control. As a direct result of 
this situation production managers are of the opinion that a negative peer culture is 
slowly developing, implying that teams do not feel accountable for their work and 
processes they were supposed to own.
The review of the Ansty site, using the Holpp (1993) model, despite its issues, was 
rated at a level V. Not surprisingly therefore the transformation and ownership for 
TQM across most engine projects is well below the process excellence performance 
measures expectations of the site by corporate indicators. The performance of the sites 
will be reviewed and highlighted later through the assessment journey as shown in 
Figure 4.5
Having reviewed each site, the discussion will now focus on the corporate 
organisational strategy for improvement referred to locally as ‘process excellence’ 
and being a hybrid TQM model involving both Lean and Six Sigma ways of working.
4.7 Assessment of Total Quality Management Strategy
With these site problems in mind, the focus of the corporation has concentrated on 
developing and executing a strategy through a corporate production system. The 
production system adopts a standard approach to managing material flow, it ensures 
that high-level business goals are aligned with the correct tools and techniques within 
the context of TQM (to meet commercial needs and the expectations of a broad 
customer base). The methods employed by the model are based around the same 
model as that of new production and provides a wide range of ‘how to’ documents 
within a framework of both Six-Sigma & Lean. The model below provides a 
schematic overview of this position based on satisfying 5 key performance indicators 
(KPI), within a framework of capable and empowered work teams.
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Figure 4.5 Case Study Production System
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Source: Case Study Production System.
In spite of the business com m itm ent to the principles o f TQM, a recent custom er 
satisfaction index during 2007 m easured the perform ance of quality at just 76% 
effective. Such a figure was well below the expectations of the corporate business. 
The statistic reflected a wide range of m anufacturing concerns, for example, factors 
such as quality complaints and non-conform ance costs that exceeded a total of 
£427million pounds. The report showed ‘non-com pliance’ to the business processes is 
therefore responsible for 80% of major quality investigations and almost 100% of 
product quality ‘escapes’. Although, it is believed that the real cost of non­
conformance is approximately 2-3 tim es greater than directly measured, amounting to 
over £1 bn per year. The organisation has stressed the importance and need for change 
by em barking upon an improvement journey where self-managed teams are assumed 
to be compatible with the organisational im provem ent strategy of TQM. The method, 
by which the organisation has set out to achieve this aim, is based around a ‘one size 
fits all’ approach, within the organisations 10-year Business Plan Deployment (BPD) 
programme that all business groups, afterm arket and new are expected to follow. 
Figure 4.6 below provides a schematic overview o f this position, which is based upon 
a 4-step process for how to deploy the fundam entals o f TQM.
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Figure 4.6
The Deployment o f the Fundam entals o f TQM
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Source: The Case Study Production System  (2008)
Drawing from secondary data, the improvement journey was found to be made up of 
four key processes, together with supporting tools. The first two steps (Process Basics 
and Process Control) concentrate on building the foundation of TQM , based on 
standardisation and stability. Continuous improvement is then sustained through Lean 
or Six Sigma techniques and in the third and fourth steps ‘process flow ’ and ‘process 
‘capability’ Once the basics are in place and controlled, the use o f all the steps 
together will remove waste, reduce variation and help facilitate improved quality 
which will ultimately help to make value flow. To sustain the progress o f TQM it is 
important that every individual adopts the principles; even basics such as keeping a 
clean and organised desk or work environment help contribute to this success and 
minimise waste. For the ease of the reader, using the four-stage model, the sites are 
positioned at stage 1 ‘Process basics’. The reviews by the researcher found no site 
with the features of a stage 2 organisation. The process basics stage is the basis of 
management before improvements, which lead to the following of a quality or a Lean 
route towards stage 2. From the perspective o f a Stage 1 case, the production system 
is the recipient of high levels of training and standardisation which is a prerequisite
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before the TQM strategy can be embedded. Figure 4.7 below is taken from the 
corporate training manual and shows that only a small percentage of work is value 
adding whilst the majority of work incurs business costs - just 5% of all engineering 
activity is shown as ‘value adding’.
Figure 4.7
Showing Proportional Value Added Work
96%
<5% fr
Source: Taken From Case Study Production System
This approach has fundamentally challenged the principles of TQM where some 
engines depart from a critical path of repair in line with a bespoke process, which is 
non-standardised and ultimately interrupts and disrupts production flow. Which in- 
tum has redirected the business strategy to adopt the practices and principles of both 
push as well as pull manufacturing (Lean ways of working). This position contradicts 
the pic strategy for improvement where Lean tools & techniques were developed in 
line with the success of Toyota, whose practice and techniques are based on 
standardisation of high volume automotive manufacturing.
Figure 4.8 shows an application of fixture designed at the case studies and how 
multiple operations have been combined into one fixed process (standardisation). 
Such a device is a concept that has carried over from automotive production and has 
been used to reduce waste. Such practices have also included quick 
changeover/SMED activities and the case companies have all benefitted by reduced
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mistakes and reduced visits to the tooling store (by combining two fixtures into one). 
Further, organisational learning and process improvement activities mean that new 
innovations have moved to the aero repair sector from automotive -  such as one-turn 
bolts with pear shaped holes in clamps, so as to make fitting and removal of aircraft 
engine components a less time consuming and more error risk free process.
Figure 4.8
Multi Purpose Fixture
Source: Taken From Case Study
The corporate business has also engaged in a process known as the ‘Active Risk 
Manager’ (ARM). This is an electronic database where improvement projects and 
best practice can be viewed for improved learning. The purpose of which is to avoid 
the duplication of effort and speeding up improvement processes at the sites. At the 
time of the study there were over 2,500 improvement projects registered onto ARM 
(including those conducted by experts of whom 400 Black Belt projects were 
registered, 900 Green Belt projects and 800 Yellow Belt projects). The information 
stored in ARM is available to all employees interested in sharing best practice and 
learning about what is happening with TQM throughout the entire pic business. Each 
site has access to this system. To help business leaders and self-managed teams to 
understand where their respective businesses are, along the improvement journey, a 
global assessment tool has been formulated that provides an overall set of results 
against a number of key building blocks shown in the model below (fig 4.9). Over 
300 assessments have been completed during 2008 and the overall score for aero
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repair & overhaul is currently averaging 40%. The objective is that all business areas 
must score at least 50 per cent at Bronze level in process basics.
Figure 4.9
Assessment Summary
Quality Operating System 
No Control > Inspection:* In Process> Error Proofing
Maturity
Source: Taken From The Case Study Production System (2008)
The red circle on the figure shows the activities on which the teams were working 
during the course of the study. These activities concern a host of material flow issues 
and, most importantly for this study, a series of unknown factors related to risk 
mitigation and team engagement. It is the purpose of this study to understand, in more 
detail, the severity of risk that the current improvement strategy and the socio- 
technical systems designs, have imposed on teams by implementing/sustaining TQM. 
In effect, the poor scores achieved by the sites (against corporate audits) provided a 
timely opportunity to delve deeper and identify the limiting factors in these safety 
critical working environments which may go some way to explain what factors inhibit 
progress against expected business performance.
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4.8 Quality Management System
Alongside the production system and its evolutionary journey is a quality 
management system (RRQMS) that must be independent, by regulation, of the 
production system. This is a parallel system defence mechanism (Reason, 2003) that 
sits alongside production audits and is designed to meet international quality standards 
of ISO 9001 / 200052 and EN/AS9100. Unlike traditional Lean production systems 
found outside this study the aerospace model differs considerably this is based on the 
need to separate production from quality where value is jointly defined by the 
customer and regulatory authorities.
The implicit assumption behind the maintenance of a quality reporting structure and a 
production structure i.e. the joining of the two defence mechanisms (with associated 
audits) is that commercial pressure will undermine aviation safety if people cut 
comers. Under regulation 145 and to avoid commercial pressures lowering quality 
standards, the company must maintain independence in these two control systems. A 
corporate quality manual has therefore been created to satisfy this position; this is 
maintained by the director of quality as the top-level document in the quality system 
and deployed to all business groups throughout the pic group. The quality 
management system provides a consistent approach to achieving customer satisfaction 
thereby improving quality performance and satisfying both its legal and regulatory 
requirements. In addition the RRQMS consists of business quality manuals, which are 
supportive of the quality policy within the context of group quality procedures (GQP).
The RRQMS is designed to provide a statement of how quality should be managed 
across the entire pic group. For example planning is one of the group’s most important 
quality procedures (GQP) and encompasses all activities involved in: “Realising the 
ambitions, objectives, targets and commitments o f it people through the delivery and 
management o f an integrated set o f strategies”. It also includes the activities 
associated with risk management of quality and product safety. In this sense one could 
argue that all levels of the organisation are provided with a clear view of what they 
need to achieve, with each business sector committing to a set of affordable plans that 
support the corporate objectives and targets. For example; under the GQP 3 Aero 
Repair & Overhaul must be able to react to unexpected events that, in some cases, will
52ISO is the world’s most established quality framework, currently being used by around 897000 
organizations in 170 countries worldwide
183
require a full or partial review of their strategic and business plan. Measuring and 
eliminating variation mitigates to some degree certain levels of quality risk and 
therefore increases process reliability based on the 4 points as summarised below.
Process Capability is:
1. Measuring how well the outputs of a process, namely quality, cost and 
delivery, meet the requirements placed on it by customers and stakeholders
2. Understanding key process output measures that reflect the needs of all 
stakeholders
3. Measuring process capabilities
4. Identifying root causes of poor capability, prioritising and then improving 
processes to meet capability requirements
It is necessary to understand which processes need to be improved first, using the 
concept of a Pareto analysis to establish the 80:20 rule, e.g. 80% of problems caused 
by 20% of the processes. The methods used to achieve this approach are based on the 
following criteria:
1. Compile databases of all improvement opportunities
2. Develop a weighting process based on business needs
3. Process all potential improvements through gant chart or priority plan
4. Provide an improvement database or ‘project hopper’
5. Provide a project selection matrix
It is important to note that points 1 to 3 relate to establishing and embedding process 
basics through the building blocks of good housekeeping, visual performance 
management and adherence to standardised processes.
In summary the improvement journey is built upon a solid foundation of 
standardisation through process basics and stability through process control. 
Continuous improvement is therefore sustained through both Lean and Six Sigma to 
enable process flow and process capability, based on the summary of the objectives 
highlighted below.
1. Achieving good housekeeping as a quality basic throughout the 
organisation and establishing 5S (see Hirano, 1995) pilots to give impetus 
to this.
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2. The introduction of 4-box charts at all levels for the quality metrics of 
customer complaints, defective Parts Per Million (PPM) escapes, 
concessions and net savings to drive local, data-driven problem solving 
and continuous improvement.
3. The reinforcement of process thinking and process adherence through 
effectively governed process deployment.
Having reviewed the cases and the corporate overarching approach to quality and 
production, the next section will review the standardised and formalised approach to 
human factors undertaken by the business. The human factors management is another 
defence mechanism for the business and the case sites.
4.9 Background to Human Error at the Case Company
During the 1990s, there were a number of high-profile accidents and incidents, as 
outlined earlier in chapters 1 & 2, consequently during the early 1990s a number of 
national aviation authorities became concerned at the level of human errors in aviation 
maintenance. This motivated extensive research carried out on behalf of the UK 
CAA, FAA, JAA and Transport Canada that led to the eventual development of new 
requirements for a Maintenance Error Management Systems (MEMS) -  the case 
company has, as a legal requirement, complied with the MEMS system.
The system is designed to address contributing factors as a means of reducing the 
likelihood of error occurring themes. The MEMS regulations were first published 
under JAR-145 amendment 5 and subsequently superseded by an annex to the EU 
regulation, which is now referred to as EASA Part 145. The regulation requires that 
maintenance organisations, such as the one found in this study, are able to 
demonstrate a level of competence, whereby all of its personnel have knowledge of 
human factors compliance and are able to demonstrate an acceptable level of quality 
control that would otherwise not be considered under more traditional approaches to 
TQM.
At the heart of the MEMS system are social issues, such as the organisational safety 
culture, as well as technical issues. These might have been missed by typical quality 
management systems audits, which address only procedural compliance. From initial 
pilot studies and data collected by the researcher, the MEMS database was found to be
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a useful resource especially as it correlated with Harrison’s Typology Model. The 
research evaluated the severity of problems that had been experienced by the case 
company; using secondary data covering all aircraft crashes (known as ‘red tops’ with 
engines from the case company) between 1981 and 2006. The graph, (fig 4.10) 
underlines the importance of human factors as the number one quality related concern.
Figure 4.10
Causes of Aircraft Crashes 1981-2006
□  (blank)
■  Viper
■  Tyne
■  Spey
■ RB199
■  P eg asu s
■  Historic 
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■  Avon
■  Adour
Source: Taken From Case study Red Top Crash Statistical Database 2007
It can be seen that, by far the greatest amount of recorded red top incidents are caused 
by human factors. However, from an operations perspective, the details of what 
system factors cause these ‘escapes’ -  the bottom of Heinrich’s (1980)‘iceberg 
model’- are unknown. He posited that for every one of these incidents the researcher 
would find 600 elements of breakdowns in the socio-technical systems under study. 
These issues will be reported in the next section of the thesis. The next section will 
provide information to enable the reader, using the maintenance error management 
tool, to appreciate the types of failures in the socio-technical system.
B irdstrike P ro c e d u re s  P ro c e s s  Specification  (blank) 
C ontrol
H um an
F ac to rs
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4.10 Maintenance Error Management System
British Standards (1984) BS 381153 defined the work of the case study states as 
unplanned and planned tasks. Unplanned maintenance is regarded as either corrective 
or emergency in nature and occurs when a component breaks down. Planned 
maintenance is a preventive and time based approach of periodic intervention 
including servicing or repairing of an engine to an agreed standard. The quality of 
maintenance is heavily dependent on schedules, which are controlled through the use 
of records that must comply with a legally accepted and pre-determined plan. EASA 
part -  145 determines that all maintenance procedures should be designed to reduce 
the probability of failure from a time based performance design plan54.
When considering the operating conditions from one aero engine carrier to the next, 
no one maintenance procedure can be described as being exactly the same. For 
example on-wing engine life expectancy for long haul aircraft will be significantly 
higher in terms of engine run hours compared to short haul flights. In addition, 
reliability centred maintenance (RCM) processes are used to predict failures when a 
condition falls below a specified standard of economic or safety related performance. 
Cases of maintenance error are in forms of events or potential hazards (within the 
iceberg model). Human factors engineers across the organisation refer to hazards as 
an occurrence that can be identified through any number of existing processes such as 
customer complaints, major quality investigations and safety alerts. Some hazards are 
potential occurrences, which could, if left unreported, lead to a maintenance error or a 
safety related concern. From secondary data, collected from the company’s quality 
management system, the researcher found 122 documented cases involving human 
maintenance related errors, the following categories were revealed:
1. Omission of parts to be fitted 56%
2. Incorrect installation of parts 30%
3. Wrong parts fitted 8%
4. Other 6%
53 BS 3811 (1984) defines maintenance as:
‘The combination of all technical and administrive actions intended to retain an item or restore it to a 
state in which it can perform a required function’. British Standards Institute. BS3811 Glossary of 
Maintenance Management (1984)
54_In the aviation world of maintenance the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) may recommend 
the removal and repair of certain engine parts that must conform to a maintenance plan in terms of the 
number of ‘take o ff s ’ and ‘landings referred to as engine run ‘cycles’
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These results are compatible with others found in the sector and EASA have forced, 
through regulation, a greater transparency and need for socio-technical considerations 
through the introduction of an all-encompassing ‘maintenance error management 
system; (MEMS) The MEMS system is currently intended to be used as a reporting 
mechanism that focuses on investigation, prevention of mistakes and actual practices 
that could lead to a maintenance error based on identifying:
1. Conditions that could result in the practice of unsafe factors that will 
seriously hazard flight safety.
2. Understanding of issues that have or could lead to a maintenance error.
The success of the system is based on what human factors engineers refer to as a ‘just 
culture’, where maintenance errors and situational violations are not punished but 
reported for investigation so that all contributing factors can be identified and 
countermeasures introduced (a learning/improving cycle). The number of reports 
raised is not regarded as a measure of quality standards, but more importantly it is 
intended to be used as a tool for formally raising and addressing potential safety and 
quality concerns. In its simplest form the error management model shown below in fig
4.11 illustrates the problematic relationship between contributing factors and errors 
that could lead to hazard or accident event.
Figure 4.11
MEDA Error Model
Probability Probability
EventErrorContributingFactors
Source: Taken From Case Study Quality Management system 2006
For the MEMS to be successful all persons within the AR&O business must feel that
occurrences and errors can be reported openly without fear of punitive action, 
however this does not advocate the need for a ‘blame free’ approach. To ensure the 
credibility and success of MEMS, a robust and clear discipline policy is essential. The 
CAA recommended AR&O utilise a model contained within CAP 716 produced by
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Professor James Reason, which ensures that a consistent approach to discipline is 
made available and maintained as a quality management standard. It is also proposed 
that to enable the effective recording of reported occurrences, AR&O adapt the 
Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) system as developed by Boeing, and is 
widely used throughout the aviation industry. The model, which provides an effective 
and structured method for the recording and investigation of error related events, is 
described in detail below. At each case study site, and corporately, there are over 100 
employees trained to carry out investigations and it is assumed that these 
investigations will be carried out by either the quality or process improvement 
departments. Following a ‘best practice’ visit to Monarch Airways, it is also 
understood that training in the use of MEDA investigations and its subsequent 
techniques are critical to the success of an occurrence reporting system. In support of 
this approach David Hall, deputy regional manager in the British Civil Aviation 
Authority (CAA) Safety Regulation Group, recommended that users should consider 
the broader potential for improvement by using MEDA system as a tool to track the 
cumulative effects of less-visible errors.
Dr. Jim Reason,(CAP716 , 2003), professor of Psychology at the University of 
Manchester, supports this view and claims that MEDA is "A good example o f a 
measuring tool capable o f identifying accident-producing factors before they combine 
to cause a bad event." As a consequence, the MEDA was introduced in 2004 at the 
time when the self-managed teams were engaged with the implementation of the 
TQM strategy. By 2006, the introduction of MEMS, the provision of Human Factors 
training for all personnel and process basics improvement programmes had been 
launched. The entire process is supported by operations and quality staff from all UK 
sites, who meet monthly to address a number of ongoing themes and key issues 
addressed so far. The MEMS process therefore provides a procedure where the 
realisation of a ‘just culture’, is facilitated through an open and honest reporting and 
investigation system where employees:
1. Can implement their right and duty to raise concerns that may lead to a serious 
safety and quality errors
2. Can report safety concerns without fear of inappropriate action
3. Can raise issues or concerns openly and honestly which will be listened to, 
with concerns investigated fully and actioned in a professional manner, 
without fear of being penalised for being honest about genuine mistakes.
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MEMS also provides a mechanism to report, investigate and prevent human 
maintenance errors occurring based on factors such as procedural ambiguities and 
mismatches between required and actual practices. For example, if an error is made 
because a maintenance manual is difficult to understand then others using the same 
procedure are likely to make the same or similar types of error. Typically an error will 
not occur due to one single contributing factor and maybe the result of a series of 
contributing factors. For any safety critical business -  these factors are critical to good 
management. The MEDA tool therefore supports a structured process for mapping 
and addressing the underlying causes of error related factors based on three key 
objectives listed below:
1. The AR&O organisation must be viewed as a system where the person is 
considered as part of the system.
2. Addressing the contributing factors at lower level events will help prevent 
more serious events from occurring.
3. The MEDA investigator should have a good understanding of the whole 
investigation process as shown in the decision making chart shown below.
Figure 4.12 
MEDA Model
1. Event Occurs 2. Investigation
Was The Event 
Caused By a 
Maintenance Error
3. Find the 
Maintenance
Technician or Inspector 
Who Made the Error
4. Interview Person
Find Contributing 
Factors 
Get Ideas for 
Process 
Improvement
Everyone Affected by the 
Event
8. Provide Feedback7. Process Improvements
Based on Single Event 
& Data from Multiple Events
6. Add the Results
Form Investigation 
Information to the 
Maintenance Error 
Data Base
5. Carry out
Follow-Up 
Interviews, as 
Necessary, in Order 
to Get All Relevant 
Contributing 
Factors Information
Source: Taken From Case Study Quality Management System (2006)
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At this point in the review of the case studies, it can be seen that the sites and 
corporate HQ have designed a system to engage the individual, team, site 
management and all employees in a portfolio of human factors reporting that is 
coherent and based on openness and trust between those who perform repairs and 
those who support the operations system.
4.11 Error Case Study Investigation
To encourage employees to report incidents occurrence reports are recorded using the 
MEMS database. In turn this allows for the measurement and identification of patterns 
of contributory factors. The database was investigated by the researcher and this 
management process was found to have been active since 2004. Sufficient amounts of 
data have also been extracted and collated which suggest that interdepartmental 
communication is one critical element of human factor management and a potential 
for failure. For the researcher such a result gives rise for concern and is illustrated in 
the graph below (figure 4.13). A significant number of human error investigations 
showed a strong correlation between the role of self-management and failings in the 
support required by other cross-functional business groups.
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Figure 4.13 Elements of Human Factor Management
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To investigate the problems between departments, the researcher extracted a 
documented case study that typified this particular type of failure. It was found that a 
combustion chamber, which was despatched to a customer, was fitted with incorrect 
parts due to the complexity of the repair process itself and a general lack of 
understanding of how to comply with procedures. The root cause was found to be 
poor technical change control for service bulletin up-dates based on 5 contributing 
factors as outlined below:
1 Non-compliance to SAP Task list planning procedures ref AROP C4.62/2 55
2 Non-compliance to SAP Sentencing procedures ref AROP F3 5/2
3 Non-compliance to SAP Final view procedures ref AROP F.3.6/4
4 Poor communications between departments.
5 Poor knowledge surrounding SAP within the repair facility.
55 SAP is the enterprise com puter system operated by the case com pany and AROP means Aero Repair 
and Overhaul Procedures (standard work instructions).
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This research indicated that a lack of management within the process of planning 
tasks often resulted in poor quality work because teams could not work efficiently and 
effectively, these elements are prerequisite ‘business process basics’ in order that 
TQM can be exploited in terms of high quality material flow. According to EASA 
part -145 there is a direct link between management attitudes and expectations of a 
maintenance/build teams. EASA provide the following summary of criteria expected 
of management systems.
Planning of work
1. Remove excess downtime between tasks
2. Create adequate time for tasks to be carried out
3. Plan tasks that can be carried out in a logical sequence 
Prioritisation of work
1. Engineers should be informed as to which tasks to carry out first
2. Important or safety related tasks to be scheduled last
3. Prevention of wide variances in workload amongst engineers 
Delegation of work
1. Refrain from assigning the wrong person to carry out a task
2. Prevent inconsistency of processes when delegating tasks
3. Be wary of giving the same task to the same person consistently
These guidelines represent ‘tests of goodness’ for any socio-technical design of a 
safety system and are also measures of success at the case study organisations. These 
themes will form part of the review process during the Results and Analysis chapters.
4.12 Chapter Summary
This chapter has provided a contextual sensitization for the reader and an overview of 
the case study issues and corporate/commercial challenges facing highly regulated 
repair businesses. It has shown that quality problems have much deeper roots in socio- 
technical designs than would otherwise be considered from ‘unregulated’, higher 
volume businesses and organizations with team leader roles. In attempting to 
understand the difficulties surrounding self-managed teams a number of 
contradictions between theory and practice are apparent. This chapter highlights more 
fundament failings in management and more importantly across departments as a 
traditional regulated and functionally structured business (typical of the industry)
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wrestles with the traditional scientific management model and new TQM practices to 
meet commercial/regulator imposed pressures.
Some areas of the business can be described as successful in facilitating some 
elements of TQM, but by contrast, most areas work at the level V Holppe 1993 rating, 
and are slow to extend empowerment to support the evolution beyond the basic 
‘process basics’ stage 1 corporate model of TQM. Since the introduction of self­
management in 1998 each of the UK sites have experienced a rapid acceptance for, 
what is referred to as, modem working practices and have faced greater human factors 
transparency in their operations (such as the introduction of MEMS, MEDA etc). The 
cases have made progress in terms of positive improvements to material flow and 
have generated dramatic reductions in engine tum-round times (by as much as 50%).
However, in spite of these successes, the quality foundation upon which the drive for 
improvement rests (and is fundamental to Slacks ‘no trade off view of world class) 
has potentially eroded. The pursuit of cost reduction has included many changes to 
the structures and support that the team had previously enjoyed (such as the removal 
of the team coach). This may have been premature in the transition to self­
management and signaled its success when, in reality, the teams were mature but 
poorly supported in the planning of work and broader socio-technical system design.
What should have been a positive substitute for traditional quality management 
thinking has therefore resulted in both confusion and loss of strategic direction for 
achieving the organisational goal of self-management (the embodiment of a TQM 
philosophy). The reality and current position of self-management is therefore 
somewhat different than expected and justified the in-depth study of this corporate 
case especially the socio-technical systems design that manages the relationship 
between self-management and TQM. This relationship is illustrated in the model 
shown below.
Figure 4.14
Assessment Model of Self-Management & TQM
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In the absence of robust academic models that cover the industry or process type of 
regulated repair business, the researcher took a broad approach to socio-technical 
systems designs and their contribution to human factor failures. This chapter has 
shown how, through the use of the iceberg model, management issues and poor local 
designs of systems have been identified as potential causal factors that limit the self­
management of TQM by teams. It has provided a cursory overview of how facility 
management has fallen short in its ability to lead teams through the stages of 
improvement, efficiency and effectiveness of the corporate TQM model.
This poses a dilemma -  can self-managed teams safely facilitate TQM in the aero 
repair industry sector? The aero repair & overhaul case studies present an almost 
unparalleled and unique position for the investigation of the phenomena of self 
managed teams and the socio-technical systems that support them.
Even ‘safety gurus’ like Reason (2003) and Rasmussen (1998) have stopped short of 
engaging with repair businesses and have instead remained committed to pilot issues 
or focused on traditional areas of high volume regulation (petro-chemical etc). The 
case studies were therefore deemed provide a major opportunity to add significant 
value to the academic understanding of a regulated business within which the 
application of TQM which is conducted in a highly complex operations management
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process. The initial sensitisation stage of the study also showed that the business 
system did seem to struggle with safety system issues concerning the structure of the 
operational staff, how best to control safety/quality processes and which elements of 
the existing business design were inhibiting progress towards full self-management 
and fully deployed safety/quality responsibility. An overview of the businesses 
engaged with this series of cross-comparative case studies has been provided in this 
chapter. The cases involved with the study are high performance and critical repair 
centres with long established skills and customary practice. The cases have 
continuously adapted and have struggled to make sense of a craft based model of 
operations management and how best to change it to that of a leaner and more safety 
conscious way of working. The businesses are in a state of flux and have little 
guidance in terms of successful organisational models in this area (and a sparse 
academic literature). As such an interpretation of the lean and TQM way of working is 
needed and these cases were selected because they offer most insight into a safety 
critical environment. Many conflicts exist including the role of team working, 
individual autonomy, situational awareness and responsiveness of the operations 
systems to commercial pressures. The timing is right to study how the socio-technical 
systems designs are changing and how these impact upon human factors (in the 
absence of a supervisor and organisational structure which is structured for command 
and control and not TQM). It should be noted at the time of finally submitting this 
thesis and the last final adjustments to this document, Toyota (the archetype lean 
business) has recalled 8 million vehicles as a result of a safety concern and a 
catastrophic breech of Toyota’s systems which makes this study all the more 
important and time critical. The next chapter will begin to distil the results of the 
study and build towards the analysis and contribution to the academic body of 
knowledge concerning human factor risk management and TQM.
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Chapter 5 Results
5.0 Chapter Introduction
During the previous chapters many evolving themes have emerged and these have all 
had a common denominator - the importance of creating a positive human factors 
environment where self-managed team working is able to facilitate the principles of 
TQM. These preconditions are important if this structure is to be effective and many 
authors claim it is a step too far for a regulated industry (Reason, 1995). This chapter 
will present the results of the empirical field research of this study and will partially 
answer the guiding research question.
The chapter is divided into two parts that reflect the two key cycles of research -  the 
quantitative analysis leading to a qualitative review cycle. Such a pluralist and 
cyclical methodology is conducive to theory building and the exploration of 
phenomena where little is known (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994). The 
purpose of presenting this material in such a way is to support the building of a model 
that describes the significant features that underpin mature improvement case studies 
within the context of, highly regulated safety management/high costs of failure, 
working environments.
Part 1 of this chapter provides the main body of results including data from the large- 
scale survey. This part of the research cycle demonstrates a generic range of error 
provoking trends that were found across 8 separate teams who are located across 4 
different UK aerospace repair & overhaul sites. The results of the second phase (the 
qualitative cycle) support the main quantitative framework and this is presented as a 
summary of written narrative events (drawn from the research with focus groups and 
semi-structured interviews of actors in the system). In other words the majority of 
information presented throughout phase 2 provides an experiential account of error 
provoking trends and builds upon the critical mass of employee’s perceptions 
(management, staff and teams). Whilst this is not purely an ethnographic study, 
employee perceptions were used and tested against secondary data collected whilst at 
the case studies. The following chart (figure 5.0) is representative of this position and 
provides a schematic overview of the main chapter primary and secondary source 
data.
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5.1 The Quantitative Review
The quantitative stage of results included the processing of raw data taken from total 
of eight hundred questionnaires that were distributed to approximately 30% of the 
AR&O population (across all four sites engaged with this study). By means of 
background data, the average in-service period (tenure) of the informants was 25 
years and this result was regarded as significant in terms of the employee having 
experienced pre and post transition states of the business and also for the employee to 
be positioned effectively to comment on working practices and systems design.
The chart shown below (Figure 5.1) provides a percentage breakdown of the mean 
case study scores of all sites surveyed, based on the most significant three risk factors 
of the 9 central risk measures adopted by this study and extracted from the survey. 
The nine major factors were drawn from established works in the field of study, 
aviation human factors in particular. Planning is reported as the highest area of 
concern expressed by the informants in terms of safety-related problems. A score of 
80% risk was associated with the process of management planning and material flow
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followed by concerns about equipment problems (recorded at 78% level). Next a 
series of inter-related activities are perceived as concerns for safety management 
namely: employee training problems (at the 58% level of significance), quality 
management and improvement processes (58%), procedures (57%) and 
communication (56%). This demonstrates an interesting result in that 3 of the most 
significant concerns are located within engineering (technical system) and reflect a 
concern for the management of technical processes. There are two major concerns in 
the cultural/social element of the repair system (quality and communication) and 
training at the individual level (social system). As such this study reinforces the 
importance of the socio-technical approach to research in this area as opposed to 
cognitive studies of individual error as has been traditionally adopted by authors in the 
field (Banbury, 1998).
Figure 5.1
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However, the perspective called ‘engineering problems’ represent 42% of the entire 
survey data and such a result supports the main body of literature (Reason, 2003), 
which suggests that hardware problems are a major underlying cause of latent error 
concern (the technical system design) in the context of managing this ‘hardware’. 
Secondly the perspective measuring individual problems was recorded at 27% and 
accounted for errors associated with cognitive information processing in terms of the 
way individuals react to specific problem situations (situational awareness). Because 
the system creates the way in which the individual will perform, this result shows that 
employees perceive poor system design to be manifest in personal fatigue, poor 
working environment control, poor team situational awareness and confusion 
concerning skill variety. As stated in the literature (Spear, 2008), the ability of an 
individual to perform at a higher level is a function of the team situational awareness 
of the employees around the individual (higher social system) and this result shows a 
concern that there is instability in the design of the operations management system at 
the individual and therefore team levels (deployment of responsibility for ownership 
and control of the repair process to self managed teams). Finally, the perspective 
measuring the company culture reflected an overall score of 31% and captured 
information, which is largely attributed to system in the form of latent error problems. 
This result shows significant concerns for the fundamental elements of TQM and 
communication between teams (team situational awareness and material flow 
performance). In the absence of TQM and high levels of team communication it is not 
possible to deploy responsibility for operations management/repair management to the 
level of the team. Viewed holistically, these preliminary results show gaps in the 
systems of all four sites and suggest the individual/teams have dysfunctional socio- 
technical systems designs.
5.2 Normality Test Results
Against the original survey design, the summary of results that follows is taken from 
800 different data sets of questionnaire scores. These results were manipulated using 
Minitab and SPSS (by 8 different case study groupings). The use of the two systems 
was important due to the rigour of the tests designed for this study. These systems 
were considered appropriate for the reliability of the data collected and Minitab was 
used (a ‘normality test’) to show how the responses were spread about a mean and not 
biased by a pocket of informants with extreme views/perceptions. The type of data
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extracted from each of the questionnaires is defined as ordinal because it is ‘count 
data’ and for the purpose of scientific evaluation was recorded as continuous in 
statistical terms (see research methodology chapter). In the charts that follow, the 
researcher organised the data into individual data plots that characterise and sum 
mean scores. These summed mean scores represent a numerical question trend by site 
and case study grouping (works and staff views). The purpose of conducting this test 
is to determine the level of standard deviation about the mean (for staff/management 
and works/operational personnel). The significance of this test result is shown in the 
table below (table 5.2).
Figure 5.2
Normality Results
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The purpose of this test was to define the type of data extracted from the raw 
questionnaire scores through what is termed as a normality test. Each statistical test 
defined the data as normal. The ‘normal’ outcome is achieved only if the probability 
value ‘p ’ was equal to or greater than 0.05 (presented as green scores in the table). 
The opposite logic was applied to data that fell below 0.05 level and was duly defined, 
for the purpose of this study, as non-parametric. The classification as ‘non-parametric’ 
is considered ‘non normal’ (these are presented as red scores in the table).
^
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To ensure the robustness of the study, it was necessary to stack the individual 
responses into a single normality test and the test selected was the Anderson Darling 
test, this is used to demonstrate the overall degree of standard deviation from the 
whole study (Henslin, 2000). The purpose of using this test was used to illuminate a 
general pattern or trend and the actual survey mean of 2.69 exposes proportional 
differences in terms of both safe and unsafe working practices as shown in the 
Anderson Darling ‘line of best fit’ test shown in the Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3
Anderson Darling Normality Test
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The graph shows a slight curve at the edges in the residuals, which indicates a 
preference from the sample size of 432 employees, which demonstrated that not 
everyone decided to score the questionnaire in the same way. In other words some 
individuals either ‘strongly disagreed’ allowing the researcher to transform a ‘tick’ 
response into a numeric code of land likewise when others ‘strongly agreed’ a ‘tick’ 
at this end of the Likert-scale was represented as number 5. Profiles of this nature are 
not uncommon in survey data, in this instance occurring owing to the expected 
variance the questionnaire was designed to extract. In summary the probability value
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of less than 0.05 has no bearing on the validity of the questionnaire itself, but rather 
exposes the research question from a non-parametric perspective where the data 
reflects wide variations of why different opinions about quality exist. In other words, 
if you give people a scale representing strongly agree/strongly disagree then it must be 
expected that extremes will be taken by individuals resulting in information that will 
not cluster around the middle value. Also, it should be noted that this study is non- 
parametric and as such defined the direction of the study, it also ruled out means 
based analysis of variance type tests (such as 2 sample t tests). The above test of 
normal distribution therefore was accepted as non-normal whereby any further tests 
will concentrate upon the median as opposed to the mean.
5.3 Cronbach Alpha Results
The next step in processing the survey results was to test the data for its level 
reliability. In other words of the researcher needed to provide evidence for standards 
of internal consistency by measuring patterns of scores from individual responses 
against each construct grouping. By measuring the survey’s internal level of 
consistency the researcher was able to estimate the level of questionnaire reliability 
against a numerical 1-5-Likert scale, as shown in the example below:
1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Unsure
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly Agree
After collecting the responses from each questionnaire a database was constructed by 
case study grouping to determine if the survey was statistically reliable against the 
perceived research design. The ALPHA option, used to assess the reliability of every 
subject’s response to each question, was analysed through an SPSS computer program 
in the form of 72 Cronbach alpha split tests. Cronbach's a is defined as
N  /
a
N t ( - ^ )
2
For example where N  represents the number of subject scores, ax  is the variance
2
between those scores against the observed total test scores and uYi is the variance of 
each factor, which is represented as component. The accepted social science ‘cut-off
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point’ for this test (Thompson, 2001) was set at p< 0.70 for a set of items, which are 
represented in the table of results shown in fig 5.4 below. The test data that failed to 
reach the probability criteria of <0.70 was considered as skewed and subsequently 
removed from the study in order to meet the standards of scientific norm (Ghauri, 
2002). The actual number of human factor measures was therefore reduced to 9, based 
on the researcher’s decision to reject the following factors (shown in red in Table 5.4) 
as listed below.
1 Commercial Pressure
2 Complacency
3 Attention
Figure 5.4
Table of Cronbach Alpha Test Results
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The internal level of consistency of the survey was confirmed as acceptable. The data 
was accepted based on the results of the Cronbach Alpha slit tests, which determined 
the exact measure of statistical reliability for all questionnaire scores. In other words 
the application of reliability testing was used to measure the effectiveness of 
questionnaire design based on rejecting data that fell below the values of p< 0.70, as 
highlighted in red. All other data shown in green was subsequently accepted for the
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processing of human error review. The quality of the questionnaire design was duly 
accepted as meeting the levels of social scientific statistical reliability upon which to 
build a theoretical model at a later stage.
5.4 Overview of Case Study Results
Having established the type and reliability of the data being used, the researcher 
recoded all questionnaire scores into a percentage scale that considered problem 
ratings between 0% and 100% (reference the list of examples show below).
0 to 25% = Strongly disagree i.e. no problems exist
25% to 50% = Disagree i.e. no problems exist
50% to 75% = Agree i.e. problems exist
75% to 100% = Strongly agree i.e. problems exist
In other words the researcher was now confident that the data available was of a level
of quality that could be used to show robust trends. The chart shown below (Figure
5.5), includes a summary of all sites and group scores and clearly indicates the biggest 
representative problems by percentage scale, based on the highest order of concern 
are:
1. Planning 80%
2. Equipment 78%
3. Training 58%
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Figure 5.5
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Interestingly, quality management ranks sixth in the series of problem measures. 
Again this result reinforces those found earlier and the view that there are problems 
with the management of the technical system.
All Aero Repair & Overhaul Human Factor Scores
206
5.5 Comparison between Works & Staff Personnel Groups
Figure 5.6 provides a cross case comparison of all sites to include differences between 
Staff & Works group perceptions, thus representing a mean percentage set of scores 
of construct measures. The purpose of which is to illustrate any trends and 
relationships between the two main groups of informants upon which this study of 
socio-technical systems designs is based (works and staff personnel). The trends 
discovered are significant and will be explored in the subsequent chapter. The bar 
chart reads from left to right, with the highest 6 areas of concern shown in the table 
below:
1. Staff Planning 79%
2. Works Planning 81%
3. Staff Equipment 77%
4. Works Equipment 79%
5. Staff Training 59%
6. Works Training 57%
Figure 5.6
All Aero Repair & Overhaul Human Factor Scores By Staff & Works
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Again, such a result confirms how much in agreement these two types of 
personnel are in terms of the issues within the socio-technical system and its 
management. As such the hypothesis that there was a difference in the views of 
informants (by classification) was wrong and this result does inform the analysis 
presented in the next chapter.
5.6 Uncertainty Results
During the initial presentation and review of the case study results, the researcher was 
only concerned with data that represented problem areas and deliberately excluded all 
uncertainty scores of 3 (the middle option in the 1-5 Likert questionnaire response 
scale). The rationale behind this approach was based on the assumption that unknown 
scores of 3, as shown in the chart below, would represent a series of ambiguous 
interpretations based on the assumption that employees.
1. Did not understand the question?
2. Could not make a decision between questions?
Figure 5.7
All Case Study Unsure Scores
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
■ i<vrv
■Bristol Staff
■ Bristol Works 
□Ansty Staff 
□Ansty Works
■ Derby Staff
■  Derby Works
■ East Kilbnde Staff 
□ East Kilbride Works
Peoblem Measures
Source: Researcher
Pr
ob
lem
 
Sc
or
es
208
For clarity of understanding the researcher was concerned with the level of distortion 
the uncertainty scores might have on the overall trend of results. It was for this reason 
that the two charts were created as shown below, these provided the researcher with a 
level of understanding of which model to pursue.
5.7 Accepting & Rejecting Results
The chart below, (figure 5.8) provides a comparative measure of ‘between site’ 
scores, based on the inclusion of all unsure scores of 3. The second chart below, 
(figure 5.9) provides a considerably different trend, whereby the problem measure of 
management attitudes is approximately 3 times greater because of the exclusion of 
unsure scores of 3.
Figure 5.8
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Figure 5.9
Between Site Grouping Excluding Unsure Scores
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The preferred method of data presentation was based on the exclusion of all unsure 
scores from the entire survey based on the differences between these two charts due to 
its averaging effect and artificial smoothing of the results.
5.8 Within Site Results
The problems experienced across all case study groups are summarised by site 
location and illustrated in the chart shown below (Figure 5.10). A similar trend was 
found to exist across all case study sites by cluster grouping. The data once again 
excludes scores of uncertainty taken from the original Likert scale which, for ease of 
understanding, was subsequently recoded in terms of percentage values, with the most 
problematic area reading from left to right.
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Figure 5.10
All Case Studies Within Site Grouping
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5.9 Summary of Quantitative Results Phase 1
From the evidence, and looking for outlier cases, problems associated with planning 
and equipment represented a higher percentage value amongst Derby works, with a 
similar trend between all other sites by sample grouping. It would appear that 
problems with training and communication are clustered very closely together, with 
Derby works measuring the highest order for concern across each construct measure. 
The situation regarding procedures and the risk of non-conformance to the 
management of the quality system is ranked highest at Derby and Bristol with East 
Kilbride and Ansty following a similar trend. In considering these findings it can be 
argued that because Derby and Bristol share the same customers the engine work 
scope, whilst different from one site to the next could, in principle, have an 
influencing effect on the same reported levels of human factors concerns. The finding 
suggests that these ‘commercial pressures’ from the same customers and similar 
technical product characteristics (engine types) induce similar pressures on the socio-
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technical system. So, despite removing the questions associated with commercial 
pressure in a previous test of the quality of the study questionnaire, it has been found 
that commercial considerations have been detected. This would validate the fact that 
the questionnaire questions were not robust but that enough questions in the 
questionnaire were present to detect the impact of commercial pressure (an important 
factor for latent errors as per Reason, 2003).
In consideration of the construct measure of individual fatigue, which has been 
previously highlighted as important, one could argue for the existence of the opposite 
situation (recorded as a low level between the Bristol and Ansty site). Since both of 
these sites share the same corporate management structure, the researcher has 
assumed that different styles of local leadership explain why the opposite situation 
exists between Derby and East Kilbride. As such ‘local management’ and indeed the 
responsiveness of local management to team/individual needs is considered important 
and a justification of the phase 2 (qualitative phase) of research to delve deeper into 
the socio-technical system design (Gummesson, 1991).
Apart from Bristol, each of the three other sites has demonstrated similar levels of risk 
that surround the general measure of their overall site safety concern. The ranking 
below provides a list of the aggregate questionnaire scores based on a pareto of ‘most 
at risk’ error provoking themes.
1. Planning 626%
2. Equipment 624%
3. Procedures 461%
4. Quality Management 461%
5. Fatigue 353%
6. Training 460%
7. Communication 447%
8. Safety Culture 364%
9. Management Attitudes 294%
Again, this test confirms the critical importance of planning and equipment as the key 
facets of safe socio-technical systems designs. Finally, ‘management attitudes’ was
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regarded as the least cause for concern, based on a consensus of opinion that 
managers are not consciously acting in a manner, which can be considered as unsafe. 
However, during the next section the qualitative approach has fundamentally 
challenged this view by exposing the underlying causes of error risk from a leadership 
point of view. In overall summary, the first phase of research clearly indicates the 
planning and equipment of the facility to be most important features in a safety- 
regulated environment. Again the multiple tests provide significant robustness as 
grounding for the resultant model that the researcher seeks as his major contribution 
to the academic body of knowledge and informed professional management practice.
5.10 Qualitative Results Phase 1
The researcher will now present, in the sections that follow, an experiential account of 
human error problems from a theoretical perspective as outlined by Miles & 
Huberman (1994). In these sections of findings a more humanistic approach is used to 
provide a more in-depth account of ‘why’ error-provoking problems exist from a 
socio-technical perspective. In the sections that follow a series of paraphrased reports 
will be presented by site-specific location, which summarise the opinions as to why 
certain areas of the business are perceived as being exposed to errors/risks. The 
researcher has limited the qualitative phase of investigation to planning problems, 
equipment problems and training issues alone due to the significance of these issues 
as shown by the quantitative research process.
Using the detailed summary of transcripts, the researcher has drawn a series of results 
from the follow up interviews with different managers at each site location. These 
informants were selected because they were ‘system designers’ and were identified, as 
being accountable for staff / works area of concern. The information and research 
findings will be presented from a staff and works viewpoint (operational employees) 
and Management viewpoint, which reflects a divide between personnel who work 
within a design and those responsible for the design of the operations system. With 
reference to this part of the study it should be noted that in nearly all cases a 
contradiction exists between the management and teams’ account for why error 
related problems exist. Based on established research taken from the literature review, 
one can argue these and other types of indifference reflect the existence of a ‘claim’ & 
‘blame’ or ‘them & us’ type of culture. In other words the ability for self-management
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to facilitate the organisational goal of TQM depends on the resolution of human factor 
problems cited at the leadership level of human factors control (design issues related 
to latent errors).
In spite of these differences, all participants of the focus group research were happy to 
engage in the analytical assessment of results; these will be discussed in more detail 
within chapter 6. In the sections that follow the researcher has utilised the support of 
4 human resource professionals, based at each case study location, their expert skill in 
facilitating each focus group workshop was considered vital in providing an objective 
account to support the research design. These professional facilitators were engaged 
to ensure there was no bias in the collection of qualitative data and that the 
researcher’s presence did not influence the willingness of the teams to be open and 
honest.
The interpretation of the qualitative results is based the methodology provided by 
Miles & Huberman (1994), Yin (2003) and within the recommendations of 
Eisenhardt (1991). These methods and guidelines were used for the purpose of 
measuring the value of both the written and spoken word but doing so without any 
crossover between these parts of the study (to ensure robustness and to eliminate 
further form of bias). Each of the HR specialists was trained by the researcher to 
conduct the research to the same standard and not to bias results or influence the 
research process.
The next sections will present; the narrative from the qualitative research, comments 
regarding the implication of the findings on the design, and errors in the socio- 
technical system design at each case study site.
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5.11 Extracts from the Ansty Focus Group Transcripts
The first feature of socio technical systems design to be reviewed was the central 
issue of planning and the co-ordination of the material flow system. The review of 
planning is important because this feature of system management is central to 
deploying responsibility to self managed teams and it is the key part of the system that 
deals with commercial pressures.
Planning Problem 1; Commercial Pressures and Deadlines 
Antsy Works & Staff Concern
The teams were interviewed for over two hours as a panel group. The most repetitive 
words and synonyms were all associated with commercial pressures as a source of 
problems which led directly to issues and conflicts with technology and materials 
flow. Comments from teams in general were raised about unrealistic deadlines being 
set for production targets, which create pressure and, as Reason (1995) states, raises 
the potential for barrier failure because of the chaotic confusion that such deadlines 
pose in an environment where routines are not standard and vary in time taken to 
achieve a quality outcome.
These issues were raised during the panel discussion about the working environment 
and the introduction of a new engine contract. The review of these experiences raised 
interesting findings about the potential for failure, role confusion at the team and 
individual level and the structural issues of accountability within the factory.
Ansty Management Response
In respect o f the new engine contract and concerns from the works teams, the factory 
management responded by establishing an improvement team. The purpose of this 
team was to temporarily accommodate and understand the issues that would enable 
the business to meet the contracted hours and beyond. Such a temporary intervention 
was a modification to the existing business structure and an ‘issue containment 
exercise’ using TQM methods for the purpose of maintaining commercial material 
flow in a competitive market. The team therefore ‘policed’ the factory system and 
constantly reviewed its targets to ensure that engine overhaul projects remained 
competitive.
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The differences between causal concerns of works staff and the reaction, by 
management, to protect short term material flow is interesting and shows a divide 
between the intentions of teams to solve problems with permanent interventions and 
temporary fixes by management teams to ensure customer service. Both approaches 
are TQM methods that are focused on the customer but they show a marked level of 
difference in the best long term and permanent solution to an identified ‘safety’ issue 
in the workplace. In this respect the strength of management response and willingness 
to change the system design is weak and implies a lack of leadership within the socio- 
technical system.
Planning Problems 2: Task Uncertainty and Leadership 
Antsy Works & Staff Concern
The teams expressed major reservations that structural changes to the regulation of 
quality management would result from structural changes by management and that the 
current department for quality control would be devolved. The single point of 
responsibility for quality control was held by the inspection departments and fears 
over its removal were expressed in terms of an increase in task uncertainty due to 
unregulated practice. These concerns therefore reinforce the issues of a designed 
safety system and the use of barriers to ensure safe and quality working practices. 
Again changes to the existing system of accountability provide a major theme and 
concern for staff.
Ansty Management Response
The business management response was that the most effective ways o f managing 
quality must be used and this implied the need to continuously evaluate the most 
effective way to plan and carry out work. Furthermore, the allocation o f quality 
responsibility would reflect the best place to conduct the assurance and control 
routines based on achieving cost commitments and the delivery o f a product, in line 
with customer contract requirements (commercial pressures).
The second response from the management team to the panel group concerns was that 
specific concerns involving the removal o f operations should be raised with the 
technical department and not directed to management. Such concerns should be 
highlighted via the MEMS reporting system. As such, the factory management had
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referred the issue to a functional specialism and would only react if the issues were 
proven to raise safety incidents or would be considered as a human factor failures. 
Such a result is again surprising given the high priority that is placed on team working 
and multi-disciplinary working under the ideals of TQM. The approach to safety 
management shows a friction between classical business structures, deference to 
specialists and the modem approach to process management and the engagement of 
all stakeholders to solve issues and maintain the safety/quality of the production 
system.
These results raise further issues that commercial pressures and a classical 
management support structure is at odds with autonomous teams and that fears exist 
between the teams and what they expect (responsibility and accountability) of the 
staff around them. As such -  this is a matter of trust -  and trust is an implicit feature 
of all TQM models (based on consensus management) but, it would appear, the level 
of trust, in regulated industries where individual professional skills are high, is 
heightened. Again, a common theme associated with this discussion was the impact of 
role ambiguity, low levels of communication, fear of blame for safety lapses and poor 
understanding of the leadership within the system.
Planning Problems 3: Low Morale and Boredom 
Antsy Works & Staff Concern
Whilst commercial pressures is one potential source of failure that catalyses many 
other failures in the defence barriers of a production system, the interviewees also 
expressed an alternative view of commercial pressures -  this time concerning low 
utilisation of staff and equipment. The view of the team was that there was a lack of 
work going through the repair shops. The interviewees expressed concern that this 
was linked to low morale and boredom -  these two features are also associated with 
poor human factors and inertia in the production system. Boredom tends to lead to 
lack of attention according to Rasmussen (1998) and a potential failed defence.
Ansty Management Response
The management response to the team following the panel interviews was that a lack 
of work necessitates individuals to become more flexible and assist one another to 
ensure that schedules are met by movement o f labour and material, thus improving
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morale and boredom. Such an approach reflects a potential conflict in that workers 
would share jobs and that those unfamiliar with the work would learn. However, 
safety models suggest it is the repetition of learning and activities that add robustness 
to the defences of an individual (they learn what to look out for). Furthermore 
unstructured learning by watching another has a second and more severe penalty -  
without structured instruction it is possible to learn the short cuts of others (based on 
their expert and implicit knowledge) and this can put the learner at risk of adopting 
bad practice without knowing or question.
The production schedule, issued at the site, has on average 450 - 500 items released 
that require output on a weekly basis and typically only 250 are achieved. The 
management response was also that the workload was present but that material flow  
system failures are the result o f individual employees failing to assist material flow  
and move to areas o f the factory that has work. The management response is 
interesting and is a means of allocating ‘blame’ for the identified problem and is a 
means of absolving management from needing to take action by requiring teams to 
chase materials for their own productivity.
This shows another dimension to the concept of trust and dependency creating a 
breakdown in understanding roles within the facility. Such confusion is again a 
potential breech of safety barriers but also a significant degree of vagary in the design 
of the new production system. The levels of role ambiguity and potential for blame 
creates a system whereby workers appear unwilling or un-empowered to move to 
other parts of the factory to enhance their skills albeit that the management have the 
authority to request such transfers but it does not exercise this level of leadership.
Planning Problems 4: Motivation. Low Morale and Poor Communication 
Antsy Works & Staff Concern
The team discussed the withdrawal of established and well-respected incentive 
schemes and their discontinuation when team based working was introduced at the 
site. The interviewed team felt that the bonus should be reintroduced in order to 
motivate people to communicate the potential for planning of workflow 
improvements. The incentive is an output driven reward and linked to the concern that 
less work in the factory was causing issues.
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Ansty Management Response
The bonus replaced individual incentives as the business moved to team based 
working (the incentive was seen as incompatible with teamwork). The management 
response was that “A// individual suggestions for improvement to our business are 
important, but we need to ensure that collectively these suggestions improve business 
output and ultimately improve profif\ The management position was therefore based 
on a level of presumed collective responsibility for material flow and that individual 
bonuses did not necessarily equate to better repair turnaround for the business. Such a 
view suggests that there is an abdication of management responsibility for material 
flow and a belief that self-management must incorporate providing materials to the 
team by the team (role ambiguity). This response shows a clear definition of the 
management role by the management and an uncertain allocation of role by the team 
who believe management should provide materials for them.
Planning Problems 5: Knowledge Errors and Attitude Differences 
Ansty Works & Staff Concern
Another major concern that was voiced by the interviewed staff and works personnel 
was that while there is a need to remain flexible, because of varying workloads, the 
teams felt under pressure and un-supported when having to cope with inexperienced, 
untrained personnel when extra resource is added to a team. This response again 
confirmed that the relationship between those who train (and may not be qualified 
trainers) and those who are attempting to be trained is strained (the direct presence of 
a person ‘watching over’ repair activities). As a root cause the concern confirms the 
earlier result that personnel do not feel qualified to train and potentially to risk 
training another in working practices that may not be wholly correct. Again this is a 
voiced reluctance to violate safety barriers within the production system design and a 
limit to the autonomy of the team.
Ansty Management Response
The site management response to these concerns was that “We operate a successful 
transfer policy within the requirements o f the competency structure. Review o f on-the- 
job training shows that management support this requirement, allowing time for  
individuals to learn new tasks”. The response to this challenge appears to suggest that 
management is comfortable with existing structures and competencies even though
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the business has moved to a team based and autonomous approach. The management 
appears to have faith in the established bureaucracy and controls. However, the issue 
is not necessarily that clear-cut and it concerns both what is trained and how it is 
trained to other team members i.e. the quality of training. From a system design 
perspective, these issues concern the continuous improvement, standardisation and 
organisational learning elements of the production system design. These features are 
all key barriers to system violation and represent chronic latent failure factors that 
management seem unwilling to re-examine. It would appear that multi-skilling and 
multi-tasking are solutions to maintaining product flow as opposed to creating a 
standard way of working where abnormality can be detected by all (such deployed 
decision-making and ability to stop production based on the detection of a defect is 
critical to Leaner ways of working). The response also has parallels with other safety 
management issues such as a lack of empowerment, role ambiguity and the negative 
influences of peer pressures placed on individuals to train others when they feel 
incapable of doing so.
Planning Problems 6: Role Ambiguity and Poor Decision Making (lack of 
responsiveness to change)
Antsy Works & Staff Concern
Within the context of a facility that was under-capacity, concerns were expressed that 
the company was out sourcing production of certain components. It was felt that the 
quality oversight and routines for quality assurance of these subcontractors was not 
robust. As such, holes in the barrier defences of incoming materials could not be 
prevented and this would inevitably lead to shortages and stop-start production as 
defects were sorted and schedules breeched.
Ansty Management Response
The Ansty management response was that “All vendors are selected in accordance 
with GQP C.4.11 the process is robust and is in accordance with the Global 
Purchasing Policy and related processes, all of which are defined in the quality 
management system”. This response shows deference back to a functional specialism 
outside of the actual facility and an acknowledgement that the local management were 
powerless to change such practices albeit that it could have introduced
220
countermeasures at the factory to inspect materials that were inbound to the 
production system but did not do so.
Planning Problems 7: Commercial Pressures and Poor Decision-Makinp  
Antsy Works & Staff Concern
Another issue raised by the team concerned the change in pace between initial stages 
of repair (where material flow was slow) and the final stages of engine shipment 
where the speed of the transfer to the customer was pressured and staff felt concerned 
that logistics bookings were happening without consultation with the teams 
concerned. As such, delivery promises were being made with inadequate knowledge 
and certainty that the date could be met and the engine despatched to the level of 
quality required. Staff, during the interview, consistently reported a ‘last minute rush’ 
to get work away and that this could lead to a compromise of safety and quality 
management practice.
Ansty Management Response
The management response to these charges was that “All ECU requirements are 
routed and communicated via the production manager and the team. All working 
arrangements are considered prior to any decision being made and passed onto the 
customer business”. This rather formal response returned the decision-making 
authority and responsibility to a specialist department with the team informed of any 
outcome, rather than acknowledging this as an issue or formally addressing the role of 
the leaderless team in the process of agreement to ship the product. These responses 
reflect a management concern to allocate roles beyond the team whilst also promoting 
the corporate view of autonomous working. At the heart of this friction is therefore 
the very definition of what the team is -  beyond a group of highly skilled engineers 
who share a common workplace. In the absence of a team member with responsibility 
to lead it is not clear how functional support departments can communicate effectively 
with the team and be confident that each member is working to the same outcome or 
at what point time constraints limit the flow of work to customers. The statement of 
this issue and the management response shows significant gaps in the safety system 
and TQM process to the point that it opens the potential for unknowing violation and 
role ambiguity (the latter being a well known source of safety system breeches -  See 
Reason, 2003).
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Planning Problems 8: Commercial Pressures and Ineffective Leadership 
Antsy Works & Staff Concern
The quality assurance of contractors was mentioned repeatedly as a cause of team 
concern but additional comments and concerns were raised that related to the 
penetration of mistakes (into the repair site). The teams proposed there was a lack of 
vetting and quality output of some contractors as this had an impact on work done at 
Ansty. In this manner, the passing of a safety defence could happen and would result 
in the team attempting to repair the faults created by another business. In this manner 
the creation of the defect and its detection were separated and this posed problems for 
inter-organisational learning and the level of ‘right first time’ or value added 
production by the teams. This performance is directly related to all management and 
customer service measures, which, if performance was low, would result in 
management intervention. These concerns were presented to the site management and 
are breeches of the safety system with which the system itself is not resilient enough 
to cope without large amounts of rework or the condemnation of the product as 
defective (to be scrapped which causes production scheduling issues as team members 
look for other work to do that may not be on the critical path of the production 
schedule). It should be noted, from the Lean production literature review, it was found 
that this source of failure is treated very seriously and suppliers are expected to 
replace defective products at very short notice (a matter of hours) and to document 
how the problems will be eliminated in the future (See Monden 1993). Such a 
feedback mechanism was found not to be in place with the teams concerned.
Ansty Management Response
The response of the management team was that “All Vendors are selected in 
accordance with GQP C.4.11 in accordance with the RR Global Purchasing Policy 
and vendor performance measurement includes Quality, Costs and Delivery 
elements”. As such no further action would be taken. This aspect of management 
thinking is indicative of an organisation with a high level of task uncertainty 
aggravated by ineffective leadership (Sholtes, 1998).
The next section will continue to dissect the socio-technical system at Ansty by 
reviewing the equipment related issues that were shown as highly significant 
contributory factors in the initial survey findings.
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Equipment Problems 10: Commercial pressures leading to rule breaking 
Antsy Works & Staff Concern
Another subject of concern to the teams was a general lack of correct transport 
boxes/cases that did not prevent material damage thus passing deunaged goods un­
noticed by Rolls-Royce and the customer. These issues drew heated debate with the 
team who had been reporting this issue for a long time and, admitted, they had almost 
given up complaining because no change had happened and the ‘product protection’ 
issues of the current working method was considered to be the norm. These 
complaints are interesting and, from an operations management perspective, these 
failures of product damage represent a major concern because good production is lost 
as transportation causes damage that will need to be reworked or scrapped. Such 
events cause low customer satisfaction and high potential for safety breeches at the 
factory and at the customer sites.
Ansty Management Response
The response from the management concerning production damage focused instead 
on the quantity of transport boxes and not the quality of the transport device. The 
written feedback provided as part of this research shows the response that “In general 
we have sufficient transport boxes to handle the current loads within the plant. We 
are beginning a project to look at improving our material handling processes over the 
next 6 months commencing with the RBI99 project”. Whilst the answer is vague, the 
implication of the statement is that management intend to design a system with 
specialists and impose this design on the teams. In effect the management have closed 
another window of opportunity for the teams to engage in learning and problem 
solving whilst opening a window of error opportunity. This response continues to 
suggest that the management have structural issues where roles and responsibilities 
are referred to the current organisational chart rather than looking to see which 
element of the organisation (department, team or specialist) should hold this 
responsibility.
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Equipment Problems 11: Poor Decision Making. Rule Breaking and Ineffective 
Leadership
Antsy Works & Staff Concern
Another concern to emerge during the facilitated review sessions with the teams was 
the reported use of paper repair manuals, which are in poor condition with missing 
pages etc. These were regarded as safety risks. When queried, people are told that the 
system will soon be transferred to an electronic version, so there is little point in 
refurbishing the paper manuals. However this has been the case for approximately 18 
months. The implications for procedural non-compliance are clear, in view of the fact 
that there is a potential for a catastrophe, an immediate and decisive action by 
management should have taken place.
Ansty Management Response
The response from the site management concerned a reference back to expert support 
function groups and proposed “I f  you find a manual that is in poor condition or pages 
are missing then you should raise this with the Technical Administration Engineers. 
They will then re issue or replace the pages”. Such as response shows a concern to 
refer the teams to the technical experts rather than show concern that an important 
control document was missing key technical pages it was therefore a potential source 
of error and a barrier that had been breached at the site. This response is a deflection 
to a functional specialist and a potential source of conflict in process-based 
operations.
Equipment Problems 12: Decision Making. Blame and Rule Breaking 
Antsy Works & Staff Concern
A number of problems were reported with reference to documentation:
1. The Olympus and Tyne instruction sheets are hard to follow without experience
2. RTM322 (mark 120) has no strip or build manuals despite this being a routine task. 
Un-official digital photos are used.
3. There is a shortage of QAS (quality assurance standards) manuals despite regular 
referral being required. All the above missing data is being worked around as a Norm. 
Once again the teams have identified a clear breach in the defences of the site and 
have showed concern that a repair error may inadvertently be produced. Such a 
scenario -  including unofficial workarounds should prompt immediate management
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action. Such a situation should generate an appropriate response, according to Reason 
(2003), because the operational safety system has the potential for violation.
Ansty Management Response
After discussions with the inspector the management concerned fe lt comfortable with 
the process and have instructed teams to contact a Manufacturing Engineer if any 
further problems arise (deflection to a specialist). A further problem identified is that 
the palletisation sheets can get oily and damaged', so it has been agreed that 
engineering will issue the instructions in a plastic wallet which will ensure 
clarification of stamps & data etc, this will come into effect immediately. In this 
manner, management were clearly provoked into a countermeasure to restore the 
system to a controlled state. Whereas other system lapses were directed towards 
expert authorities, this breach prompted immediate corrective action which suggests 
the site management are concerned for the quality systems and the prevention of 
violations of practice. The potential explanation for this prompt action could be the 
ease of the solution and is not typical of the Ansty response thus far in the research.
Equipment Problems 13: Role Ambiguity and Rule Breaking 
Antsy Works & Staff Concern
The team also reported that “It is reported that task cards do not reflect the 
complexity or nature o f the work as it is carried out and people are stamping fo r work 
completed by others, unseen. ‘One-liners * are also common, where the task requires 
more than one shift/person but there is only one stamp”. Whilst ‘one liners’ are not 
violations of system defences they are potentials for failure due to lack of detail about 
a job or a problem. Of far higher significance is the misuse of the stamping system, 
which is itself a disciplinary offence given the significance of the ‘stamp’ and also the 
certification standard that it confers on the individual. Such a scenario should provoke 
an immediate reaction by management.
Ansty Management Response
The management response was to demand that “Specific examples o f these should be 
raised with Engineering using an Operation Change Request in line with AROP 
C4.62/2” and a return to the rule book. There appears to be a reluctance of 
management to confront these failings in the system design and shows a pattern of
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returning to the rule book or specialists. The emerging pattern of responses suggest 
that management have no means of front line control which traditionally was enacted 
by supervisors and, under other world class businesses, this role is performed by the 
team leader. It would appear the absence of such a linking pin in the management 
structure has created a vacuum or void within which the management default to expert 
specialists (and their codified rules).
Equipment Problems 14: Poor decision-making and knowledge errors 
Antsy Works & Staff Concern
The team also reported that “Data in use was out o f date, inaccurate and reports of 
such have not been acted upon. Some new projects in progress had no manuals at all 
and staff regularly work with old revisions o f data”. From a human factors 
perspective these symptoms reflect an unstable safety system where the potential for 
failure is high. Again, from Reason’s systems approach, these are breaches in the 
defences of the business and should prompt the redesign of the system (root cause 
analysis) to solve the cause of the problem. In this case, countermeasures should be 
sought to control the process documentation, its release to shop floor teams and the 
removal of obsolete working practices from the workplace. The management response 
placed the responsibility on the specialist to replace rather than control documents of a 
safety critical nature.
Ansty Management Response
The management team proposed “I f  you find a manual that is in poor condition or 
pages are missing then you should raise this with the Technical Administration 
Engineers. They will then re-issue or replace the pages”. The elimination of the issue 
would have been to find a means by which the documents are not lost and the latest 
revisions available to shop floor teams instantly -  such as electronic solutions, mobile 
computer stations and hyperlinked work instructions that are linked to the master 
engineering database.
The next section will focus on the social system at Ansty and review a number of 
training related issues as the third area of human factors concern based on the initial 
survey findings.
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Training Problems 15: Task Uncertainty and Knowledge Errors 
Antsv Works & Staff Concern
During the discussions around training, concerns were raised about the frequency of 
temporary transfers and the opportunity this brings for errors as the level of training in 
these instances was thought to be insufficient. This is a view shared by Reason (1995) 
& Rasmusssen (1998) who claimed the temporary deployment of labour or rotated 
labour on short assignment is identified as a source of potential failure due to 
inexperience or lack of regular repetition of the task.
Ansty Management Response
The management response in consideration of this advice was that “Due to the 
situation regarding workload and flow , it is necessary to move personnel to best 
utilise available resource rather than book diversions. As personnel move between 
projects on the job training is given and individuals are only transferred within their 
current competency”.
The implication of the response is far stronger than the potential safety lapses, 
although these issues are commercial in nature. Such a response appears to represent a 
strategy of convenience rather than a deliberate attempt to multi-skill workers in a 
manner that would result in improved and safer organisational flexibility. In light of 
this situation it would have been better -  from a team perspective -  to multiskill 
members who would work together in the same part of the facility and for a longer 
period of time thereby retaining the teams’ level of situational knowledge.
Training Problems 16: Commercial Pressure leading to Rule Breaking 
Antsy Works & Staff Concern
During discussions relating to the need to work to standards, individuals reported 
situations where during sentence inspection, components, which would to their 
knowledge and experience, be rejected were instead requested by the customer to be 
accepted for further service (rather than being scrapped). Such an approach 
contravenes good practice and is a form of institutional ‘rule breaking’ (inducing a 
latent system error). In this process a skilled employee would look at what parts of the 
product should be filtered out of the product to be repaired and those that can be 
legitimately repaired and despatched back to the customer. The team argued that
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clarification is required, for the people involve, to explain why this is occurring 
because it is causing confusion and frustration for the working teams.
Ansty Management Response
The management response was that teams should do what the customer expects but to 
acknowledge the potential for failure -  using the processes outlined in the existing 
rule book. The response was that “The form 1 document states ‘It is important to 
understand that the existence o f the document alone does not automatically constitute 
authority to install the part/component/assembly * we should be doing what the 
customer states on the purchase order request but at the same time individuals have a 
duty o f care to notify customer of any identified defects”. Such violations or risk of 
violation should, in other industrial settings such as the automotive industry, result in 
an escalation of the issue to management for solution, Changes of this nature, or 
working to these standards exposes the business to external customer failures and the 
high cost of rectifying this scenario.
Training Problems 17: Leadership leading to knowledge errors 
Antsy Works & Staff Concern
There was a general view amongst the team that continuation training of staff was not 
complete enough, with a large proportion of the group reporting having little or none. 
The shift and task handover document within the AROP for example was not known 
about, this appeared to be indicative of a wider perception of the lack of continuation 
training. These results are serious safety risks caused by poor process control (despite 
good situational awareness by the team). The issues with handovers could mean that 
issues with one shift were not corrected by another. In the medical setting such 
failures in handovers is considered a potential for patient harm and litigation (Vincent 
et al, 2001). These are serious breaches and latent error.
Ansty Management Response
The response was rather mundane and the management team proposed, “Continuous 
training is part o f the competency model which all trainers and assessors have been 
briefed on. This may not have been cascaded by those individuals to team members. 
Shift and task handover has been cascaded to all teams at various team meetings. It 
may be necessary to communicate further”. The response to the concern about safety
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system design was to refer to company policy rather than engage countermeasures or 
even defend the business position by referring to the number of people who were 
actually trained; the management team did not refer to these facts. It did, however, 
seem willing to invest more skills in the leaderless autonomous teams.
Training Problems 18: Task Uncertainty leading to Rule Breaking 
Antsy Works & Staff Concern
The main corporate computer system is known as SAP and the teams proposed that 
training in the use of SAP was patchy at best, with people feeling under confident in 
using the system. This situation was thought to be very likely to increase the 
opportunity for error, with people being shown, unofficially, how to ‘get around the 
system to get by’. The data in the computer is the main ‘police force’ used to capture 
electronic stamps, material movement times and all manner of deviation control.
Ansty Management Response
The management team acknowledged this criticism and replied that it had been 
discussed at the business level training review. The response was a plan is to identify 
an infrastructure o f super users and key users fo r  each piece o f SAP functionality. 
Once individuals have been identified fo r  those roles they will be trained 
appropriately. This support infrastructure o f super users and key users will then be 
able to support the end users at the work place embedding the use o f SAP. Such a 
structural response shows the concern of the management to maintain the cleanliness 
of the data in the master planning system due to the fact that the system controls all 
aspects of material flow and safety. The creation of super users is a quasi form of 
generating a specialist but this time closer to the team.
Training Problems 19: Poor Decision Making and Communication 
Antsy Works & Staff Concern
The teams identified further underlying issues of poor communication. Some 
individuals (n=12) reported not having had a production team weekly meeting for a 
considerable amount of time and thought that the revisiting this option would be of 
benefit, as it gives the opportunity for information to flow both ways. Comments such 
as ‘there is no communication with management — only by exception when voiced’ 
suggested that there was a frustration with daily communication systems and
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dissonance with management also a significant allegation of disengagement by 
management.
Ansty Management Response
The Ansty management response was to direct the attention o f the teams to the 
published communications policy o f the site, which the management intended to 
review in the near future. The review was prompted by a recent Employee 
Engagement Survey, which highlighted similar issues. However no formal 
commitment to improve the effectiveness and regularity of communication was 
provided by the management team.
Training Problems 20: Commercial Pressures. Poor Leadership. Poor Decision 
Making. Knowledge Errors, and Rule Breaking 
Antsy Works & Staff Concern
Within the AR&O division there is a set of behaviours and values, one of which is the 
employee is ‘Encouraged to take rational risk’. Some individuals felt the use of the 
word ‘risk’ was not compatible with the message EASA are promoting in respect of 
‘always follow the procedure’ and also felt a safety conscious organisation should not 
take risks at all. It should be noted that the company’s ‘behaviour statement’ does not 
define in what context risk is being taken; however to the employees the statement 
appeared to be inappropriate in a MEMS system and safety conscious environment.
Ansty Management Response
The Ansty management response was to reiterate the need for all staff to remain 
compliant with procedures and that “no one within the organisation has the authority 
to take risks with regard to air safety ”. The response was a decisive reaction to staff 
concerns and suggested that the values associated with risk were not compatible with 
the way business is conducted at the Ansty site. Given the other responses by the 
management team and the reversion to the ‘rulebook’ this is a deviation away from 
that response. The message was that management would not tolerate breaches of any 
sort -  especially at the level of the individual, where risks were at their highest.
Having reviewed the position of focus group results the researcher duly complied with 
the conditions laid down by Bryman (1989) who argued that qualitative follow-up
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studies should take place, within a time frame of 1 year, once the questionnaire 
process is complete. The concept of semi-structured interviewing at the Ansty site has 
therefore satisfied the principles of congruence56 suggested by Miles & Huberman 
(1994) who claim they are important, when establishing a triangular approach to a 
cross-case research design.
In next section the researcher will present the results of the Bristol teams in the same 
format and will add to this review by showing whether the same environment and 
same commercial pressures facing a repair business create a common view of 
management and the teams.
5.12 Bristol Focus Group Transcripts
Planning Problems 21: Leadership and commercial pressures 
Bristol Works & Staff Concern
The issue of ‘overproduction’ as described by Ohno (1985) was raised during 
discussions by the Bristol team. The comments were with reference to the 
management overloading of the repair shop with high and unconstrained levels of 
work. The general implication being that choke points (bottleneck constraints) were 
creating extended lead-times and this was being aggravated by local custom and 
practice which was more sensitive to selling hours to customers, based on the 
principles of ‘cost plus’ that had a negative effect on efficiency and disrupted material 
flow. ‘Booking hours’, as portrayed by the interviews was a process to satisfy the 
businesses management accountants rather than a means of generating external 
customer value. This practice, more often than not, created the situation whereby 
operators could not distinguish which components require the most urgent level of 
repair. Such confusion is a major break in the safety defences of the organisation and 
is a latent factor that could create a lapse in concentration resulting in error or 
mistakes.
56 Referred to data analysis that includes within-case, within-group, across-case and across-group 
pattern matching
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Bristol Management Response
The management response was based on satisfying customer demand and the 
accountants need to meet target demands o f good hours sold against monthly key 
performance indicators. The view held by the management team is contradictory to 
the practice of human factors thinking and highlights an organisation which is at odds 
to the principles of TQM where a silo mentality is evident in terms of a ‘them & us’ 
type of culture.
Planning Problems 22: Commercial Pressure and poor leadership 
Bristol Works & Staff Concern
The teams raised the concern about the removal of certain Non Destructive Testing 
(NDT) inspection operations from the process, which they argue is causing a potential 
problem with quality control. This activity is vitally important as it provides a final 
check against process errors. The team claimed that by removing this element of the 
process is a violation in itself that would inevitability lead to and deviations of 
product quality. In spite of the teams’ concerns the management had still scheduled 
for its removal, which heightened the likelihood of defects/ failure as a system 
defence was removed (exposing more latent failure opportunities). In parallel with 
increased take-off and landings conducted by the airlines customers would inevitably 
expose the system to more quality control issues.
Bristol Management Response
There have been activities e.g. zero basing whereby NDT operations have been 
removed where duplication is evident in the repair strategy. All NDT changes to 
routing documents require authorisation by the controlling Level 3 engineers, who 
must be authorised by the OEM. This response was completely overlooked by the 
management team who failed to acknowledge the concerns of the teams who were 
genuinely alarmed by intentions of local management proposals.
Planning Problems 23: Commercial Pressures and individual accountability 
Bristol Works & Staff Concern
Planning for the human factors requirements to take into account the circadian rhythm 
and performance influencing factors raised concern of how this would impact on turn 
round times. The issue highlighted the need for management to define what is meant
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by a critical task where fatigue is thought to be of concern during the early hours of 
night shift working.
Bristol Management Response
When confronted with this question there was clearly a very poor level of 
consideration for how to plan against such risks as outlined by EASA part -  145. The 
formal management response was that teams should refer to regulations and the 
definition this holds in terms o f accepting or rejecting what constitutes a safety 
critical process.
Planning Problems 24: Communication and Leadership 
Bristol Works & Staff Concern
There was a concern about the amount of time it took for information to cascade to 
the shop floor and it was pointed out that rumours seemed to propagate much faster. 
There was a general feeling that more thought should be put into the planning of the 
communication strategy and that it was vastly in need of improvement.
Bristol Management Response
There is a communications policy in operation on the Bristol site, which has been 
adopted by the management team. The researcher therefore argues that such a cursory 
response implies little or no evidence exists for policy deployment where the 
execution of a planning strategy is dependant of a two way communications process 
that provides pace and timing for effective organisation change.
Planning Problems 25: Leadership and Commercial Pressure 
Bristol Works & Staff Concern
Staff were concerned that time allocated for tasks was continually being reduced and 
they felt under pressure to complete their work in what they describe as ‘unrealistic’ 
timescales, which could increase the likelihood of error
Bristol Management Response
This is an extremely competitive business with more capacity worldwide than is 
required. In this climate of competitiveness and an increasingly intelligent customer, 
the drive for cost reduction is paramount. We must continue to review the process and
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implement improvements whilst maintaining the highest levels o f quality and 
reliability. The response given by management clearly highlights a situation where a 
lack of understanding for the principles of Lean planning is at stake. There is much 
written about how to plan for improved flow that Suri (1998) specifically relates to in 
terms of planning for both push & pull techniques within the context to quick 
response manufacturing.
Equipment Problems 26: Commercial Pressures. Poor Leadership and Poor 
Individual Accountability 
Bristol Works & Staff Concern
Individuals highlighted the fact that specialist tooling is regularly damaged and upon 
reporting the situation several times, nothing has happened. Concerns were raised that 
continued working with damaged tools would lead to maintenance error.
Bristol Management Response
Guidelines on the process o f dealing with tooling issues have been cascaded to the 
production managers who should be consulted initially. When damaged tooling is 
reported as requiring rectification then it is the responsibility o f the manager to 
ensure that procedures are followed to repair the tool. Whilst there is 
acknowledgement by the management team of their responsibility, there is no mention 
of the process (if any) by which the teams can facilitate accountability for ownership 
of tooling and specialist equipment being used.
Equipment Problems 27: Blame. Poor Decision-Making and Leadership 
Bristol Works & Staff Concern
The shop floor teams repeatedly voiced their concern that manuals are not being 
updated and after numerous reported occurrences to the management team the issue of 
no feedback has become the norm.
Bristol Management Response
The manager’s response to this situation was such that a process exists whereby 
situations such as these can be alerted through a MEMS report that can be raised by 
anyone within the organisation. The researcher, in view of this situation, saw little 
evidence of any form of
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reactivity and considered the use of the MEMS process more suitable as a procedure 
for dealing with events, hazards etc., rather than the suggested use.
Training Problems 28: Poor Communication and Leadership 
Bristol Works & Staff Concern
There were a number of comments regarding poor communication between 
Management and the shop/office floor. This was a highly emotive area of debate and 
extracted a number of deep-rooted issues surrounding weak leadership where 
interdepartmental differences had impacted on the quality of training through poor 
communication.
Bristol Management Response
During 2001 the Bristol site introduced a communications policy that aims to ensure 
each person in the business understands how they are performing in relation to issues 
affecting their business area. Where the policy is not being adhered to, employees 
should firstly consult their local management and if, after consulting with their local 
management, the policy is still not being adhered to then employees should contact 
their local HR representative. From the researcher’s point of view, this indicates a 
management attitude that makes no reference to sub cultural differences within and 
between teams that West (2004) argued should always be understood and removed.
Training Problems 29: Communication and Leadership 
Bristol Works & Staff Concern
It was highlighted that before effective training could take place communication on 
behalf of the ‘1st line’ management team should be improved because training by 
specialists from other business areas required good communication with key 
individuals, this should take the form of regular briefings, which the team thought 
would improve the situation and assist in the deployment of more cooperative 
training.
Bristol Management Response
The Bristol business has a published a communications policy, which is intended to be 
reviewed in the near future. The recent employee engagement survey highlighted 
similar issues, which are currently being addressed. This approach however, does
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little for those individuals who still feel unsupported by a system, which appears to be 
technical, rather that social.
Training Problems 30 Leadership and lack of Individual Accountability 
Bristol Works & Staff Concern
Concerns rose over the level of management commitment given to past ‘initiatives’ 
and individuals requested assurances that management are committed to supporting 
the human factors issues.
Bristol Management Response
It is the responsibility o f every individual to drive initiatives such as human factors 
and not just the management team. There is no doubt that this initiative is supported 
throughout the leadership team, but no amount of willingness by the teams themselves 
can sustain the type of changes required to properly manage a human factor 
programme, which according to Kurogane. (1993) begins and end with leadership.
Training Problems 31: Commercial Pressure. Peer Pressure and Role Ambiguity 
Bristol Works & Staff Concern
Concerns were raised that upon being asked to carry out new tasks training was not 
given and it was felt that people were expected to be ‘up to speed’ without support.
Bristol Management Response
The management response to this concern reflects the position that a successful 
training policy is in place and meets with the requirements o f the competency 
structure and a review o f on the job training showed that management support this 
requirement by allowing time for individuals to learn new tasks. This was a view that 
did demonstrate a degree of understanding, but the management response did little to 
convince the teams that any real-time level of support was adequate to satisfy their 
concerns.
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Training Problems 32: Knowledge Errors and Leadership 
Bristol Works & Staff Concern
There was concern shown on the level of computer literacy at shop floor level, in the 
general use of the company software system, and about the general level of SAP 
knowledge required to comply with inspection procedures.
Bristol Management Response
The response given by the management team was that training co-ordinators are in 
place to ensure individuals receive appropriate training. In their view this level o f 
education provides over and above standard training requirements and as a result o f 
this an introduction o f a new process system is soon expected to be in place. The 
training department are aware of the situation and plans are in place to ensure 
individuals receive appropriate training and refresher training.
5.13 Derby Focus Group Transcripts
During the following summary of transcripts the researcher reminds the reader of the 
need to consider the geographical location of the Derby site, which unlike the 
previous two case studies has unique type of organisation where the shop floor teams 
consist of a wide and diverse range of sub contract labour. The results of the 
following transcripts are based on a very different type of organisational culture that 
Johnson (1993) claimed is linked to social conditioning that ultimately defines the 
quality of organisational and ‘team situational awareness’.
Planning Problems 34: Leadership and Communication 
Derby Works & Staff Concern
In view of the wide use and mix of sub contract labour the shop floor teams presented 
a very negative opinion of the current situation surrounding the quality of 
management planning where a clear lack of understanding exists of who will perform 
the shift-handover-process. Because of the differences in organisational sub cultures 
the teams are not mature in their ability to identify a nominated person to perform this 
task.
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Derby Management Response
Whilst the cohesiveness nature of the shop floor teams can be described as loose by 
comparison to that of Ansty and Bristol the fact remains that the management culture 
is not. For example the response put forward reflects a common approach whereby the 
attitudes of management is wholly dismissive of the complexities of social factors and 
as shown below reflects a highly individualistic position claiming that: “A good 
practice guide has been produced detailing how these handovers should be carried 
out and a trial to assess its effectiveness is currently underway. ”
Planning Problems 35: Commercial Pressure. Peer Pressure and lack of Team 
responsibility
Derby Works & Staff Concern
The issue of daily organisation of workflow was discussed within the context of 
planning. Concerns were raised that some managers were undermining the role of 
self-management where teams are being told which jobs to work on from a ‘work to 
list’
Derby Management Response
The response from management was that it recognised this was the case, but would 
continue to operate in this way until the lead-time performance had improved. In 
response to this situation the researcher contends that teams will always be in a 
constant state of change and failure to permit the complex interplay between culture, 
structure and processes will ultimately deny the principles of autonomy and 
responsibility for change as a necessary process in achieving the end goal of TQM.
Planning Problems 36; Commercial Pressures leading to Boredom. Knlwledge 
Errors. Poor Decision Making and Poor Leadership 
Derby Works & Staff Concern
According to EASA Part-145 the repair & overhaul business is committed to plan 
safety critical tasks when individuals are likely to be most alert, including plans to 
work around human performance limitations of the circadian rhythm. A request was 
made on the basis of what defines a ‘safety critical task’ and this was further 
expressed by the need to recognise night shift working as an error prone period.
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Derby Management Response
The response by the management team is that this issue that will be considered as 
part o f the long-term strategy to remove night shift working. However in the mean 
time the fact remains that individuals within teams are subjected to risk factors. The 
researcher therefore refers back to the human factors authors such as Stout (1994) 
who referred to this type of situation as ‘internal’ factors where these considerations 
would typically include influencing conditions such as fatigue and noise distraction. 
The effects of ignoring this situation (even on a temporary basis) have not only 
resulted in decreased human performance, but can also be seen as the underlying 
cause of many workplace mistakes that often, as early illustrated in the iceberg model, 
result in catastrophic accidents.
Equipment Problems 37: Commercial Pressure and time lagged decision making 
Derby Works & Staff Concern
Several team members report queuing for PC access on work related tasks, this 
created a tendency towards getting on with the job from memory where the wait is 
long. While this does suggest a desire and willingness to ‘get the job done’ a bias 
towards productivity without proper regards for safety is therefore apparent.
Derby Management Response
The management response to this situation was such that while PC access from time 
to time may cause frustration, in general the distribution o f PC's appears to be 
consistent with team requirements. However, a review is underway as part o f the 
Technical Data Integration programme and the opportunity will exist to redress these 
concerns in the near future.
A response such as this is according to Helmreich & Wilhelm (1997) a perceived 
measure by which the majority employees gauge their employer’s commitment to 
safety.
Equipment Problems 38: Commercial Pressure and Blame 
Derby Works & Staff Concern
When the group expressed concern over insufficient investment in tooling the 
standard answer was said to be “there is no money available ”
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Derby Management Response
The management team responded by saying there is an established tooling budget, 
which is available to address in particular the refurbishment o f tooling. Guidelines on 
the process of dealing with tooling issues have been cascaded to the production 
managers who should be consulted initially with tooling concerns. They go on to 
argue that it is not sensible to try to claim there is no money available, since tooling 
budgets are incorporated as part o f most major build activities such as fitting o f fuel 
& oil pipes along with turbines and fan blades.
Equipment Problems 39: Commercial Pressure and Rue Breaking 
Derby Works & Staff Concern
During discussions regarding the reasons why people do not follow or use procedures, 
it was discussed that accessing some maintenance data was becoming more difficult 
as increasing reliance is placed upon electronic formats, with people reporting having 
to ‘click on dozens of links’ to find a procedure or information. Additionally, the 
number of computers and screens, in particular printers, is thought to put people in 
compromising situations where it is easier to ‘work around’ the need to refer to 
official documents.
Derby Management Response
The situation is known to be problematic and a full assessment should be carried out 
on all new equipment. However, considering this situation in terms of a temporary fix, 
individuals are still carrying out carrying out their work without an important human 
factors feature referred to as ‘declarative knowledge, which according to Stout (1994) 
often denies the importance of ‘procedural knowledge’ where information about the 
steps required to accomplish various activities can induce a work around that results 
in rule-based errors.
Equipment Problems 40: Communication. Commercial Pressure and Poor
leadership
Derby Works & Staff Concern
With the move to the new building being planned, concerns were raised that the ‘same 
old equipment’ would simply be moved across to the new site. In terms of human
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factors, there is an issue of whether obviously poor standards of machinery and 
equipment will be fit for [67h purpose. It seems there is a clear case for 
communication and debate of this issue, with key individuals who may disagree.
Derby Management Response
All equipment transferred to the new facility has been fully assessed to ensure it is fit 
for function and complies with the latest legal requirements. As a result o f this review 
a significant amount o f equipment requires refurbishment or replacement, within a 
capital budget o f £4 million. While there was an acceptance that financial investment 
is required for equipment refurbishments there is a noticeable reluctance by the 
management team to engage directly in face-to-face discussion as requested above 
according to the works & staff concerns.
Training Problems 41: Knowledge Errors. Communication and Leadership 
Derby Works & Staff Concern
Several issues were raised concerning the issue of MEMS that highlighted the fact 
that not everyone is computer literate based on the format of the MEMS system, 
which does not lend itself to be people friendly. A paper version of the MEMS report 
form was thought to be needed to compliment the electronic version with people 
being able to fill out and post a MEMS report at well publicised points throughout the 
facility. Conversely, it was also thought that a facility for uploading copies of bad 
data, i.e. photographs or other data might be beneficial to those who are computer 
literate. Concern was raised as to the competency of the MEMS investigators, since 
they were trained a while ago. The opinion being that they should have refresher 
training and ongoing recurrent training to ensure confidence that the error 
management process is carried out. A suggestion was put forward that there should be 
some type of MEMS ‘Champions’ in the facility where people can go and talk 
through the system and get advice or up to date information. It was strongly felt that 
future additional investigators should be sourced from the shop floor in addition to the 
existing staff investigators. Whilst these people may not be ideal for investigating 
local shop floor maintenance errors due to bias and norms, it would increase the 
confidence and trust of the MEMS system.
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Derby Management Response
A paper version o f the MEMS form will be provided; this will identify the problem 
and the person who is reporting it. To keep the system simple there are no links 
available when reporting a problem. This information can be shown in the text or 
supplied later. All AR&O UK MEMS investigators have recently attended an all-day 
meeting in Bristol to discuss an investigation and share thoughts. While further 
events are expected to happen in due course, most human factors authors refer to this 
type of situation as barriers to effective teamwork. These are known to take place 
frequently and can lead to a person making errors or mistakes, which are also 
described in terms of violations.
Training Problems 42 Errors. Communication and Leadership 
Derby Works & Staff Concern
During the discussion of the MEMS system and the submission of the MEMS report 
form an interesting point was made that not everyone has a LAN Username and 
password, which is currently required to submit a report. Additionally, not every body 
is computer literate and as such will obviously require some IT training to resolve this 
problem.
Derby Management Response
IT training is available to all employees, however in the mean time it will also be 
acceptable for paper copies o f the form to be used instead.
Training Problems 43: Knowledge Errors and Leadership 
Derby Works & Staff Concern
Shift and task handover documentation was discussed, with reference to best practice 
of EASA Part -145 and CAP 716. While AR&O within its AROP system of F2.2/2 
has a flow chart to guide the user through the intent of the process it is not clear of 
how this process should be carried out, with differing standards and methods of 
practice around each of the UK sites.
Derby Management Response
In respect to this situation there is a pilot scheme envisaged fo r the near future that 
aims to standardise this process across and within different sites. Also there is a shift
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& task handover working party on the Derby site with representatives o f each 
production area. Staff areas will also be involved as appropriate. Good progress has 
been made with pilot methods of shift handover. However it is not expected that all 
areas would use the same system, which is why the procedure does not specify this 
more closely. In view of this response the apparent lack of consistency would appear 
to suggest that managers are inadvertently contradicting the safest and most effect 
method of human factors control where standardisation is the most effective method 
to be deployed.
Training Problems 44: Rule Breaking. Leadership and Responsiveness to 
Change
Derby Works & Staff Concern
During discussion the question was asked ‘why don’t we follow procedures?’ with 
reference to the SAP system as this was cited as being hard to use. Individuals also 
commented that the language used is difficult to understand. Some also described how 
they have written their own version of instructions so they could fit with the intent of 
the procedures. Also mentioned was a request to have the procedures amended to a 
simpler version, which was previously denied
Derby Management Response
Standard processes have been written to ensure that all work is recorded on SAP, 
which can be understood by other people later in the process without question or need 
for correction. These processes have been documented in procedures o f SAP scripts 
that are available to help all users o f the system. I f  users can see ways of improving 
these documents they should suggest this by using the feedback methods in the AROP 
section of the intranet for procedures or the MEMS system. Both these links were 
referenced in the recent QMS training. I f  there is difficulty in getting a desirable 
change made, the Quality Assurance department should be asked to help. While the 
management team accepted that personal procedures and scripts can be very helpful 
they may not be kept up to date when changes are made to the system and so should 
not be used at all times. This response was considered by the researcher as wholly 
appropriate owing to the fact that once a paper document has been printed it 
immediately becomes an out of date and illegal method to use.
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5.14 East Kilbride Focus Group Transcripts
Following on from the Derby transcripts the researcher next focused the review on the 
East Kilbride site, which is situated within the city of Glasgow. It encompasses a very 
strong and different kind of work ethic, which unlike the Derby site, is united in its 
view about the problems surrounding human error concerns. The rationale behind 
these differences will be expanded upon during the next chapter, which is illustrated 
in statistical terms from a hypothesis driven point of view.
Planning Problems 45: Commercial Pressure and Poor Leadership leading to a 
Blame Culture
East Kilbride Works & Staff Concern
The manner in which time pressure is applied was reported to be autocratic and 
authoritarian and in some cases this was perceived by the team as being threatening. 
Instances were cited of individuals being taken into offices and told to ‘pull their 
finger out’. In view of this situation time limits were being prescribed for task and job 
performance, this included those activities associated with the collection of spares 
parts, which are not value adding, but are necessary and therefore recorded under 
what the business refers to as diversions.
As a result of these circumstances the teams reported a condition whereby it is 
becoming impossible to perform the job in the allocated time. The popular perception 
was that this situation is getting much worse and fears are wide spread that the it 
would never change.
East Kilbride Management Response
There will always be an element o f time pressure involved in a manufacturing 
businesses because o f it is a customer-facing unit. As customers are becoming more 
demanding and their expectations increase, we must be able to match these 
expectations by responding appropriately to customer needs. However, this should 
still be possible to achieve without creating an environment where individuals 
experience a level o f pressure that should not be allowed to prevail and in view of this 
complaint anyone who does feel this way should register their issue or concerns 
under the MEMS system, which will be properly logged and investigated accordingly. 
The reporting manager who accounted for this situation presents a really bad example
i
of where the senior leadership has allowed a climate of fear and intimidation to take
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place. This type of practice contradicts the guidelines stipulated by EASA under CAP 
716 that no organisation should allow this type of situation to exist.
Planning Problems 46; Commercial Pressures and Poor Team Responisbilitv 
East Kilbride Works & Staff Concern
Planned time for some work tasks is often insufficient, especially on older engines, 
which require extra work, thereby causing excessive time pressures.
East Kilbride Management Response
Management are keen to engage team members in understanding planned times. An 
improvement team has been brought together to review current planned v actual times 
which, we trust, will be fully supported by the teams. In light of this problem the 
management team reported significant difficulties in convincing individuals to work 
overtime especially at weekends due the high levels of interest in watching and play 
football. While this example did underline a lack of commercial responsibility on 
behalf of the teams, the question ultimately rests with management planning for 
failing to consider social and cultural factors in contingency planning.
Planning Problems 47: Commercial Pressure and Leadership 
East Kilbride Works & Staff Concern
There were concerns raised about the priority of work raised as persons who inputted 
data were often unaware of operations at the shop floor. It was felt that this caused 
time pressure, which could lead to an increase in maintenance errors.
East Kilbride Management Response
Planning and scheduling process priorities do exist as standard practice and in the 
case of priority 1 situations all requests are routed via the SAP system and discussed 
with the appropriate manager prior to a decision being made. When orders are 
rescheduled or raised, SAP calculates a new schedule date for each activity and this 
includes queue time, which acts as a buffer to protect against rushing.
The researcher’s view on this situation is such that one must refer to the concept of 
Lean load & capacity planning. He argues that SAP planning has shown to 
inadvertently create system waste through the concept of ‘overproduction’ that 
disrupts flow and results in excessive lead-time performance. According to Kaplan
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(1990) this type of approach to production planning not only limits the ability to 
process efficiency, but also affects quality through the creation of an environment 
where products are hidden through mass storage, which increases the risk to quality 
through damage. In other words SAP has inadvertently created a ‘push’ situation 
where unnecessary products down-stream have queued owing to the practice of short­
term gain.
Planning Problems 48: Commercial Pressure and Communication 
East Kilbride Works & Staff Concern
The rotation of the 3-shift system was discussed with regard to the optimal phasing of 
the shifts. There was a general agreement that a review of the shift rotation of would 
be worthwhile in light of this experience.
East Kilbride Management Response
As customers become more demanding and the business comes under more pressure 
to reduce turnaround times, an element o f shift working including nights and 
weekends will become inevitable. In light o f this situation it will become necessary to 
maintain an appropriate level o f customer responsiveness. The important task is to 
identify the most appropriate and safe pattern for each set o f circumstances. Part of 
the Paragon New Facility Project is looking at shift pattern options with the trade 
unions.
Planning Problems 49: Commercial Pressure and Poor Leadership 
East Kilbride Works & Staff Concern
There was concern that the practice of ‘shipping dirty’ as required by the customer 
was an unacceptable lowering of repair engineering standards. This was not a 
unanimous opinion but it underlined an example of commercial pressure driving the 
overhaul process. It was accepted that an inspector could send a component back to 
the clean line process if he or she felt that the dirt impaired the inspection process
East Kilbride Management Response
The last sentence of the comment addresses this issue.
From the researchers perspective it is evident that problems associated with planning 
are highly affected by the quality pf leadership. In respect to this example Helmreich
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& Merritt (1995) claimed that a team’s performance is very closely associated with 
the effects of motivation and based on the cursory comments from the response it is 
clear to see why. The level of concern therefore presents a very real problem that 
explains the extent to which the managers have demonstrated a clear lack of 
understanding of how to control commercial pressure, which in turn has affected the 
limitations of team situational control.
Equipment Problems 50: Leadership, communication and commercial Pressure 
East Kilbride Works & Staff Concern
The subject of inadequate tooling arose and the fact that people have tried to report 
this to managers in the past, but still the problem goes unnoticed. The opinion was 
that there is generally little or no response to the concerns being raised. Thus an 
improvement in communication of these issues in terms of response action needs to be 
seen from the team’s perspective
East Kilbride Management Response
This is one of the key areas that the MEMS system is being established to address, 
however the researcher reminds the reader that a lack of equipment according to 
Hobbs (2000) is an important local factor in influencing the quality of work especially 
in relation to damaged tooling which Hobb’s research cited as a major cause of 
damage if allowed to prevail.
Equipment Problems 51: Leadership and Poor Responsiveness to Change
leading to Low Morale
East Kilbride Works & Staff Concern
There was a concern that machines were only repaired when they broke down as 
opposed to being maintained in line with a planned schedule.
East Kilbride Management Response
The response given by the manager claimed that an internal maintaince group is 
operating a planned maintenance system, which has already addressed various 
problems o f this type with machines throughout the facility. However, it is the 
intension o f the business to introduce a TPM (Total Productive Maintenance) 
program. >
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In understanding the complexity of this situation it is important to consider the 
implications of the management response above in terms of the correct choice of 
communication strategy when facilitating system change as radical as the introduction 
of TPM. This is a concept that Bumes (2000) highlighted in terms of 3 different 
approaches affecting the individual, group and system as whole. The correct choice of 
model options was discussed earlier in the literature review as illustrated in figure 
5.11 shown below.
Figure 5.11.
Change Management Model
Incremental Punctuated Continuous
Individuals Learning Promotion Career development
Groups Kaizen Team building
Changes in 
composition and task
Systems
Fine Tuning BPR Culture
Source: Taken From Burnes (2000) pp-304
Equipment Problems 52: Task Uncertainty and Role Ambiguity 
East Kilbride Works & Staff Concern
There was an issue about the quantities and availability of measuring equipment as 
well as its correct storage.
East Kilbride Management Response
It is the responsibility o f each individual team to define the required quantities of 
measuring equipment. Where an additional requirement is found then advice must be 
sought from the Metrology Manager in conjunction with GQP C.4.63 as to the most 
appropriate use and availability o f measuring equipment. The satisfactory storage 
and retrieval o f equipment is the responsibility o f each individual team in their 
respective area. Any anomalies or problems should in the first instance be reported to 
local management.
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Equipment Problems 53; Rule Breaking and Poor Leadership & Responsiveness 
to Change
East Kilbride Works & Staff Concern
Personal tooling is still being used rather than dedicated and controlled tool kits. This 
is particularly true in the component repair area where the concept of tool control was 
considered to be lacking.
East Kilbride Management Response
Where standardised tool kits are deemed necessary local management should have 
implementation plans in place. This explanation by the manager in question provides 
only a cursory overview of the situation and underlines poor or inadequate levels of 
leadership, which is not responding to the team’s need for change.
Training Problems 54: Rule Breaking due to Poor Responsiveness to Change 
East Kilbride Works & Staff Concern
The subject of procedural compliance was raised and it was agreed generally that the 
instance of ‘black books’ representing unofficial data was fairly widespread. It was 
discussed that better availability, in terms of numbers of manuals etc were needed for 
review and communication. It was also thought that the future introduction of a new 
electronic system of access to data management might alleviate the situations 
currently faced, thereby providing sufficient computer terminals for easier methods of 
working.
East Kilbride Management Response
Under no circumstances should the unofficial use o f documents be present within the 
repair process. From the researcher’s perspective the position of working to ‘black 
books’ is endemic within the organisation and requires a far deeper response to this 
situation in terms of management reviewing the real extent to which procedural non- 
compliance has been allowed to exist.
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Training Problems 55: Poor Communication and Slow Responsiveness to 
Change
East Kilbride Works & Staff Concern
Clarification is needed with regard to how the MEMS system is intended to interface 
with current business tools such as customer complaints, major quality investigations, 
safety alerts and accidents. The period of time for feedback to the originators of 
MEMS reports needs to be defined further so that people feel they will be able to have 
some visual progress with regard to their submissions. This will obviously encourage 
confidence and future use of the system if training is available to support this change.
East Kilbride Management Response
The intention is that the MEMS database will record all o f the items highlighted. The 
question, however from the researcher’s perspective, should warrant a more thorough 
explanation. The above response is very shallow, and could be construed as 
patronising to many of the teams who voiced this type of concern. With a more 
carefully worded response the teams may have felt more confident in how the MEMS 
process was expected to work as a whole, this could have improved relationships in 
what is already being described as a ‘them & us’ culture.
5.15 Summary of Quantitative Results Phase 2
The following table summary (in accordance with the works of Miles and Huberman, 
1994) is presented as a holistic overview of the socio-technical systems at each case 
study site. The summary table which has exposed major issues with the design of each 
socio-technical system where the researcher found evidence of significant gaps that 
was openly found to exist. By simplifying the content of events from each case study 
location the researcher was able to condense a large array of error provoking factors 
into 9 generic measures, whereby a methodology can then be established in terms of 
linking both data sets into one cross-case design. In acknowledgement of the 
complexity surrounding this requirement, the researcher designed a method whereby a 
set of codes are used to assign units of meaning which relate to key words, sentences 
or paragraphs as a whole. The assumption being that the researcher will be able to 
examine, identify and highlight similarities of findings, within the context of different 
error trends through a linking methodology of questionnaire results and focus group 
concerns. In principle this approach was taken from Ragin (1987) who argued in
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favour of a method that would enable the development of “Dialogue between ideas 
and evidence” The researcher has therefore structured, in fig 5.12, below the 
following model that summarises the entire range of error provoking factors by 
patterns of reoccurring themes.
Figure 5.12
All Sites Qualitative Summary Model
Evaluation
Themes
Field
Specialists
Questionnaire
Dominant
Themes
Focus
Group
Dominant Themes
Planning
Scores
Equipment
Scores
Training
Scores
Commercial
Pressure
Reason
(1995)
Commercial
Pressure
Commercial
Pressure 70% 70% 80%
Task
Uncertainty
Scholtes
(1998) Leadership Leadership 70% 60% 80%
Low Morale
Jonassen
(1997) Communication Communication 60% 70% 80%
Boredom
Broadbent
(1989)
Individual
Accountability
Individual
Accountability 60% 70% 60%
Knowledge
Errors
Helmreich et 
al(1995)
Attitude
Differences
Attitude
Differences 80% 90% 60%
Blame
Stout et al 
(1996) Role Ambiguity Role Ambiguity
o' 80% 70%
Lack ol 
Empowerment
Rasmussen
(1998) Peer Pressure Peer Pressure 70% 70% 80%
Poor Decision 
Making
Dawson
(1994)
Responsiveness 
To Change
Responsiveness To 
Change 50% 70% 80%
Specialist
Knowledge West (2004)
Team
Responsibility
Team
Responsibility 20% 20% 10%
Rule Breaking
Banbury 
(1998) ‘
Problem
Solving Problem Solving 20% 20% 20%
Source: Researcher
During the qualitative phase of the research, many reflective sessions were conducted 
during which the researcher compared the findings with the survey and also against 
the literature base. The most striking outcomes of the second phase were the 
validation of the survey findings (planning, equipment and training). Also it must be 
noted that there is a new importance of commercial pressure as a catalyst for issues 
within the socio-technical system design (exposing rule breaking and many other 
forms of confusion or system violation).
Secondly there also appeared a consistent trend whereby staff and shop floor 
personnel were asking for more autonomy or leadership clarification to operating 
issues but this was not forthcoming from management. In the most part the local
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management defended a ‘rule book’ approach to leadership or ‘blame’ culture and 
greater issues concerning a rift between ‘them and us’ (management and other teams).
There are also other emerging themes from the qualitative research and many other 
violations to the system have become evident. These issues and latent errors concern 
equipment availability, documentation availability, broken or inappropriate tooling as 
well as transport issues, supplier management issues and the accountability for quality 
control (NDT testing as well as removal of quality control personnel).
5.16 Phase Three: Implemented changes at the Sites
At the close of the qualitative stage, the research findings were drawn together and 
communicated to the host company and its four case sites. This took the form of a 
power-point presentation to the senior management teams at each site (a presentation 
at each site) and a presentation to the corporate executives (led by the Director for 
Quality at the main board level).
At each presentation, feedback to the study was received from the teams and there 
was no public disagreement with the findings. By far the largest subject for discussion 
at each site were the process and practices of planning and a belief that the cases were 
conforming to good planning procedures but, given this study, the problems 
associated with planning when compounded by commercial pressures to repair and 
return engines to customers were recognized.
It was well reported that one of the most significant reasons for mistakes was due to 
the influence of failing to manage time pressures, which in turn had exerted undue 
stress on teams who admitted to ‘comer-cutting’. For this reason, senior managers at 
the cases and corporately began to plan how best to change and improve the socio- 
technical systems as a working party. At this point the researcher disengaged with the 
case study businesses and instead waited for 6 months before revisiting the sites to see 
what systems and safety defences had been introduced as a reaction to the study 
findings. The next section will present the main changes to the systems that were 
studied at each site. The main recommendations of this study to the case businesses 
were that management should be aware of their responsibilities, which include the
t
setting of deadlines and allocating tasks that minimize mistakes based on
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1. Prioritization of work
2. Control of the actual time available to carry out work
3. Management of contingencies against illness and holidays
4. Management of engineering specialization of tasks
5. Monitoring and controlling of the availability of parts and spares.
With these legal requirements in mind the researcher claims that failure to understand 
and adequately manage applied human factors thinking is the major reason why 
engineers are central to the problem of human error. The resultant factor being that 
each case study site was shown to experience similar problems both statistically and 
experientially in terms of rule-based risks through which a mistake or event could take 
place. In order to address this situation a number of changes are recommended, these 
should begin and end with leadership at the most the senior level, which underlines 
the importance of maintaining human factors awareness to the already existing 
standards of the quality management system that states: “Leaders should develop the 
mission, vision, values and ethics and are role models o f a culture o f excellence”
In respect of this position, it must also be noted that repeating an initiative that was 
unsuccessful in the past may have different results when applied to other areas of the 
business in the future. While it may not always be possible to foresee and plan for 
every maintenance need, the necessary improvements in the area of planning are 
considered to be the most important step in preventing the practice of unintentional 
comer cutting. The consequences of which, at worst will lead to mistakes and best 
create ineffective communications that undermine the process of cross-functional 
team working. To resolve this problem the researcher has designed and implemented a 
working model as shown below, which is based on three key stages of working 
development. The model is referred to as socio-technical, which is aimed at 
improving the performance of self-managed teams in terms of helping the business to 
improve both efficiency and effectiveness in respect of the continuous cycle of 
business improvement out-put.
The case study businesses, armed with the aforementioned problems and the results of 
the study, began to enact changes to the systems they managed. Whilst this is beyond 
the official research design of this study (this study is not a longitudinal case study) 
the opportunity was presented to study the outcomes of the research. This is a rarity
253
and not many doctoral researchers get to see what happens as a result of a problem- 
driven project. It was considered appropriate for the student to continue to monitor 
these changes and to report upon what practices had evolved.
5.17 Summary of Phase Three Site Changes
For the sake of completeness, the process of deploying TQM at the case study sites 
has continued and the next few pages will present an epilogue to this study. In 2002, 
the business began a process of change and had, in 2006, successfully deployed three 
very large transformation projects across both the Ansty and Bristol sites. It was 
previously noted that these two sites had the most socio-technical features and 
commercial pressures in common. The projects were entitled ‘Journey to Process 
Excellence’ and were a deployment of a total quality management strategy centrally 
as a corporate initiative. The major elements of change included the re-design & re­
layout of the facilities. These redesign activities included two at the Ansty site 
(namely ‘Fast Jet’ and ‘HERC’ projects), followed by a combustor repair centre 
project located within the Bristol site. The new projects involved a fundamental 
review of the material flow processes at each site and moved from the chaotic nature 
of a job shop environment to a more flow oriented design (RRPS Factory Design & 
Layout FDL model) as shown below.
Figure 5.13
Factory Design & Layout Model
PfMHJulaltM start
End (O perational Facility)
Source: Figure Taken From The Case Study Production System
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To operate the new system, there have been many improvements and changes to the 
leadership, planning and management commitment/engagement with the new material 
flow system. The new approach to management has been changed as a result of new 
processes for material movement, less quantity and variety of materials are issued to 
the production units and the improvement methodology of DMAIC (Six Sigma) has 
been deployed to the sites via a central corporate strategy (part of the Journey to 
Excellence programme). The design & layout of the new facilities project model 
conforms to Lean ways of working and has integrated human factors management 
practices. The DMAIC process also covers the project-by-project approach and has 
formalised change controls through the introduction of a charter to establish an agreed 
business case with the key stakeholders as illustrated in the model shown below 
(Figure 5.14).
Figure 5.14
The New Project Charter
Project Charter
Project
Charter
Project KPI’s
Project KPI’s
Improve
Delivery
Reduce
Source: Model Taken From the Case Study Production System
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Under the new project charter to control change, a business case is needed to begin 
the process to nominate a change. The management at the sites now raise and review 
(with the Finance Management Team and others) the projects and implement the 
change using cross-functional management groups following a standard process with 
5 gateway reviews to ensure the project is deployed in a controlled and sustainable 
way. As such any change to the socio-technical system is controlled to a standard and 
reviewed by experts.
The new approach was accepted as a means to sustain what is now regarded as a 
deployment model for process excellence to take place. The approach also promotes 
self-management as a major feature of organisational change through changed 
business structures and deployment of responsibilities to the teams. As such, an equal 
amount of effort is channelled into the soft elements of social system changes as much 
as the harder technical changes. The model below is taken from the case study 
business and shows the new direction of change based on engendering a self­
management capability for engine overhaul teams.
Figure 5.15:
The New Direction of Change
Senior Leadership Support 
Production System Support 
Finance Support 
Administration Support
Equipment Support ^  Sub-System Enablers
Planning Support
Quality System Support 
Engineering Support 
Improvement Support
Source: Researcher
The new redesign of the business structure has also brought with it formal allocations 
of roles and responsibilities to the team level as well as the management/specialist 
roles. These two activities are joined under a general approach to the site employees
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being a team and that specialists support engine repair personnel in a proactive and 
system-wide approach. Socio-technical systems thinking is directly embraced by the 
corporate and site quality management model (see figure 5.16). As such most of the 
research outcomes have become embedded in the new model. As an extension to the 
research, the company has detailed a journey and sequence to the socio-technical 
systems evolution. The starting point is a new ‘process basics’ approach (as outlined 
in the case study chapter) as a foundation to later improvement capabilities found in 
new Lean and new Six Sigma skills for autonomous teams.
Figure 5.16:
The New Quality management Model 
Step - 3 Enabling Socio-technical Systems To Facilitate Flow
M Process Improvement
Identify Cause of Variation
Process Measures
Process Control
Four Elements Defined 
with
Building Blocks
Maturity
Rolls-Royce data-strictly private
Source: Taken From The Case Study Production System.
The new system also pays much greater attention to uninterrupted material flow and 
planning. These new activities include formal processes to:
1. Measure & understand load & capacity planning over a ten year forecast
2. Ensure adequate labour is available allowing for surge capability at 20%
3. Only strip & build engines at the rate of customer demand.
4. Measure & understand product quantity through a P&Q analysis
5. Identify the opportunity to create value stream through value stream mapping
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6. Design the system to be visual and error proof against overproduction.
7. Manage human resources in a cross-functional way facilitated by 
management.
8. Resolve team situational awareness issues in a systematic and continuous way. 
It should be noted that these activities are all basic requirements for effective and 
good quality planning. They also reinforce teamwork and safe management at the 
team level. Another dimension to the new design, at the highest level and beyond 
process basics, is that of value stream management (figure 5.17) and the highly 
reliable flow of materials. This new addition to the model connects different teams 
(and has a distinct tool box of techniques) to create greater dependency between 
individuals and teams. A new environment emerges whereby employees are more 
willing and empowered to work together to ensure materials flow through the facility 
and are optimised (at the quickest possible turnaround time to reduce the significance 
of commercial pressures). Thus team working is enhanced and the human factors 
features needed for effective team situational awareness is able to develop.
Figure 5.17
Fast Jet Traditional Value Stream Map Ansty
CURRENT STATE VALUE STREAM MAP
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The value stream management process shows diagrammatically on one sheet of paper 
the total engine strip & build activities and how they are coordinated. Each of the 
process steps have data recorded relevant to the individual step in order to establish 
the true lead time through the system and the amount of time that value is actually 
added to each module build (enhancing planning capabilities at the sites). The value 
stream management reviews demonstrated that there was 99% waste activity at the 
sites that were studied, this waste has now been reduced allowing materials to flow 
and teams to better organise the documentation, tools, equipment, transit boxes and 
other supporting features including better visual management in the factories (Figure 
5.18).
Figure 5.18
Fast Jet Future State Value Stream Map Ansty
FUTURE STATE VALUE STREAM MAP
SW/KJ 2005
Source: Case Study Ansty Site Concept Design and Layout Business Plan
The new controlled material flow processes and team based working within the value 
stream is further defined in the schematic plan shown below (figure 5.19). The
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diagram shows clearly how materials are deliberately stocked using Lean Kanbans 
and how the process path has been simplified (allowing pull production and full 
availability of parts to meet customer demand).
Figure 5.19
Fast Jet Design & Layout Plan
Linier Pause Flow Line -  Ansty AR&O
RB199 CUSTOMER VALUE EJ200
KANBAN CUSTOMER BUSINESS
MODULE DESPATCH MODULE DESPATCH
BALANCE BALANCE
KANBAN
LOGISTICS/KITTING LOGISTICS/KITTING
MODULE STRIP MODULE STRIP
KANBAN KANBAN
MODULE INDUCTION MODULE INDUCTION
Source: Taken From the Researcher’s Presentation To The Ministry of Defence 
(2006) Case Study Ansty Site Concept Design and Layout Business Plan
A determining factor in the success of this approach is based on understanding the 
importance of load & capacity balancing, which the researcher accepted on the basis 
of Theory of Constraints (TOC) thinking within the concept of “Little’s Law”57 as
57Little’s Law is a Lean m anufacturing calculation that focuses on the am ount o f W IP released into a 
system, which is consistent with the required cycle tim e and output capability.
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illustrated in the example shown below. These new additions have added a greater 
stability to the flow of work whilst reducing the amount of work in ‘half finished’ or 
temporarily halted form. The new levels of control provide a stable platform for teams 
and individuals to engage with self-management of flow.
Work In Progress Calculations
Demand x TRT = WIP 
Time
D x T = WIP 
T
Example
D = 84 outputs per year
TRT =100 days based on future state VSM predictions 
Time = 249 available business days per year
84 x 100 
249
8400
249
Future state WIP = 34
The introduction of load levelling at the sites has served to further steady the flow of 
materials in the repair system and to set a basic rhythm to the operations, which from 
a human factors perspective reduces the impact of commercial pressures on 
production loading. The new design has also included the introduction of a planning 
& scheduling model to enable control and effective use of a FIFO system through the 
concept of a visual control. The waterfall design is a generic tool that can track or map 
a component through a process in relation to variables such as surges in labour and 
unscheduled delays. This problem was only highlighted when constructing the 
planning & capacity model as a means to check current ‘load’ in order to establish the 
root causes for cell bottlenecks and greater engagement with the local teams. From the 
research phases, the rift between management and the working teams was aggravated 
by: a lack of transparency as well as commercial pressures that had led to friction, a 
management defence of the rule book and working to the SAP computer system
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schedules. The new model has a much greater level of transparency and the plan is 
promoted in a visual format to all areas of the facility (Figure 5.20).
The visual planning model is regarded as ‘best practice’ amongst many repair & 
overhaul lines at both the Ansty and Bristol sites and beyond the case study company. 
The model is characterised by issuing materials for one repair unit at a time (Lean 
single piece flow -  see Ohno, 1985). The new visual control of repair operation shows 
WIP days plotted along the horizontal axis, set against a chronological sequence of 
operations shown on the vertical axis of the chart. The critical path is stepped in green 
and components are represented by magnetic counters, controlled or moved by 
different team members at the start and end of each day to show their progress. The 
importance being that each counter must always move to the right and if behind in its 
due date will drop away from the critical path and fall into the red, thereby providing 
a dynamic monitor or early indicator of a process, which is starting to fail. This 
provides a visual trigger for management intervention to correct the slow movement 
of work around the team or for the team to seek management assistance -  thereby 
reducing the ‘them and us’ rift of blame that existed during the formal study.
Figure 5.20
Visual Management System
Ahead
Source: Case Study Ansty Site Concept Design and Layout Business Plan
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The time between concluding the formal study and the presentation of the results to 
the local and corporate management has witnessed a great amount of change and 
movement from the existing conditions during the research to the new repair 
processes that are evident at the sites. The new system has addressed the past 
dysfunctions of leadership that were created by commercial pressures. The changes 
have impacted on the transparency of the system, it has increased the effectiveness of 
communication and the attention pacing production has allowed a greater flow of 
materials and equipment etc.
In parallel the teams are more focussed on the customer due to the hard changes to the 
technical system and its material flow. The issues of morale, boredom and a perceived 
lack of empowerment have been addressed and greater communication has been used 
to enhance team situational awareness.
The divide between specialist knowledge, role ambiguity and rule breaking to get 
around the old way of working has also changed such that, by design, the new work 
environment has influenced a level of behavioural change and employee engagement 
that is more conducive to effective human factors management. These activities have 
increased levels of empowerment whilst encouraging a greater responsiveness to 
change and a new relationship with holders of specialist knowledge as well as 
managers.
Teamwork and problem-solving have also benefited from the greater transparency of 
operation and devices for production control. In term the general decision making (at 
the many levels of staff and personnel) has improved.
Overall, the new changes to the system have created a new way of working that is 180 
degrees away from the case study businesses that started this research in 2002. The 
epilogue shows that despite the view of the literature that culture takes a long time to 
change, these businesses have shown major socio-technical systems redesigns without 
a compromise in terms of output or the human factors defences needed to ensure 
compliance within a regulated environment. This is contradictory to the gurus of 
human factors that stimulated this study and shows a major gap in the work of Reason 
(1995) who has long dominated thinking in this area of management.
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5.18 Chapter Summary
This chapter has reviewed the main results of the study. It has presented a review of 
the quantitative phase of questionnaire results and shown the existence of common 
error themes from the perspective of gaps in the socio-technical system. The results 
showed a significant range of gaps where the qualitative reviews of system 
performance were reviewed using a panel group of experts in terms of providing a 
number of resolves from representatives of the teams and managers who the 
researcher drew together to discuss issues with the existing safety management system 
design.
The evidence suggests that while over 50% of all case study results are measured in 
terms of a satisfactory condition, the fact remains that numerous barriers are breeched 
and offer the potential for latent errors and risks to turn into major catastrophic 
failures within the facility.
The highest occurrence of problem failure causes originate from the technical system, 
where a general lack of planning and the use of inappropriate equipment was widely 
believed to exist. The results also show that the flaws in system design are further 
compounded by a series of gaps in the social system where human resource training in 
particular is not currently supporting the basic requirements of self-management for 
TQM.
It was also evident from the qualitative phase of research results that differences exist 
between the management and staff /shop floor teams in many of the major areas of 
safety system design. This phase of the research showed major failings in the control 
systems and barrier defences of the case study sites. Many of the problems cited by 
the operational teams were defended by management using traditional scientific 
management reactions. These included the deference of the issue to a functional 
support specialism (which reflected a silo mentality) and a reference to existing rules 
and policies rather than using team concerns to engage with problem-solving activities 
to make robust the production system. The findings suggest that those involved in the 
case studies, at the forefront of autonomous team working, had paid insufficient 
attention to the system design and had significant levels of role ambiguity -  a latent 
error factor. The study results show that the case studies are not compliant to the
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principles of TQM and that whilst the structural arrangement of work is autonomous -  
the system design is incompatible with high performance, organisational learning, 
process improvement and system resilience. With regards to Reason’s ‘Swiss Cheese’ 
model many of the case study defences have significant holes. These holes include 
leadership, planning, documented work standards, inter-team communication, training 
and role ambiguity. The incompatibility of these two systems has therefore resulted in 
significant levels of error related risk that could, if left unchallenged, penetrate any 
one of the following defence mechanisms as listed below.
1. Regulatory compliance to include legal benefits through avoiding 
enforcement action, which may extend to loss of license to operate.
2. Product escapes that relate to errors that could have a direct impact on 
product and passenger safety.
In light of this and other such discoveries the results from both hard & soft data sets 
will be analysed in more detail during the next chapter through a single cross-case 
design. The purpose of which will provide a greater depth of understanding where a 
series of cause and effect relationships can be established against the prescribed 
literature review. While error reduction is seen as a desirable end in itself, the fact 
remains that maintenance organisations such as the one found in this study, react 
favourably to change when improved human factors engineering can be measured 
against the cost of non-quality in terms of a profit and loss. The researcher will build a 
model that, it is hoped, will help managers, EASA and academics alike, in terms of 
understanding how to reduce variation, within the complexity of high product mix and 
low volume demand.
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Chapter 6 Research Analysis
6.0 Chapter Introduction
The previous chapter has outlined the major findings of this study and begun the 
process of answering the guiding research questions that support closing the gap in the 
body of knowledge. It has also identified major gaps in the defences of the safety 
systems that support autonomous team working. The previous chapters have shown 
that merely changing elements of the socio-technical system without a holistic 
approach to designing structures that support robust and resilient processes simply 
exposes businesses to risk -  risk that is greatly heightened when commercial pressures 
to satisfy customers in a timely manner is introduced.
This chapter will focus on the analysis of research results and draw comparisons with 
the main body of literature in order to conceptualize the study and present a model 
with which to inform professional practice and the improvement of the understanding 
of operations management in high variety and low volume regulated industries. This 
chapter will refine the data presented in the previous two chapters in order to make 
sense of the research and build the model of human factors management, which 
contributes to the understanding of operations management in the safety critical 
aerospace repair sector.
At the outset of this study, the early implications of the literature suggested that self­
management was the most evolved form of high performance management with great 
potential from the perspective of organizational behaviour. From the operations 
management perspective, this structural form runs contrary to the needs of a robust 
and resilient safety system within which it is acceptable to have redundancy built into 
processes to allow them to recover from failures. The appeal of the self-management 
of highly skilled teams was therefore counterbalanced with the limitations created by 
poor control of human factors in the designed production system. The study has, to- 
date, identified three significant barriers that limit the opportunity for self-managed 
teams to facilitate the principles of TQM, namely; planning and control, equipment 
and training. The evidence to support this claim has been researched using two 
fundamentally different and yet complementary methodologies of quantitative and 
qualitative research perspectives.
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6.1 The Quality of Results
The quantitative research provided a deep insight into the views of employees and 
using statistical analysis as evidence, a series of hypotheses and predictions were 
either accepted or rejected. To provide robustness to the study, three different types of 
test were conducted. These tests included:
1. Mann-Whitney Test (Non-parametric)
2. Two Sample-T Tests (Parametric)
3. Chi Squared Test (Non-parametric)
The researcher also used a probability value where statistical differences of ‘error 
provoking risk’ were found to exist. The population sample within each case study 
was drawn from ‘works’ and ‘staff groups, a common one-directional hypothesis test 
for attitude differences between groups and across sites was used.
6.2 The Findings
From the charts that follow, the researcher is able to state that no significant 
differences in attitudes exist between the 2 main groups, based on the probability 
value of p = <0.86. In other words, both the ‘staff & ‘works’ groups who took part in 
the questionnaire are of the same opinion as to ‘how much and in which areas the 
problems of human error risk lies’. The results show that the original literature- 
derived hypotheses prediction was incorrect. Instead the researcher accepts the 
position of a common held belief system that barriers to TQM are both real and 
statistically proven to exist.
Whilst the quantitative results provided a framework of understanding, the severity of 
risk could only be accepted in part, based on the assumption that human factors 
research requires a more meaningful explanation in terms of the contributions of both 
the written and spoken word. Such research is best conducted using qualitative 
methods in an environment that stimulates debate and interaction between 
stakeholders, and where anecdote opens up new insights.
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6.3 Mann-Whitney Analysis
To satisfy the demands of cluster grouping of responses, the next section will explain 
the issues that relate directly to the original research question by demonstrating a 
number of significant relationships between case study groupings. The research at this 
stage is regarded as the most important because of the statistical relevance in either 
accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis.
A series of 36 Mann-Whitney tests (summarised below) in Fig 6.0 were based on the 
assumption that all data entries were non-parametric in nature and taken from random 
samples of two populations within the same site locations. Each of the Mann-Whitney 
test results are based on a mean rank score approach that highlights which group 
submitted the highest or lower scores, with a social science cut off point of p = <0.05. 
For the purpose of this study the table of results shown below provides a range of 
values at construct level by way of highlighting areas of cultural differences within 
each of the 4 Aero Repair & Overhaul case study sites.
Figure 6.0
Mann-Whitney Analysis Table
(Bristol S ta ff  v W orks jo.oo 0.16 0.04 0.87 0.08 0.09 0.29 0.58
|A nsty S ta ff  v W orks 0.55 0.12 |o.01 0.27 0.32 0.77 0.11 0.21
[Derby S ta ff  v W orks lo.oo 0.00 0.00 lo.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
|E ast K ilb ride  S taff  v W orks |o.33 0.46 0.83 lo.oo 0.66 0.08 0.25 0.01
Source: The Researcher
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6.4 Two Sample T Test Analysis
Two sample T tests were used to analyse the study problem areas (shown in fig 6.1). 
The 3 highest problem areas of concern across each site location were considered in 
terms of their statistical level of variance between the staff and works case study 
grouping. The chart depicts each of the case study scores against the statistical level of 
variance and compares the differences between mean scores. A series of one tailed 
hypothesis predictions were either accepted or rejected on the basis of a social cut off 
point of p = >0.05.
Figure 6.1
Two Sample T Test Analysis Table
B risto l S ta ff  v W orks 0.01 0.18 0.08 1 0.29 0.14 0.03 0.32
A ntsy S ta ff  v W orks 0.55 0.11 lo.Ol 0.31 0.35 | .07
D erby  S ta ff  v W orks 0.00 0.00 0.00 lo.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 lo.oo
E ast K ilb ride  S ta ff  v W orks 0.39 0.45 0.88 lo.oo 0.66 0.20 0.30 lo.oo
Source: Researcher
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6.5 Analysis of Hypothesis (The Case Study of Ansty)
The Ansty case study provided a closely aligned set of results with only one negative 
correlation, which was in relation to training. This particular case study chart shown 
below in Fig 6.2 provides strong evidence of an organisation, which is closely aligned 
with high levels of correlation in attitudes relating to human factors engineering. 
Figure 6.2
Analysis of Variance Ansty Case Study
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Source: The Researcher
The Mann-Whitney & Two Sample T test results are based on a 95% confidence
interval displaying data taken from the highest problem areas o f concern namely:
Mean planning for staff = 84%
Mean planning for works = 81%
The null hypothesis for planning problems was accepted based on the test being 
significant at p 0.97.
Mean equipment for staff = 82%
Mean equipment for works = 86%
The null hypothesis for tooling problems was accepted based on the test being 
significant at p 0.55
Mean training for staff = 63%
Mean training for works = 60%
The null hypothesis for training problems was accepted based on the test being 
significant at p 0.11.
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6.6 Analysis of Hypothesis (Bristol Case Study)
With the exceptions of planning, both groups within the Bristol site were found to 
experience similar levels of difficulty, which is indicated in Fig 6.3 based on the 
majority of cases showing the existence of a shared understanding of human factor 
concerns.
Figure 6.3
A n a ly s is  o f V a r ia n c e  B r is to l C a s e  S tu d y
100
-♦— M ann-W hitney T- 
■■— Two Sam ple T T< 
Bristol Staff Meai
Bristol W orks Me
P r o b le m  M e a s u r e s
Source: The Researcher
The Mann-Whitney & Two Sample T test results are based on a 95% confidence
interval displaying data taken from the highest problem areas o f concern namely:
Mean planning for staff = 70%
Mean planning for works = 90%
The null hypothesis for planning problems was rejected based on the test being 
significant at p 0.01.
Mean equipment for staff = 87%
Mean equipment for works = 86%
The null hypothesis for tooling problems was accepted based on the test being
significant at p 0.18
Mean training for staff = 59%
Mean training for works = 58%
The null hypothesis for planning problems was accepted based on the test being 
significant at p 0.08.
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6.7 Analysis of Hypothesis (Derby Case Study)
The Derby site case study is an outlier and a total of 8 negative correlations were 
found with p-values that failed to correlate < 0.00 between staff and works 
population. Thereby indicating, in Fig 6.4 below, an organisation, which is not closely 
aligned with only 1 positive correlation of fatigue between the two case study 
groupings.
Figure 6.4
Analysis of Variance Derby Case Study
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The Mann-Whitney & Two Sample T test results are based on a 95% confidence
interval displaying data taken from the highest problem areas o f concern namely:
Mean planning for staff = 85%
Mean planning for works = 92%
The null hypothesis for planning problems was rejected based on the test being
significant at p 0.00.
Mean equipment for staff =81%
Median equipment for works = 96%
The null hypothesis for tooling problems was rejected based on the test being
significant at p 0.00
Mean training for staff = 59%
Mean training for works = 74%
The null hypothesis for training problems was rejected based on the test being 
significant at p 0.00.
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6.8 Analysis of Hypothesis (East Kilbride Case Study)
For East Kilbride, the main cause for concern is centred on the construct measure of 
planning, which demonstrates a positive correlation based on the highest problem 
rating scores as shown in Fig 6.5 in the chart below: With the exception of design & 
maintenance interface this organisation is able to demonstrate that its organisational 
culture is closely aligned.
Figure 6.5
A n a ly s is  o f V a r ia n c e  E a s t K ilb r id e  C a s e  S tu d y
1 0 0  i
M ann-W hitney T est
Two S am ple  T T est
E ast Kilbride Staff Mean
E ast Kilbride W orks 
M ean
P ro b le m  M e a s u r e s
Source: The Researcher
The Mann-Whitney & Two Sample T test results are based on a 95% confidence
interval displaying data taken from the highest problem areas of concern namely:
Mean planning for staff = 86%
Mean planning for works = 88%
The null hypothesis for planning problems was accepted based on the test being
significant at p 0.33.
Mean equipment for staff = 89%
Mean equipment for works = 87%
The null hypothesis for planning problems was accepted based on the test being 
significant at p 0.45
Mean training for staff =61%
Mean training for works = 62%
The null hypothesis for planning problems was accepted based on the test being 
significant at p 0.83.
273
6.9 Analysis of Variance All Case Study Groups
This particular test provided a closely aligned set o f results, which shows, in Fig 6.5 
below, an entire organisation, which is closely aligned to the same set o f concerns 
surrounding human error risk.
Figure 6.5
Analysis of Variance Across All UK Aero Repair & Overhaul Sites
•Mann-Whitney Test 
•Two Sam ple T Test 
All Sites Staff Mean
All Sites Works Mean
P ro b le m  M e a s u r e s
Source: The Researcher
The variance of test results are based on 95% confidence intervals that display data 
taken from the highest levels of human factor concerns:
Mean planning for staff = 88%%
Mean planning for works = 85%
The null hypothesis for planning problems was accepted based on the test being 
significant at p 0.49.
Mean equipment for staff = 85%
Mean equipment for works = 87%
The null hypothesis for planning problems was accepted based on the test being 
significant at p 0.26
Mean training for staff =65%
Mean training for works = 63%
The null hypothesis for planning problems was accepted based on the test being 
significant at p 0.31
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Against the highest 3 categories of human error provoking themes, the analysis from 
each of the quantitative tests, concluded that no case study organisation was achieving 
the goal of TQM. The type of data used to support this claim was identified as being 
of non-parametric origin because it failed to meet the normal distribution criteria of 
the ‘Anderson Darling’ test. In other words the test demonstrated that in the majority 
of cases the questionnaire data fell below the threshold value of p> 0.05 thereby 
confirming the direction of all hypotheses testing in terms of analysing data about the 
medium and not the mean. The relevance of which, provided the researcher with a 
degree of certainty that his original hypothesis was in fact wrong. For example all 
questionnaire results were based on the medium rank score, which provided evidence 
that each case study group is of the same statistical opinion, based on the social 
science cut off point of p = <0.05.
In acceptance of this position, the researcher draws on earlier data presented from the 
raw scores of results and provides a series of test measures based on statistical 
differences of error provoking risk. The population sample was identified on the basis 
of ‘works’ and ‘staff groups using a common one-directional hypothesis test that 
provided data based on the relationships of attitudes between groups and across sites. 
The analysis of results chart shows no significant relationship between scores from 
each of the 2 main groups existed, based on the probability value of p = 0.86. The 
level of which is regarded as significant in terms of ‘staff & ‘works’ populations who 
are of the same opinion as to which areas of error risk exists. The null hypothesis was 
therefore rejected on the basis of a 2-sample T Test correlation for the staff group 
against the score of 2.71 based on a standard deviation of 1.18. The works group by 
comparison showed a survey mean of 2.73 with a standard deviation of 1.23 based on 
a median test score set at 2.00 respectively. The general consensus for all error related 
concerns is based on a 2 sample T Test at p = 0.70 and Mann-Whitney at p = 0.67 and 
further supported by the Chi-Squared test at p = 0.90.The analysis of results therefore 
provided a trend both consistent and reliable enough to satisfy the researcher that 
attitudes towards human factors, present a significant risk in terms of the highest order 
as shown below:
1. Planning 80% risk
2. Equipment 78% risk
3. Training 58% risk
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Whilst the above test results provide wide spread evidence of opinions between and 
across groups, the researcher still required a more in-depth understanding of the levels 
of variance between sites and across groups measured in terms of the data mean.
For this purpose the Chi squared test was used as a means of comparing observed 
values against expected values by way o f determining the statistical difference 
between sets of case study results. The null hypothesis was again rejected based on 
the statistical probability value of p = 0.90 where no difference in collective opinions 
was shown to exist. The statistical evidence taken from the Chi Squared test was 
based on 3 different categories of measurement highlighted by the criteria shown 
below in Fig 6.6
1. Observed value (Percentage problem score)
2. Expected value (Scores based on all cases experiencing the same problems)
3. Chi-Squared value (The difference between observed and expected values)
Figure 6.6
Chi Squared Analysis of Variance
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Bristol Staff Observed Value 63% 78% 53% 56% 65% 71% 30% 52% 34% 502%
Expected Value 77% 77% 56% 55% 57% 57% 43% 45% 34% 501%
Chi-Squared Value 2.49 0.02 0.21 0.02 1.25 3.67 4.09 1.20 0.12
Bristol Works Observed Value 81% 78% 53% 56% 51% 51% 43% 45% 33% 491%
Expected Value 75% 75% 55% 54% 55% 55% 42% 44% 35% 490%
Chi-Squared Value 0.45 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.34 0.34 0.00 0.39 0.14
Ansty Staff Observed Value 84% 74% 63% 58% 59% 61% 45% 42% 33% 519%
Expected Value 79% 79% 58% 57% 59% 59% 48% 46% 37% 522%
Chi-Squared Value 0.26 0.33 0.36 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.38 0.49
Ansty Works Observed Value 81% 77% 60% 51% 56% 57% 44% 47% 35% 508%
Expected Value 78% 78% 57% 56% 57% 57% 44% 45% 37% 509%
Chi-Squared Value 0.13 0.00 0.14 0.36 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.06
Derby Staff Observed Value 76% 73% 53% 54% 56% 50% 44% 41% 34% 481%
Expected Value 74% 73% 54% 53% 54% 54% 42% 43% 35% 482%
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Chi-Squared Value 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.32 0.14 0.07 0.01
Derby Works Observed Value 83% 86% 67% 65% 68% 64% 42% 48% 42% 565%
Expected Value 86% 86% 64% 62% 64% 64% 49% 50% 41% 566%
Chi-Squared Value 0.14 0.00 0.18 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.10 0.14
East Kilbride Staff Observed Value 78% 80% 55% 55% 54% 51% 51% 43% 39% 506%
Expected Value 77% 77% 57% 55% 57% 57% 44% 45% 36% 505%
Chi-Squared Value 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.16 0.63 1.23 0.09 0.19
East Kilbride Works Observed Value 80% 78% 56% 52% 52% 56% 54% 46% 44% 518%
Expected Value 79% 79% 56% 57% 58% 58% 45% 46% 37% 515%
Chi-Squared Value 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.37 0.69 0.97 1.93 0.00 1.22
Aggregate Construct Scores 626% 624% 460% 447% 461% 461% 353% 364% 294%
Source: Researcher
The reliability of the questionnaire was therefore considered as extremely high 
confirming the existence of common problems between and across all of the case 
study groups. Within the Chi-Squared analysis itself a number o f anomalies were 
found to exist, which are highlighted in red, as failed values that did not meet their 
expected scores against the specific case study correlation. The null hypothesis was 
subsequently accepted confirming an organisation, which is cohesive of attitudinal 
measures in terms of the type of quality related problems that were found to exist.
The areas highlighted in bold confirm unusual differences ‘between groups’ as shown 
in the table of analysis below.
6.10 Cross Case Analysis
Whilst providing a reliable and statistically significant trend the quantitative approach 
could only be accepted in part as the study required a more holistic form of analysis, 
which the researcher accepted on the basis of Miles and Huberman (1994) 
recommendation in terms of incorporating different types of data into one cross-case 
design (qualitative cross case comparisons). In light o f this a number of factors were 
found to be widely apparent in terms of their influences to both motivation and 
cognitive thinking. This was found to be evident across all case studies especially in 
those areas, which the researcher claimed could impact greatly on the quality of 
decision-making in critical situations. The importance of this finding therefore 
legitimised the use of a broad based methodology that Ragin (1987) advocated as a 
single cross-case model, which considers the analysis o f all results in terms of the 
study as a whole. The explanations that follow are based on utilising this approach
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where configurations and associations of results were accounted for within a historical 
framework that formed grounded patterns o f information by using data from both sets 
of results. The chart shown below, which is presented in terms of a pareto of 
contributing factors against the three highest questionnaire themes, provides a 
summary of this position. Analysing the results based on this approach therefore 
differs considerably from the majority o f other human factors research, where 
experimental studies have, in many ways, excluded the value of empirical evidence, 
although there are a common range of problems beginning with measures of local 
reality which link back to the business strategy as a whole. In order to expand on this 
position a matrix analysis was created, as shown in fig 6.7, which enabled the 
researcher to extrapolate common error provoking trends based on the following list.
1. Leadership
2. Commercial Pressure
3. Communication
The qualitative themes are displayed in the left side o f the chart presenting a mean 
score rating that was taken from semi structured interviews and focus group research. 
The chart shown below in Fig 6.7 also provides a link to the main questionnaire 
results by the bar colour coding illustrated within the chart key as ‘survey results’. 
Figure 6.7
Cross Case Analysis
C o m m u n ic a tio n
□  Training 58%
■  Equipment 78%
■  Planning 80%
5  C o m e rc ia l P r e s s u r e
L e a d e rsh ip
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Focus Group Factor M easures of Concern
Source: Researcher
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The evidence suggests that many of the underlying causes of human error risk are not 
always committed by careless individuals, but instead the chart reflects a wide range 
of contributing factors that fall in line with evidence taken from the literature review. 
To support this argument the researcher extracted information from each of the focus 
group workshops and discussed the most prominent issue, namely leadership in 
relationship to planning which represented the highest problem area within the entire 
range of questionnaire themes. It is also evident that problems associated with 
planning were highly affected by the quality of leadership at each case study site. For 
this reason the researcher accepted the view put forward by Helmreich & Merritt 
(1995) who claimed in their research that performance related factors associated with 
effective socio-technical systems are heavily dependent on the positive effect of 
motivation. For the most part evidence supporting this view was confirmed in many 
areas of this study where a strong ‘them & us’ type of culture existed this could be 
explained as a determining factor in understanding the limitations surrounding 
autonomy for team situational control. Supporting evidence of this claim can be 
found in the analysis that follows which is based on three key themes from all areas of 
the study.
6.11 Planning Problems
Beginning with the analysis of case study planning the researcher refers back to the 
hypothesis analysis illustrated on diagram 6.7 that statistically demonstrates levels of 
human factors concern set against the probability value of the null hypothesis being 
true. In other words the measure of planning was analysed as the most problematic 
area of all human factors risk that was accepted by all cases and by all groups 
concerned. In conjunction with the qualitative analysis the researcher will also discuss 
the findings summarised in the qualitative overview against the background literature 
as detailed in chapter two. For example problems associated with planning were found 
to be closely associated with a lack of management planning this highlighted an 
underlying issue with leadership that was found to unacceptable, based on the extract 
quotation from the teams point of view. “Planned time fo r  some work tasks is often 
insufficient, especially on older engines which require extra work, thereby causing 
excessive time pressures ” The management response in relation to this issue was 
explained in terms of a lack of training whereby individual competency levels were 
questioned on the basis and need to be managing themselves more efficiently.
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This particular example is consistent with the existence o f a ‘claim’ & ‘blame’ type 
culture, where training and retraining according to EASA is systematic of the 
continued reason for why human error is allowed to exist.
In other examples of problems relating to planning the researcher draws on the issue 
of overproduction, which was raised during discussions with reference to managers 
overloading the shop floor at Bristol, with too much work. The resultant factor being 
that bottleneck situations became the norm based on the transcript taken from text 
number 21 claiming that: “Choke points were creating extended lead-times by local 
custom and practice to satisfy the accountants need to sell hours”. The practice of 
which has not only created one big push system, but also has undermined the basic 
principles of TQM where Lean has not been utilised to meet the efficiency aspects o f  
lead-time reduction. In essence the existing leadership has, on the one hand, promoted 
the corporate improvement strategy and, on the other, systematically undermined this 
approach in terms of practicing scientific management from the perspective o f batch 
& queue. The response offered by the Bristol management team in relation to this 
problem was based on satisfying the accountants need to meet targeted demands of 
‘good hours sold’ against monthly key performance indicators. This is yet another 
example o f where the practices within industry, such those in this study in particular, 
have contradicted the popular held belief put forward by Seddon (2000) who argued 
that TQM and scientific management are diametrically opposed and will always fail 
to co-exist. This was also seen as an issue at the Derby site based on complaints about 
the organisation of day-to-day workflow.
For example the teams raised concerns, in text box 35, about their role within the 
framework of self-management. Individuals were being told which jobs to work on in 
the form a ‘work to list’ The response from the management team showed that it had 
recognised that this position was less than satisfactory, but insisted on a continuation 
of this approach until the current lead-time performance had improved. Based on the 
approach put forward by Suri (1998) this is a classic example o f where managers 
should not assume that lead-time reduction can be achieved based on the principles of 
using SAP. In other words Suri is claiming that lead-time improvements cannot be 
used as a tactic and thereby emphasises the importance o f changing the management 
psychology as the first step in moving towards the goal o f TQM. For example ‘work 
to’ systems such as SAP are ‘push’ based and inadvertently create ‘overproduction
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which according to Ohno (1985) is one o f the seven wastes that needs to be 
eliminated, which in turn
“Improves performance and leads to leaner operations, which in turn highlights poor 
quality and the need for change ”
Finally the issues o f leadership and it effect on planning was also prevalent at the East 
Kilbride site where one focus group in particular blamed the causes of ineffective 
planning on leadership, see transcript taken from text number 47.
Concerns were raised about the prioritisation o f work by staff positions who were 
often unaware of the complexity o f operations on the shop floor. It was argued that 
management created this type of system, which invariably caused time pressures, 
which could lead to an increase in maintenance error. As a response to this one 
manager had commented that planning and scheduling priorities do exist as standard 
practice. In the case of priority 1 all requests are discussed with the appropriate 
manager prior to a decision being made. When orders are rescheduled or raised in 
priority, SAP calculates new schedule dates for each activity and this includes queue 
time, which acts as a buffer to protect against rushing. This represents a different type 
of example where teams felt powerless to manage and organise their own time. Again 
senior leadership, as Reason (1995) describes, is often the most transparent and 
remote from the system itself.
Accepting this position the situation regularly occurs where individuals are required to 
rush work due to planning input changes. The response below underlines this position 
where information about time management was extracted from the questionnaire 
results as an obvious area for concern. “We often have to rush jobs due to unrealistic 
deadlines”
Bristol Staff Response 60% Strongly Agree
Bristol Works Response 77% Strongly Agree
Ansty Staff Response 82% Strongly Agree
Ansty Works Response 81 % Strongly Agree
Derby Staff Response 76% Strongly Agree
Derby Works Response 84% Strongly Agree
East Kilbride Staff Response 78% Strongly Agree
East Kilbride Works Response 81% Strongly Agree
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Whilst discussing the issue of commercial pressure, some individuals identified 
instances where undue stress was being brought to bear in order to complete work 
within an unrealistic time frame to satisfy customer demand. The opinions 
surrounding this problem highlighted an important example of where commercial 
pressure is driving the repair and overhaul process towards what human factors 
engineers refer to as the ‘error zone’ The following points provided examples of the 
intended strategic plan, based on the organisations quality procedures namely AROP 
F2.2/2 that was thought to be achievable through the implementation self-managed 
teams:
1. Improved performance through increased employee involvement
2. Customer focused objectives owned by the team
3. Team alignment to business performance measures
4. Teams planning and carrying out their assigned work task
5. Increased flexibility through multi-tasking o f team members
6. Greater involvement in problem solving and decision-making
7. Team members developing their personal skills portfolio
8. Leadership and coaching style o f management
However, the main barrier to achieving this aim was highlighted by problems within 
the supply chain that exposed each o f the case studies to the risk associated with 
inappropriate levels of stocked inventory. The assumption being that due to 
obsolescence and depletion of working capital an insufficient number of engine
components are failing to buffer against system variation and changes in customer
demand. The consequences o f not buffering against an under performing supply chain 
in many cases has resulted in team working becoming over dependent on its manager 
and support network for decisions that generally exist outside o f the team’s control. 
The symptoms of which are illustrated below in terms o f failure to protect customer 
expectation based on sporadic material supply and parts control.
“Jobs are often delayed due to a shortage of spare parts ”
Bristol Staff Response 80% Strongly Agree
Bristol Works Response 81% Strongly Agree
Ansty Staff Response 84% Strongly Agree
Ansty Works Response 89% Strongly Agree
Derby Staff Response 76% Strongly Agree
Derby Works Response 91 % Strongly Agree
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East Kilbride Staff Response 82% Strongly Agree
East Kilbride Works Response 83% Strongly Agree
The resultant factor being that, where communication creates a weakness within the 
social system, managers fail to find adequate time to support the requirements of daily 
workplace control.
“/  am always properly briefed by those giving me a jo b ”
Bristol Staff Response 56% Disagree
Bristol Works Response 53% Disagree
Ansty Staff Response 62% Disagree
Ansty Works Response 52% Disagree
Derby Staff Response 52% Disagree
Derby Works Response 68% Disagree
East Kilbride Staff Response 53% Disagree
East Kilbride Works Response 53% Disagree
The social system was designed to empower teams to plan, schedule and manage its 
own workflow. But in reality the barriers to achieving this aim have inadvertently 
created a level o f interdepartmental confusion, which renders the socio-technical 
system as dysfunctional both within and across departments. The point in question 
being that team-based working was designed to form cohesive patterns o f behavior 
within departments that in turn limits the extent to which teams are able to develop 
their wider responsibilities between one department and the next. West (2004) 
highlights this problem in terms o f the team design, by underlining the importance of 
communication as to how cross-functional goals should be achieved.
In recognition of this requirement it becomes apparent that in each o f the case studies 
a difference in attitude exists between the main groups namely works and staff, where 
many departments are consistently functioning in isolation to the next. One o f many 
different causes to this problem dates back to 1998 when the creation o f the team- 
based working process excluded the white-collar population within Aero Repair & 
Overhaul UK. After numerous interviews with the staff population, evidence o f this 
problem became apparent when individuals expressed feelings o f isolation and 
exclusion from the entire self-management process. Divisions were created because of
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the monetary reward system where shop floor teams were paid an extra 10% of their 
annual salary to accept a range o f  additional roles and responsibilities that encroached 
onto white-collar jobs. According to the staff perceptions many o f these new roles 
included responsibilities such as technical documentation and control, which served to 
erode white-collar status and sub cultural identity. The analysis therefore highlights a 
major weakness within the social and technical system underlining a strategic 
leadership issue that has limited the ability o f self-management to perform properly.
6.12 Equipment Problems Analysis
With each of the businesses experiencing some form of modernisation or relocation a 
number of concerns were raised that the ‘same old equipment’ would simply be 
moved as well. In many cases individuals voiced serious concerns claiming that they 
were very dissatisfied with the suitability and issue o f existing equipment, which was 
not fit for purpose. This was reinforced by a number o f groups who expressed concern 
about insufficient investment in tooling. Equipment problems were exposed as the 
second and most serious cause for concern. For example when requesting 
refurbishment or replacement tools the standard answer was said to be ‘there is no 
money available’ The summary o f responses taken from the questionnaire underline 
this position in terms of the question that asked if: “Some tools could be better
East Kilbride Works Response 78% Strongly Agree
According to Hobbs (2000) problems with tools and equipment are cited as the most 
important local factor in influencing the quality o f work. The results o f this case study 
support the findings from Hobbs Australian research programme. Hobbs claimed that 
equipment deficiencies presented the second highest problem in his research 
programme, which resulted in system violations based on improvisation o f rules. He
designed”
East Kilbride Staff Response
Bristol Staff Response 
Bristol Works Response 
Ansty Staff Response 
Ansty Works Response 
Derby Staff Response 
Derby Works Response
78% Strongly Agree 
78% Strongly Agree 
74% Strongly Agree 
77% Strongly Agree 
73% Strongly Agree 
86% Strongly Agree 
80% Strongly Agree
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claimed that problems associated with inadequate tooling provide a breeding ground 
for system violations, which encourage a silo mentality where designers work in 
isolation to engineers. With the introduction of condition-based refurbishment 
programmes engines are now being overhauled in less time than it takes to 
manufacture new replacements. In this sense the business has identified with the 
customer through partnership programmes where ‘overhaul’ is the least expensive 
option as opposed to buy. In order to extend engine life efficiency, designers have 
developed new ways o f exploiting technology where design changes through ‘single 
crystal technology’ means that turbine blades are becoming stronger, lighter and last 
longer. Changes of this kind have also demanded a different approach for the 
maintainer in terms of tooling challenges that no longer fit their intended form or 
function. The resultant factor being that minor changes to engine specification 
coupled with a fragmented social system has resulted in a ‘can do’ attitude whereby 
tooling is sometimes adapted without proper or full regard for its function and 
purpose.
Other cases were highlighted in relation to specialist tooling, which is often partially 
damaged or broken and was found to be still in use, where risk to compliance could 
lead to maintenance error. It was claimed that the problem of inappropriate use o f  
tooling is regularly reported to management and often goes un-noticed to the extent 
that it has now become accepted as the working ‘norm’. When damaged tooling is 
reported for rectification it is the responsibility o f the manager to ensure that quality 
procedures are followed to enable its correct repair. The general opinion surrounding 
this issue was reflected by the wider problem that little or no change would become 
apparent, until radical improvements were made to improve communication within 
the social system. The researcher is therefore suggesting that the system weaknesses is 
strongly associated with ‘lack o f management’ often caused by time constraints from 
commercial pressure that has led to an unacceptable level o f illegal tooling use. In 
light o f this claim Karasek & Theorell (1996) argue, “ The responsibility and 
workplace control is often overlooked, in relation to job  demand and individual 
autonomy” For example evidence o f bad behaviours by management have 
‘encouraged individuals to take rational risks when using some equipment that was 
inappropriate and not designed for its subsequent use. The word ‘risk’ was not 
perceived as being compatible with the message promoted by the European Aviation
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Agency, in respect to ‘always follow the procedure’. The type o f problems discussed 
by the focus groups are also conducive with the questionnaire survey that highlighted 
concern across all case studies with reference to procedural. “The procedures I use 
always adopt best practice ”
Bristol Staff Response 80% Strongly Disagree
Bristol Works Response 40% Agree
Ansty Staff Response 57% Disagree
Ansty Works Response 57% Disagree
Derby Staff Response 57% Disagree
Derby Works Response 59% Disagree
East Kilbride Staff Response 58% Disagree
East Kilbride Works Response 48% Agree
With the exception of Bristol & East Kilbride works all other case studies admitted to 
breaking procedures. This was confirmed during the focus group workshops, based on 
the practice and use of engineering ‘black books’ When interviewed, some engineers 
described how they have written their own version o f procedures with the aim of 
carrying out their work more effectively, thus entering into the area as previously 
referred to as the ‘error zone’
6.13 Training Problems Analysis
According to Hobbs (2000) errors become incorporated at the person level o f analysis 
in terms of the misapplication o f rules that arise because o f problems with 
information, which is one of the most difficult factors to control. In view of this 
dilemma West (2004) stressed the importance o f communication and underlined the 
critical nature of training to enhance team performance, which Pasmore (1988) also 
cited as an important area of concern. Training should also incorporate a wide range o f  
other responsibilities, such as ‘flow ’ based on planning within the context o f Lean. 
From a practical standpoint the analysis o f results has also supported the work of 
Hobbs (2000) thus demonstrating that engineers often struggle to follow procedures 
because of an inappropriate design. In understanding the complexity o f this problem 
the qualitative analysis provided explanations that cited problems within 
training, within the context of ‘systems application processing’ (SAP) For example a 
reiteration of numerous procedures was found to be apparent which required a more
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human friendly approach in areas where data access was both difficult to understand 
and obtain. This led to the focus group workshop asking ‘why don’t we follow  
procedures’ with reference to the SAP. The commenting response was that “SAP 
language is difficult to understand”. The resultant factor being that some team 
members described how they have written their own version o f instructions so they 
could fit with the intent o f the procedures.
Also mentioned was a request to carry out a training amendment so that scripts could 
be made simpler, a request that was subsequently denied. In respect o f this example 
the general view held was that training in the use o f SAP was still patchy at best, with 
people feeling under confident in using the system. This situation, brought about by 
lack of understanding in the use o f computers, was thought to be very likely to 
increase the opportunity for error because people were still being shown, unofficially, 
how to get around the system. The use o f written procedures provides the necessary 
information for tasks to be completed based on the use o f a standardised approach that 
maintains the most effective and safe method o f working. This became apparent in 
chapter 4 when three off combustion chambers were fitted with the wrong parts, 
because of non-compliance to SAP. Failure to follow what is described as the 
application of good rules will, according to Reason (1995), inevitably result in 
shortcuts that lead to mistakes. This type o f situation is indicative o f knowledge-based 
situations where the selection o f an incorrect o f thinking program is directly linked to 
the system’s failure at the organisational level o f control.
During the explanation of the MEMS system and the submission o f the MEMS report 
forms the point was made that not everyone has a LAN username and password. In 
addition, it was also voiced that not everyone is computer literate and required 
computer training in order to use the MEMS reporting system, which does not lend 
itself to be people friendly. A paper version o f the MEMS report form was thought to 
be needed to compliment the electronic version, with people being able to fill out and 
post a MEMS report at well publicised points throughout the facilities. In light o f this 
problem Wellins (1992) claimed that organisational training should represent 20% of 
each employee’s time, further claiming that companies who invest in depth and 
breadth of training broaden their range o f activities for teams to perform satisfactorily.
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Concern was also raised as to the competency o f the MEMS investigators, based on 
divided opinion that investigators only represented the staff population. The popular 
belief held that refresher training and ongoing recurrent training was necessary to 
ensure a renewed level o f confidence in the shop floor that investigates were carrying 
out there work correctly. Whilst these people may not be ideal for investigating local 
shop floor maintenance errors, it would on the other hand increase the confidence and 
trust of the MEMS system if  they were still being used.
It light of this position West (2004) explained this type o f problem in terms of 
‘intergroup relationships’ and argued that differences should always be exposed to 
encourage one cross functionally represented system. West is critical o f organisations 
that introduce team working without addressing the issues o f intergroup relations. He 
also argued that unless differences between teams are fully understood, intergroup 
difference would erode the stability and potential for teams to perform properly. This 
was an issue that was highlighted during the study in response to the measurement of 
cross-functional management, which is a fundamental requirement o f TQM as 
highlighted by the responses listed below. “Management, works and staff 
communicate well with each other ”
Bristol Staff Response 90% Strongly Disagree
Bristol Works Response 72% Disagree
Ansty Staff Response 62% Disagree
Ansty Works Response 58% Disagree
Derby Staff Response 52% Disagree
Derby Works Response 64% Disagree
East Kilbride Staff Response 57% Disagree
East Kilbride Works Response 58% Disagree
It is not surprising therefore that a lack o f training o f communication was measured as 
a contributing factor that perpetuated the problem o f cultural diversity, where some 
departments are perceived to be working in isolation to next.
In light of this situation West (2004) claims that a key aspect o f team structure should 
include cross-functional representation o f departmental types, where targets and goals 
should be made clear with feedback o f performance.
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6.14 Analysis of Gaps in Critical To Quality Characteristics
The critical success factors identified from the analysis of this chapter have been 
characterised into three distinct areas. Based this position the summary model shown 
below in figure 6.8 illustrates that most, if not all, of the issues found in this study 
could be considered as a consequence of misdirected leadership, where problems with 
planning, equipment and training originated from the same area as previously 
highlighted in figure 6.7. The significance of this position is based on the evaluation 
of the cross-case analysis that confirmed the existence of risk factors associated with 
human error that can be described as, a general ‘lack of management’ owing to gaps 
in the wider socio-technical system as illustrated in figure 6.8 below. In other words, 
different error types as suggested by Hobbs (2000) are not always committed by 
careless engineers, but instead can be induced through a system weakness at the at the 
rule-based level of human factors control.
Figure 6.8
Analysis of CTQC Across All Case Study Sites
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In respect to this situation the researcher confirms for the position o f realism was the 
correct approach taken for this study where a middle ground is recommended in terms 
of how best to regain control o f human error risk. This opportunity will next be 
discussed, based on the introduction o f resultant model as an enabler for the 
organisation to achieve both efficiency (speed o f delivery) & effectiveness (reduced 
human error) as shown below in figure 6.9. The resultant model also provides a 
valuable framework for those case study managers who are trying to develop a 
positive culture as the first step in preventing ‘comer cutting’ where individuals for 
the most part in this study were found to be at significant risk o f making errors 
because of breaking rules. According to Hobbs (2000) this is occurs because of the: 
“Misapplication of rules that arise because o f problems with information, which is 
one of the most difficult factors to control
6.15 Resultant Model
The discussion throughout this chapter has underlined a general trend where self­
management within the context of TQM is at significant risk o f procedural non- 
compliance. The model shown below in recognising this position was designed to 
bridge a number of gaps in support o f EASA where self-managed team working can 
safely facilitate the organisational goal o f TQM. From the analysis o f results it is clear 
that many of the identified risk factors associated with barriers to achieving this aim 
were not limited to random acts o f individual occurrence, but rather system induced 
that created a latent form of human error risk. To counteract the effects o f this 
problem, the researcher started with the assumption that all organisations are different 
and should therefore adopt an eclectic strategy to improve the quality o f human 
factors thinking. The point in question being that the resultant model shown below in 
Fig 6.9 should be considered as a basic framework to improve quality and at the same 
time is designed to meet the safety related standards o f EASA part-145.
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Figure 6.9
Research Resultant Model
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Source: Researcher 
6.16 Chapter Summary
In deploying the resultant model it is highly recommended that each of the cases 
concerned cascade within their business plan a guiding framework for change so that 
everyone is communicated to and understands. This is a powerful approach that 
should be used to facilitate strategic change based on agreed milestones where pace 
and timing is seen as an important feature to create a cohesive structure so that teams 
are adequately empowered to deliver the system goals. The application of policy 
deployment is therefore seen as a powerful tool that will engender a more committed 
and focused approach by senior leadership, based on the principles of joint decision-
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making through the concept o f Hoshin58 Kanri. In light o f this consideration the 
chapter has also shown that commercial pressures are seen as a major contributing 
factor in compromising the position o f self-managed teams. The limitations o f which 
are centred on cost-based accounting models, which is one o f the underlying causes o f 
why inadequate planning was found to exist. The resultant model therefore promotes 
the principles of a Lean; based on an eclectic approach to managing flow by using a 
mix and match of both ‘push’ as well ‘pull’ based repair engineering.
While the technical stage of the resultant model considers a number o f hard system  
changes the softer requirements taken from the gap analysis shown in figure 6.8 above 
underlines how important the social system is when defining the team’s respective 
roles and behaviours. According to Cannon-Bowers (1993) the importance o f this 
aspect of the system is seen as a determining factor in shaping the quality of the team 
situational awareness where the ability for individuals to work across departments is a 
prerequisite for the delivery o f technical tasks, roles and goals. The researcher 
therefore argues in favour of a number o f basic social requirements, within the context 
of knowledge training that should include three different levels o f analysis. Firstly, 
training for declarative information should contain knowledge about facts, rules and 
relationships that will be necessary for teams to perform cross-functionally. Secondly, 
knowledge of procedural information is important, as this will enable the team to 
understand how to self-manage goal relationships with other team members, so as to 
avoid knowledge-based errors. Thirdly, training for strategic knowledge should focus 
on relevant information about the system as a whole, which will help in areas such as 
problem solving, where information can be communicated efficiently between one 
department and the next. Learning about systems however, is not a naturally evolving 
phenomenon and as such the researcher argues that successful development of 
effective and efficient social systems requires a more gradualist approach, which is 
critical to the safe practice and performance o f self-managed teams. In respect to this 
situation the researcher was able to demonstrate sufficient examples o f where 
managers assumed compatibility with Leaner ways o f working, but at the same time 
failed to understand the complexity o f how to apply the correct mix and balance of 
autonomous team working within the context o f TQM.
58The term hoshin is a concept that ensures focus is not blurred and the deployment of policy can be 
engaged by all.
292
It was for this reason that either too much, or too little responsibility exists within 
teams, which in turn has created a level of system induced error risk where low levels 
of team situational awareness has resulted in a culture of comer cutting at the rule 
based level, as illustrated in figure 7.0 below
Figure 7.0
Analysis of Different Error Types
JS a
.£" 2 12IS
2
<u•o
S3
12 <u
a> 4>•a J S3
S3 6
a>J -J
s
OX) OH'C E a’Es
S3
a
‘5c
'c
2a. W H
|Rule-Based Errors |H ||H
|Knowledge-Based Errors N  II
[Skill-Based Errors |L ||L |L 1
Source: Researcher
In summary this chapter has demonstrated that problems facing teams and their 
limited ability to resolve such situations cannot be understated and what may require 
the application of a particular type of problem analysis for one case study could be 
completely different when compared to another area of the business. Therefore 
aknowledging this position the researcher’s contribution to the main frame of applied 
human factors research contradict a significant number of other studies, which tend to 
be highly indualistic and often miss the importance of the socio-technical system as a 
valid contribution to the application of safer human factors management thinking.
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Chapter 7 Conclusion
7.0 Chapter Introduction
The initial interest of the researcher in Human Factor engineering was stimulated by 
dissatisfaction with the existing body o f knowledge for operations management (that 
is focussed exclusively on high variety, low volume and skills routines) and has 
ignored the importance of low volume and high variety industrial settings. This 
dissatisfaction and motivation to learn more, whilst closing a gap in the body of 
knowledge, set in process a long journey o f research, covering many years and 
countless miles. This chapter marks the conclusion o f this journey and thesis. The 
chapter will build from the analysis o f the results and mark out what learning has 
happened and the next generation o f research questions this work has uncovered. In so 
doing, it will spend some time in discussing the implications o f the findings for the 
design o f effective operations management systems and how best to teach these 
concepts to university students and practicing managers. The original research 
question as declared in chapter 1, set out to understand the extent to which, self­
managed teams across each of the Aero Repair & Overhaul UK sites is currently able 
to facilitate TQM. The results o f the study with respect to this question have exposed 
a number of key factors affecting this position, based on a general lack o f knowledge 
of how to manage Lean production tools and techniques in what was described as 
non-linear environments. This position was similar to other literature examples and 
seen as common to other human factors studies.
What makes this condition unique for Aero Repair & Overhaul is the outcome of 
where non-compliance to procedures in a safety critical environment will as the 
background literature has shown place at risk passenger safety, which is o f paramount 
concern. Therefore it is claimed that effective human factors management must be 
seen as an essential feature of operations management and cannot be carried out 
without due consideration for the deployment and control o f socio-technical system  
design. In light of this position, the researcher rejects the value o f individualistic 
research when attempting to solve complex problems o f a socio-technical nature; this 
approach fails to account for the complexity o f knowledge-based systems. 
Individualistic research is, more often than not, better aligned to mechanistic 
environments of new production such as those found in traditional Lean organisations.
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7.1 Changes to Self-Managed Teams
In order to resolve the issue of team empowerment versus ‘control’, the important yet 
absent ‘linking pin’ phenomena (Lewin, 1958) could not be ignored. In other words 
the recommendations are that a ‘team leader’ should be introduced which according to 
Storey (1994) is associated with the high performance o f TQM designs While the 
main framework of STS literature was fully endorsed, the most appropriate structure 
for improved human factors performance was therefore concerned with the current 
issue of the safety critical processes where effective team working is dependent on the 
vital linking pin of the team leader. The rationale being that, the current disadvantage 
of just relying on the group responsibility without leadership, which is more often 
referred to as the ‘diffusion of responsibility’, is at the detriment o f a human factors 
performance. While the researcher draws upon many aspects o f socio-technical 
research he also extends his advice beyond the industrial sector o f operations 
management to the immediate resolution o f the system where front line engineers 
experienced exposure to commercial pressures, which manifested in terms of comer 
cutting and rale-based mistakes. This type o f phenomena may not always be 
associated with ’intergroup conflict’ but it is a subject unique to situations involving 
small groups who often act cohesively, but are pressurized to cut comers because o f  
conflicts that arise between engineers and managers both between teams and across 
sites. The implications show a close resemblance to the findings o f Reason (2003), 
where teams often failed to share responsibility for ownership o f shift task handovers. 
In other words in the absence of a direct or immediate line o f accountability the 
concept of ‘social loafing’ was often seen as apparent, it also reflected a tendency for 
some individuals to work less hard on a task when they believe others are working on 
it as well. The belief being that in absence o f task ownership some individuals 
assumed that their own efforts would be pooled with that o f other group members and 
would not be seen in isolation. It is for these reasons the researcher points out the 
importance and application of the role o f the team leader, who can provide the 
important ‘linking pin’ between shifts, a role which the teams themselves have not 
been adequately able to demonstrate. The point in question being that individual 
responsibility is an organizational and legal requirement by the licensing regulations 
that should include adequate education and training as a means o f engendering a 
culture of shared but not ‘diffused responsibility’.
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7.2 Reflections on Methods Used
No research initiative is complete without a reflection upon what has worked well and 
what would be done differently if  it were possible to start the research process again. 
The next section will provide an account o f this reflection.
The questionnaire used by the study was drawn from human factors knowledge, 
which is limited in its treatment of management attitudes and vague in what this term 
means. In hindsight, the addition o f a section on the attitudes o f management to 
certain practices such as information sharing, cross functional working, and the extent 
to which the manager sees criticism as a positive dimension of change processes 
rather than a threat, would have been appropriate. These facets could have been 
examined in more detail but, given the time and word count o f this thesis and its 
realist, rather than ethnographic, nature these interactions could not be investigated 
fully. These issues were detected in the other phases o f the research.
A repeat of the study would benefit from such a section added to the questionnaire but 
this is a proposed improvement to the next generation o f research questions. To date, 
none of the major human factors authors have considered these features when 
building their models (Reason, 2003). These activities and behaviours were found, by 
this study, to significantly influence the performance o f the socio-technical system in 
terms of enabling self-management by teams to facilitate high performance via TQM.
Upon reflection, the questionnaire was the correct method for the primary stage of this 
investigation, on the grounds that the research has identified many vague areas that 
were previously ignored by operations and human factors specialists. One of the 
implications of the questionnaire was the major amount o f time spent processing the 
outcomes/returns (approximately a year o f manipulation to the standards expected in 
the Research Design stage).
The administration of the questionnaire was greatly assisted by the engagement o f an 
HR specialist at each site and this was considered to have been o f help in the 
achievement of such a high return rate.
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The researcher also under-estimated the amount o f time spent feeding back to site 
management following the questionnaire and focus group stages. Many sites began to 
enact changes based upon their learning from the early stages o f this study but at a site 
level rather than a corporate change to the implementation o f TQM and the corporate 
model that underpinned this approach to self managed teams, Lean processes and 
continuous improvement.
The researcher’s day book was a very effective method which allowed the collection 
of qualitative observations about feelings, emotions and attitudes, which surrounded 
the research process. These were important during the group panel interviews where 
simple transcription would have missed innuendo and sarcasm etc. The day book also 
allowed the researcher to collect data whist walking the facilities and make 
observations about Human Factors within the workplace. As an expert in Human 
Factors investigation, a lot of data was collected in this manner.
The use of secondary data and access to company archives, including statutory 
records of risk registers and the MEM’s database was a major advantage and strength 
of this study. The addition, this aspect o f research allowed the findings o f this study to 
be compared with another source o f system and human factor assessment. Whilst the 
MEMS and MEDA methods are standard software that does not have the true level o f  
depth and meaning of this study, it did offer a second perspective on the socio- 
technical system as a secondary check to ensure reliability and validity o f the research 
results. The researcher benefited from many informal interviews that supported the 
formal process of interviewing. Whilst at the sites many managers, who were 
concerned about their role, had questions following the questionnaire and panel group 
stages and these interviews offered new insights into the culture, diversity and 
collective mental model of managers and the stresses they were experiencing within 
the organisation.
The selection of four sites also proved to be an advantage in meeting the needs o f a 
robust case-based study in that it fitted the design criteria o f Eisenhardt (1989, 1991) 
and Leonard-Barton (1992). The amount o f data that the four sites generated was, it 
has to be acknowledged, enormous and required extensive treatment with qualitative 
methods of data analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994).
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The researcher benefited greatly from interaction, via structured interviews with 
industry experts at the beginning o f this study. These experts included nuclear safety 
investigators, aviation expert assessors (CAP regulation 716 assessors), rail industry 
accident experts and ‘world leading’ academics in the fields o f human psychology and 
operations management (Dr. Simon Banbury, Lean Enterprise Research Centre Staff, 
Cardiff Business School).
In any type of research design a trade-off will always exist between theory and 
practical considerations, this has been accepted in terms o f limiting conditions. 
However, from a theoretical perspective the researcher claims that given a greater 
amount of time and access to the organisation he would have made the research more 
robust by increasing the actual numbers o f focus group sessions as a means o f testing 
the questionnaire model derived from the quantitative phase o f the research design 
with more rigour. In addition, a different selection o f the exact type o f case study 
strategy to be deployed could have provided alternative courses o f action as a means 
of including, amongst others, grounded theory. At the time o f writing this approach 
was deemed as inappropriate because o f ethical issues when aligning ethnographic 
research with certain questions and outcomes that relate to the uniqueness o f this 
study in particular. In other words the researcher considered such issues impractical to 
manage owing to the economic and political tensions, which exist between the trade 
union and local management teams.
Given the opportunity to repeat the study in the future, funding permitting, it could 
have included an additional choice o f global case studies such as other repair facilities 
of Canada, Singapore and the United States o f America. Therefore from a latent error 
perspective, no reference to the quality o f design processes was made, which, on 
reflection, could have impacted on several latent error conditions referred to earlier as 
slips, lapses and mistakes. This area o f research often referred to as ‘concurrent 
engineering’ was not of interest to this study as the older engine designs o f more than 
15 years would not have benefited from such cross-functional approaches. Although 
this is not to suggest that this approach could not have been considered based on the 
Trent family of engines, which, since the start o f this study, have already been, in 
some cases, on their second cycle o f repair. The researcher therefore proposes that
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there are few differences between old and new designs and that a second study could 
focus on concurrent engineering practice and not the design effectiveness o f what the 
industry refer to as ‘legacy’ types o f aero engine repair. Further more the supplier 
network was not examined, which again is thought be o f an influencing factor, but 
was considered a process that was outside the scope o f case study and therefore did 
not form part of the socio-technical system design.
Finally the researcher could not ignore important constraints imposed on to this study 
in the form of the official secrets act 1971 and the restrictions imposed as a direct 
result of the terrorist attacks 9/11 in the USA. In other words the practice o f  
knowledge sharing across global sectors is often limited by non-disclosure 
agreements, which are typically enforced by United States Government in terms of 
export and control of information from one country to the next. This has impacted to a 
large extent on the transfer o f knowledge that has typically affected the way that 
training across repair and maintenance operations can be carried out. For example in 
the UK those organisations wishing to trade with the United States o f America, and in 
some circumstances any person anywhere in the world, are now required to register 
their activities with the DTI export control authorities. This includes restriction of  
knowledge transfer relating to any one or the following shown in the listed below.
1. Marketing and sales
2. Basic operations, maintenance and training
3. Repair procedures
4. Design, manufacture and production
5. Software
6. Any service that could be considered in the possible use o f defence.
Overall, the research strategy and design proved to be very robust in a field of study 
where positivistic methods had dominated what little studies existed. The methods 
mark a contribution. They go well beyond the Microsystems view o f human factors 
authors since 1990 and obscure definitions o f TQM authors, to engage with case study 
informants that blended qualitative and quantitative methods as well as limited 
ethnographic dimensions of the operations management and socio-technical systems 
designs at the case study companies. Such an approach is unique to this type of human 
factors study and represents a small closing o f a gap where new structures of
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investigation are needed to really identify the key factors that influence teams in aero 
repair settings. In this way the methods defended here form a solid, legitimate and 
valid source of robust data and a strong theoretical foundation when generalising 
between systems.
7.3 Generalisation of the Study Findings and M odel
The benefit of a doctoral research programme o f this nature, one that deals with a real 
problem-driven management issue and seeks as an outcome to inform better 
management practice, is to speculate beyond the cases involved with this study and to 
generalise the findings. Generalising from case based research is difficult yet the 
design of this research has involved the countermeasures suggested by Silverman 
(2000) and Miles and Huberman (1994) to allow such generalisations to be 
undertaken.
Generalising beyond these cases, it is possible to propose that businesses engaged in 
the same technical operating system, that o f complex and low volume repair, with 
team structures and deployed responsibility for self-management, would conform to 
the same issues and management problems as detected by this study.
Miles and Huberman (1994 p 277) contend that every research investigation should be 
reviewed against a series of measures designed to test the ‘goodness’ o f the research. 
These measures enhance the external reliability and ‘replicability’ o f the research. The 
researcher has taken due care to make explicit the methods used for this investigation, 
to assure an objective approach, and has provided data displays to assist the reader. 
There has also been an attempt to provide clarity in the approach and description of 
the investigation in order to improve the ‘reliability’ and ‘auditability’ o f the work 
whilst presenting the data collected in a manner that provides as much contextual 
sensitivity and ‘authenticity’ as possible.
Silverman (2000) notes that providing generalisations from case based research 
requires that the researcher has qualitative and quantitative research methods and 
employed a purposive or theoretical sampling framework to the selection o f case 
study firms. The selection of the aero repair cases were purposive due to the
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likelihood that new theory would emerge following a robust study. The selection o f  
informants was purposive only in terms o f engaging with a representative number o f  
staff grades (as stated in the research design chapter).
Miles and Huberman, citing Firestone (1993), contend that there are three forms of 
generalisation. These include generalisations between the sample and the population, 
analytical generalisations based upon a connected theory and case-to-case 
generalisations.
This research generalises to the full population o f the corporate aero repair group and 
can be generalised to the entire population o f military and civilian repair businesses in 
the UK that share a common national culture (Hofstede, 2001). The generalisation 
being that managers will face very similar social and technical processes in 
maintaining aero engines. The degree to which self-managed teams are engaged will 
differ but the main issues discovered by this research will hold true. Analytical 
generalisations are founded upon this similarity o f operations management system; 
the sectors that could be the targets o f generalisation include repairs o f marine engines 
(civilian and military), energy generation, and nuclear submarines. Going further, 
other high variety, low volume and highly skilled operations settings (with large 
consequences for poor human factor management) could include any safety critical 
operation system that faces commercial pressure and is reliant upon human 
intervention to ensure material flow. These settings could include the healthcare 
management system and patient flow where expert knowledge is used in a 
decentralised form to supply a patient journey. Many recent authors in the field of 
Healthcare have identified rifts between managers, clinicians and the safe flow of 
patients suggesting synergy between this study and that o f healthcare socio technical 
systems (Powell et al, 2009).
7.4 Implications for Professional Practice o f M anagement
As far as generalisations from case studies permit (Silvermann 2000) there are a 
number of implications for professional managers and these will now be explored.
It is at this point in the research process that numerous gaps in the system, which are 
responsible for the failure of self-management, in terms o f inappropriate system  
designs, have been identified. The researcher therefore argues that a culture of
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excellence thinking, within the context o f TQM, is not an all-encompassing approach 
for self-management to take place. Moreover he draws attention to the limitations of 
the ‘one size fits all’ and considers the writings o f Hofestede (2001) who argued that 
theoretical transportation o f social systems cannot be easily applied from one industry 
setting to the next.
For this reason attention is drawn to the dangers o f theoretical transportation, which, 
in the case of this study, resulted in the unknowing introduction of a number o f  
underlying problems, this occurred as early as 1998. For example it was the 
executives’ belief, during this period, that self-managed teams could readily support 
changes in customer demand, based on the corporate statement, which claimed: 
“There are sufficient examples of successful team based working both within the USA 
and Japan to confirm that it contributes in a very meaningful way to business 
improvement”. Emulation of innovations that have come from different cultures 
appear to be simple modifications to the existing socio-technical system, but the 
researcher argues this ‘theoretical transplantation’ approach is an unsubstantiated 
claim.
At this point in time it was discovered that in fact no prior research was used to 
substantiate this claim and that the above statement was based entirely on assumption, 
with no supporting evidence. In addition the researcher also draws attention to a major 
theoretical contradiction that exists between the philosophy o f self-management and 
Lean operations management models claiming they are not naturally aligned and 
moreover, one is actually in contradiction with the other. For example the more 
prescriptive Lean becomes the less choice an individual has over his or her autonomy 
at work and unless these differences, at the very least, are understood self-managed 
teams can easily become a major source o f non-quality. In other words business 
environments such as the one found in this study, which are high in product variation 
can opt for the model of self-management, but should be aware o f their unique entities 
that cannot be managed in the same way as new production thinking.
The researcher cautions against transportation and accepts the advice given by West 
(2004) who argued that prior, to any form o f system redesign a measure and 
assessment of the existing organisational culture should always take place. In light of
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this consideration the fact is underlined that Aero Repair & Overhaul did not carry out 
any form of cultural assessment and instead adopted a ‘big bang’ approach to change 
described by Peters (1993) in terms of: “Change radically and do it quickly ”
The lessons learnt position therefore implies that big bang models are often too 
simplistic when organisational change is both complex and part of a continuous and 
open-ended process. It unsettles the socio-technical system and its complex 
interaction/relationship and the roles o f the stakeholders (staff, shop floor and 
management), thereby creating role ambiguity and confusion which results in poor 
material flow and an unstable working environment -  these contribute to the breeches 
of human factors and system defences.
By radically transforming a system, variation in processes is increased, roles become 
unclear and system/material flow co-ordination becomes more difficult. Therefore the 
response is to clarify roles and demarcate between employees. If left to evolve, this 
situation will manifest itself in mechanistic and dysfunctional ways of working. This 
confirms the work of Reason and summarises the state of the case businesses at the 
beginning of this study. The implications for the practice o f management is to 
understand the complex weave o f relationships that are being manipulated when 
redesigning the socio-technical system for autonomous working and to allow this 
deployment of responsibility to self managed teams to evolve in a paced and 
controlled manner -  an anti ‘big bang’ theory. Such an approach is rarely taught at 
business schools and neither are the contingencies o f each workplace. Again -  as 
stated on the very first page o f this thesis -  the teaching of how best to design low 
volume and high variety workplaces is not taught. Indeed authors such as Hill (1987) 
have retreated from this area and have not explored, in detail, the contingencies of 
designing structures for such low volume/high variety workplaces. As such they have 
ignored the human factors that underpin the performance of any system especially 
repair and overhaul (Slack et al, 2008).
From a practical provision of advice it is important for professional managers to 
understand the limitations of human factors which are defined by the quality and 
design of material flow systems (and the capability o f processes/people requirements). 
Managers need to understand the real demand affecting any system because if they do 
not understand and control demand then erratic demand will induce system variation
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as teams and material flows will become confused. Such confusion leads to error and 
is a design and latent error as defined by Reason -  a management failing.
Managers, facing the variety o f aero repair services with many shared resources and 
complex irregular flows of work, must understand the structures and methods (as well 
as technology) in order to be successful. This is a contingent approach to the design of 
a facility and its social engagement. Here the researcher argues that scientific methods 
are not all bad although the negative image is portrayed in operations management 
and TQM literatures and for safety critical processes, it is believed that it is necessary 
to add duplication o f tasks, functional specialisms and to divorce production from 
inspection. This line of thinking supports Reason’s human factor view of preventing 
risks of human error and poor operations designs with latent risks beyond the control 
of the autonomous team.
This study indicates that there are many psychological design issues available to 
support the visual management o f the workplace in such a way that colours and 
simple indicators show when a process or material flow performance is performing to 
a predefined and acceptable standard. These methods also trigger reaction when the 
visual indicator shows that abnormal conditions are encountered. It is important that 
managers understand these mechanisms and design dynamic control measures that 
allow the team to react to indicators that show (as a warning) system variation and a 
tendency to the important loss o f material flow control. Managers cannot abdicate this 
design responsibility and must ensure that robust processes are monitored using 
policing mechanisms to ensure that the variation does not destabilise the operations 
system. They must concentrate on stabilising material flow.
Managers should also be aware o f the constraints o f any business and how change 
impacts on the business over time. It should not be seen as a management weakness to 
move from a mechanistic structure to an organic one and back again as the wider 
environment and commercial pressures dictate. The answer to optimal material flow is 
less to do with the tools of TQM and more to do with the balance and equilibrium of 
the socio-technical system in delivering materials in a stable manner.
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7.15 Implications for Teaching
The contribution of this study to the teaching o f operations management at 
universities is another important area. It shows that, in the field o f human factors, 
the dynamics of workplaces and science o f human factors must be understood by 
students. The subject is not a unified discipline and therefore it is important for 
students to understand the different approaches. Teaching should reinforce the 
contingencies needed to make effective socio-technical systems and therefore the 
researcher argues that such teaching should be conducted by case study. Students 
should be able to appreciate the differences in work context (especially low volume 
and high variety) where operations management designs are critically important. 
This approach to teaching could involve work placement, visits or traditional study 
of cases in classrooms. The scope and importance o f this subject is not easily 
transferred to students in the form a lecture.
The teaching of Lean ways of working, from a variety o f perspectives, from human 
resources to operations management, should promote the concepts of people 
integration and processes o f system-induced error (regardless of the process). 
According to the researcher, it is important that the soft elements of a production 
system design are balanced and integrated with harder technology. Much o f the HR 
literature favors the self-managed team but stops far short o f the practicalities of 
managing such a structure. Lectures fail to express the complexity o f team design 
and choices for managers in optimizing their work flow. For high variety and 
highly skilled operations, it is important to teach the problems for individuals and 
for businesses when the values o f a profession (such as engineering) are 
compromised or changed by de-skilling or deployment to teams. Also multi­
skilling and the effects of going the other way to de-skilling also has implications 
for the individual and the time they need to get back to effective ways o f working. 
In the experience of the researcher this is rarely covered at an undergraduate or 
masters level- to the detriment o f students striving towards becoming better systems 
thinkers.
A final implication of this study is the ‘positive spin’ promoted by lecturers as they 
teach TQM in a biased way. Much teaching is positive and ignores the impact on 
the individual even though the most frequent source o f human error is from
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employees failing to sustain the system. TQM can be as demotivational through use 
of routines/standards and de-skilling o f knowledge and reduction in creative skills. 
Up-skilling of the workforce by de-skilling the qualified can be as concerning to 
those gaining the skills as much as those who are losing them. This aspect o f 
knowledge transfer is poorly explained in the textbooks and lectures for 
management students. This study shows that these issues are at the very heart o f  
what makes a successful and sustainable system o f TQM, i.e. continuous 
improvement and a learning environment. Failure to appreciate the design of a 
system therefore aggravates employees and creates latent system failures, which 
further thwarts material flow. A balanced approach to TQM teaching is therefore 
recommended.
7.6 Future Research Directions
With these restrictions in mind it has not been difficult to understand the complexity 
of implementing ‘open systems thinking’ when numerous assumptions and attempts 
to manage change have all been carried out in isolation from the manner in which 
engineers are legally permitted to work. These disadvantages have therefore reflected 
a general lack of individual accountability where entire teams o f engineers no longer 
carry out single tasks, but are expected to be multi skilled conforming to the ‘group 
think’. The responsibility has therefore shifted from the individual, to that o f the 
‘team’ this, in part, has created role confusion surrounding ‘who does what’ within the 
less defined responsibility o f the entire team. In acceptance o f this position the 
researcher has therefore presented a problem driven solution to address this gap, but 
has not been able to provide definitive answers to specific human factors solutions. 
The implications of which suggest a greater need for more detailed and localised 
research that will help provide a series o f platforms whereby the greater 
understanding of human factors programmes can be more efficiently and effectively 
applied. So when examining other and more similar types o f industry as to the effects 
of those conditions found in this study it will be necessary to proceed with caution as 
to who and what information can be involved. In light o f the known limitations 
surrounding disclosure ‘by any means’ the researcher has therefore included the 
possibility of knowledge sharing to include the need for more research studies that 
extend beyond the scope of this project to include:
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1 Case study research across other UK or US aero repair & overhaul sites 
that include a larger sample size. This study would therefore address the 
issue of national and company cultural bias towards human factor 
management. These businesses operate under the same regulations with 
similar technology and therefore differences in the two populations would 
be culturally embedded. This study may also detect differences in the 
understanding of what is TQM (an extension o f Hofstede’s 2001 seminal 
study).
2 Carry out comparative studies across other pic business sites to include the 
resultant model against established error provoking trends to-date. Such a 
study would detect, under the same company policies and conditions, 
differences in market groups within the same company. These other groups 
would allow the researcher to test for contingencies that are product and 
customer specific and to find patterns that match with this study.
3 Compare established trends with other case studies using the resultant 
model against other similar repair engineering business. This study would 
include businesses that make other repairable structures such as fuel tanks 
for planes, helicopter rotor boxes, field guns, ships, tanks etc and the 
intention is to identify the common issues from a socio-technical system  
design. The researcher would also expand the enabler and inhibitor analysis 
to see if differences in management perception or business structure (not 
team working) generates better performance than that found in this study.
Based on the need to satisfy objective number three, the researcher is already able to 
satisfy the question put forward by Kearney (2002) who claimed that 80% of all total 
quality programmes had not been able to demonstrate any form of statistical 
assessment. The findings from this study can therefore be used to address this position 
in terms of bridging the gap between theory and practice, within this under researched 
and yet critical area of human factors engineering. This is not to suggest self-managed 
team working has reached its natural level o f maturity, or that supervised team 
working lacks the ability to become self-managing, but moreover it is the current lack 
of focus for what is meant by self-management, within the context o f any given socio- 
technical system. For example the corporate strategy for the implementation of TQM 
is based on the principles of new manufacturing where most, if  not all, variation can
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be removed through the application o f Six Sigma and Lean. Whilst the researcher 
promotes the same tools and techniques o f new production, the fact remains that 
human error will always emerge and therefore in practice must require a more 
pragmatic approach in how best to manage the middle ground in terms of open as well 
as closed-loop systems. This was a dichotomy that Seddon (2000) argued against in 
terms of their diametrically opposed position, which he claimed would always fail to 
co-exist.
As a result of the findings from this study in which the ‘middle ground’ is favoured, 
some obvious contradictions, which have led to some undesirable actions cannot be 
ignored, thereby confirming the need for wider schools of human factors research, 
based on the following list o f topics shown below.
1. Studies that measure leadership commitment to self-management for TQM
2. Studies that measure the financial benefits o f self-management & TQM
3. Studies that measure organisational cultures for their compatibility with TQM. 
By researching these types of questions, programmes such as the one presented in this 
study can be used to reinforce a number o f legally required benefits that should also 
encourage good practices in relation to application o f EASA part -145. These actions 
are mutually supportive, for example more information on financial benefits should 
increase leadership commitment to review industry experience in all aspects of 
maintenance, with a view to encouraging or mandating the same type o f scientific 
research. The results could then be extended throughout the entire pic organisation to 
include, Defence, Energy, Marine and Nuclear business groups. In the short term it 
will be necessary for industry to decide how best to standardise, as far as possible, this 
approach, which the researcher has already started to simplify in terms of both macro 
and micro models alike. The presentation o f which included the resultant model from 
a macro perspective followed by a micro visual control system. The combination and 
application of these two systems will help to reduce the problems o f overproduction 
associated with rule-based errors, which are highly important to control and yet 
reasonably easy to resolve.
Following the completion of this thesis, a number o f conferences and publications 
have been targeted for the dissemination o f this work and its findings/new models. 
These include the IOSH Annual Conference (specialist branch and area branch) for
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aviation related safety/quality. The work will also be submitted to conferences in the 
patient safety arena where common management models (Lean and TQM) are being 
implemented. The work will also be submitted for publication in the form of peer- 
reviewed papers at the International Institute o f Risk and Safety Management Journal 
(HSW) and practical journals IOSH (SHP) Safety and Health Practitioner Journal. It is 
also the intention of the researcher to publish a book that promotes the model that has 
resulted from this research.
7.7 Chapter Summary
The findings taken from this study were found to be broadly in line with other similar 
forms of research carried out in the field o f front line operations. While it has 
demonstrated a number of unique areas o f research criteria the root cause of many 
chronic and long-term quality issues were similar to those outside o f the aviation 
industry where commercial pressure is seen as the main limitations in terms o f the 
ability of self-managed teams to facilitate the principles o f TQM. During the creation 
of the earlier chapters the researcher has drawn attention to the importance of 
identifying with the correct selection o f methodological approach that would be best 
placed to measure specific types o f quality /  safety related problems. In other words 
this study has provided a different level o f understanding based on inputs (before the 
event) as oposed to outputs driven research namley (after the event) as an early 
indicator in terms of how people and technology have limited their opportunities to 
co-exist. This was a position that Adam (1993) described as the primary objective of 
human factors in terms of; “knowing what is going on so you can figure out what to 
do”. In light of this statement, there is an overriding legal requirement now in place 
whereby organisations in Europe and the USA must commit to gaining a wider 
understanding of human factors risk, which, prior to the introduction o f EASA in July 
2004, many businesses chose to ignore.
However, this was not the case for this organisation that, in spite of its many 
imperfections, opted for a more pro-active approach, based on guidance taken from 
this study some two years before, during 2002. In many respects this study has 
already benefited from the resultant findings, which has already impacted on large- 
scale change before its completion date. These benefits have arisen in several ways 
and in particular the issue of team control has been addressed at both micro and macro
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levels of change. Firstly recognising that in order to protect the customer it was 
necessary to assist the existing model o f self-management with the reintroduction of 
team leaders whose role and function is to provide the missing link in terms o f support 
to teams at Bristol. In addition, the earlier model highlighting a need to control 
variation was also introduced at three different site locations, system redesigns have 
already been completed based on improving information and physical product flow in 
terms of managing a three tier system namely; strip, kit. & build. In other words major 
change and investment to the existing design & layout o f engine overhaul locations 
has started to take place, they have seen a transformation to what the researcher refers 
to as the ‘middle ground’. These changes have demonstrated deliverable benefits in 
the form of dramatically reduced lead-times within the Fast Jet centre at Ansty where 
order and conformity has also resulted in less system variation, this is now considered 
the norm in terms of a repair & overhaul. Following on from this model, other fast Jet 
support contracts are being won, this includes partnership agreements between 
Defence Aerospace at Bristol and the RAF, also the Royal Navy, to repair and 
overhaul Harrier jump-jet engines. The finicial benefits o f which form a new £198m  
contract to support the aircraft's Pegasus engine over the next ten years. According to 
Group Captain Andy Ebdon;
“This contract to Rolls-Royce for complete through-life support o f Pegasus is a very 
significant achievement. It not only assures affordable engine availability, but also 
incentivises both industry and the MOD to actively work together to improve 
efficiency. The end effect is better value fo r  money and improved support performance 
for the front line ”
Finally the researcher contends that, for those organisations in which human factors 
programmes are not yet discovered it is important to state that good operational 
performance management is wholly dependant on the quality o f socio-technical 
system designs. Only when each business group has engaged with the critical mass o f 
the entire organisation can the real benefits o f TQM begin. The journey is open-ended 
and begins with education as a means o f engendering sustainable change to working, 
both differently and in a more effective way. The consequence o f ignoring this 
position will ultimately lead to an environment o f human fallibility, where imperfect 
conditions, without proper regard for systemic issues, as history has shown, will lead
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to poor customer satisfaction, lack of human factors awareness and ultimately the loss 
of human life.
This concludes the final chapter of this very long and arduous journey from a 
motivated ambition to learn more about human factors engineering to the resultant 
contribution and model that has been generated by this study. It is hoped that this 
doctoral study will be of use to future researchers who seek to make a difference to 
the professional management of ‘non traditional’ operations management businesses. 
The significance of these contributions cannot ever be underestimated in terms o f the 
quality of working life and the protection o f human life.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
National Transportation Safety Board Accident Summaries.
Boeing 737-200, en route from Hilo, to Honolulu, Hawaii, 28 April 1988.
Explosive decompression, loss o f cabin crown, due to undetected cracking.
Aloha Aircraft Accident Report 89/03
Boeing 747-122, en route Los Angeles to Sydney, Australia, 24 February 1989.
Loss of cargo door.
Arcraft Accident Report 90/01
DC-9-33F, Carswell Air Force Base (AFB), Fort Worth, Texas, 18 March 1989.
Loss of control after cargo door opened in flight.
Arcraft Accident Report 90/02
DC-10-10, Sioux Gateway Airport, Iowa, 19 July 1989.
Crash landing after engine burst and loss o f all hydraulics. Undetected rotor crack. 
Arcraft Accident Report 90/06
Embraer 120, near Eagle Lake, Texas, 11 September 1991.
Arcraft broke up after stabiliser leading edge separated in flight.
Arcraft Accident Report 92/04
B747, Narita, Japan, 1 March 1994.
No. 1 pylon failed on landing. Improper maintenance.
Arcraft Accident Report 94/02
Leaijet 35A, Fresno, California, 14 December 1994.
In flight fire due to improper electrical installation.
Arcraft Accident Report 95/04
Douglas DC-9-32, Atlanta International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia, 8 June 1995.
Engine burst due to undetected cracks.
Aircraft Accident Report 96/03
Embraer EMB-120RT, near Carrollton, Georgia, 21 August 1995.
Propeller blade separation due to inadequate maintenance.
Aircraft Accident Report 96/0
Appendix 2
Questionnaire & Administration
Dear Colleague,_
This questionnaire has been designed for use within AR&O to measure the ‘safety health’ of our 
businesses and to highlight potential problem areas within the organisation. The AR&O executive team 
have commissioned this survey as part of our human factors safety campaign, and we are very keen to 
hear your views. Your input will provide useful feedback as to where the problems (if any) lie. The 
results will analysed and the findings will be shared, so that we can start to develop joint solutions.
This questionnaire is anonymous so please answer the following questions as honestly as you can.
To help us gain the most from the results please also complete the following page, which provides 
information on the nature of your job and your experience. If you are in a job where you think you can 
be identified from this data, then just fill in those parts that you are happy with.
Please complete the questionnaires on your own, without discussing your answers with colleagues. It is 
your view and experience, which are important. Please return the completed questionnaire to the 
nominated person within one week o f issue.
The questionnaires will take about 20 minutes to complete.
The results will all be analysed and you will be given feedback on the outcomes.
Thank you for your assistance.
David Price
/
J o b  d e ta ils  
Date
Location:
Your Job: Tick all those which apply 
Description of Job
The number of years you have worked in aviation 
maintenance engineering
The number of years with Rolls-Royce
The number of years in your current job/position, or with 
current responsibilities
The shifts you work:
Permanent days 
Permanent nights 
Rotating shifts
Approx number of hours you work in typical week
<40
40-50
50-60
60-70
i
Please indicate in the appropriate box the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with the following statements '3bC  <Do  <D
£  & CO ca
V
too<
o>
l-H3
Oz
<D
CD
Vh
gps
'tob g
O  as £ S3 
CO T3
Management, works and staff communicate well with each other
Managers always let us know of important safety findings
I am always properly briefed by those giving me a job
Before I start a job I’m always given the necessary information
I am fully aware of the contents o f the Company’s safety policy
I know exactly what I am expected to do and my responsibilities
I know those parts of my job where I can be held accountable
I sometimes think my colleagues are confused over their exact roles and 
responsibilities
There is often confusion between departments over exact roles and 
responsibilities
The procedures we use are accurate & complete
The company provides us with all the information to work effectively
The procedures we use are clear and easy to understand
We can easily identify where procedures have been revised
The procedures we use are practical and easy to understand
The procedures we use always adopt ‘best practice’
We have a good system for reporting problems with SAP maintenance data 
and documentation
We have a good system for fixing problems with SAP maintenance data and 
documentation
We have systems in place to ensure that all the resources specified in the 
procedures are readily available
We often have to rush jobs due to staff shortages
Jobs are often delayed due to vital equipment being missing or in the wrong 
place
I am often not given enough time to do the job
We usually manage to complete a job despite the non-availability o f the 
specified equipment/tools
Jobs are often delayed due to a shortage o f spares
Engines/modules/components are sometimes released even if some work 
can’t be done due to parts shortages
Some deadlines are unrealistic
We often have to rush jobs due to unrealistic deadlines
There was pressure placed upon me to work additional hours when I felt that 
I was not at my best
There were conflicting commercial & safety demands
People who are prepared to cut comers seem to always get promoted
I accept that changes to my job are necessary from time to time
I am always willing to change the way I work to fit in with the Company 
requirements
The training I receive is appropriate for the job I do
Appropriate refresher, or continuation, training is regularly provided
I am confident that I have the necessary experience/qualifications
Please Indicate in the appropriate box the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with the following statements
St
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ng
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I am confident that all my colleagues understand the hazards & risks 
associated with maintaining engines/modules/components
I have a good knowledge of mainteniance rules & procedures
I would be confident flying in an aircraft fitted with engines on which my 
colleagues had worked on after engine/component overhaul
I am confident our managers have the necessary experience/qualifications 
for the work they do
I sometimes go to work when I am ill or feel less than 100%
During the last month I have made an error in my work due to tiredness
During the last month some of my colleagues have made errors in their work 
due to tiredness
I often have to work long hours or a large amount of overtime
My job can sometimes be physically tiring
My working conditions often make it difficult for me to do my work 
properly
Some tools could be better designed
The engines/modules/components could be better designed to allow for 
easier repair and overhaul
Anyone who makes an error deserves to be disciplined
My colleagues fully understand the implications o f their actions on 
airworthiness and aviation safety
All the people I work with are very safety conscious
People don’t care about the job anymore - they just do it for the money
It is the responsibility of the inspector to check that no one has made any 
errors - that’s what he’s paid for
I find my work boring and unsatisfying
It doesn’t really matter if I make the odd mistake as my work is always 
checked
Some procedures are often not fully followed by some people
Some procedures are only there to protect management’s back
The real risks from us making mistakes are quite small
My colleagues often do not follow some procedures
I experience some pressure from my workmates to do things differently to 
the procedures
Management regularly demonstrate their strong commitment to safety
All my colleagues think management are strongly committed to safety
We never see anyone in management where I work
The management have no idea of what really goes on
Management are happv to discuss any of our concerns
My immediate boss sometimes pressures me not to follow maintenance 
procedures
My immediate boss would approve of my actions if I did not follow  
procedures in order to get an engine/module/component away
